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ABSTRACT 
The informal economy represents two-thirds of worldwide employment (OECD 2009) 
and contributes more than 40% of global GDP (Schneider et al. 2010). It is an especially 
significant feature of urban labour markets in the Global South, having been a persistent 
phenomenon in all regions, and expanding in the wake of economic growth in Latin America 
and Asia in recent decades (OECD 2009). Governmental policies toward the informal economy 
have taken various forms based on several theoretical approaches (Chen et al. 2001, WIEGO 
2014). These range from repressive policies that perceive informal entrepreneurship as a drag on 
economic growth and poverty reduction, to those promoting their legalisation to foster 
economic development and others encouraging informal workers’ organisation to resist 
capitalist forms of exploitation. More recently, strongly supportive municipal initiatives have 
been put in place to increase informal productivity.  
 
This study aims to understand the rationality behind, and the impact and limitations of 
this emerging supportive policy approach aimed at improving the livelihoods of informal 
entrepreneurs. It analyses these practices using a mixed-methods approach (ethnography 
complemented with statistical analysis), on the basis of primary data drawn from 97 face-to-face 
interviews and focus group discussions, together with a randomised questionnaire survey of 906 
workers conducted with the collaboration of a team of field assistants across three informal sub-
sectors in Santiago de Chile: waste-pickers, street vendors and home-based enterprises. In light 
of the evidence, I argue that granting informal entrepreneurs the right to succeed through 
municipal support effectively promotes the social and economic inclusion of vulnerable 
populations. Municipal policy support, in the form of training, capitalisation, access to markets 
and organisation, can be key to speeding up the growth of enterprises otherwise condemned to 
stagnation or limited expansion. As part and parcel of this argument, I contend that supporting 
informal entrepreneurs is vital in a situation in which informal entrepreneurship typically 
becomes a ‘one way street’ in the absence of decent employment alternatives in the lower tiers 
of the formal economy.  
 
My thesis also suggests that understanding formal-informal linkages can benefit from a 
selective amalgamation of divergent theoretical approaches, as these two markets operate both 
in integration (as per structuralist and legalist perspectives), a structure commonly described as 
exploitative, and separately in a parallel network of informal enterprises (as per dualist 
perspectives), described as a fairer alternative for informal enterprises to trade products. In light 
of my findings, I offer concrete suggestions for further improving the nature of municipal 
policies and the necessity for higher-level supportive approaches to fully unlock the informal 
economy’s potential. 
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CHAPTER 1 : INFORMALITY IN THE SOUTH – CONCEPTS AND 
ISSUES 
 
INTRODUCTION: MOTIVATION 
 
Why should we care about the informal economy?  
 
Since 1970, the informal economy has been an important subject of development re-
search and practice. Several theories have been advanced and a wide diversity of policies has 
been implemented around the globe to tackle informality. Forty years later, with a global GDP 
that has multiplied more than twenty times over and poverty rates being reduced to less than one 
quarter of the world population (Roser 2016), it seems pertinent to ask whether or not we should 
still care about the informal economy. The short answer is yes: in Chile and Latin America, just 
as in most developing countries and regions, the informal economy plays a significant role in 
the generation of wealth, as well as providing a huge source of employment for the most vulner-
able members of society (ILO 2002a; Perry et al. 2007). The informal economy is far from mar-
ginal,constituting an average of 41% of total national GDP in Latin American countries 
(Schneider et al. 2010, p.31; see also Thomas 1992, 1995). Despite Chile’s steady economic 
growth, studies have shown that the informal economy still accounts for between 20% and 32% 
of its GDP (Schneider 2010, p.19; Vuletin 2008, p.27). Unsurprisingly, the informal economy 
provides a significant amount of employment, and this is particularly true in developing coun-
tries for people coming from poor families, lacking formal education and with low employabil-
ity potential in the formal sector (Chen et al. 2016; UN-ECOSOC 2006). This part of the popu-
lation plays a significant role in my study, and throughout the thesis I will refer to them as ‘vul-
nerable populations’. 
 
According to OECD data, over two billion people are in informal work worldwide, and 
of this number, 900 million informal workers have non-agricultural employment. In Latin 
America and Chile, 51% and 36.8% of all non-agricultural employment is in the informal econ-
omy respectively (Chen et al. 2016; OECD 2009a, p.1). Furthermore, contrary to earlier predic-
tions, the informal economy is not contracting in size, and has even expanded in some regions 
of the world – such as Latin America (Chen 2001; ILO 2013a). The informal economy is here to 
stay, and will thus continue to contribute significantly to the GDP of developing countries, gen-
erating the largest share of employment around the globe, mostly amongst the poor. 
 
 What have been the main policy approaches to the informal economy? 
 
Despite policy attempts to reduce the size of the informal economy, through methods 
such as fostering formal employment generation, repressing informal activities, or providing the 
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facilities to integrate into the formal economy, the informal economy has remained. The infor-
mal economy is commonly described as having low productivity, low wages and poor working 
conditions (such as an unsafe work environment, long working hours, a lack of stability and 
inability to provide basic social protections), and thus perpetuating the poverty cycle (UN-
ECOSOC 2006). This has led to several policy approaches that aim to make the informal econ-
omy disappear. Several academics and international institutions (OECD 2009a; World Bank 
2007) consider the informal economy to be impeding growth and hindering the creation of de-
cent work, and thus advocate its elimination through a combination of economic growth and 
repressive policies (Maloney 2004; Perry et al. 2007). In turn, Marxian scholars concerned 
about working conditions argue that the informal economy is the result of advanced capitalism 
and global competition, which lead to production being subcontracted to informal enterprises as 
a means of avoiding tax and social security payments. As a consequence, workers’ conditions 
degrade, which has led to calls for the extension of social protection policies and, ultimately, the 
elimination of the informal economy entirely (Centeno & Portes 2006). Last but not least, ne-
oliberals see the capacity for enterprises in the informal economy to be a source of poverty alle-
viation, but only if they formalise. Consequently, neoliberals promote the legalisation of the in-
formal economy through a significant reduction of barriers of entry into formal markets. 
 
These different policy approaches have not led to a significant reduction of the informal 
economy over 45 years (Fajnzylber et al. 2010), suggesting flaws in both our conceptual 
frameworks and policy initiatives. 
 
Why concern ourselves with municipal policies aimed at the informal economy? 
 
 Local goverments are key players in both implementing national policy and generating 
local regulations that affect the economic and social outcomes of the urban informal economy 
(Amis 2004, p.146; Portes et al. 1989, p.307). Even when policies are designed at the national 
level, implementation generally occurs at the local level. First, police and inspectors who im-
plement and monitor everyday policy are commonly coordinated at the local level, by municipal 
or regional agencies, so the effectiveness of their control depends on the local capabilities in 
specific cities of the developing world. Second, the administration of public space, where a 
great deal of informal activity occurs (Chen et al. 2016), is carried out at the municipal level. 
Third, in the use of private land, local regulation and microenterprise permits are handled local-
ly.  
 
 The local context itself is also a generator of public policies which affect informal activ-
ities. Municipalities have considerable powers of regulation which can hinder or aid informal 
entrepreneurs, being responsive to local needs and realities. For example, locally designed land 
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use regulation can affect home-based informal activities, and local directives can influence 
waste collection schedules, thus affecting informal garbage collectors. Moreover, local govern-
ments have investment power that can directly or indirectly have an impact on informal activi-
ties, for example investment in street infrastructure and the provision of stall space (de Soto 
1989; Dobson et al. 2009; Lindel & Appelblad 2009). On this note, two key books on the urban 
informal debate by Alejandro Portes et al. (1989) and Hernando de Soto (1989), as well as sev-
eral studies (Meagher 2010; Kinyanjui 2014; Sassen 1989; Strassmann 1987), use evidence at a 
city level to support their findings. Local government intervention has thus been perceived as a 
crucial step for policy analysis and incorporation for the informal economy. Moreover, in the 
context of a rapidly urbanising developing world, these local goverment roles are likely to be-
come even more crucial in affecting the success of informal enterprises (Chen et al. 2016). 
 
What is currently happening with municipal policies? 
 
Supportive policies have become more commonplace in recent years, with several stud-
ies reporting that NGOs, as well as local and regional governments, have started implementing 
and recommending a supportive policy approach towards informal activities (Allen et al. 2006; 
Dobson et al. 2009; FAO 2003; 2007; Fergutz et al. 2011; Navarrete 2010; Ostrom 1996). Of 
note, these have gained popularity among local authorities in Latin America and Asia (Medeiros 
& Macêdo 2006; Otero 1994). Among these policies, measures that improve infrastructure, 
capitalisation, organisation and training of informal enterprises and workers are common. These 
are being implemented across various informal subsectors, but without the existence of a fully 
developed theoretical framework.  
   
While various municipal policy strategies of active public support of the informal econ-
omy have been implemented, there is little clarity about their motivation and rationale, design 
process and effectiveness. Developing a comprehesive supportive theoretical framework would 
require several components of understanding that are currently lacking. First, the rationale be-
hind supportive policy design and its expected impacts remains under-studied. Second, there is 
no real clarity about the effectiveness of these sets of policies once implemented, nor about 
whether or not they are a sensible investment of the scarce public resources available. Third, 
there are no studies that help us to understand the limitations of supportive policy interventions. 
Finally, there are no studies that allow us to understand if supportive policies have a common 
understanding and applicability across different sectors. This PhD thesis aims to contribute to 
scholarly understanding of these four gaps in research. 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
Despite the vast amount of academic literature on the IE, supportive approaches still 
remain a crucially understudied policy approach. An increasing number of supportive policy 
actions exist across informal sectors, yet there remains a lack of academic research and limited 
conceptualizations of these municipal actions, revealing a disjunction between research and pol-
icy agendas. This research project thus aims to bridge this research/policy divide by answering 
the following main research question: 
 
What is the rationality behind, and the impact and limitations of an emerging supportive 
policy approach aimed at improving the livelihoods of informal entrepreneurs? 
 
I focus on informal entrepreneurs specifically (rather than all informal workers) since 
the number of informal self-employed worldwide represents a larger share than those earning 
wages in informal employment (Chen et al. 2016), thus placing informal entrepreneurship at the 
centre of development policy discussion. I answer this main research question by addressing 
four specific/operational research questions: 
 
1) To what extent do theories of the informal economy accurately describe the on-the-
ground everyday experience of informal entrepreneurs in Santiago de Chile? Here, the focus is 
on understanding informality from a multi-perspective or integrated view that allows us to ac-
count for informality in all its complexity. 
2) Why are municipalities supporting the IE and what are the common discourses ar-
ticulated to do so? Here, I aim to contribute to the construction of a solid theoretical framework 
through which we can understand municipal support policies, based on current common politi-
cal reasoning and practice. 
3) To what extent do municipal support measures achieve their expected impact? and; 
Among the diversity of policies implemented, which supportive policies are more likely to 
work? These questions focus on explaining the rationale behind different policies that affect the 
performance of the IE within and across informal sub-sectors, and evaluating their impacts. 
4) To what extent do supportive municipal policies face barriers to enhancing the liveli-
hoods of those in the IE? This point refers to the analysis of structural limits to policy impacts 
and the exploration of possible solutions. 
 
CONCEPTIONS AND POLICY APPROACHES TOWARDS THE INFORMAL 
ECONOMY 
 
Academic conceptions of informal economic activities and their related policies have 
traditionally been based on four approaches (Chen et al. 2004)
1
. The first is the ‘dualist ap-
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proach’, which contends that informal activities are a means of last resort or a marginal survival 
activity, emerging from a lack of growth and availability of modern employment in developing 
world cities (Boeke 1942; Harris & Todaro 1970; Lewis 1954; Sethuraman 1976). Under this 
rubric, urban informality is essentially counter-cyclical to economic growth: it expands in times 
of crisis as the need for survival-based activities increases. Dualist conceptions of the informal 
economy also advocate for policies that promote the expansion of the formal economy and the 
repression of informal activities. 
 
A second approach is the ‘structuralist’ or ‘neo-Marxian’ approach, which conceives in-
formality as an integral part of the capitalist system, being connected to the formal economy 
through the backward and forward linkages of supply and distribution of formal products. In-
formality allows for the exploitation of labour as large enterprises are able to fix prices, product 
standards and conditions of payments for small informal enterprises, and also by subcontracting, 
thus removing their responsibility over labour stability and social benefit provision. Regarding 
policy recommendations, structuralists propose fostering the welfare state, as well as reinforcing 
informal workers’ associations to increase their bargaining power and avoid capitalist exploita-
tion (Portes 1988; Portes et al. 1989; Thomas 1995). 
 
The third approach is the ‘legalist’ or ‘neoliberal’ approach whereby informality is seen 
to reflect the micro-entrepreneurial spirit of vulnerable populations. From this perspective, per-
vasive government market intervention favours inefficient formal activities while excluding 
competitive informal activities from market opportunities (de Soto 1989). These informal busi-
nesses will persistently yield low productivity so long as rules and regulations alter natural free 
market equilibriums. Regarding policy implications, neoliberals promote the legalisation of in-
formal enterprises by reducing barriers to formalisation – in other words, through deregulation 
of the formal economy. In this context, there is no substantial role played by local and national 
governments. 
 
The fourth approach to the informal economy is the ‘voluntarist’ school. As its name 
suggests, it proposes that the informal economy is a voluntary choice arrived at after a careful 
cost-benefit analysis of the monetary and non-monetary utility obtained through informal activi-
ties when compared with formal employment (Maloney 2004). Informality is the preferred op-
tion for some low-skilled workers, although it has low potential for growth as it is under-
capitalised and characterised by low productivity, and thus preserves conditions of poverty 
(Maloney 2004; Perry et al. 2007). Therefore, voluntarists arrive at a similar conclusion as dual-
ists, although through a different reasoning. As a consequence, they advocate for similar policies 
to dualists, describing a ‘carrot-and-stick’ set of policies: the ‘stick’ refers to the repression of 
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the informal economy, while ‘carrot’ policies are put in place to stimulate growth in formal em-
ployment (Perry et al. 2007, p.10). 
 
These different theories, concepts and policy recommendations have travelled through-
out space and time, through both the developed and developing world, mainly promoted by the 
work of international organisations such as the ILO and the World Bank. Over time, these or-
ganisations have also advocated different waves of policy in keeping with evolving informal 
economy discourse. These discourses have then intersected with local understanding and prac-
tices in the informal economy, resulting in a time-space specific geography of local policy. 
 
The policies of international organisations and their dualist origins (1950s-70s) 
 
 Drawing on Boeke (1942), Harris and Todaro (1970) and Lewis’ (1954) conceptualisa-
tions of informality from a dualist perspective, several international organisations recognised the 
potential utility of a conceptual framework to understand the origins of informality and begin 
policy development towards the UIE (Bangesser 2000; Guha-Khasnobis et al. 2006). In the 
1950s and 1960s, for international agencies such as UNDP, ILO and UNIDO, the informal 
economy was the result of a ‘modern job gap’: in developing countries, the rate of ‘modern’ 
employment creation was lower than employment demand, thus pushing people to keep them-
selves ‘economically busy’ whilst ‘waiting for a formal job’ (Bangasser 2000, p.4). A centrally 
planned economy that would carefully manage the national economy, take control of basic in-
dustry and invest in infrastructure was necessary to accelerate the creation of modern jobs and 
facilitate the transition of workers from informal activities into formal employment (ibid., pp.3-
4). In this context, the ILO perceived the informal economy as a short term ‘safety net’ for peo-
ple that would otherwise be unemployed, while in the long run, ‘the formal sector would absorb 
them’. 
 
 In the 1970s, within the context of lower rates of economic growth and large-scale ru-
ral-to-urban migration, the creation of ‘modern’ jobs in the formal economy was unable to keep 
pace with the increased demand, leading to massive unemployment in developing world cities 
(Biles 2009, p.222; see also Bangesser 2000). In response, the ILO established the World Em-
ployment Programme in 1969, refocusing resources on re-analysing employment dynamics in 
developing countries, rather than intervening directly with remedial measures. In 1972, the ILO 
considered the informal economy as a type of self-employment that generates informal income 
(see also Hart 1973). Later, economists based in the ILO described the informal sector as being 
comprised of small-scale enterprises with low productivity and low income generation, unable 
to sustain significant economic development or to act as a long-run safeguard from unemploy-
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ment (Hart 2006). Although the ILO never explicitly called for repression of the UIE, their ar-
guments fuelled a more hostile attitude towards it in reaction to its persistence and its associa-
tion with a lack of development (Bangesser 2000, p.4). From the perspective of international 
organisations at the time, any tolerance of informal activity should fall within the context of so-
cial, rather than economic policy. 
 
A shift towards legalist policies with structuralist influences (late 1980s-90s) 
 
Changes in world policies during the 1980s from a (Keynesian) state-led national econ-
omy to a (neoliberal) market-led economy, promoted by international organisations such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were paralleled by a change in these 
institutions’ points of view and policy suggestions regarding the Urban Informal Economy 
(UIE). The overarching vision that a free market is the engine of growth reinforces the position 
of the UIE as an example of an unregulated and competitive market. De Soto’s book ‘El Otro 
Sendero’ [The Other Path] (1986) provided an ideal theoretical framework to support a project 
of massive deregulation and reduction of state power. Suddenly, the UIE was supported by insti-
tutions, such as the World Bank, that claimed the failure of the state and advocated for the de-
regulation of all markets and the inclusion of informal entrepreneurs in the market economy 
(Hart 2006). The World Bank launched several initiatives, entitled ‘Doing Business’, to collect 
data on the costs of registering firms in a large range of developing countries. This confirmed de 
Soto’s original claims regarding the prohibitive time and monetary costs of formalising in de-
veloping countries (Fajnzylber et al. 2010, p.262). This evidence was then used by the World 
Bank to promote deregulation, legalisation and reduction in the costs of registering a firm. 
 
‘The Dilemma of the Informal Sector’, an international conference held in 1991, 
marked a definitive break for the ILO with dualist conceptions and practices, recognising that 
‘the informal sector is not going to disappear spontaneously with economic growth’ as no signif-
icant reduction in informality had occurred (ILO 1991, p.63). Moreover, for the very the first 
time, the UIE was addressed as the primary subject of a major ILO international conference ra-
ther than an appendix, and informal workers were invited to be part of the discussion. Later, the 
ILO's 2002 report on ‘Decent Work and the Informal Economy’ made a significant acknowl-
edgment of neoliberal policies as the most appropriate strategies to deal with informality. First, 
following de Soto’s (1989) argument, the ILO stated that the root of informality is ‘the legal and 
institutional obstacles that make it difficult, if not impossible, for either enterprises or workers 
to become or stay formal’ and that it is the national government that ‘directly or indirectly con-
strain(s) employment creation in the formal economy’ (ILO 2002a, p.5). Moreover, the ILO rec-
ognised ‘the right to work’ as fundamental, independent of the work done, strongly backing up 
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the legitimacy of informal work. The report went further to advocate neoliberal policies of re-
ducing the cost and complexity of legalisation (that is to say, deregulation), guaranteeing prop-
erty rights over informal assets and reducing harassment. However, the ILO (1991; 2002) also 
reasserted some of the structuralist concepts developed in the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s, for example stating that the UIE should not be promoted as a low-cost means of produc-
ing employment. It recognised in the UIE significant deficits in providing decent work condi-
tions, such as job stability, decent wages, employment security (in terms of workers’ benefits) or 
a representative voice for informal workers. Additionally, contrary to the World Bank, the ILO 
advocated for a safety net of social services and investments in the working force. Finally, in the 
ILO’s combined neoliberal-structuralist vision, with the gradual move of informal workers to-
wards the formal economy, it was envisaged that workplace laws and social services could be 
applied to all workers, resulting in an overall increase in the amount of ‘decent work’. 
 
A new voluntarist perspective on old dualist policies (2000s) 
 
 Policies of legalisation, recognition of property rights and reduction of barriers of entry 
into the formal economy were extensively applied in the 1990s, and contrary to their intent, this 
seemed to boost the growth of the UIE on the whole (ILO 2002a; Perry et al. 2007). After the 
perceived failure of neoliberal strategies to integrate the informal economy into the free market, 
the 2000s saw the World Bank revert to more traditional policies of fostering growth in the for-
mal economy and repressing the informal economy. Based on Hirschman’s (1970) theory and 
Maloney’s (2004) further development, the World Bank introduced an ‘informal exit theory’ 
(Perry et al. 2007). This new approach was fundamentally based on voluntarist principles that 
informal work is considered to be a rational choice. Nevertheless, rather than analysing the role 
that neoliberal reforms may have played in growth in the informal sector, the World Bank chose 
to directly blame the states in question. In their view, the main reason behind an increasing ‘exit’ 
towards informality was that ‘workers, firms and families, dissatisfied with the performance of 
the state or simply not finding any benefit to interact with it, opt for informality’ (Perry et al. 
2007, p.xi). In line with voluntarists, the report claimed that in states with limited power of law 
enforcement, small businesses can opt to exist outside of legal regulations and workers can opt 
for informal jobs to avoid payment of social protection. Beyond this, the World Bank’s report 
added that large enterprises take advantage of the state’s failure to detect underreporting of op-
erations, workers and profits. As formal businesses start to exploit this by employing workers 
‘unofficially’, informality then begins to encroach on the formal sector. The World Bank here 
lost its faith in the UIE, since this sector was no longer perceived as a source of poverty allevia-
tion, but rather a drag on economic growth. 
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 Following this change in perception, the World Bank introduced an updated dualist pol-
icy recommendation. Advocating the aforementioned two-fold carrot-and-stick policy, they at-
tempted to shift the cost-benefit analysis of working within the informal versus formal sector, 
leading to a move towards formal institutions. Their ‘carrot’ policies consisted of traditional 
pro-growth policy recommendations: promoting job provision within high-productivity large 
formal enterprises; enhancing levels of human capital; and labour market reforms of deregula-
tion and decreasing trade union power. The ‘stick’ policies were largely based on law enforce-
ment, harassment and reduction of access to social protection aimed at increasing the cost of 
remaining in the informal economy. 
 
An ‘outlier’ or a new generation of policies? (2000s) 
 
 In contrast to the growing trend of voluntarist policy recommendations coming from 
international organisations, notably the World Bank, during the 2000s the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO) started to promote ‘supportive policies’ towards the informal sector (FAO 
2007). According to the FAO, informal activities play a positive social and economic role, with 
negative externalities potentially being alleviated through supportive policy interventions. The 
Informal Food Sector (IFS) makes a significant contribution to social objectives, through im-
proving food security, increasing market coverage in more isolated (rural or peri-urban) areas, 
improving the proximity of products to consumers and providing food in small quantities at 
convenient prices (FAO 2007, pp.1-2). Furthermore, the IFS provides a substantial source of 
employment, and thus a means of income for the urban poor, not to mention constituting a posi-
tive contribution to economic growth in developing countries (ILO 2002a, p.24; Simon 2003; 
Yasameen 2001). Supportive policies could solve identified negative externalities such as health 
risks (e.g. unhygienic ingredients or risks associated with handling and poor conservation) or 
urban and environmental decline (e.g. strained infrastructure or increased congestion) (FAO 
1996; 2003, p.v). These recommended policies included the establishment of food quality and 
hygiene standards, direct supply of infrastructure, equipment and services, and improved access 
to credit. 
 The FAO suggests that supportive policies should be implemented at the municipal gov-
ernment level. They argue that, at the local level, ‘needs and constraints could be integrated into 
urban planning and (the IFS’) knowledge and ability in business management strengthened’ 
(FAO 2007, p.6). Indeed, a large number of municipal support policies, based on FAO recom-
mendations, have been implemented in cities around the developing world. Examples include 
Quito (Ecuador), where infrastructure and training have been provided to increase food safety; 
Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), where local authorities have worked in tandem with street vendors to 
construct a street market in the city centre, as well as organising a better waste management sys-
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tem; Dakar (Senegal), where a partnership between street vendors, the municipality and a local 
university assessed common problems of food safety, then putting appropriate hygiene practices 
in place; and Makati (Philippines), where, in order to promote alternative sources of income, the 
municipality supported the access of micro-enterprises to municipal funds (FAO 2003; 2007). 
  
Local policies: The crossroads of international discourse and local practice 
 
 Dualist, neoliberal, structuralist, voluntarist and supportive policies, promoted at differ-
ent times amongst various waves of international policies, have not been implemented at the 
local level in a clear-cut manner but rather tend to be applied in combination, differing from 
sector to sector, in time and in place. De Soto (1989) explains how, in Lima (Peru) in the 1970s, 
the informal transport system was strongly repressed (some transport routes were banned for 
informal vehicles and all types of tax exceptions were removed) while street vendors were toler-
ated (central areas were declared ‘free zones’ for street vending trade), exemplifying a discrep-
ancy in policy between sectors. Moreover, he describes how policies towards these street ven-
dors have changed over time, passing from periods of strong repression to periods of tolerance 
and of support. (see also Dobson et al. 2009; Kinyanjui 2014, pp.21-30; Skinner 2008 for simi-
lar examples in Durban, South Africa and Nairobi, Kenya). A variation in policy between differ-
ent locations can be observed during the first half of the 2000s: in South Africa, Durban’s street 
vendors were strongly supported, while the Zabaleen waste-pickers of Cairo were strongly re-
pressed and displaced by the municipality (Dobson et al. 2009; Salah-Fahmi 2005). Moreover, 
local policies can differ even within the same region. As my own study of waste-pickers demon-
strates, in 2010, waste-pickers were repressed, tolerated and supported by different municipali-
ties within the conurbation of Santiago de Chile alone (see Navarrete 2010). 
 
 From the existing literature, it appears that the policies most commonly applied at the 
local level are dualist and neoliberal. With dualist policies, the focus is on the elimination of the 
informal economy, achieved through restriction of working hours, confiscation of products or 
working capital, severe policing measures, bans over working areas, and clean-up operations 
(Bromley 2000; de Soto 1989; Navarrete 2010; Söderbaum 2006). In contrast, neoliberal poli-
cies emerge as a result of a more collaborative process of interaction between local government 
and informal entrepreneurs, resulting in a tolerance of informal activities that can include the 
payment of a local tax for the right to work for a period of time (Cross 1998; de Soto 1989). In 
this case, the local government turns a blind eye to the informal economy, allowing it to operate 
with minimal policing and no confiscation of products or capital. 
 
 Few local initiatives have attempted to organise the informal economy in a manner pro-
posed by structuralist policies. My previous study of waste-pickers in Santiago de Chile (Navar-
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rete 2010) describes how the municipality of Cerrillos attempted to organise these workers, ini-
tially making contact with them in street markets, then supporting their legal constitution as an 
organisation and coordinating recycling operatives. The aim of this type of local government 
intervention is to facilitate the regulation of informal activity and provide a certain extent of so-
cial services. What has proved to be more common, however, has been the emergence of infor-
mal workers’ unions established by their own members, with the aim of defending or campaign-
ing for particular rights (Harrison & McVey 1997; Kinyanjui 2014). 
 
 In recent years, local governments have started to take a more positive and supportive 
approach (Dobson et al. 2009; FAO 2007; Fergutz et al. 2011; Kigochie 2001; MMA 2013). In 
these cases, local governments can take direct supportive action or foster the intervention of 
NGOs that aim to enhance the productivity and/or the social conditions of informal entrepre-
neurs (Fergutz et al. 2011; Portes et al. 1989, pp.305-307). Local governments have started to 
strongly invest in organisational assistance, financial support and civic education as means of 
helping various informal entrepreneurs in countries such as India (Chaturvedi 1998), Costa Rica 
(CYMA 2008), Argentina (Schamber & Suarez 2007) and Brazil (Medeiros & Macêdo 2006). 
These experiences have occurred mostly as isolated cases with limited involvement of interna-
tional organisations, emerging more as part of a process of local interaction, understanding and 
negotiation between local governments and informal organisations. Contrary to other schools of 
thought on policy recommendations, these local support policies could suggest that there is a 
significant role for local governments to play in enhancing the livelihoods of those in the infor-
mal economy. 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
Case study: Santiago de Chile  
 
As mentioned previously, my research focuses on informal entrepreneurs in Santiago de 
Chile (for a discussion about the administrative structure of Santiago de Chile, see Annex 1). 
There are three reasons for selecting Santiago as the focus of research. First, since one of the 
objectives of this study is to evaluate the impact of supportive municipal policy approaches on 
informal entrepreneurs’ livelihoods, I wish to analyse the success or failure of policies that have 
actually been implemented. This contrasts with most literature, which has focused on the ca-
pacity of states to implement policies prior to doing so. To undertake this successfully, it will be 
necessary to study entrepreneurs inside a well-functioning state, to help control for state failure. 
Chile satisfies this condition: the World Bank states that, when compared with other developing 
countries, Chile has a high capacity for ‘quality of policy formulation and implementation’ and 
furthermore, citizens and the state respect institutions, reducing two major sources of distortion 
– governmental ineffectiveness and unchecked corruption (Kaufmann et al. 2010, p.4; World 
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Bank 2015). Second, as Chile’s largest city, Santiago de Chile has an informal economy of sig-
nificant size both in terms of GDP ratio and employment generation. In Chile, the informal 
economy accounts for 32% of the national GDP (Vuletin 2008, p.27) and provides 36.8% of 
non-agricultural employment (Charmes 2009, p.36; OECD 2009a, p.2). While several develop-
ing countries classify as possible candidates under this criterion (see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2), 
few satisfy the requirement of having a well-functioning public sector. Third, examining a di-
verse range of informal sub-sectors will allow me to overcome the limitations of studying a sin-
gle sub-sector of the UIE or studying the UIE at an aggregated level. This is due to informal 
sub-sectors varying substantially in their structure, size, cyclicality and connection to the formal 
economy. Furthermore, studying the UIE at an aggregated level will not provide the required 
deep understanding of the diversity of municipal policy approaches, designs and impacts. Santi-
ago de Chile provides a large diversity of informal sub-sectors (e.g. home-based enterprises, 
street performers, informal parking services, street markets, ambulant vending, waste-pickers). 
Therefore, by addressing my research question across the diversity of the informal economy in 
this specific urban context, I can perhaps better understand which impacts of municipal policies 
are common across multiple sectors and which are sector-specific. 
 
This study uses an ‘industry by industry’ approach to understanding the impact of sup-
portive policies. According to Skinner (2008, p.236), each informal activity has its own particu-
lar dynamic and logic, and it can be as diverse as the formal economy. Consequently, my study 
explores the impact of local policies in three informal economy sub-sectors: waste-picking, 
street vending and home-based enterprises. These particular sub-sectors have been selected first-
ly due to their permanence over time and significant size: all of these sectors have existed for at 
least thirty-five years in Chile, and together provide more than 15% of the total employment in 
the Santiago conurbation (INE 2015). 
 
Mixed methods: A qualitative-quantitative approach 
 
My research uses an Exploratory Sequential Design (ESD) strategy, consisting first of 
implementing a qualitative method (the ‘primary’ method), and then using quantitative methods 
to test consistency and generalise qualitative findings. The qualitative research is used to ex-
plore two topics: first, understanding each informal activity by investigating motivations behind 
informal entrepreneurship, the economic rationale of working in each informal sub-sector and 
any social issues underpinning the activity; and second, exploring the motivations and rationale 
of supportive policies applied to each informal economic activity and the impacts of these poli-
cies, as well as their potential limitations. Once a clear picture of informal sub-sectors and the 
mechanisms at work behind policy impacts have been established, quantitative research is then 
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used to measure the impact of different policy approaches and evaluate the effectiveness of par-
ticular policies applied. 
 
For the qualitative component, thematic analysis is used to study data collected from 
ninety-two participants. Individual and group interview samples in each sector have been pur-
posively selected, following a criterion sampling strategy to reflect as best as possible the diver-
sity of municipal policy approaches. Thematic analysis is carried out using a hybrid approach of 
first a deductive and then an inductive analysis (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane 2006). The resulting 
hybrid codebook captures the full richness of the data, allowing for a sound understanding of 
the studied phenomenon (Boyatzis 1998). 
 
For the quantitative analysis, descriptive statistics and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
methods are used to analyse primary and secondary data
2
. I have incorporated quantitative data 
to obtain a deep insight into the generalisability or effectiveness of implemented policies. For 
two of the sub-sectors, home-based enterprises and street vendors, a representative survey using 
a stratified random sampling strategy was undertaken to collect empirical data, which is used to 
test the veracity and relevance of qualitative findings. In the case of waste-pickers, the lack of a 
sampling frame prevented me from carrying out a city-wide randomised survey, and so a census 
of four waste-picker cooperatives was carried out as a ‘second-best’ alternative.  
 
In order to analyse the policy impacts, OLS regression modelling is used to identify the 
impacts of specific municipal policies over indicators of economic and social performance and 
negative externalities for each informal sub-sector, built from the qualitative analysis. The quan-
titative analysis in this stage mainly serves to test associations among variables, functioning as a 
complement to the qualitative analysis. A detailed description of the methods is provided in 
Chapter 3. 
 
ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS  
 
In this chapter, I have sketched out the underlying foundations for this study, explaining 
the motivations behind this particular research and the relevance of the city of Santiago de 
Chile, as well as illustrating the strengths of the analytical tools used. 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis begins by providing a detailed look at the theoretical debate be-
hind public sector conceptions and policymaking regarding the informal economy for more than 
forty years, and its intersection with the promotion of the decent work agenda. Following a dis-
cussion of the four main schools of thought presented above, the chapter then analyses the 
emergence of a supportive policy approach for three informal sub-sectors covered in this study. I 
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outline how the public sector understanding of the UIE varies between these three sub-sectors, 
with policies ranging from repressive through to supportive, and the ways that this reflects the 
different theoretical conceptions of the UIE. 
 
The subsequent chapter (Chapter 3) assesses and describes the methodological choices 
behind exploring supportive local policy towards the UIE in Santiago de Chile. I contextualise 
the study based on the current labour market conditions of Santiago, in particular the effects of 
radical flexibilisation reforms of labour markets. A detailed explanation for choosing Greater 
Santiago as a case study is provided, as is the rationale behind the selection of the three informal 
sectors. Next, I present the reasoning behind the selection of a mixed method strategy, or more 
specifically an exploratory sequential design, with a discussion of the emphasis on qualitative 
over quantitative findings. Finally, the qualitative and quantitative data sources, sampling strate-
gies, data analysis and the associated interpretation of results are explained in detail. 
 
Chapter 4 is the first case study chapter, and explores the role that municipalities in San-
tiago de Chile play in affecting the outcomes of waste-picking activities. It begins by introduc-
ing waste-pickers and analysing reasons for entering and remaining in the activity. There is also 
a particular focus on the connections between waste-picking and the formal economy through 
various types of networks. Following this, the rationality behind municipal support for waste-
pickers is analysed, and the different measures introduced by supportive municipalities are 
evaluated. The chapter concludes by analysing the limitations of supportive policies in enhanc-
ing waste-pickers’ productivity gains. A similar framework follows for Chapters 5 and 6, which 
provide the case studies for street vendors and home-based enterprises respectively. 
 
In Chapter 7, I summarise the findings of the study regarding the role of municipal poli-
cies in supporting the informal economy. Here, I discuss commonalities between sub-sectors 
and supportive policies, contrasting these results with existing conceptual frameworks. I focus 
on the motivations for working in the UIE when work quality at the low end of the formal econ-
omy is so poor, and the essentially exploitative links between informal and formal enterprises. I 
further analyse the common rationalities behind the emergence of supportive municipal policies 
in the different sub-sectors, as well as their sector-specific implementation, concluding that their 
effects are overwhelmingly positive for supporting growth in enterprises of the poor. The final 
section focuses on the common structural limitations of supportive policies, and potential ways 
to overcome these issues. 
 
Chapter 8 provides a summary of the policy implications of this study, ultimately pro-
posing a shift in focus towards quality of work rather than legality. I advocate for qualitative and 
quantitative studies that account for the variegated geography of informality and work quality at 
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the bottom of the labour market. The main policy recommendation of this study is to foster the 
favourable incorporation of informal entrepreneurs by increasing formal work quality for vul-
nerable populations, and to promote informal entrepreneurs’ right to succeed through a holistic 
support network that increases skills, capitalisation, market access and organisation. 
 
 
Notes to Chapter One 
 
1. These four policy approaches will be analysed in depth in the literature review in Chapter Two  
2. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is a statistical method used for the estimation of unknown 
parameters of linear or non-linear regressions. In turn, these parameters describe the relationship 
between two variables as we control for other sets of observable variables. In practical terms, the 
OLS method fits a model or line that tries to describe as close as possible the relationship 
between two or more variables, i.e. a ‘best-fit’ model. The goal of using OLS multiple linear 
regressions is to estimate the impact of specific local policies on the informal economy, when 
controlling for other observable variables such as gender, income or experience of informal 
workers. Although this technique cannot control for other non-observable variables, or omitted 
variables that could affect the municipal policy of interest, it still provides a strong complement 
to strengthen the credibility of qualitative findings.    
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
DIFFICULTIES IN DEFINING THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
 
Settling on a definition of the UIE has created a field of intense debate where little 
agreement exists (Guha-Khasnobis et al. 2006). Most scholars and international organisations, 
however, subscribe to a broad definition which comprises ‘economic activities performed by 
workers and economic units that are not covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrange-
ments’ (Williams & Lansky 2013, p.359; see also Castells & Portes 1989; Feige 1990). Hart 
(1973), who was one of the first scholars to work on ‘informal activities’, underlined that the 
difference between the formal and informal sectors does not lie in their legal status, but in two 
characteristics: low wages and self-employment. Although Hart’s conceptualisation of informal 
activity has been incorporated into the academic and institutional vocabulary, several critics 
have underlined the erroneous attempt to seek out a unique characterisation of the diversity of 
sectors that compose the UIE. The low-wage hypothesis has been proved partially wrong 
through empirical studies showing that earning levels in the UIE can be higher than in the for-
mal sector for workers with similar levels of qualification (Centeno & Portes 2006; Jutting & 
Laiglesia 2009; Meng 2001; Neuwirth 2011; Portes et al. 1989; Roberts 1989). Nor is Hart’s 
characterisation of self-employment fully accurate, as empirical studies have demonstrated the 
existence of informal workers employed within both informal and formal enterprises across 
several sectors (Castells & Portes 1989; Chen et al. 2004; de Soto 1989; ILO 2002a; Perry et al. 
2007; Sassen 1989). 
 
The International Labour Organisation itself has modified its statistical definition of the 
informal economy over time, allowing an ever-expanding number of activities to be considered 
informal. In 1993, the ILO used a enterprise-centred framework to define informal activities as 
economic units of production that ‘form part of the household sector’ as ‘informal own-account 
enterprises’ and ‘enterprises of informal employers’ (owned and operated by employers in part-
nership with family members), characterised by their small size and a lack of registration (ILO 
1993, pp.3-4; Williams & Lansky 2013, p.356). Later, in 2003, the ILO recognised the incapaci-
ty of their definition to account for the diversity of informal employment arrangements, notably 
employment in formal enterprises and subsistence farming. The organisation then moved to a 
more job-centred definition of informality, as being employment relations that do not provide 
basic social protection, legal protection or employment benefits. This definition encompassed 
many workers employed in formal enterprises, alongside informal enterprises and households 
(ILO & WIEGO 2013, p.3; Williams & Lansky 2013, p.357). 
 
The question of legality and the informal economy has taken central significance, as it 
strongly shapes the perception of informal activities. Several authors consider illicit activities, 
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such as the falsification of well-known brands (Chen 2006; Hart 1973; 2006), money launder-
ing, drug trafficking and human smuggling (ILO 2002a, p.3; Schneider & Klinglmair 2004, 
p.4), to constitute a part of urban informal activity (Chen et al. 2004). This leads many academ-
ics and policymakers to associate informality with criminality, fostering an overall negative atti-
tude towards the development of informal activities (Neuwirth 2011, p.20). However, from the 
early days of UIE studies, authors have tended to separate licit and illicit activities (Hart 1973, 
p.69; see also Castells & Portes 1989; Centeno & Portes 2006; OECD et al. 2002). Centeno and 
Portes (2006, p.26), for example, state that ‘illegal enterprises involve the production and com-
mercialisation of goods that are defined in a specific society as illicit, while informal enterprise 
deals, for the most part, with licit goods’. In this influential definition, these authors argue that 
economic activities can be classified as formal, informal or criminal, based on the combination 
of two factors: the legality of the production or distribution process, and the legal status of the 
final product. Formal activities constitute both licit production/distribution and a licit final 
product; informal activities have an illicit production/distribution process but generate a licit 
final product; and criminal activities are those for which both dimensions are illicit. This defini-
tion has been crucial to disentagling informal activities from more socially pervasive criminal 
activities, opening the door to a more positive attitude from academic and policymakers towards 
the informal economy. 
 
By current definitions, the informal economy includes at least two broad groups (Chen 
et al. 2004; ILO 2002a; Perry et al. 2007): the self-employed working in small enterprises that 
fail to adhere to institutional rules (these are what I refer to as ‘informal enterprises’, and form 
the focus of this study) and those earning wages in informal jobs (either in formal or informal 
enterprises) without access to social and work security (referred to as ‘informal workers’) (Chen 
et al. 2004, Chen 2006, p.78; Feige 1990; ILO 1993; 2002; 2013; WIEGO & ILO 2013a; Wil-
liams & Lansky 2013). Debate remains regarding the inclusion of informal jobs in the agricul-
tural sector and the creation of goods that are produced and consumed within a household – 
some countries include these in their national statistics while others do not (WIEGO & ILO 
2013a, p.3). 
 
This broad definition allows a variety of activities to be encompassed by the UIE (see 
Gaughan & Ferman 1987 for a detailed description), as well as a variety of employment statuses 
(both entrepreneurs and workers), but does raise questions of heterogeneity, as each activity has 
its own particular dynamics and unique reactions to broader policy regulation. The UIE’s dy-
namics as a whole cannot be easily generalised, as they change across space, time (Castells & 
Portes 1989; Centeno & Portes 2006) and sector, calling for specific and detailed analyses of 
each component of the UIE. As Skinner (2008, p.236) suggests, a ‘sector or industry-by-
industry’ approach is required to understand the specific dynamics and impacts of policies on 
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the UIE. In response to this heterogeneirty, this study focuses on a particular group of the in-
formal economy (informal entrepreneurs, rather than informal workers in general), in three sec-
tors (waste-pickers, home-based enterprises and street vendors) and in a particular geography, in 
this case being Santiago de Chile from 2014 to 2015. 
THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND THE DECENT WORK AGENDA 
 
The informal economy has been traditionally considered an obstruction to the progression of 
decent work. The ILO defines decent work as that which provides “aspirations for opportunity 
and income; right, voice and recognition; family stability and personal development; and fair-
ness and gender equality” (ILO 2015). This has been articulated in a policy agenda based on 
four dimensions – creating jobs, guaranteeing workplace rights, extending social protection and 
promoting dialogue – which became a core global objective in 2016 under the eighth Sustaina-
ble Development Goal (or SDG-8) (for a larger discussion on the evolution of the decent work 
agenda and the difficulties faced when measuring decent work, see Annex 2). 
These aims are considered to be compromised by the UIE’s lack of compliance with labour reg-
ulations and its perceived low-quality standards of work. First, the ILO (ILO 2013b, p.23) states 
that “all aspects of decent work have a legal dimension and while law alone cannot bring about 
decent work… labour laws are one of the preconditions to its achievement”.  Webster et al. 
(2016) argue that informal workers inherently exist outside the scope of national laws and new 
regulatory frameworks, and so cannot be forced to comply with laws promoting decent work. 
However, authors also argue that work in informal enterprises is less ‘decent’ than formal work 
including lower wages, less benefits and lower unionisations levels offering particularly low-
quality employment for vulnerable groups including women, disabled people and migrants (Eu-
ropean Comission 2009, Kantor et al. 2006; Lim 2003; Webster et al. 2016). Other scholars 
have opposed the view that the informal sector obstructs the Decent Work Agenda. Neoclassical 
economists have argued that international labour standards, such as those of the Decent Work 
Agenda, are too far-removed to affect workers’ movement into or out of the informal economy 
(as these workers are mostly concerned with simply finding a survival alternative), or that they 
can even contribute to expanding the informal economy by increasing the cost for enterprises to 
employ formal workers, leading to dismissals that push people into informal work (Trebilcock 
2005, p.9). Along a more proactive line, it has been argued that decent work needs to be pro-
moted within the informal economy itself, and that this is in fact necessary in the current climate 
of permanent and growing informal economies in the developing world if we are to attain SDG-
8 (Chen 2001; 2004; Navarrete 2016; OECD 2009c). International organisations, such as the 
ILO (2008a) and the European Commission (2009), are indeed moving in this direction, but 
their initiatives remain isolated and do not constitute a coherent body of policies (Bruchell et al. 
2014, see also Kantor et al. 2006; European Commission 2005).  
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FOUR SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT: DUALIST, STRUCTURALIST, 
NEOLIBERAL, VOLUNTARIST 
 
 As iterated in Chapter 1, four main schools of thought have been identified in academic 
debate on the UIE: dualist, structuralist, neoliberal and voluntarist (Chen et al. 2004; Chen 
2013; WIEGO 2014a; 2014c). These four schools of thought generally agree on the economic 
significance of the UIE through its contribution to national GDP as well as its generation of 
employment for the poor in both rural and urban areas of developed and, particularly, 
developing countries (Chen 2006; Chen et al. 2016; ILO 2002a; Perry et al. 2007; Portes et al. 
1989; Schneider et al. 2010; Tokman 1995). Table 2.1 demonstrates the extent of these 
contributions: 
 
Table 2.1: The Urban Informal Economy as Percentage of Official GDP and Total Non-
Agricultural Employment by Country and Region 
 
    
% of GDP % of non-agricultural 
employment 
OECD Countries 18.70% 12.8% (a) 
 
Switzerland 8.4* - 
  United States 8.7* 7.5% 
  United Kingdom 12.9* 12.7% 
  Italy 27.6* 25.1% 
  Greece 29.5* 28.6% 
Developing Countries 38.6*   
East Asia and Pacific 33.3* 18.5(a) 
  China  13.4* 32.6*** 
  Vietnam 16.0* 68.2*** 
  Indonesia 19.3* 72.5*** 
  Thailand 53.4* 42.3***-51.6**** 
Europe and Central Asia 40.5* 10.6(a) 
  Ukraine 52.5* - 
  Georgia 65.9* - 
  Turkey 32.0* 30.6*** 
  Russian Federation 46.5* 8.6**** 
  Kazakhstan 43.7* - 
  Czech Republic 18.7* 15.9(a) 
  Hungary  25* 11.5(a) 
Latin America and the Caribbean 38.3**-42.1* 34.9(a) 
  Chile  19.5*-32.1** 35.8**** 
  Argentina 25.7*-32.9** 49.7***-53.3**** 
  Colombia 40.0*-43.5** 59.6***-38.4**** 
  Brazil 28.4**-40.0* 42.2***-51.1**** 
  Peru 38.1**-61.1* 67.9****-69.9*** 
  Bolivia 66*-67.7** 63.5****-75.1*** 
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Table 2.1: The Urban Informal Economy as Percentage of Official GDP and Total Non-
Agricultural Employment by Country and Region (continuation) 
 
  
% of GDP 
% of non-agricultural 
employment 
Middle East and North Africa 28.5* 35.1(a) 
  Egypt, Arab Rep. 35.6* 45.9****-51.2**** 
  Morocco 37.5* 67.1**** 
  Algeria 35.0* 41.3**** 
  Iran, Islamic Rep.  19.5* 48.8**** 
  United Arab Emirates 26.4* 8.2 (a) 
South Asia 34.0* 53.8 (a) 
  Bangladesh 35.7* 75.4 (a) 
  India  23.9* 83.4****-83.6*** 
  Pakistan 36.8* 77.9****-78.4*** 
Sub-Saharan Africa 41.3* 39.2 (a) 
  Nigeria 59.6* - 
  Zambia  49.7* 53.8****-69.5*** 
  Dem. Rep. of Congo 48.8* 51.8 (a) 
  Cameroon 33.3* 43.8 (a) 
  Ghana 42.0* 66.9 (a) 
  Sudan 34.1* 40.7 (a) 
  South Africa 28.8* 32.7***-50.6**** 
Note: * Schneider et al. (2010); ** Vuletin (2008); ***ILO-WIEGO(2013); ****OECD (2009b) for total em-
ployment; (a) OECD (2009b) for total self-employment 
 
 
 This agreement, however, is short lived, with divergence on interpretations of causes, 
dynamics, economic consequences and policies for the UIE (Chen et al. 2016). Although certain 
policies and strategies do not always fit neatly within these four theoretical categories, and new 
debates continue to arise within each of the schools, Chen (2004; 2016) and WIEGO’s (2014b) 
classifications provide a useful entry point for understanding the main elements of ongoing 
debate and policy implications involving the informal economy (see Table 2.2): 
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Table 2.2: Schools of Thought on the Urban Informal Economy  
 
 
Adapted from Chen et al. and WIEGO 2014b
Boeke (1942) Marginal activity Counter-cyclical
Lewis (1954)
Geertz (1963)
Harris and Todaro (1970)
Bosh, Goni-Pacchioni and Maloney 
(2012)
Rational Choice        Counter-cyclical 
Fiess, Fugazza and Maloney (2010) (grows as unemployment expands)
Maloney (2004) Pro-cyclical
(as demand for specific informal 
sectors growth)
Castells and Portes (1989) Dependent activity Pro-cyclical
Centeno and Portes (2006)
Moser(1978)
Portes (1988)
Portes, Castells and Berton (1989)
Reactive Activity Counter-cyclical 
(survival activities)
Pro-cyclical
(micro-entrepreneurial activities)
Expand formal economy 
& Repress UIE
Welfare state & Informal 
union support
No government 
intervention, neglecting 
UIE, formalisation and 
property rights
Expand formal economy 
& Repress UIE
Informal economy depends 
on health of the formal 
economy
formal and informal 
economy are continuum 
labour market
Key General Authors Position Vision UIE Economic relation Policy implicationsSchool of thought
Adapted from Chen et al. 2004 and WIEGO 2014b
Micro-
entrepreneurs
(grows as unemployment  
increases )
(expands when economy expands)
Dualists
De Soto (1989, 2000)
Structuralist
Legalist
Hidden 
unemploymentno link between formal and 
informal economy
Government and formal 
economy exclude informal 
economy 
Exploited cheap 
labour
Voluntarist Voluntary choice
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The dualist school 
  
 Dualists regard the UIE as a consequence of unemployment and lack of economic growth, 
and see no fundamental link between the formal and informal sectors. The origins of this dualist 
conception trace back to Boeke (1942), Lewis (1954) and Harris and Todaro’s (1970) economic 
vision of two economies operating concurrently and independent of one another within the same 
space: a market economy, characterised by intensive exploitation of capital and a high level of 
technological advancement, and an outside or traditional economy, characterised by intensive use of 
labour and more primitive technology. The practical utility of a dualist conception in development 
studies is to explain the dichotomous ‘dual world’ where formal and informal economies can 
coexist. Under this perspective, informal activities in developing countries, such as garbage 
collection or street vending, emerge from a lack of dynamic growth and unavailability of modern 
employment. In this sense, due to its limited productivity, the UIE is condemned to remain an 
activity of ‘last resort’ or survival for the poorest citizens waiting to be integrated into the modern 
formal economy (Lubell 1991, p.12; see also Geertz 1963; Tokman 1982, Williams & Lansky 
2013). Therefore, dualists are optimistic that the UIE will tend to disappear as the modern economy 
expands. 
 
 For dualists, the UIE is essentially counter-cyclical to economic downturns: during periods 
of economic contraction an increase in unemployment leads to an increase in the dependence on 
survival activities amongst the growing poor, and during economic expansion, an increase in the 
availability of formal employment relaxes this dependence (Biles 2009, pp.222-223). This 
conception is supported by an observation of counter-cyclical reactions of the UIE over the period 
1950-1990. For example, worldwide economic growth up until the mid-1970s led to a significant 
decrease of the UIE. The Latin American UIE tended to contract over this period in countries with 
high growth rates, while it expanded or remained stable in countries with low growth rates (Thomas 
1995, p.44). Conversely, in the 1980s, during the so-called ‘lost decade’, the economic contraction 
in Latin America led to a strong expansion of the UIE in most countries (Biles 2009; Lubell et al. 
1991; Thomas 1992, p.68). 
 
 The main assumption underlying this argument of contraction and expansion is that workers 
will prefer a formal and secure job, and that informal work is only undertaken when there is no 
alternative (Bangesser 2000, pp.3-4, Williams & Lansky 2013, p.363). The validity of this notion as 
applied in a modern economic climate is challenged by Maloney (2004), who argues that it is 
dependent on the appeal of employment within the formal sector. Whilst the post-war political 
economy favoured employees in many regards, including a strengthening of employee rights, access 
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to social protection and a relatively high minimum wage, neoliberal market reforms of the 1980s 
saw a casualisation of the formal sector, leading to a reduction in the very facets that lent the formal 
sector its appeal (Harvey 2005; see also: Kinyanjui 2014; Meagher 2010; Vanamala 2001). Thus a 
criticism of dualist conceptions presents itself: if the formal sector is no longer perceived as the 
more appealing option at the lowest end of the labour market, the premise of the UIE being a ‘last 
resort’ option for employment is undermined. 
 
Dualist policy approaches 
 
 Dualists consider informality to lie in the domain of pre-capitalist society – in countries 
with underdeveloped economies and high birth rates, such as Kenya, Ivory Coast or Nigeria, the 
availability of formal employment is generally low. This creates a ‘modern job gap’ that pushes 
people into informality and underemployment as they fail to gain access to ‘decent’ employment 
(Bangersser 2000, p.4; Klein & Tokman 1988; PRELAC 1985). Dualists have accordingly 
advocated for development policies that strive to expand the formal sector and create formal jobs. 
As a modern economy expands, so informal workers should gradually become absorbed into the 
formal sector (Williams & Lansky 2013, p.363). In the first period of dualist policy implementation, 
notably during the 1950s and 1960s, no further intervention was needed, as a state-led development 
strategy continued to bring investment and economic growth and thus formal jobs were created in 
most developing countries. It was expected that the informal self-employed and paid workers would 
switch voluntarily to formality, enticed by the availability of higher wages and better working 
conditions. 
 
 Nevertheless, in the 1970s and early 1980s, after a period of economic success, the UIE 
proved to be persistent in several countries in Latin America and Africa, leading to the development 
of specific policies that targeted this enduring informality (Bangesser 2000, pp.3-4; Galli & Kucera 
2003, p.16). With this second generation of policies, dualists considered the UIE to be a ‘parasite’ 
on the formal economy that created a drag on economic growth potential (Farrell 2004; Germani 
1973). A high number of self-employed enterprises offered no productivity potential, being small, 
undercapitalised and labour intensive, and so a persistent UIE limited the potential reallocation of 
unskilled labour to more productive activities. Beyond this, the ‘cost advantage’ from which 
informal enterprises were benefiting by avoiding taxes and regulations allowed them to undercut the 
prices of formal enterprises, taking over a portion of their market and thus hindering growth in 
formal employment (Farrell 2004, p. 28; Kinyanjui 2014, p.38). The policies introduced at this time 
were repressive in nature, directly targeting the UIE, and heavy policing, prohibition of work, 
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decommissioning and the issuing of fines became commonplace as means of suppressing 
informality (de Soto 1989; La Porta & Sheifer 2008, p.277; Neuwirth 2011, p.14). 
 
 From the 1990s onwards, scholars and policy makers started to suggest that dualist 
conceptions had become outdated in academic debates as a result of theoretical flaws and 
contradictory evidence (Chen et al. 2004; see also Nadvi 2004; Portes et al. 1989; Rogerson 1996; 
Siggel 2010). Indeed, in the 1990s it became evident that there was no systematic counter-cyclical 
reaction to macro-economic growth on the part of the informal sector – economic recovery in Latin 
America did not lead to contraction but rather expansion of the UIE (Galli & Kucera 2003, p.16). 
Moreover, mounting evidence of the UIE existing and interacting within global value chains of 
production and distribution ran counter to the assumptions of a dualist labour market (Portes et al. 
1989). Alternative theories, notably the structuralist and neoliberal schools of thought, which 
emphasised the connections between the formal and informal economies and the role of public 
policies, had gained momentum in the late 1980s and made their way into international 
organisations by the 1990s. Although the dualist school of thought has almost disappeared from 
contemporary academic debate (Chen et al. 2004, p.16), pro-growth and repressive dualist methods 
aimed at reducing informality remain in place as common national, regional and local policy 
practice in developing countries (FAO 2007; p.6; Kinyanjui 2014, pp.37-42; Wilson et al. 2006, 
p.805;). These primitive dualist ideas thus remain relevant to contemporary policymaking in Global 
South contexts. 
 
The structuralist school 
 
 
In the late 1970s, Marxian literature began challenging dualist ideas, claiming that the UIE 
played a functional role in the process of capitalist accumulation. Moser (1978), in a seminal paper, 
proposed a variant of this idea based upon the Marxian concept of ‘petty commodity production’, 
stressing how the informal economy works in a subordinated and exploitative relationship with the 
capitalist (formal) sector (ibid., p.1078). In this early conception, informal and formal activities are 
not segmented markets but rather form a continuum of production and distribution activities with 
complex links (ibid., p.1041). These links involve subcontracting, the use of outsourced workers 
and/or the use of workers for product distribution. In these cases, small-scale operators, the self-
employed, unpaid family workers and casual workers are contracted on a piece rate basis. 
Precarious informal labour arrangements limit the negotiation power of workers – workers are 
easily replaceable and have very little bargaining power – meaning that wages are kept low. From 
this vantage point, the potential to promote employment and economic development of informal 
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activities is limited, as underdevelopment and ‘backwardness’ are essential conditions to extract 
surplus value for the advancement of a few international companies. Moreover, growth potential of 
informal enterprises is limited. This is due first, to the dependency of a large number of self-
employed producers upon the demand of a limited number of formal firms and, second, to the 
dependency of self-employed sellers upon inputs from a limited number of formal producers. This 
creates unequal market power for negotiation of prices and conditions of exchange, favouring large 
formal enterprises. 
 
As an exponent of the Marxian school, Moser argues for policies aiming at ‘cutting the 
links with larger capitalist enterprises to avoid exploitation’ (1978, p.1061) and for structural 
changes within the capitalist system. During the 1980s, Marxian theory on UIE developed and 
eventually took the shape of the structuralist school of thought. 
 
More broadly, structuralist thought is founded on an ‘informalisation thesis’ that 
conceptualises the UIE as both an integral and functional part of the capitalist system, arguing that it 
is the consequence of modern capitalist production (Fernández-Kelly & Shefner 2006; Williams & 
Lansky 2013, p.363). In the context of globalisation, the opening of national markets has exposed 
business to competition on a global scale. One way that national and international firms have 
remained competitive is by increasingly subcontracting and outsourcing production work to 
intermediaries and informal firms in developing countries, in a process of international ‘labour 
market segmentation’, taking advantage of lower wages and weaker contractual relationships 
(Birkbeck 1979; Chen 2006; Portes et al. 1989; Williams & Lansky 2013, p.364). 
 
At the same time, informality integrates with formality through backward and forward 
linkages that extract profits from labour exploitation (see Thomas 1995 for a detailed discussion on 
backward and forward linkages). Forward linkages can be seen in the subcontracting of production 
to local informal enterprises. In this situation, the monopsony/oligopsony power of the large formal 
businesses leads to decreased prices and unreliable payments for these small enterprises (Birkbeck 
1979; Clay 2005). Furthermore, Vachani and Smith (2008) identify in backward linkages, such as 
‘trading partnerships’ (involving the trade of formal products through informal networks of self-
entrepreneurs), a source of exploitation that allows distribution costs and risks to be transferred to 
the poor (see also Dolan & Scott 2009; Karnani 2007). Indeed, several case studies demonstrate a 
strong link between formal and informal firms, in both developed and developing countries (Lozano 
1989; Roberts 1989). For example, Sassen (1989) establishes the link of informal apparel and 
electronics firms with formal enterprises in New York (see also Birkbeck 1979; Chaturvedi 1998; 
Sicular 1992). The structuralist approach thus conceives these relationships between formal and 
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informal economies as one comprising ‘a porous membrane, not a rigid boundary’ (Fernández-Kelly 
& Shefner 2006, p.4). 
 
 Pursuant to this view, the UIE is functional to a capitalist economy (Tokman 1989) and its 
political objectives (Centeno & Portes 2006) in a number of ways focused around the absorption of 
costs from the formal sector. First, the exploitative working conditions for informal workers and the 
self-employed allows for a reduction in production and distribution costs, thus raising formal firms’ 
competitiveness (Centeno & Portes 2006; Clay 2005; Dolan & Scott 2009; Fernández-Kelly & 
Shefner 2006; Karnani 2007; Portes et al. 1989). Weeks (1975, p.11) stresses that this 
subcontracting will not help vulnerable populations through capital transfer, since subcontracting 
tends to occur in less profitable and more labour-intensive activities, thus keeping productivity and 
wages low. Second, low wages in the informal economy allow large formal enterprises to maintain a 
reserve of labour that compromises formal workers’ bargaining power for higher wages, as low-
skilled workers can be easily replaced by willing workers from the informal sectors (Portes et al. 
1989). Third, the increase in subcontracting and the associated growth of unorganised informal 
labour results in additional erosion of formal worker trade unions, in turn shifting power and 
income from workers to businesses. Finally, it is argued that the UIE serves political objectives, by 
increasing purchasing power for the poor (Gerry 1987, p.112) and providing a source of mass 
employment that allows for political stability (Centeno & Portes 2006). Consequently, the UIE is 
not just ‘integral’, but also a ‘functional part’ of the capitalist economy, providing production, 
consumption and political expediency. 
 
 Regarding economic dynamics, structuralists see the UIE as pro-cyclical (Biles 2009, 
p.224), expanding during economic growth due to the higher demand for cheap inputs and 
distribution, and contracting with recession as the demand for products decreases (Jütting et al. 
2008). Chen (2006, p.87) points out that subcontracting has led to the creation of two types of 
informal workers: a permanent informal workforce and a ‘permanent temporary (informal) 
workforce’. Whereas the former is permanently employed, the latter ‘is mobilised (only) during 
peak season and demobilised during slack seasons’. The UIE thus operates as a ‘reserve army of 
labour’ which helps to preserve low wages and competitiveness for firms during periods of growth. 
 
 Qualitative studies in Kenya, Bangladesh, India, Brazil and Thailand have demonstrated 
that the informal economy is integrated into global value chains of production (Hodal et al. 2014; 
Nadvi 2004; Phillips 2011; Ruthven 2010). In this context, the multinational complex chain of 
subcontracting and outsourcing has reduced tractability from international firms, allowing labour 
exploitation and poor working conditions to prosper, and even contributing to an increase in slavery 
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at the bottom of the labour market. Following structural adjustment and the liberalisation of markets 
reforms in the first half of the 1980s, the informal economy expanded along with the worldwide 
economy in the 1990s and early 2000s (Drechsler et al. 2008; Perry et al. 2007), as suggested by 
structuralist theory and running counter to dualist predictions. 
 
Structuralist policy approaches 
 
 Structuralist policies advocate first for the improvement of informal work conditions, while 
on a grand scale they also call for a radical change in the capitalist system of production. 
Structuralists observe that ‘the process (of informalisation) in the capitalist economies serves to 
strengthen the hand of the dominant class and to weaken labour’s organisations’ (Portes et al. 1989, 
p.300). At a more immediate and tangible level, structuralists propose a policy solution to this 
exploitative relationship through the reinforcement of the welfare state in developing countries, 
which would in turn guarantee minimum living standards and security to all people, rather than just 
to formal workers (Centeno & Porter 2006). Further to this, structuralists promote policies that 
foster ‘universal trade unions’ (Portes et al. 1989, p.311) or ‘multi-stakeholder platforms’ (Chen et 
al. 2016, p.339) – joint unions of both informal and formal workers – who work towards improving 
living standards for all. By these two worker demographics acting together, they are able to put 
more pressure on employers, improving their minimal powers of negotiation. 
 
 At a more fundamental level, structuralists see a need for radical change in the capitalist 
system. Even though structuralists sympathise with informal workers as part of the exploited class, 
they consider that, in the long run, there is neither place nor function for the informal economy, and 
that its disappearance is necessary for the betterment of all parties and to decrease exploitation: 
 
‘…the informal economy has a role to play in this revamped [Washington] consensus. That role is to 
disappear. […] There will be no better sign that Latin America is on the mend and on the path toward 
sustained development than when the bulk of its labour force ceases to depend on invented self-
employment and on precarious and unprotected jobs for survival. In such a world, the “functions” 
played today by the informal economy will cease to exist’ (Centeno & Portes 2006, p.42). 
 
The neoliberal school 
 
‘In Peru, informality has turned a large number of people into entrepreneurs, into people who know 
how to seize opportunities by managing available resources, including its own labor, relatively 
efficiently. (...) if every citizen, regardless of his or her origin, color, sex, occupation, or political 
orientation, can in practice be in business, then we shall have a genuinely democratic economy, a 
market economy.’ (de Soto 1989, pp.243-244). 
 
 44 
 The neoliberal perspective conceives the UIE as the result of a mercantilist legal system that 
works to maintain elite privileges and exclude poor people from the market economy. For 
neoliberals or legalists, the UIE has its origins in massive rural-urban migration and in the needs of 
a large new urban population to make a living. These new urban poor are systematically excluded 
from legal work and business development opportunities, in a system settled to avoid free market 
competition. They go on to create a ‘system of extralegal norm(s)’ becoming informal as a 
‘legitimate reaction’ to exclusion and excessive government regulation (de Soto 1989, p.14). 
Developing economies have not evolved into ‘democratic capitalist’ systems, but rather they have 
remained as old ‘mercantilist systems’ (ibid., p.xx). In this respect, de Soto (1989, p.xviii) 
underlines that ‘the principal enemy of these (informal) entrepreneurs is the legal system, which 
excludes them (from the formal economy)’ – powerful states create and enforce laws that preserve 
an existent elite. 
 
 For neoliberals, the UIE is the only rational choice for the poor in mercantilist systems 
where the excessively high-cost, time-consuming and demanding process of registration outstrips 
the capacity of vulnerable populations to invest in their enterprises (de Soto 2000; Williams & 
Lansky 2013, p.365). De Soto (1989), in his case studies, further shows how these difficulties 
involved with the legal processes of registration complicate the access of the poor to legal housing, 
trade and transport markets. Other empirical studies show similar results for Latin American 
countries (Loayza 1997), and in countries such as Bangladesh and India (UNDP 2009, pp.12 & 56). 
 
 Yet on a more positive note, the UIE is also seen as a significant source of competitive and 
efficient entrepreneurship, having real power to generate sustained economic growth and alleviate 
poverty in developing countries (de Soto 1989; 2000; Söderbaum 2006; Wily 2006). First, the UIE 
is efficient, as it develops from a large number of competitors, which theoretically drives prices to 
optimal levels. Second, it is competitive, as it is able to survive in competition with the formal 
economy over time. Furthermore, it remains competitive despite the high costs of informality, such 
as those associated with avoiding legal penalties, indirect taxation (paying product taxes), higher 
exposure to inflation (mainly because of the dependency on cash, which devalues over time) and 
credit rates (paying higher interest rates for informal as well as formal finance) (de Soto 1989; Roy 
2010). Finally, the UIE is perceived as positive overall for the national economy, not only because 
of its size, but also because of its large investment capacity. 
 
 Regarding economic dynamics, the neoliberal school sees the UIE as both pro-cyclical and 
counter-cyclical. Drawing on Castells and Portes’ (1989) framework, Biles (2009, p.226) 
distinguished between three different types of informal activities: ‘subsistence’, ‘subordinate’ and 
 45 
‘autonomous’. Subsistence activities are associated with very low wages, cheap products, low 
capitalisation and technology and low levels of education. People generally engage in subsistence 
activities because they lack alternative employment options. In contrast, subordinate and, in 
particular, autonomous activities are associated with higher levels of education and incomes, the 
sale of more expensive products and services, and have higher levels of capital endowments, and so 
these workers opt for informality due to the motivations of greater income opportunities and/or 
higher flexibility. Using Biles’ (2009) framework, it is possible to recognise that ‘subsistence 
activities’ are likely to be counter-cyclical: declining growth will raise unemployment, leading to 
their expansion. In contrast, ‘subordinate activities’ and ‘autonomous activities’ are pro-cyclical 
insofar as they are directly linked with the demand for their products and services. These activities 
are likely to suffer from the slowing of the economy as demand decreases, and to experience a 
strong growth when demand for their products and services is high. 
 
Neoliberal policy approaches 
 
 To fully grasp the rationale behind neoliberal policies, it is first necessary to understand 
more precisely the neoliberal school’s perception of intervening policies and their effect on both the 
formal and informal economies. As stated earlier, neoliberals consider the lack of growth in 
developing countries to be the direct consequence of pervasive government intervention that 
prevents an efficient market equilibrium (de Soto 1989). According to neoliberals, government 
regulation hinders growth through five factors: creating a decline in productivity, reduced 
investment, the creation of an inefficient tax system, limited technological progress, and lastly 
complications in macro-economic policy (ibid., p.173). 
 
 Regarding the first of these factors, productivity tends to decline as significant potential 
production time is spent dealing with complex sets of regulations. Second, reduced investment 
arises from government exclusion, as informal entrepreneurs generally have no access to credit or 
must contend with very high interest rates, thus hindering their investments. Similarly, unreliable 
contract enforcement and the pervasive threat of being closed down leads informal industries being 
hesitant to invest in their business, thus not taking advantage of the economies of scale. Third, an 
inefficient tax system is mainly caused by governments investing significant resources in detecting 
evasion, costs which are then burdened by a small formal sector. This increase in the cost of being 
formal encourages formal businesses to move into informality, resulting in a self-perpetuating cycle 
of higher taxes for the remaining formal enterprises. Fourth, technological progress is hindered as 
informal entrepreneurs remain as small-scale enterprises to avoid detection, investing less in 
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technology. Finally, the design of an efficient macroeconomic policy is tempered: as informal 
activities remain hidden, the efficiency of different sectors, the real GDP of the UIE, and the ratio of 
employment relevance for the formal-informal economies are difficult to ascertain. Therefore, 
macroeconomic policy is designed with a blind spot concealing its impact on a significant portion 
of the national economy. Neoliberals thus draw the conclusion that inefficiency in informality and a 
lack of growth in developing countries will continue so long as rules and regulations hinder efficient 
market results. 
 
 In response to these negative effects of intervening policies, neoliberals promote 
legalisation of the UIE through the deregulation of the formal economy, which they argue will 
unlock informal entrepreneurial capacity as the poor gain access to a real neoliberal market of free 
competition (de Soto 1989; Williams & Lansky 2013, p.367). This legalisation will guarantee three 
basic elements that promote economic efficiency: property rights, certainty in contracts, and an 
extra-contractual legal system. Through property rights, the UIE can enjoy, dispose of and sell its 
assets, reducing uncertainty and raising returns from informal investment. Legal contracts are 
essential to avoid unfulfilled promises and to provide sufficient guarantees to capital investment on 
a long-term basis. The extra-contractual legal system grants workers and businesses access to rental 
agreements and credit. 
 
 From a neoliberal perspective, the removal of regulatory, bureaucratic and monetary 
barriers for the legalisation of informal enterprises will effectively merge the formal and informal 
economies into a single market, in which former UIE enterprises are given the opportunity not just 
to survive, but also to grow into thriving enterprises. In an optimal scenario, efficiency is likely to 
increase for these enterprises by fostering their capitalisation and allowing them to complete fairly, 
leading to higher economic growth and poverty reduction in a ‘trickle-up effect’ (de Soto 2000), all 
within a policy framework where the government plays no substantial role. 
 
The voluntarist or utilitarian school 
 
‘Arguing that workers are voluntarily informal does not […] imply that they are not living in poverty, 
only that they would not obviously be better off in a formal job for which they are qualified. Being in 
the informal sector is often the optimal decision given their preferences, the constraints they face in 
terms of their level of human capital, and the level of formal sector labor productivity in the country’ 
(Maloney 2004, p.1160). 
 
 As outlined in Chapter 1, the voluntarist school conceives of the UIE as being the result of 
the rational choice of micro-entrepreneurs, after a careful cost-benefit analysis of being formal 
versus informal. Based on conventional microeconomic rationality, voluntarists consider informal 
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workers to be rational agents who, within a perfect labour market with no entry costs and no 
binding wage rigidities, make effective decisions that maximise their job utility – including the 
decision to work within the informal or formal economy. When making a formal/informal sector 
trade-off, individuals take into account costs and benefits that are not only monetary (income 
generation, tax payments and social security costs), but also non-monetary (flexibility and 
independence) (Maloney 2004, p.1164). Both formality and informality have a number of costs and 
benefits. Formality enjoys the benefits of a relatively higher income and better social protection 
leverage (health, housing subsidies and pensions), but it bears costs such as income taxes, pension 
taxes, inflexible workday hours and a lack of independence. On each of the points, the opposite 
tends to be true for informality. Therefore, according to this utilitarian approach, informality does 
not represent ‘an inferior position’, since one person who chooses informality must be at least as 
well off as they would be in the formal economy (Maloney 2004, p.1162). 
 
 Although the voluntarist school explicitly underlines the notion of informal workers as 
entrepreneurs, it still perceives informality as a constraint on poverty relief and a symptom of 
underdevelopment. Voluntarists recognise in informality the seeds of entrepreneurialism, 
underlining that ‘…we should think of the informal sector as the unregulated, developing country 
analogue of the voluntary entrepreneurial small firm sector found in advanced countries’ (Maloney 
2004, p.1159). However, they remain sceptical of the role that the UIE can play in broader 
development. First, the minimal benefits of informality might appear desirable only for the segment 
of the population with the lowest level of skills and who thus may have low expectations of income 
and social benefits from formal work (Maloney 2004, p.1164). In addition, because of their 
combination of low-skilled workers and undercapitalisation, most small informal enterprises fall 
victim to low productivity and high rates of failure, thus perpetuating the poverty cycle. Second, the 
popularity of informality is itself a symptom of underdevelopment. The inefficiency of the public 
sector in developing countries makes public services expensive to run and of low quality, and given 
the lack of law enforcement, some workers choose to move into informality. In doing so, they can 
choose to join only some social protection programmes, for example a specific health or pension 
scheme, reducing their total payments (Maloney 2004, p.1165). Informality thus acts as a ‘blunt 
societal indictment of the quality of the state’s service provision and its enforcement capability…’ 
(Perry et al. 2007, p.2). 
 
 Voluntarists mainly interpret the UIE as being counter-cyclical to economic dynamics, but 
consider that a few cases will see a pro-cyclical relationship develop (Fiess et al. 2010, p.211). 
These counter- and pro-cyclical dynamics are determined by two factors respectively: ‘binding 
wage rigidities’ in the formal sector, and economic sub-sector origin of the shock (ibid., p.212). The 
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counter-cyclical reaction to economic shocks is the result of the lack of labour market flexibility, 
ultimately resulting in a dual or segmented market. An economic crisis leads to lower demands for 
formal products and labour – in particular, low-skilled labour. The formal sector is characterised by 
low labour market flexibility and wage rigidity, arising from, for example, minimum salary or trade 
union requirements. This rigidity prevents enterprises from reducing salaries to maintain levels of 
employment, meaning that they must dismiss workers to remain profitable, thus increasing 
unemployment. In turn, unemployed individuals seek work in the informal sector, increasing the 
size of, and competition within, the UIE. Income in the formal sector ultimately remains higher than 
the informal sector, resulting in job market segmentation. Evidence for this counter-cyclical 
interpretation can be drawn from a ‘small economy macro model’ empirically tested over various 
periods in Brazil (1989-1993), Argentina (1991-1995), Mexico (1994) and Colombia (1997-2004), 
which indicated that economic crises lead to an increase in unemployment and a large expansion of 
the UIE (Fiess et al. 2010). 
 
 Pro-cyclical dynamics, on the other hand, are understood to be the consequence of shocks 
within a specific economic sector. A growth shock in a sector with a high number of informal 
enterprises would increase the demand for ‘micro-entrepreneur’ products (Bosh 2012, p.655). As 
demand rises, so do profitability and salaries within this specific sector, resulting in a growth in 
perceived benefits. Subsequently, people move from less profitable formal and informal 
employment to the informal niche undergoing economic expansion. The aforementioned ‘macro 
model’ provides evidence also for this pro-cyclical interpretation. Aggregated data from Mexico 
(1987-1991) and Colombia (1991-1996) show that during economic expansion, the size and 
incomes of the UIE grew, and Fiess et al. (2010, pp.220-221) point to this pro-cyclical interpretation 
of higher demand in specific sectors as the reason for growth. 
  
Voluntarist policy approaches 
 
 For voluntarists, government intervention in labour markets directly affects the costs and 
benefits of informal and formal activities, which affects workers’ trade-off decisions and thus 
impacts the size of the UIE. By this utilitarian logic, formal and informal economies form a labour 
market continuum whereby workers flow from one sector to another depending on relative rates of 
return for their assets until a utility equilibrium is reached (Fiess et al. 2010, p.221). The direction of 
this flow can be strongly influenced by the positive or negative effects of public policy on each 
sector. If a change in public policy promotes, for example, the existence of universal ‘protection 
packages’ such as health or housing benefits, the appeal of informality is increased, and individuals 
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will voluntarily move to work in informal employment as a result of this. Over time, this flow of 
workers will result in increased competition and lower wages in the informal sector, increasing the 
appeal of work in formal employment once again. Likewise, public policy that increases the appeal 
of the formal market will also drive workers away from informality towards formality. In the 
absence of labour market distortion, this back-and-forth labour flow will continue until a ‘utility 
equilibrium’ between the formal and informal sectors is once again reached (Maloney 2004, 
p.1164). Policy thus is able to affect the cost-benefit analysis underlying this choice to move 
towards or away from informality, and impacts the informal sector’s size and incomes accordingly 
(Maloney 2004, p.1173). 
 
 Regarding policy implications, following from their view of informality having low 
productivity and potential for poverty reduction, voluntarists advocate ‘revisited’ dualist 
recommendations of carrot (pro-growth) and stick (repression) policies. For voluntarists, policies 
should attempt to appeal to people’s perception of utility, making the formal sector more attractive 
than the informal, by increasing the utility of formality and/or decreasing the utility of informality. 
An increase in the utility of formality is achieved by enhancing the skills gained by workers and 
supporting formal enterprise growth. Strengthening and diversifying labour skills would increase 
workers’ opportunities for growth and their ability to access more attractive formal jobs. Supporting 
industry productivity and aiming to expand the formal industry’s size would also increase the 
availability of employment and help to render informal activities unprofitable (Maloney 2004, 
p.1173). Following from this, voluntarists argue that policies that increase levels of education, 
decrease taxes and provide a ‘friendly business environment’ for international enterprises are 
required (Perry et al. 2007, p.13). A higher utility of the formal economy can also be achieved 
through labour market flexibility, which is required to reduce the costs and risks that enterprises 
face when signing contracts of employment, thus helping to increasing the number of formal jobs 
available. In this sense, labour market rigidity, in the form of overtime costs, increased penalties for 
employee lay-offs and high levels of union power (e.g. facilitation of union creation, compulsory 
membership and legal unions’ right to strike), restrain the ability of enterprises to offer higher 
quality formal employment (Maloney 2012, p.653). 
 
 Concurrently, voluntarists argue that decreasing the utility of informality through repressive 
policies is required. Here, punitive measures might include increased law enforcement, the creation 
of monitoring agencies, increased penalties for offenders and a ‘re-engineering’ of social protection 
to increase the costs of informality (Perry et al. 2007, p.13; Williams & Lansky 2013, p.369). 
Voluntarists strongly criticise the structuralists’ ideals of universal social protection (Portes et al. 
1989) that work to make informality more appealing and, consequently, increase its size.  
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 Although voluntarists and dualists justify their policies through different arguments and 
have contrasting interpretations of the rationality behind working in the informal sector, in practice, 
their policy recommendations tend to be similar. As this research focuses on policy practices, from 
this point forward in the literature review, these two policies will be analysed as one. 
  
Co-production theory 
 
 An increasing number of scholars call for recognition of the role of the informal economy 
as a provider of public services in developing countries. This has not yet reached a point of a fully 
developed informal economy theory, as it only covers the provision of public services, but is a 
perspective that is currently emerging, and has been reflected in certain ways in some modern 
supportive policymaking approaches towards the UIE. 
 
 Joshi and Moore (2004) argue that the monopolistic provision of the state and the new 
public management strategy of privatisation have failed to provide public services in developing 
countries because of logistical and governance-related failures. Logistical failures occur due to 
‘natural’ causes associated with the cost of providing public services for poor populations who are 
geographically widespread and have a limited capacity to pay for services. Failures of ‘state-centred 
and hierarchical governance’ arise from an institutional incapacity to effectively provide core public 
services and achieve a sustainable financing system, particularly in areas with large poor 
populations (Joshi & Moore 2004, p.41; Allen et al. 2005, p.31). In both cases, the problems are 
rooted in the traditional ‘supply-led engineers’ approach based on expensive capital investments, 
expensive operational costs and unrealistically demanding standards for developing countries that 
have high availability of labour, low governance capacity and limited investment capacity (Allen et 
al. 2006, p.333; Ostrom 1996, p.1074). 
 
 Ostrom (1996, p.1073) has described ‘co-production’ arrangements, in which, through long-
term partnerships, citizens and the state pool resources to provide public goods and services, 
offering an alternative solution for the delivery of basic services in developing countries. Further to 
this, Joshi and Moore (2004, p.46) extend this concept to include partnerships between the state and 
the informal sector for the provision of public services. Allen et al. (2005) further propose that a 
shift to a more ‘governance approach’ that is ‘centred on society’ is needed. This would account for 
more horizontal social structures, which promote the co-responsibility and synergy of social actors, 
both formal and informal, for the provision of public services. These authors underline that co-
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production is a serious alternative, as it fills the gap left by weak states ( see also Allen et al. 2005; 
Dias 2016; Joshi & Moore 2004) and has the potential to be the best available alternative for 
providing much-needed public services. Furthermore, it provides the first real attempt at a positive 
theoretical perspective of informal activities, and is thus of particular relevance for this study of 
supportive policy approaches. 
EMERGING SUPPORTIVE POLICY APPROACHES IN THREE URBAN 
INFORMAL SUB-SECTORS 
 
The following section discusses emerging supportive policy approaches in the three sub-sectors that 
form the core of this research: waste-picking, street vending and home-based enterprises. Although 
I do not have sufficient space here in the main text to fully explore the potentially fascinating 
intersection of the various other schools of thought with these three informal sub-sectors, I do 
provide a complementary discussion of this in Annexes 3 (on waste-pickers), 4 (on street vendors) 
and 5 (on home-based enterprises). 
 
Supportive policies towards waste-pickers 
 
 Co-production theory has provided a framework for including waste-pickers in local 
partnerships with municipal SWM. In this vision, waste-pickers contribute to the building of an 
integral SWM system in developing countries, serving important social functions such as 
employment generation, poverty alleviation, urban development and environmental protection 
(Fergutz et al. 2011, p.597). Although some scholars recognise negative externalities and conditions 
of poverty as mainstays of waste-picker environments, they consider the cause of this to be social 
exclusion, paltry payment of social contributions and lack of public support. 
 
For scholars who favour the practices of supportive approaches, NGOs and local and central 
government all have a crucial role in achieving ‘better methods of recycling’ by socially and eco-
nomically including waste-picker cooperatives in formal integral SWM (Fergutz et al. 2011, p.597; 
see also Bhaskar & Chikarmne 2012, pp.615-616; WIEGO 2015). Supportive practices place a ma-
jor emphasis on raising waste-pickers’ productivity as a means of achieving social and economic 
inclusion, standing in quite stark contrast to co-production theories, which focus on the capacity of 
a waste-picker as a ‘second best’ means of providing a public service. From a supportive policy 
viewpoint, the recycling of waste is underexploited and performed by rudimentary methods, and 
increases in productivity will maximise the economic efficiency, social equity and positive envi-
ronmental impacts of the activity (Navarrete 2010). Policy recommendations include a mixture of 
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state support for trade unions, legalisation, granting access to waste, and, most interestingly, strong 
involvement in sector organisation and capitalisation (Navarrete & Navarrete 2017) . Following the 
same reasoning as structuralists, the support of waste-picker organisations such as formal trade un-
ions or cooperatives is seen as crucial for increasing informal enterprises’ bargaining power against 
formal enterprises, middlemen, and in increasing participation in local and national waste manage-
ment policymaking (Dias 2016; Kingsley 2014; MMA 2013). Dias (2016, p.376) proposes granting 
waste-pickers access to waste as a way of securing their access to key resources and opportuninties. 
The legalisation of these organisations is also essential to establish formal contracts, place account-
ability on waste-pickers, and enhance access to government funding (Dias 2016; Fergutz et al. 
2011). At the same time, supporting the capitalisation of waste-pickers is crucial for creating 
productivity gains that reduce poverty and enhance environmental performance (Navarrete 2010). 
Improvements in organisational arrangements such as route planning, door-to-door collection and 
promotion of waste separation at the point of origin – from both enterprises and households – would 
increase the quantity and quality of recycled material collected, resulting in a higher income for 
workers and creating positive environmental run-on effects (ibid.). In the context of an integral 
strategy of economic productivity policies, waste-picking can play a role as a sustainable mecha-
nism to generate decent employment with reasonable remuneration and social protection (MMA 
2013, p.46). 
 
 Although support strategies are not mainstream policies, they are currently applied in a 
diversity of forms in several developing world cities. For instance, in Temuco (Chile) and Pune 
(India) municipalities have provided training for waste-pickers, educated the population regarding 
the separation of recyclable waste, and furnished waste-pickers with uniforms, tricycles and ‘clean 
points’ (containers in public streets for the deposit and collection of recyclable material) (Dias, 
2016; MMA 2013). The city of Londrina (Brazil) has achieved the highest recycling rates in the 
country through a partnership between the municipality and the waste-picker trade union. The 
municipality provided sorting centres distributed across the city to facilitate waste accumulation and 
door-to-door collection, allowing waste-pickers to move away from unsanitary work in landfills 
(Fergutz et al. 2011, p.606). In Cairo, the Zabaleen, a community of garbage collectors that handles 
one-third of total city waste and recycles more than 80% of waste collected, has achieved 
integration into the formal SWM system after being excluded for more than ten years following its 
privatisation (Salah-Fahmi 2005, p.158). Uniforms and vehicles have been provided as part of the 
fourteen pilot contracts assigned to Zabaleen organisations (Kingsley 2014). In Belo Horizonte 
(Brazil) and Bogotá (Colombia), city goverments have created payment incentives to waste-pickers 
based on quantities of waste collected, recognising their environmental value and the cost savings 
that they create for SWM systems (Dias 2016).  
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Supportive policies towards street vending 
 
 A call for supportive policies towards street vending activities has gathered momentum in 
recent years. While not sharing a common theoretical framework or homogenous policies, all 
approaches similarly maintain that public sector involvement can lead to improved social and 
economic performance of street vendors. First, there is a recognition that street vending contributes 
to the economy through the payment of municipal permits (patentes municipales), high aggregate 
profits, and creating demand for formal suppliers. Second, there is a recognition of the social value 
of this activity as a provider of affordable products and one that makes available a wide diversity of 
goods and services for the poor, as well as generating employment and income essential to 
livelihood strategies (Dobson et al. 2009; FAO 2007; NASVI 2014). These proponents of 
supportive strategies also recognise the effect felt by street vendors from policy approaches 
(Skinner 2008, p.228). However, most cases have seen the livelihoods of street vendors being 
destroyed through the advocation of ‘bad policy or repression’, instead of enhancing the activity 
through more supportive strategies – this is outlined in Amis’ (2004, p.145) study of municipal 
policy in ten cities in the developing world (Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Cebu City, Johannesburg, 
Kumasi, Mombasa, Santiago, and Visakhapatnam). 
 
 For those who promote supportive policies towards street vendors, the positive and 
proactive involvement of the public sector can lead to increases in the economic inclusion of the 
poor (Skinner 2008, p.228), as well as a reduction of negative externalities – particularly for 
women, who are most well-represented in the street vending sector (Kinyanjui 2014, p.1). In this 
sense, Kinyanjui (2014, p.7) calls for a planning model that incorporates or includes street vendors. 
Here, policies that target economic enhancement mainly attempt to raise human and capital 
endowment of the activity. For instance, capital endowments such as infrastructure provision for 
street markets can lead to increased security from weather and theft, enabling people to trade more 
valuable goods, while the provision of electricity and water facilitate street vendors’ movement into 
more lucrative activities, such as catering or sewing (Dobson et al. 2009). Enhancement of human 
capital through management skill training can result in improved commercial strategies, more 
informed pricing strategies and management of credit alternatives. Training in cooking and the 
preparation of food can also lead to development within niche markets with healthier profits (FAO 
2003, p.3).  
 
 Negative externalities can likewise be reduced by similar measures. The provision of 
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infrastructure – such as childcare facilities, public toilets, basic services or appropriate workplace 
shelter – is particularly relevant here, helping to minimise the negative effects of child labour, poor 
street hygiene, food poisoning and homelessness (Chant & Pedwell 2008; Dobson et al. 2009; FAO 
1996; 2007; Lues et al. 2006). In addition to this, Skinner (2008) underlines that training and 
fostering the unionisation of street vendors can make significant contributions. Training in food 
management standards and cleanliness can lead to safe processing and conservation standards for 
street food vendors (FAO 2007, p.24; 2003, p.6; Lues et al. 2006, p.327), and partnerships with 
street vendor unions can increase safety and local tax payment (Lindell & Appelblad 2009; Skinner 
2008). As an example, Skinner (2008, p.235) reports that in Durban, local police partnership with 
street vendors has resulted in a reduction in crime. She (Skinner 2009, p.239) suggests that 
supportive policies should focus on three changes in order to render street vending an ‘effective and 
inclusive’ activity: innovation in local government (to incorporate an economic rather than only 
social approach), the participation of street traders in policy design (to create a better understanding 
of processes and policy impacts) and the redirection of public economic resources (to implement 
policies). In spite of increasing support from academics and the growing number of successful 
policy examples, street traders still remain largely excluded from planning operations (Dolan & 
Scott 2009, p.1; Kinyajui 2014, p.32; NASVI 2014). 
 
Supportive policies towards HBEs 
 
In some scholarly circles, there is an increasing call for supportive policies that increase the 
efficiency of HBEs and reduce the constraints placed upon them, as well as some of their less 
desirable consequences (Chen & Sinha 2016; Ezeadichie 2012, p.57; Tipple 2004, p.378). As with 
the other sectors, supportive policy approaches towards HBEs do not constitute a single unified 
school of thought, however these informal enterprises have increasingly been perceived as an 
opportunity for poverty alleviation when met with support. From this perspective, HBEs play a 
fundamental role in the reduction of poverty, since they aid poor people in finding and creating jobs, 
provide entrepreneurial opportunities, supplement household income, stimulate investment in low-
income housing (Gough & Kellett 2001), supply cheap accommodation, introduce new services to 
urban areas at affordable prices (Kigochie 2001, p.230) and reduce transport costs for customers 
and workers (Tipple 2004, p.373). In this sense, Kigochie (2001, p.223) concludes that policies 
supporting HBEs have the potential to solve problems of both unemployment and shelter. In 
general, papers focused on supportive policies recognise the neoliberal argument of exclusion from 
the state, calling for legalisation and property rights policies; however, they consider that 
government intervention is also needed. 
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Supportive policies advocate for a change of attitude in government policies from 
confrontation to collaboration, creating more policies that are ‘pro-poor’ (Ezeadichie 2012, p.57; 
Watson 2011, p.8). For Chen and Sinha (2016), HBEs should constitute a relevant part of local 
economic development plans, with the promotion of policies that increase HBE productivity and 
guarantee the provision of basic services and housing and favourable zoning regulations. Aside 
from neoliberal recommendations, pro-productivity policies also include public service initiatives 
such as the public provision of basic infrastructure and improvement of roads, which would reduce 
operational and product supply costs (Gough 1993; Gough & Kellet 2001). Moreover, effective 
public lighting and reliable provision of electricity would allow HBEs to extend their opening 
hours, resulting in higher profits. Along the same lines, effective policing and prosecution of 
violence and crime in poor neighbourhoods can allow people to extend their opening hours without 
fear of crime, and minimise the products and cash stolen from HBEs (Gough et al. 2003, pp.270-
271; Chant & McIIwaine 2016). The state can further generate policies of land use and housing to 
back up the expansion of successful HBEs. For instance, governments can establish more affordable 
housing (Chen & Sinha 2016) and assign HBEs to more centralised locations in main streets, thus 
increasing their client potential and visibility (Gough 2001, p.232). The upgrading of houses and 
neighbourhoods, including road and transport infrastructure, can also help to attract more clients 
into an otherwise less desirable area (Ghafur 2001). Additionaly, Kigochie (2001, p.230) proposes 
that training programmes have the capacity to further increase levels of human capital and the 
ability to compete with the formal sector, while governments and NGOs can support HBEs in 
obtaining access to market opportunities and distribution networks for their products (ibid., p.231).  
 
At the same time, supportive policies recognise some negative externalities of HBEs, but it 
is argued that these can be minimised through policy interventions (Ezeadichie 2012, p.57). For 
example, the provision of sewerage, water and electricity would improve hygiene standards and the 
conservation of products (Kigochie 2001, pp.227-228). Social housing would facilitate the 
establishment of HBEs in preferable conditions, for example by incorporating space divisions 
between a home area and a business area, providing a bigger plot of land to allow for expansion, or 
including larger storage spaces on the property. Tipple (2004, p.378) demonstrates that most HBEs 
are ‘benign’ activities, which are not associated with significant problems of pollution. While child 
exploitation is underlined as a major problem (Jones & Chant 2009, p.190), Tipple (2005, p.621) 
stresses that, in general, it is ‘soft’ child labour, along the lines of ‘minding the shop’ when parents 
go out. Therefore, in Ezeadichie’s (2012, p.57) words, there is an increasing number of supportive 
policy recommendations that would have a positive effect on a high share of the population, while 
minimising the ‘abhorrent’ negative effects of HBE activity. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has provided a sketch of the theoretical background that has led to the imple-
mentation of different sets of policies towards the UIE. Although most scholars and policymakers 
acknowledge the importance of the UIE through its contribution to economic growth and employ-
ment generation in the Global South, and thus the urgency of policy interventions for development 
purposes, there still exists competing debate regarding the social consequences and sector dynamics 
of the UIE, as well as its relationship with the formal economy. This, in turn, has led to diver-
gent policy strategies. Dualists/voluntarists, structuralists and neoliberals have promoted policies 
ranging from strong repression of informal activities – such as the reduction of social benefits and 
prohibition of work – to feeble support – including the promotion of informal trade unions and le-
galisation of the activities. Following from these observations, Skinner (2008, p.4) calls for an ‘in-
dustry-by-industry approach’, and we have observed how these different conceptions of the UIE 
intercept with a remarkable heterogeneity of informal practices. This has led to time-, space- and 
sector-specific conceptions and realisations of policy practices. 
 
Figure 2.1 summarises these municipal policies in relation to waste-picking, street vending 
and HBEs. It is important to recognise that municipal policies do not occur in clear-cut categories, 
but in practice, their policy approaches occur as part of a continuum, where in one extreme lies 
repression, and on the other lie policies of supportive approaches. 
  
Figure 2.1: Municipal Policies towards the Urban Informal Economy 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Looking more closely within these three UIE subsectors, we can observe an increasing 
recognition of supportive policy literature and practices. In the waste-picking subsector, co-
production theories explain public sector support policies as a strategy for achieving integral SWM 
services in the Global South, thus offering a second-best alternative that ‘fills the gap’ of state and 
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private sector failures (Joshi & Moore 2004, p41). Nevertheless, this concept of public service 
delivery emphasised by co-production theories contrasts with local government and NGO 
consideration that the primary objective of their policy practices is the ‘economic inclusion’ of 
informal workers. Regarding street vending and HBEs, although the literature describes an 
increasing number of supportive policies that attempt to raise the productivity of the average 
informal worker, it seems that a clear theoretical framework does not exist that could be used to 
argue in favour of informal activities as being providers of private products and services. This study 
of municipal policies aimed at the UIE analyses these support policies more closely, to create a 
better understanding of the rationality behind and the impact of a public sector that takes a more 
positive role regarding the UIE. The following chapter will take a close look at the research 
methodology used to explore the issues raised in the literature review. 
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CHAPTER 3 : METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter outlines the methods employed to study the impact of supportive municipal 
policies on performance in Santiago de Chile’s informal economy. First, I will provide an essential 
contextual background of the formal labour market reforms affecting the work enviroment in Santi-
ago de Chile. Then, I explain the reasons behind the selection of Santiago as a case study and the 
selection of the three particular informal sub-sectors (waste-pickers, HBEs and street markets). 
Third, these three informal sub-sectors are introduced in some detail. Fourth, I explain the reasons 
behind the selection of a mixed methods strategy as a means of exploring the research question. 
There is particular focus on the way in which an exploratory sequential design connects methods 
with the research question. Finally, qualitative and quantitative methods are explained in detail. 
 
THE EROSION OF FORMAL WORK QUALITY AT THE BOTTOM OF THE 
LABOUR MARKET. 
 
To address the first issue, we must understand the origin of poor conditions in low-end for-
mal workplaces. Santiago de Chile, the largest labour market in the country, has experienced a rapid 
transition from a highly regulated labour market to one of the most open and unregulated markets in 
Latin America (Lima & Paredes 2007, p.163). This has had a significant impact on decreasing the 
quality of formal work available for those at the bottom of the labour market. From 1930 to 1973, 
the labour market was characterised by strong state intervention aimed at reducing unemployment 
and enhancing working conditions, with high minimum wages, strong job security and access to 
social protection. During this period, trade unions had significant power as they were organised at a 
national level, with one union per enterprise and mandatory memberships. There were no limits 
placed on the duration of strikes, and the replacement of striking workers was forbidden. Minimum 
wages were settled well above inflation and additional employment benefits were achieved through 
trade union negotiations. Job security tended to be high, due to a law introduced in 1966 prohibiting 
unjustified dismissal of workers, which required all dismissals to be reported to the Ministry of La-
bour. Courts commonly ruled in favour of employees, imposing high monetary punishments for en-
terprises (Riveros 1995). Pensions were publicly administrated, centrally managed, and were not 
necessarily dependent on personal contributions, which led to significant pensions for workers on 
minimum wage. Health care was also public and centrally managed, and received large expenditure 
that was reflected in high access levels for unskilled labourers (Lima & Paredes 2007, p.163). Addi-
tionally, formal workers were granted access to several homeownership programmes. 
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Since 1973, Chile like many other countries has experienced a rolling back of the state, with 
the imposition of structural adjustment reforms permanently transforming labour market conditions 
in Chile, particularly for unskilled formal workers. In the six years following the coup d’état trade 
unions were banned, and the process of bargaining over wages was replaced by a central state that 
set increases in minimum wage close to inflation levels, which in practice led them to stagnate. Fol-
lowing this, through the Labour Code of 1979, national unions were entirely dismantled and re-
placed by multiple unions at the level of individual firms, which dissolved their collective power, 
and laws were introduced permitting the replacement of striking workers. Job security also disap-
peared: dismissals no longer had to be reported to the Ministry of Labour, a justified cause for dis-
missals was no longer required and severance payments were cut down to a maximum of five 
months (Law Decree 2.200). Furthermore, in 1980, restrictions to subcontracting ended and enter-
prises were permitted to subcontract regular workers as self-employed (trabajadores independien-
tes) for fixed terms, without contracts and without the payment of social benefits, and with no cost 
sustained by the business at the termination of contracts (Lima & Paredes 2007, p.166). Access to 
social benefits associated with formal work were also cut. From 1970 to 1989, government expendi-
ture on public health and housing declined from 29.6% to 11.5% of the national GDP (Riveros 
1995), drastically reducing the minimum standard of public health, while housing schemes targeted 
only those in extreme poverty. In 1981, centralised public pensions and health systems were re-
placed by a system of private self-responsibility, which in practice meant that high-quality access 
was restricted to those who could contribute to the service in high amounts. This meant that those 
formal workers close to minimum wage faced access to an extremely low pension and an under-
funded public health system. 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the next four democratic governments opted to maintain 
most aspects of job flexibility and social security reforms from the previous two decades, incorpo-
rating few fundamental changes. One of the only significant changes occurred in 1991, as severance 
payments were increased from five to eleven months. Between 2001 and 2015, the minimum wage 
in Chile grew on average by only 2.6% p.a. in real terms, meaning that unskilled workers experi-
enced slow income growth (OECD 2014). Therefore, this massive deregulation over the last 40 
years has seen a significant decrease in work quality of formal work, particularly for those at the 
bottom of the labour market, i.e. those more likely to trade off between informal and formal em-
ployment options. 
 
CASE STUDY SELECTION: GREATER SANTIAGO DE CHILE   
 
In Chapter 1, I established three points sustaining the selection of Santiago de Chile as an 
appropriate case study for this thesis: having a well-functioning public sector, a sizeable informal 
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economy and having a diversity of informal sub-sectors. It is important however to recognise that 
Santiago de Chile has also been chosen for reasons driven by its unique geographical makeup. 
 
Much of the appeal of Santiago is due to its containing a wide diversity of municipal policy 
approaches within one single region. To effectively study the impact of municipal policies, the im-
pact of regional and national policies must be isolated. Complications arise if we compare two mu-
nicipal policies across different regions or nations, as the impacts of the municipal policy become 
more difficult to distinguish when regional or national influences – such as culture, regulations and 
taxes – are also affecting the results. By studying municipal policies within the same nation, and 
particularly within the same region, we work within a context of homogenous external policies (i.e. 
we have a natural control strategy for non-local policies), and thus changes in performance can be 
directly linked to municipal conditions. It is particularly advantageous that (Greater) Santiago de 
Chile contains a large diversity of municipal policies within its one region. When compared with 
other potential Chilean regions, Greater Santiago is the only one to contain a large sample of 37 ur-
ban municipalities, thus providing a wide variety of municipal approaches that can be tested – in-
cluding dualist-voluntarist, neoliberal, structuralist and supportive policies. Finally, studying the 
informal economy in Chile, and in Santiago in particular, is in itself a contribution to the existing 
literature, as it expands the scarce research on the informal economy in this country. 
 
SELECTION OF SUB-SECTORS WITHIN THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
 
 The three sub-sectors of the informal economy – waste-pickers, HBEs, and street vendors – 
have been selected on the basis of three criteria: permanence over time, diversity and employment 
generation. Regarding the first criterion, these three sectors have long been part of the landscape of 
Chile and Greater Santiago. For example, waste-picking has been present for more than 40 years (as 
reported by Castro and Paz in 1976). Mobile, periodic street markets have been in existence for 
even longer. Indeed, street markets date back to colonial times when small producers gathered peri-
odically in villages to sell their products. From this point, the activity of street vending went on to 
expand with urbanisation. In 1955, there were already 87 (periodic) street markets in Santiago, 
while in 2013 the number had expanded to 425 (ASOF 2014). Finally, as with waste-picking, the 
origins of HBEs date back at least 38 years, with attempts to introduce location and tax regime 
regulations noted in law 19.749, dating to 1979 (CNCh, 2001). 
 
 Regarding the second point, these three sub-sectors represent a large diversity of informali-
ty, judged by their connection to formal supply/demand chains, use of public/private space, whether 
the activities are fixed or mobile, their level of formality and amount of regulation (see Table 3.1). 
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Waste-picking is connected with the formal economy through chains of supply; it is performed in 
both public and private space, it is a mobile activity, and it is almost completely informal with very 
little regulation. Street vending is connected to the formal economy through the demand chain, uses 
mainly public space, is a fixed-mobile activity, and is more formal and regulated than waste-picking 
(e.g. street vendors pay municipal taxes but not business taxes). HBEs are connected through both 
the supply and demand chains, use mainly private space, are fixed activities, and are the most for-
mal and regulated informal enterprises of my sample (some of them pay municipal and business 
taxes, but do not satisfy land and sector specific regulations such as sanitary, electricity or working 
conditions). Finally, as explained in Chapter 1, these three activities combined provide a large 
amount of employment, accounting for more than 15% of the total employment in Chile. 
 
Table 3.1: Characteristics of Waste-Picking, Street Vending and Home-Based Enterprises 
 
 
Waste-Picking Street Vending HBE 
Characteristics       
     Link with formality Supply chain Demand chain Supply and demand chain 
     Space of operation Public and private Public Private 
     Level of mobility Full Partial Fixed 
     Level of informality Complete High Soft 
        
Rule of law       
     Recognition No Yes Yes 
     Local taxes No Yes Yes 
     Local regulations No Yes Yes 
     National taxes No No Partial 
     National regulations No No Partial 
        
Power of the municipality       
     Authorisation  Yes Yes Yes 
     Determining location Yes Yes  No 
     Determining taxation - Yes  Yes 
     Fixing of additional regulations Yes Yes Yes  
     Determining operation schedule Yes Yes   No 
     Police controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
     Closure of the business - Yes  Yes  
 
Source: Based on survey by author. ‘Recognition’ refers to whether or not the activity is officially recognised as 
employment by law. Local and national regulations refers to whether or not the activity is subject to regulations. 
 
 For each of the informal sub-sectors, municipalities within Greater Santiago have been se-
lected to study in detail. Selection has been based on a strategy of maximum variation and match-
ing. To do this, I first searched policy reports, newspapers and online news articles to locate extreme 
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cases where the informal sector is supported or repressed by local authorities. Second, the theoreti-
cal framework of three schools of thought (dualist-voluntarist, structuralist, and neoliberal) plus 
emerging supportive policies has been used to complement the previous selection, matching munic-
ipalities with existing schools of the informal economy. For this, an initial interview with the leader 
of the national organisation of informal self-entrepreneurs in each sector was used to inform the 
final selection of cases. The research accordingly obtained a purposive sample that has maximum 
variance of existing municipal policy approaches.  
 
WASTE-PICKING, STREET VENDING AND HOME-BASED ENTERPRISES IN 
CHILE  
 
 The next section introduces the three chosen sub-sectors of the informal economy, outlining 
their demographic, economic, social and gender characteristics. The information is presented at the 
national level, and when possible, at the regional level.   
 
Waste-picking in Chile  
 
 Waste-picking has been present in Chile for least 40 years, as Castro and Paz (1976) report-
ed people collecting food, bones, and scraps to make a living. They were referred to by several 
names during this time, such as ‘hueseros’ (bone collectors), ‘cachureros’ (collectors of odds and 
ends) or ‘cartoneros’ (cardboard collectors), and more recently have been referred to as 
‘recicladores’ (recyclers). The activity expanded to include the collection of recyclable materials, 
such as paper, cardboard or plastic bottles, following the incorporation of large recycling compa-
nies. Nowadays, in both cooperatives and independently, waste-pickers collect for two purposes: 
recycling (by selling to middlemen who then sell the product on as raw material to local industries) 
or reusing (by selling odds and ends in street markets). Waste-picker activities can be found 
throughout the fifteen regions of Chile, from the cold south to the hot north of the country, and con-
stitute an estimated 51,600 people nationwide. Almost all workers in the sector have very low levels 
of education, with 92% not having completed secondary school. The activity is mainly male-
dominated (81% are men). Gender differences are important – even though female waste-pickers 
have higher levels of education than males, they have much lower levels of income and access to 
pensions (see Table 3.2). 
 
 In the Santiago Metropolitan Region there are 14,700 waste-pickers (28% of the total 
waste-pickers in Chile), composed of around 12,083 men and 2,627 women. Although regional au-
thorities in Santiago intervene insofar as they set the minimum standards for SWM administration, 
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it is the municipalities that fully control the system by designing, implementing, enforcing and pay-
ing for it. As a result, waste-pickers are mainly affected by the municipal policies that are in place 
where they work. Recycling activities in Santiago comprise a number of uncoordinated activities: 
waste-picking, designated recyclable collection-points and the selling of waste between enterprises. 
However, waste-pickers alone account for 70% of the total waste recycled in the Santiago metropol-
itan region, recycling 10% of the total amount of waste produced and removing 810 tonnes of waste 
from landfills each day (CONAMA 2005). Waste-picking is thus relevant for both its generation of 
employment and positive environmental impact. 
 
Table 3.2: Demography, Economic Condition, Social Security and Capital Access of Waste-Pickers 
in Chile  
Waste-Pickers (national figures) Male Female Total 
Demography       
1. Sex (%) 80.8 19.3 100.0 
2. Age (mean) 47.0 45.8 46.8 
3. Household size 4.0 4.7 4.1 
4. Education (%)       
Incomplete secondary school 95.0 81.2 92.4 
Complete secondary school 3.7 18.8 5.9 
Incomplete technical or university  0.9 0.0 0.7 
Complete technical or university  0.4 0.0 0.3 
 
Economic Situation       
5. Average income per worker (monthly)   263.42USD  133.14USD   237.89USD  
6. Working hours per week  41.6 33.5 40.0 
7. Average productivity per day  6.33USD   3.98USD   5.94USD  
8. Have second employment (%)       
Yes 20.0 0.3 16.2 
No  80.0 99.7 83.8 
9. Poverty (%)       
Indigent 4.3 0 3.5 
Poor 21.1 6.3 18.3 
Non-poor 74.6 93.7 78.3 
Social Security       
10. Pension access (%)       
Yes 59.8 25.4 53 
No  40.2 74.6 47 
11. Access to healthcare (%)       
None 0.6 0 0.5 
Public health 98.8 0 99.0 
Public (low coverage) 52.8 99.7 61.8 
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Table 3.2: Demography, Economic Condition, Social Security and Capital Access of Waste-Pickers 
in Chile (continuation) 
 
Waste-Pickers (national figures) Male Female Total 
Public (low-medium) 33.1 0.3 26.8 
Public (medium) 10.8 0 8.7 
Public (medium-high) 2.1 0 1.7 
Private health 0.6 0 0.5 
 
Would move to formal economy (same income)? (%)       
Yes  27.8 6.3 21.7 
No 68.1 93.7 75.4 
 
Capitalisation (%)       
12. Vehicle ownership (for work purposes) 0.2 0 0.0016 
13. Mobile phone ownership 50.0 20.1 44.2 
14. Size of residential plot       
<100 sq. metres 65.9 87.7 63.0 
101-200 sq. metres 25.3 5.3 21.3 
201-300 sq. metres 8.8 0.3 7.1 
301-500 sq. metres 7.8 0 6.3 
>500 sq. metres 1.2 6.7 2.4 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Data from CASEN 2009 (Chilean household survey). Data represents a subsample 
of the survey selected by activity (waste-picking) and work location (in the street). Regional weights provided 
by the survey have been used in estimation. 
  
 
Street vending and street markets in Chile 
 
 Street vending activities, and particularly street markets, are present in fourteen out of 
fifteen regions of Chile. There are a total of 124,058 street vending enterprises in Chile, generating 
134,861 jobs (see Table 3.3), i.e. 2% of national employment. Concentrated in the Santiago 
Metropolitan Region, there are 78,715 street vending micro-enterprises (65% of the national total) 
generating 85,569 jobs. Almost all of these enterprises are small in size, employing fewer than 5 
workers (98.9%). Street vendors have low levels of education, with 96.0% of all street vendors 
having only secondary (26.5%) or lower (69.6%) levels of schooling. Regarding gender, men and 
women are almost equally represented in the activity nation-wide, however women have lower 
incomes and access to pension and health schemes. 
 
 Among street vendors, the largest group comprises the ‘feriantes’, which refers to those 
who sell in ‘ferias libres’ (street markets). Ferias libres have been part of the landscape of Santiago 
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for more than 100 years. According to the Chilean National Confederation of Street Markets 
(ASOF, from its Spanish acronym) (2014), there are a total of 66,514 feriantes in Chile. In the 
Santiago Metropolitan Region, there are 425 ferias libres where 42,203 (63.5%) feriantes are 
working (ibid.). 
 
 Regional and national regulations only prohibit the sale of certain types of products – such 
as food cooked in the street – but in general terms, as ‘administrators of the public space’, 
municipalities are in charge of all other aspects of ferias libres regulation (MICh 2006). 
Municipalities thus fully determine and administrate the very existence of street markets by 
determining their number, size, location, permanence and tax payments. Ferias libres are temporary 
markets, and over the course of a week perform several ‘posturas’ (the process of setting up, trading 
and dismantling a street market in a particular location, see Plates 3.1 through 3.3), moving to 
different neighborhoods on particular days. Each feriante can go through as many as 3 or 4 posturas 
in a week. Feriantes pay ‘patentes’ (local taxes), the price being determined by each municipality. 
However, they do not pay national taxes, such as VAT or income tax. Ferias libres sell food (60.2%) 
(mainly fruits, vegetables, fish and seafood), products for the home (28.2%) and personal items 
(11.60%), and represent the main providers of fruits and vegetables (70%), seafood and fish (50%) 
and eggs (50%) for Chilean households.  
 
Plate 3.1: Demarcation of feriantes’ stall.
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete. 
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Plate 3.2: Feriantes installing their stalls, Maipú. 
 
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete. 
 
Plate 3.3: Feriante selling fruit and vegetables to local customers. 
 
 
 
 Source: Pablo Navarrete.  
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Table 3.3: Demography, Economic Condition, Social Security and Capital Access of Street Vendors 
in Chile 
  
Street Vendors (national figures) Male Female Total 
Demography       
1. Total number 68,549 66,312 134,861 
2. Sex (%) 50.8 49.2 100.0 
3. Age (mean) 44.7 43.5 44.1 
4. Household size 4.5 4.4 4.5 
6. Education (%)       
Incomplete secondary school 71.7 67.4 69.6 
Complete secondary school 24.5 28.5 26.5 
Incomplete technical or university  2.2 1.8 2.0 
Complete technical or university 1.7 2.2 1.9 
Economic Situation       
7. Type of employment       
Employer/self-employed 90.1 93.9 92.0 
Worker 8.9 4.6 6.8 
Relative (unpaid) 1.0 1.5 1.2 
8. Average income per worker(monthly) 463.53USD   318.06USD  392.87USD  
9. Working hours per week 41.7 30.6 36.2 
10. Average productivity per day 11.11USD   10.40USD 10.87USD  
11. Enterprise size (%)       
Self-employment 61.9 67.3 64.6 
<5 workers 31.6 28.2 29.9 
5 or more workers 1.8 0.6 1.2 
11. Have second employment (%)       
Yes 3.7 4.7 4.2 
No 96.3 95.3 95.8 
12. Poverty (%)       
Indigent 2.2 2.7 2.5 
Poor 10.4 11.9 11.2 
Non-poor 87.4 85.3 86.38 
13. Sector (%)       
Retail 98.2 98.8 98.5 
Manufacture 1.1 0.4 0.7 
Other 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Social Security       
14. Pension access (%)        
Yes 40.3 30.9 35.6 
No  59.7 69.1 64.4 
15. Access to health (%)       
None 9.4 3.0 6.2 
Public health 89.9 94.7 92.2 
Private health 0.5 2.2 1.4 
Other 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Would move to formal economy (same salary)?   
Yes 26.0 31.9 28.9 
No 74.0 68.2 71.1 
Capitalisation (%)       
16. Vehicle ownership (for work purposes) 24.4 3.2 14.8 
17. Size of residential plot       
<100 sq. metres 38.5 47.1 42.7 
            101-200 sq. metres 39.2 31.8 35.5 
            201-300 sq. metres 12.8 12.5 12.7 
            301-500 sq. metres 5.2 4.8 5.0 
            >500 sq. metres 4.3 3.8 4.1 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Data from CASEN 2009 (Chilean household survey). Data represents a 
subsample of the survey selected by activity (retail), work location (in the street) and payment of VAT 
taxes (none). Regional weights provided by the survey have been used in estimation. 
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Home-based enterprises in Chile 
 
HBEs are registered in Chile under the title of ‘Micro-Empresa Familiar’ (micro family en-
terprises) (MEFs). MEFs are defined as ‘enterprises owned by one or more people who perform 
their activity inside the house where the owner lives’ (MHCh 2002). In the fifteen regions of Chile, 
there a total of 671,256 HBEs that generate 919,529 jobs, representing 13.9% of total national em-
ployment. In Santiago Metropolitan Region there are 292,197 HBEs generating 400,270 jobs, i.e. 
10.0% of total employment in this region. HBEs are small in size, with 93% of them having fewer 
than nine workers (see Table 3.4). As many as 93.9% of them are concentrated within five economic 
sectors: retail (27.4%), services (24.6%), manufacture (17.0%), construction (16.1%) and finance, 
insurance and real estate (8.84%). Regarding gender, as in other parts of Latin America (see Gough 
1993, p.100) HBEs contain a similar proportion of men and women, and key gender stereotypes can 
be noted. Women are concentrated in retail, domestic-related services (such as laundry work), cloth-
ing manufacture, hairdressing and small restaurant activities. For men, the most relevant activities 
are construction, retail, mechanics, house-related services and furniture manufacture. 
 
At a national level, although people working in HBEs have higher levels of education than 
waste-pickers and street vendors, their overall education levels are still quite low: 81.67% of people 
working in HBEs have only secondary education or lower. However, a considerable discrepancy 
with the other two informal sub-sectors arises in the proportion of people holding a higher educa-
tion degree (11.5%, compared with less than 2% for the other groups). As with the other sub-
sectors, despite men and women having similar levels of education, women still earn much less than 
men (around two-thirds) for the same number of hours worked, and have lower levels of access to 
pensions. 
 
Regarding the regulatory system, regional and national regulations prohibit HBEs that in-
volve activities catalogued as ‘disturbing, hazardous or polluting’ (MHCh 2001, art. 1). Moreover, 
HBEs are expected to comply with regional regulations specific to the sector in which they operate, 
such as sanitary regulation for restaurants or noise regulations for furniture manufacturing. With this 
basic framework, municipalities fully determine and administer the existence of HBEs. These en-
terprises pay local taxes and are requested to pay national VAT and income taxes, however in prac-
tice 73% of HBEs pay neither of these. Municipalities also determine land regulation and control 
construction codes that HBEs must follow. In practice, municipalities are in charge of enforcing 
these regulations over time, thus having a large leeway to either tolerate or shut down HBEs. 
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Table 3.4: Demography, Economic Condition, Social Security and Capital Access of HBEs in Chile  
 
 
 
Home-based enterprises (national figures) Male Female Total 
Demography       
1. Total number 538,447 381,082 919,529 
2. Sex (mean) 58.2 41.8 100.0 
3. Age (mean) 45.2 45.8 45.4 
4. Household size 4.0 4.0 4.0 
5. VAT (%)*       
Paid (services) 12.3 11.3 11.9 
Paid (goods) 12.6 16.7 14.3 
Not paid 75.1 72.0 73.8 
6. Education (%)       
Incomplete secondary school  48.9 44.8 47.2 
Complete secondary school 32.9 36.7 34.5 
Incomplete technical or university  7.4 6.0 6.8 
Complete technical or university  10.8 12.5 11.5 
Economic Situation       
7. Type of employment (%)       
Employer/self-employed 69.3 78.2 73.0 
Worker 29.5 19.7 25.4 
Relative (unpaid) 1.2 2.1 1.6 
8. Average income per worker (monthly)    781.03USD   463.83USD   651.26USD  
9. Working hours per week 43.0 37.1 40.5 
10. Average productivity per day  18.17USD   12.51USD   16.06USD  
11. Enterprise size (%)       
Self-employment 53.1 63.9 59.6 
<9 workers 35.0 28.8 33.5 
10 or more workers 12.0 7.3 6.9 
11. Have second employment (%)       
Yes 7.1 5.7 6.5 
No  92.9 94.4 93.5 
12. Poverty (%)       
Indigent 1.9 1.6 1.8 
Poor 6.6 6.3 6.5 
Non-poor 91.5 92.1 91.8 
13. Sector (%) 92.2 96.5 94.0 
Retail 18.2 40.2 27.4 
Services 19.3 31.9 24.6 
Manufacture 16.2 18.2 17.0 
Construction 27.0 1.0 16.1 
Finance, insurance & real estate 11.5 5.2 8.8 
Social security       
14. Pension access (%)       
Yes 64.2 50.4 58.5 
No  35.8 49.6 41.5 
15. Access to health (%)       
None 6.2 2.7 4.7 
Public health 44.6 45.5 45.0 
Private health 3.7 5.3 4.4 
Other 0.8 1.0 0.9 
Would move to formal economy (same salary?)       
Yes 31.0 22.2 27.1 
No 69.0 77.8 73.0 
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Table 3.5: Demography, Economic Condition, Social Security and Capital Access of HBEs in Chile  
(Continuation) 
 
MIXED METHODS: EXPLORATORY SEQUENTIAL DESIGN  
 
 I have used a mixed method strategy of data collection and analysis to undertake this study. 
An early definition of mixed methodology defines it as including ‘at least one quantitative method 
(designed to collect numbers) and one qualitative method (designed to collect words)’ (Greene et al. 
1989, p.256). Greene’s definition was then expanded upon by Johnson et al. (2007, p.123), who 
defined mixed method research as a ‘type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers 
combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g. use of qualitative and 
quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis and inference techniques) for the purpose of 
breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration’. Finally, Greene (2007, p.20) complements 
this definition, clarifying that mixed methods are not an eclectic methodology where ‘everything 
goes’, but rather they allow for the expression of ‘multiple ways of seeing and hearing, multiple 
ways of making sense of the social world’. I have used a mixed method strategy to both deepen the 
understanding and corroboration in the study, and to allow for multiple (research) narratives of 
informal entrepreneurship. 
 
 The use of a mixed method strategy in this research project is justified for two reasons: first, 
studying the impact of local supportive policy on the informal economy from one source of data 
seems insufficient, and second, the incorporation of both methods appears to be complementary. On 
the one hand, qualitative research (studying small samples) builds a deep understanding of the 
diversity of informal entrepreneurs’ visions, their reasons for entering into an activity and the 
specificities of informal sub-sectors in Santiago de Chile. Moreover, qualitative analysis allows us 
to explore municipalities’ understanding of the informal economy, and thus the logic behind 
Home-based enterprises (national figures) Male Female Total 
Capitalisation (%)       
16. Vehicle ownership (for work purposes) 16.5 7.5 13.8 
17. Mobile phone ownership 78.5 77.3 78.0 
18. Size of residential plot       
<100 sq. metres 34.6 36.9 30.1 
101-200 sq. metres 29.7 30.5 30.6 
201-300 sq. metres 13.4 13.9 13.6 
301-500 sq. metres 8.4 8.4 8.4 
>500 sq. metres 13.9 10.4 12.5 
Source: Own elaboration. Data from CASEN 2009 (Household survey of Chile). Data represents a 
subsample of the survey selected by activity (all except maids) and place of work (in the home). Regional 
weights provided by the survey have been used in estimation. 
*Percentage of businesses that pay VAT, broken down into service businesses and goods businesses 
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municipal policymaking. Finally, qualitative methods can lead to more complete theories of the 
informal economy, and a better understanding of the limitations of a local supportive approach. 
However, qualitative conclusions are unlikely to be generalisable to a larger population since they 
are susceptible to different sources of bias arising from sampling methods, interviewees’ responses 
and the researcher’s personal interpretation of verbal data (Collier & Mahoney 1996; Creswell & 
Plano-Clark 2011; Kvale 1994). Qualitative methodology can thus inform us about expectations but 
tell us little about the impact of supportive municipal policy approaches or the generalisability of 
their impacts. 
 
 On the other hand, quantitative analysis (studying large samples) allows us to measure how 
representative and accurate competing explanations of the informal economy are. It also permits us 
to explore the ability to extrapolate qualitative findings to a larger population. Furthermore, it 
enables us to assess the impacts of supportive policy approaches and explore the effectiveness of 
specific municipal policies on performance within the informal economy. Nevertheless, this method 
alone tells us nothing about the reasons behind the impacts and rationality of municipal policy, 
which are so central to this research. Additionally, exclusive reliance on quantitative methods can 
fail to test emerging municipal approaches and/or specific policies that are currently in place but are 
not contained in the existing literature. This is particularly relevant to this study as there is currently 
no theoretical framework to explain why municipalities decide to support the informal economy 
(particularly true for the cases of street vendors and HBEs), nor the logic behind the design of 
supportive policies and their expected outcomes. 
 
The limitations of both qualitative methods can be counterbalanced by the strengths of 
quantitative methods, and vice versa (Creswell & Plano-Clark 2011, p.8). With this combination of 
methods, I will be able to provide a more complete and robust understanding of municipal policies 
that is generalisable whilst still acknowledging the diversity in the informal sector. 
 
Exploratory sequential design 
 
This research utilises an exploratory sequential design (ESD) from among several other 
possible mixed method strategies. Creswell and Plano-Clark (2011, p.68) identify six common ty-
pologies of mixed method studies applied to social science research, each of which emphasises dif-
ferent levels of priority, timing, mixing and interaction (see Table 3.5). 
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Table 3.6: Six Common Typologies of Mixed Methods Applied to Social Science Research 
N Type                                                  Notation 
1 Convergent parallel design Quant    +    Qual   =  converge results 
2 Explanatory sequential design QUANT  qual    =  explain results 
3 Exploratory sequential design QUAL     quant  =  generalise findings 
4 Embedded design QUANT  (qual)  =  enhance experiment  
5 Transformative design Quant    Qual   =  interpretation 
6 Multiphase design QualQuantQual…  =  program evaluation    
 
Adapted from Creswell and Plano-Clark (2011, p.68). Notation system suggested by Moser 1991, Nastasi et al. 2007 
and Moser and Niehaus 2009. ‘quant’ indicates quantitative, ‘qual’ indicates qualitative, upper and lower letters de-
note prioritised method, ‘+’ indicates that methods occurs at the same time, ‘’ indicates a sequence, ‘’ indi-
cates implementation in a recursive fashion, ‘=’ indicates the purpose of using a mixed method. 
 
Moser (1991) and Morgan (1998) underline that an ESD method, with a qualitative-priority, 
is particularly suitable to test specific aspects of emergent theory or to explore a phenomenon in 
depth, and then measure the relevance of competing explanations. In this sense, this particular 
method fits my research purpose as it can provide a deep understanding of local supportive policy-
making, first by building on existing and emergent theory, and then by evaluating the accuracy of 
its policy predictions. ESD is used in a two-stage strategy: first qualitative, and then quantitative 
methodology (Creswell & Plano-Clark 2011). In the first step, I have used a qualitative approach 
where verbal data were collected and analysed in an initial stage of fieldwork from June to Septem-
ber 2014. From this, qualitative analysis was carried out to identify the various visions, motivations, 
explanations and logic behind the impacts of municipal policies (Creswell et al. 2003; Greene et al. 
1989). In the second step, quantitative data were collected in a second stage of fieldwork from Au-
gust 2015 to January 2016. From this, data were then used to test the plausibility and/or generalisa-
bility of qualitative findings to a larger population. This research applies ESD in its theory-
development variant, prioritising qualitative research to develop emergent theory or taxonomies 
(rather than instruments) and then testing the relevance of this theory and its relationship to a larger 
population (Creswell & Plano-Clark 2011) (see Figure 3.1). Findings are reported in an interactive 
manner allowing the reader to compare qualitative and quantitative results.   
Figure 3.1: Exploratory Sequential Design (adapted from Creswell and Plano-Clark 2011) 
 
 73 
First stage: qualitative study 
 
The qualitative component of this study explores three central themes with a sample of 97 
participants. The first theme engages with understanding informal activities in the context of Santi-
ago de Chile: what are the motivations behind informal entrepreneurs entering and/or exiting the 
activity, what are the links between the formal and informal economies and what is the economic 
evolution behind each informal activity? The second theme pertains to understanding the relation-
ship between municipalities and informal entrepreneurs, how municipalities perceive informal en-
trepreneurs, what the rationality is behind supportive local policymaking towards informality, and 
what are the impacts of those policies. The final theme explores the limitations of supporting infor-
mal entrepreneurs at the local level, and potential solutions to overcome these limitations. For this 
purpose, verbal data from interviews with local authorities and local leaders of informal unions, as 
well as group discussions with informal workers in Santiago, were collected. In this section I dis-
cuss the sampling, collection, analysis and interpretation strategies used to gather and study these 
qualitative data. 
 
A criterion sampling strategy 
 
This research uses a purposive sampling strategy to recruit participants in interviews and 
group discussions. In particular, it uses a criterion sampling strategy (Hay et al. 2010) where 
participants were selected to accurately reflect as much as possible the diversity of municipal 
approaches towards the informal economy (dualist-voluntarist, structuralist, neoliberal, and 
emerging support policies). As noted in Chapter 1, to select the sample for each informal sector, I 
explored policies and news reports, as well as performing interviews with national representatives 
of informal organisations, in particular the National Movement of Recyclers of Chile (MNRCh) to 
represent waste-pickers, the Chilean National Confederation of Street Markets (ASOF) for street 
vendors and the National Confederation of Small Industry and Handcraft (CONUPIA) for HBEs. 
Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 show the municipalities selected for each sub-sector of the UIE using this 
sampling strategy. 
 
Following this, for each municipality, local informal organisations were contacted using the 
information provided by the corresponding national organisation. For each local organisation a 
member of the directive was selected and interviewed. Local leaders provided information about the 
municipal department with which they interact most closely and provided contacts for local 
informal entrepreneurs. The municipal department was then contacted separately without 
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referencing informal local leaders, and an interview was conducted with the chief officer. Similarly, 
local informal entrepreneurs were contacted by telephone and invited to a neighbourhood space to 
conduct a group discussion. 
 
Figure 3.2: Municipalities Selected to Study Policies Towards Waste-Picking 
 
 
Municipal Approaches: Santiago (Dualist approach), Pudahuel and Cerrillos 
(Neoliberal), Recoleta (Structuralist), La Reina and Peñalolen ( Support) 
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Figure 3.3: Municipalities Selected to Study Policies Towards Home-Based Enterprises 
 
Municipal approaches: None for dualist approach, La Granja and Las Condes 
(neoliberal), Lo Prado (structuralist), Santiago (support) 
 
Figure 3.4: Municipalities Selected to Study Policies Towards Street Vending 
 
Municipal Approaches: La Granja (dualist), Maipú (neoliberal), Conchalí 
(structuralist), Macul (support) 
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Data collection: group discussions and interviews 
 
Qualitative data collection consisted of in-depth semi-structured interviews and focus 
groups, involving a total of 97 participants over three informal sectors (a detailed list of interviews 
is provided in Annex 9). I conducted semi-structured interviews and focus groups face-to-face from 
the beginning of June to the end of September 2014. Before commencing interviews and groups 
discussions, the objective of the research was explained, and anonymity was guaranteed. Interviews 
and groups discussions were electronically recorded and then fully transcribed into Microsoft Word 
for later analysis. All original names of participants have been replaced by pseudonyms in order to 
preserve their anonymity. 
 
Interviews  
 
Thirty-six in-depth interviews were conducted with municipal officers, national and local 
leaders of informal organisations, and when necessary middlemen and leaders of formal industries. 
This strategy served two purposes: allowing for the collection of information from all actors, in-
cluding those on both the designing and receiving ends of municipal policies; and the triangulation 
of information from multiple informants. Twelve topic guides were built to collect verbal data, i.e. 
one for each sector and each type of participant (with three informal sectors and four participant 
types). Questions in the topic guides explore five areas of informality: reasons for working in the 
particular activity; reasons for entry and exit; linkages with the formal economy; rationale of munic-
ipal policies; and the limitations of policies (see Annexes 10, 11 and 12). Interviews lasted between 
46 minutes and 2 hours 7 minutes. Interviews were conducted on the site of the activity, meaning 
that I was able to observe the context of informal workers. Participants were required to express 
their verbal consent before being interviewed and recorded. 
 
Group discussions 
 
Twelve group discussions were conducted with 61 informal workers across the three infor-
mal sub-sectors. As explained above, local leaders provided a list of contacts of informal entrepre-
neurs, and from these a sample of ten people was selected for each municipality in order to provide 
a diversity of socio-demographic characteristics, notably age and gender. Group discussions took 
place in ‘sedes vecinales’ (neighbourhood association spaces) and participation was voluntary, thus 
accounting for the varying numbers of participants across group discussions. One topic guide for 
each sector was designed to conduct groups discussions. Questions in these topic guides explore six 
aspects of informality: entry and exit in the activity; economic rationality of the activity; capital en-
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dowments; municipal policies; relations with local authorities; working conditions; and negative 
externalities of the activity (see Annexes 10, 11 and 12). Focus group attendance varied, ranging 
from 4 to 8 informal entrepreneurs, and sessions lasted between 1 hour 3 minutes and 1 hour 39 
minutes. After explaining the objective of the research and ensuring anonymity, participants were 
asked to express verbal consent to be recorded. One participant refused to participate. 
 
Group discussion started by asking participants to introduce themselves to the group and, 
when required, explain their type of activity performed. I then introduced some general themes re-
garding their motivations behind starting an informal enterprise, and alternate motivations for un-
dertaking formal work. Following this, I moved the discussion to their capital endowments and 
problems faced when developing their enterprises, finally moving to the more complicated ques-
tions of negative externalities and their relationships with their respective municipalities. During the 
focus group, I stimulated interaction and focused on divergent opinions, to enrich the diversity of 
qualitative data collected. 
 
Ages in these group discussions ranged from 28 to 65 (with a mean of 49) and gender was 
generally balanced across focus groups, although certain groups were skewed towards men. One 
group discussion was comprised only of men and another only of women. Age, gender and duration 
of each focus group is shown in Table 3.7 . 
 
 Table 3.7: Composition of Group Discussions by Activity, Municipality, Gender and Age. 
Activity Municipality 
Local Policy Ap-
proach 
Men Women Total 
Age 
(mean) 
Duration of the 
interview 
Waste-pickers               
  Pudahuel Repression 2 2 4 50 01:00:00 
  Cerrillos Tolerance 3 1 4 52 01:03:00 
  Recoleta Weak support 4 2 6 52 01:02:00 
  Peñalolén Strong support 3 4 7 48 01:05:00 
Street Vendors               
  La Granja Repression 3 2 5 50 01:27:00 
  Maipú Tolerance 6 0 6 48 01:03:00 
  Conchalí Weak support 2 2 4 51 01:04:00 
  Macul Strong support 3 1 4 52 01:37:00 
Home-Base Enterprises             
  La Granja Repression 1 3 4 49 01:07:00 
  Las Condes Tolerance 2 3 5 51 01:39:00 
  Lo Prado Weak support 1 5 6 49 01:39:00 
  Santiago Strong support 0 6 6 43 01:23:00 
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Data analysis: a hybrid thematic method 
 
I introduced earlier the concept of a hybrid approach of deductive and inductive analysis in 
my methodological process (see Mixed Methods: A Qualitative-Quantitative Approach). I will now 
focus on the practicalities of implementing such a method following the data collection process de-
scribed above. To gather an insight into the themes and concepts present throughout the data, a de-
ductive approach has been used to build a ‘theory-driven codebook’ that contains the main interpre-
tations and policy recommendations from the different schools of thought. These codes were built 
following Boyatzis’ (1998) methodology: by identifying labels, defining labels and describing ways 
of interpreting the code. As recommended by Fereday and Munir-Cochrane (2006), checks were 
performed to improve the reliability of the code. The following process is applied: first, the code-
book was tested on a portion of an interview; second, corrections were made to the codebook to 
include any missing theory-driven categories; and finally, the codebook was applied to the full data 
set. The verbal data, previously digitalised in Microsoft Word, was entered into the N-VIVO data 
management software and codified according to the ‘theory-driven codebook’. N-VIVO was rele-
vant for managing a large verbal data base, to introduce emerging themes and categories in code-
books, and particularly to explore data through graphical analysis tools and to track the representa-
tive quotes.  
 
The deductive approach was complemented with an inductive approach. After fully coding 
the verbal data according to the ‘theory-driven codebook’, the remaining data was coded in order to 
incorporate emerging themes to build a ‘data-driven codebook’. At the same time, I took notes of 
the emerging concepts in order to build a larger construct of organised themes. This data-driven 
analysis constitutes the main source of new findings as these categories are not contained in the ex-
isting literature concerning the informal economy. From this exercise a complete codebook was 
built that captures the full richness of my qualitative data, allowing for a deep understanding (Bo-
yatzis 1998) of informal activities and approaches to municipal policies in Santiago de Chile (a 
short sample of waste-picker codebook is provided in Annex 16).  
 
Interpretation: themes and quotes 
 
Data interpretation has been performed according to Attride-Stirling’s (2001) recommenda-
tions as follows: first, the ‘basic themes’ (lower-order) are identified; second, they are grouped ac-
cording to ‘organising themes’ that summarise abstract concepts (middle-order); finally, they are 
grouped into ‘global themes’ (higher order) to encapsulate the main findings of the research. To 
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facilitate the analysis of verbal data, two tools have been used: memos and N-VIVO tools. First, 
memo notes taken throughout the process of coding summarise the key concepts and ideas that 
emerge from the data. Second, using N-VIVO tools to explore data, graphics such as tree maps and 
bar charts are constructed. These data analysis tools allowed me to graphically compare the intensi-
ty of coding in categories across all interviews and group discussions. This is not used for statistical 
ends, but rather as a tool to ensure that important categories underlined by the interviewees are not 
left out. 
 
Findings are reported with stress placed on two issues: assessing how well existing theories 
match with each informal activity in Santiago and reporting new findings of emerging subjects for 
the case studies. When reporting findings, analytical and empirical evidence is provided. In practi-
cal terms, findings are presented in analytical paragraphs (researcher’s voice) and supported with 
interview/group discussion quotes (respondents’ voices) in accordance with Baxter and Eyles’ 
(1996, p.508) recommendations. The selection of quotations presented in the final report follows 
two criteria: representativeness and inclusion. Representativeness refers to the extent to which an 
interviewee’s quote reflects/illustrates the underlying concept that is being analysed. Inclusion is 
used in the sense of incorporating as many interviewees’ voices as possible. Representativeness of 
underlying concepts is used as the main criterion for selection, whereas an approach of inclusion is 
necessary for cases where several quotes express the underlying concepts clearly. 
 
A note on evaluating rigour 
 
Baxter and Eyles (1996), after reviewing 31 qualitative papers, developed a number of 
strategies to ensure rigour in qualitative analysis. My research uses nine of these strategies. First, 
this research has already clearly presented the rationale for its methodology – using qualitative 
methods to explore the role of local policies and quantitative analysis to expand upon these results. 
Second, this research uses two types of triangulation: sources and methods. According to Baxter 
and Eyles (1996, p.508) ‘triangulation is one of the most powerful techniques to strengthen (the) 
credibility (of findings)’ as multiple sources converge in their results. Triangulation of sources is 
performed by including interviews with public officers, informal leaders and informal workers, 
from which we can locate sources that corroborate each others’ descriptions. Moreover, the inclu-
sion of thematic and statistical analyses allows me to check that qualitative findings are confirmed 
by quantitative analysis and vice versa. Third, in this chapter, the method of selecting participants 
(criterion purposive sampling) and the reason for using this method are transparently stated. Fourth, 
quotations have been included to reveal how ‘meanings are expressed in the respondents’ own 
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words’ (Baxter and Eyles 1996, p.508). Fifth, details of how interviews were conducted through an 
overt technique and samples of questionnaires are presented (see Annexes 10, 11 and 12). Sixth, the 
procedure of analysis – a hybrid inductive/deductive method – is clearly stated (see Annex 16). 
Seventh, findings are contrasted with the existing literature to analyse the confirmation or refutation 
of existing theories. Eighth, the rationale of verification is guaranteed by the methodology chapter, 
which presents an explanation of the collection, analysis and interpretation of data. Finally, in the 
findings chapter, the presentation of both researcher and respondent voices allows the reader to 
evaluate the harmony between these two perspectives. 
 
 
Second stage: quantitative methodology 
 
Qualitative findings are tested and generalised using quantitative data sources. Quantitative 
analysis is used to triangulate, complement and expand upon the conclusions from the qualitative 
analysis (Grenne et al. 1989). Regarding triangulation, I look for convergence, corroboration and 
correspondence with qualitative results, enhancing the validity of findings (Bryman 2006). The 
quantitative analysis naturally provides further elaboration and illustration of qualitative data, en-
hancing the credibility of findings (Bryman 2006). Finally, this analysis expands on the qualitative 
results, so they can be applied to a larger population of informal entrepreneurs in each sub-sector. I 
will now describe the sampling, collection, analysis and interpretation strategies used in the quanti-
tative analysis. 
 
Sampling methods and data collection: primary and secondary data sources 
 
For quantitative analysis, this research uses primary and, to a lesser extent, secondary data. 
Since there are no other data sources available regarding existing municipal policies, it was neces-
sary to build up surveys that could provide a detailed characterisation of informal entrepreneurs and 
evaluate local policy impacts on each informal sub-sector.  
 
Primary quantitative data sources 
 
According to Groves et al. (2009, pp.69-70), sampling frames are essential to build repre-
sentative surveys – in some cases these already exist, in others they need to be built. In the case of 
waste-pickers, registration is not required, and some waste-pickers do not even have a fixed ad-
dress, so a sampling frame does not exist from which to build a representative survey. Therofore, a 
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census of cooperatives was applied as a second-best alternative.  In the case of HBEs and street 
vendors, Chilean municipalities have updated lists of ‘microempresas familiares’ (HBEs) and ‘feri-
antes’ (street vendors) that is updated every six months. This list contains the name of the owner, 
the location of the enterprise and types of goods traded.  
 
Census to four waste-pickers cooperatives 
 
A survey was designed to collect quantitative data from four cooperatives of waste-pickers 
(La Reina, Santiago, Cerrillos and Maipú). Specific cooperatives were selected to represent the pol-
icy approaches established in Chapter 2 (see p.56). Association leaders provided a list of members 
which was used to perform a census, achieving a 100% response rate. This survey was self-
administrated between March and April 2010 to 100 waste-pickers in the form of a census, collect-
ing data from all members of these cooperatives. For illiterate waste-pickers, I presented the survey 
verbally. With this quantitative data, I then tested the plausibility and relevance of the hypothesis 
established in the first qualitative stage of analysis. Given the non probabilistic nature of this sur-
vey, results should thus be interpreted carefully. Unlike street vendor and HBE surveys, they are 
valid for the surveyed cooperatives, and do not necessarily represent the larger population of waste-
pickers in Santiago de Chile. 
 
Stratified random sample survey for street vendors and HBEs 
 
For HBEs and street vendors, a stratified sample survey was designed. Sampling frames 
have been collected for 35 municipalities from the period May to June 2014 for both sectors
2
. From 
this, a stratified random sample was taken. The municipality was used as a stratum to guarantee the 
representativeness of HBEs and street vendors at the local level. Individuals were then selected ran-
domly from each stratum (in each municipality a simple random sample selection is performed), 
allowing a 95% confidence of representativeness of my sample. Between August and January 2015, 
a total of 402 surveys of randomly selected street vendors and 406 HBEs were administrated face-
to-face at the workplace by trained surveyors
3
 across 35 municipalities, achieving a response rate of 
70% and 71% for street vendors and HBEs respectively. As Groves et al. (2009) point out, sampling 
stratification techniques provide smaller standard errors and confidence intervals, leading to more 
accurate population estimates. 
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Secondary quantitative data 
 
Secondary data sources come mainly from municipal administrative data, the Chilean 
household survey (CASEN 2009) and from national informal unions. For all three sub-sectors, I 
drew upon administrative data from the 2015 Municipal System of Information 
(www.sinim.gov.cl). For the analysis of waste-picking activities, I have complemented my census 
survey results with the ‘Primera Encuesta de Recicladores y Recicladoras, 2013’ (PERR 2013) from 
the NGO Fundación Casa de la Paz and the Chilean household survey (CASEN 2009). The PERR 
(2013) survey uses a non-probabilistic sample containing 404 observations of waste-pickers in four 
different municipalities, while the CASEN (2009) survey uses a probabilistic sample, but only con-
tains 66 observations for the region. Further detail of secondary souces of data can be obtained in-
side each institutional document (Fundación Casa La Paz & MNRCh 2013; CASEN 2009). 
 
Analysis: descriptive statistics and ordinary least squares 
 
For quantitative analysis, descriptive statistics and ordinary least square (OLS) methods 
have been used. To generate descriptive statistics, for waste-pickers simple statistics have been cal-
culated without weights. In the case of surveys with stratified sampling (HBEs and street vendors), 
weighting factors have been used to ensure that descriptive statistics are accurate. Weight factors 
include the design weight, non-response weights and post-stratification weights.  
 
To analyse the impact of local policies, OLS modelling has been used. The OLS model has 
been constructed to identify the policy impact over indicators of performance (economic, social, 
environmental and negative externalities). Performance indicators (response variable) are identified 
from a combination of literature sources and qualitative findings. Local policies (explanatory 
variables) are controlled for owners, enterprises, neighbourhood and municipality. In this way, the 
models test the impact of specific policies on an increase/reduction in performance for each sub-
sector. Quantitative results are then discussed in the context of qualitative findings, which explain 
the mechanisms behind policies having a particular impact.  
 
All OLS models are estimated with robust testing (standard errors) using Stata software. My 
preferred specification is using all controls, but I also report different model specification for 
transparency reasons. The regression models test the relationship between performance indicators 
(Y) and municipal policies (β1) controlling by individual (β2) and enterprise (β3) characteristics, 
and neighbourhood (β4) and municipal (β5) socio-economic conditions, as shown in the equation:  
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 (1) Y
(indicators)   
= β
0
 +  β
1
loc.policies +β
2
individual +β
3
enterprise +β
4
neighbourhood+  β
4
municipality+ ϵ 
 
The particular variables used in each each sub-sector’s OLS equation are described in each 
empirical chapter
4
.  
 
A note on the associational interpretation of results 
 
This research is mainly concerned with associations between local policies and perfor-
mance, and not about causality. There are two reasons for this. First, there is little qualitative under-
standing of the impact of local policies on the performance of the informal economy. Second, there 
are almost no studies that quantitatively evaluate the impact of local policies on these three informal 
sub-sectors. Therefore, since we know so little about the impact of municipal policies, in both theo-
retical and empirical terms, there is no point in narrowing this research to look for the very specific 
causal impact of one particular local policy. It seems more reasonable, at this stage of research, to 
gain a deep understanding of the mechanisms behind the impact of municipal policies, and to identi-
fy policies as ‘likely’ to have a relevant impact on the performance of the informal economy. After 
this process of establishing the most effective policies has been undertaken, further studies can fo-
cus on the specificities of disentangling the causality question. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has outlined the rationality behind my selection process and presented the 
main features of the three UIE subsectors in Santiago de Chile that provide the focus of this study. 
The selection of Santiago de Chile, a city with a well-functioning public sector, a sizeable and di-
verse informal economy, and a diversity of municipal practices within one single region, comple-
ments the selection of three sub-sectors of the urban informal economy. Waste-pickers, street ven-
dors and HBEs are sub-sectors that have a sustained longevity over time, that account for a diversity 
of practices, and that generate significant amounts of employment. Each of these three activities 
contains a varied and contrasting male to female ratio
5 
(see Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4), holds a differ-
ent position in supply and demand chains, uses public and private space in different ways and faces 
varying levels of regulation. With the diversity of these three sub-sectors, and of Santiago de Chile 
itself, we can obtain a more complete and accurate representation of the diversity of practices and 
influences that comprise and affect the UIE. The use of a mixed method strategy with exploratory 
sequential design arguably provides a complete and robust means of studying these three sub-
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sectors: first understanding the logic behind the activities and the impact of policies through qualita-
tive techniques, and then testing and generalising from these findings with quantitative methods. 
 
 
Notes to Chapter Three 
 
1. Although non-assistance might introduce a certain degree of bias from the original qualitative 
sample by not excluding the view of specific groups of informal workers, this fact does not bias 
the representativeness of quantitative results that are used to generalise and test the validity of 
the hypothesis. 
2. The survey carried in this study is representative of the whole population of all municipally 
registered feriantes (street vendors) and HBEs. As a consequence, the quantitative results of this 
study are applicable to the registered population of feriantes and HBEs. The lack of sampling 
frames means that I am unable to build a representative survey of Santiago de Chile for  
unregistered street vendors and HBEs to collect the detailed data required to test qualitative 
hypotheses. I have provided general representative statistics for the larger population of 
registered and unregistered street vendors and HBEs in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 (in Chapter 3) based 
on the Chilean Household Survey (CASEN 2009). 
3. A total of 43 students were hired to carry out surveys in Santiago de Chile, comprised of 11 men 
and 32 women. The Corporación Más Progreso provided training on theory and interview 
techniques, to guarantee ethical soundness and avoid interviewer bias. All surveyors practised a 
mock interview during the workshop and received feedback before conducting the field survey. 
The veracity of survey results was checked by certifying the coincidence of questions on age and 
type of product/activity collected in the survey and the database provided by municipalites in the 
sampling frame. Any surveys without this coincidence were discarded as false information and 
carried out again.  
4. When possible, I have run a regression on key Decent Work indicators including 5, 7, 8, 12, 13 
and 14 (see Table A.2.1). 
5. Post-stratification weights were used to ensure that descriptive statistics truly represent the male 
to female ratios in the discussion of each informal subsector in Chapters Five and Six. 
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CHAPTER 4 : WASTE-PICKING: MARKET DYNAMICS, 
SUPPORTIVE POLICIES AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS. 
 
 To set the scene for a detailed discussion of ‘exit and inclusion’ in Chapter 7, this chapter 
aims to understand the diversity of realities faced by waste-pickers operating in Santiago, as well as 
the rationality behind, and the impacts and the limitations of municipal supportive policy 
approaches aimed at improving their livelihoods.  
 
Waste-pickers are mobile gatherers who collect waste from its source or from dumps for 
recycling purposes (Chen et al. 2016, pp.333). In Chile the most common way of collecting is door-
to-door, normally collecting with a rather precarious vehicle called a triciclo (cargo tricycle). While 
landfill waste-pickers do still exist in Chile, their numbers remain very low as privatisation, 
fiscalisation and regulation of landfillds has tightened. Waste-pickers are not subject to local, 
regional, or national regulation and, as of the moment of this research, municipal ordinances do not 
regulate the activity in Santiago de Chile. Although, most Waste-pickers have income levels that are 
not taxable, they fail to report incomes to authorities. Chapter 3 (section ‘Waste-pickers’) presented 
further discussions of the main characteristics of waste-picking in Chile, and Figure 3.2 presented a 
map indicating the six municipalities selected to conduct qualitative interviews and group 
discussions. The table below presents the corresponding interview demographics: 
 
Table 4.1: Interview Sample by Municipality, Activity, Age and Gender. 
              
Municipality Policy approach Average 
Age 
Range Male  Female Total 
MNRCh*   52 52 1 0 1 
La Reina Supportive  47 39-55 1 2 3 
Peñalolén Supportive 56 27-60 6 4 10 
Recoleta Unionisation 50 39-60 6 2 8 
Cerrillos Laissez-faire 66 35-65 5 1 6 
Pudahuel Laissez-faire 54 42-65 5 2 7 
Santiago Centro Soft repression 50 59-61 1 1 2 
         *MNRCH: National Movement of Waste-pickers of Chile 
 
The six selected municipalities represent a variety of local policy approaches towards waste-pickers 
(see Figure 3.2 for a map showing the locations of the municipalities). Notably, La Reina and 
Peñalolén have both strongly supported their waste-picker cooperatives, Recycling and 
Environmental Education Cooperative (CREACOOP) and Association of Recycling Micro-
Enterprises of Peñalolén (AMRP) respectively, providing them with collection points, tools and 
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vehicles, as well as organising the sector to facilitate integration into the formal SWM system. 
Recoleta is in the process of establishing a waste-picker organisation, primarily focused on 
establishing ‘operativos de recoleción’ (collection operatives) – a collection day every two weeks, 
during which locals are permitted to leave unwanted items and recyclable materials outside their 
homes for collection by workers from the waste-picker cooperative. At the time of research, waste-
pickers in Cerrillos and Pudahuel operated in a laissez-faire policy environment, with policies 
neither supporting nor repressing their activities. Until 2010, at the point of data collection
1
, the 
policies of Santiago Centro were discouraging waste-picking by restricting collection schedules 
(from 8pm to 8am) as well as imposing stricter identity controls in the streets and in informal street 
markets, resulting in the eviction and displacement of waste-pickers. 
 
 Given the importance and relevance of more than forty years of research devoted to 
understanding waste-picker activity and devising policy recommendations, the first section of this 
chapter examines the correlation between the theories and realities of waste-picking in Santiago de 
Chile. This will show that existing theories fail to fully explain a ‘one-way road’ movement into 
waste-picking, and the complexity of formal-informal linkages. This serves to establish the value of 
analysing supportive policies as an emerging approach to waste-picking for both academic theory 
and practical implementation. In the second section, I draw out the main rationality behind 
supportive policies, explaining that the primary motivation for municipal engagement with waste-
pickers is promoting social inclusion, but alongside this, positive environmental objectives are 
presented as a bargaining tool used to generate public support for the activity. In the third section, I 
assess the main policy outcomes of current supportive initiatives, concluding that the most effective 
policies are based on the inexpensive act of organising waste-pickers, as well as increasing their 
access to capital. In the final section, I identify some of the main barriers faced by municipal 
support strategies. 
 
CHARACTERISATION AND MARKET DYNAMICS OF WASTE-PICKING 
 
In Chapter 2 and Annex 3, various contrasting points of view on waste-picking were 
presented. It was established that academic debate offered conflicting explanations for the reasons 
behind entering into and continuing work as a waste-picker, the activity’s relationship with 
economic cycles, and the relationship between waste-picking and the formal economy. This section 
shows that none of the existing theories accurately describes the complexity of waste-picking 
dynamics in Santiago de Chile, but rather an integration of theories is needed. 
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Multiple reasons of entry and expansion with economic crises 
 
The reasons behind an individual becoming established as a waste-picker provide the basis 
of much discussion in academia and policymaking. I will first explain common ‘necessity’ reasons 
for entry, then moving on to an explanation of more ‘opportunity’ reasons. Since the weight of these 
two driving factors comprise much of the quantitative work on the subject, I illustrate my 
qualitative analyses using data from my survey, providing measurements of how large a role 
necessity factors play in motivating a worker to start as a waste-picker. It is worth mentioning that, 
while analysing the data, it became clear that it was not possible to precisely group waste-pickers 
into two simple categories of ‘opportunity entrants’ and ‘entrants out of necessity’. The decision to 
enter into the activity tends to be multifaceted, with many motivating factors. The survey results 
thus indicate the importance of factors that ‘push’ people into waste-picking, versus the active 
‘choice’ to start waste-picking, but it is important to keep in mind that almost all waste-pickers are 
motivated by a combination of these factors. 
 
My analysis shows that the main motivation behind waste-pickers entering into this activity is 
poverty – most commonly it is an option of last resort for vulnerable people to make a living. 
Poverty, unskilled labour and an absence of formal employment stand convincingly as explanations 
for the adoption of waste-picking as an employment option (see Lomintz 1977; Souza 1980). In my 
survey, four out of five individuals declared that a complicated economic situation was the main 
reason for becoming a waste-picker. This is corroborated in interviews and group discussions, 
exemplified here by Esteban (52), a national waste-picker leader: 
E: …the starting point mainly comes from (people’s) need to look after their families…the vulnerability 
of a social group that has no access to the formal economy… The doors of the labour market are 
closed (to them) and they look for an alternative. 
 
Waste-pickers pointed to vulnerability, gender and lack of employability as the main factors 
that move workers into waste-picking. Being part of a vulnerable social group is an important 
reason for entry, particularly when connected to permanent illness
2
 and disability
3
. These factors 
can exclude workers in the long term from the formal labour market and push them into waste-
picking. As explained by Ramón (57), a waste-picker of Cerrillos: 
R: (I started waste-picking)...because I have a kidney disease, so I cannot work in construction.I don’t 
have a criminal record. I had an operation, but I cannot work in construction, it’s too heavy.  
 
Similarly, female waste-pickers have noted that gender becomes relevant when they have 
children, and are forced to raise a child and maintain a working life concurrently. Compared with 
formal work, waste-picking allows them greater flexibility of their working schedule, as Sofia (46), 
a waste-picker from Peñalolén, comments:  
 88 
S: (I began) working out of necessity. I worked as a maid…for 6 years, and I had a boy… I quit this job 
because I had nobody to leave my son with and I started (recycling), little by little…first I was 
ashamed, but later I liked it.  
 
Furthermore, a lack of employability is mentioned as another relevant factor pushing workers 
into waste-picking. In these cases, two broad groups exist. One group declared their main 
motivation as having lost their prior formal employment. Fernando (56), a waste-picker from 
Recoleta, and Ignacio (65), a waste-picker leader from Cerrillos, state: 
F: I used to work in marketing, but…technology left me behind and I had to start looking 
elsewhere…as I haven’t studied much… I got into the street market (as a waste-picker) and now I have 
been working for (several) years. 
 
I: (I think that people start waste-picking) because they don’t find a (formal) job. I used to work doing 
anything…mostly in construction. I lost my job, and so I started doing this. 
 
A second group is comprised of people excluded from the labour market due to their age, as 
they are perceived as being too old to be employed in the formal labour market. As Victor (60), a 
waste-picker from Peñalolén, and Sebastian (62), a waste-picker leader from Pudahuel, explain: 
V: I (started) out of necessity, as at my age I couldn’t find a job. After age 40, nobody gives you a job in 
any business. 
 
S: I used to work in a construction company, I earned a salary as a construction worker…but they’re 
no longer offering jobs. So, above the age of 45-50, it’s difficult to get any work.  
 
An ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ among the poor or a voluntary rational movement towards the 
most beneficial work can sometimes prove accurate, but these opportunistic reasons for entry only 
account for a minority of waste-pickers. Drawing from my survey, one in five waste-pickers 
indicated that being a waste-picker was a choice. From these, chasing an economic opportunity and 
personal preference account for just over one in ten people. This is consistent with discussions with 
waste-pickers across municipalities, where only one out of thirty-five participants mentioned a 
voluntary motivation. Lorenzo, when asked how he came to pass from formal employment to 
waste-picking, responded: 
 
L: I used to work in a plant nursery. Then, I decided to become independent and I continued alone… It 
was my decision to leave this (formal) job and start waste-picking. It’s as simple as that.  
 
An alternative argument for entry reasons is mentoring or apprenticeship from a close relative 
who is a waste-picker. According to my sample, this ‘family entry reason’ accounts for just under 
one in ten waste-pickers, being almost as pertinent as voluntarist and neoliberal explanations. 
Discussions with waste-pickers have identified two types of these: ‘intra-generational’ and ‘inter-
generational’. Intra-generational family entry occurs when individuals are taught by relatives of 
their same generation. In these cases, ‘mentors’ tend to be their partners or siblings. As Hugo (55), a 
waste-picker from Recoleta, and Sofia (46), a waste-picker leader from Peñalolén, explain: 
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H: (My wife) taught me how to recycle. Initially it was cardboard, then doors, toys, clothing…things 
like that. My wife has been recycling for... eighteen years. I have been going for thirteen years  
 
 
 S: (I became a waste-picker because of) my husband, because he has always been recycling for 
roughly twenty years…since he was waste-picking, I liked it and I started to work with him. 
 
Inter-generational entry refers to the transfer of waste-picking methods from one generation 
to the next. Normally, this cross-generational transfer of skills occurs as parents train their children 
in waste-picking at a very early age, and can involve more than four generations of waste-pickers. 
Carlos (48), a waste-picking leader of La Reina, and Esteban (52), a national waste-picker leader, 
discuss this: 
C: There are many who are waste-pickers from the beginning…choosing this job because their parents 
were waste-pickers too. In my case, my grandfather started recycling bones. 
 
E: There is a boy in Quinta Normal…he is the fourth generation of waste-pickers. He graduated as a 
sales agent from a business school…and, in four years, he has really built (a business in waste-
picking). (He did) what his grandparents couldn’t (do) in 35 years.  
 
There is a clear correlation between the qualitative and quantitative data gained from 
interviewees and a more necessity-entry (dualist) conception of waste-picking. Comparatively, 
voluntarist and neoliberal opportunity entry reasons account for only a marginal proportion of the 
waste-picker population in Santiago. Following from dualism, an economic crisis should thus see an 
increase in the number of waste-pickers. The growing unemployment during economic crises 
contributes to the exclusion of marginalised groups, and so accelerates the flow of workers from 
formal employment into waste-picking, as exemplified by the case of Esteban (52): 
E: A crisis increases the number of waste-pickers…I'll give you two clear examples…that I have seen 
as a waste-picker leader. The Argentinian Economic Crisis in 2002 affected not only Argentinian 
waste-pickers but also Chilean waste-pickers, and also the (financial) crisis of 2009. (In both cases) it 
is incredible, the number of (new) waste-pickers that suddenly appeared. 
 
One-way street: marginal contraction of waste-picking with expansion of the economy 
 
Waste-picking is not a temporary activity, but rather has a strong likelihood of becoming long 
term. In my 2010 survey, 86% of the interviewees have been dedicated to waste-picking as their 
main activity for at least four years, with twelve years being the average. A more recent survey from 
Fundación Casa de la Paz (2014) indicates a median of 12 years and a mean of 16 years in the 
activity. I presented Ramón (57), Cristian (35) and Nicolas (62), in a focus group in Cerrillos, with 
my question about the amount of time spent waste-picking: 
R: Oh, a lot of time, around ten years? 
C: No, more than that. 
N: In my case, thirty years. 
 
This development of waste-pickers’ careers once already established in the occupation align 
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more closely with voluntarist perspectives (Maloney 2004; Perry et al. 2007). In Chile, particularly 
in Santiago, unemployment rates were below 7% from 2010 until 2014, yet this has not moved 
people out of waste-picking (INE 2015). This is consistent with the views expressed in my survey, 
as 84% of waste-pickers declared that they feel satisfied with their current activity and 81% would 
continue with their current activity even if a formal job was offered to them. A crucial point, 
systematically expressed by waste-pickers during interviews and focus groups, is that this activity 
has a series of monetary and non-monetary benefits that exceed those of formal employment offered 
to low-skilled workers. Regarding monetary benefits, waste-pickers tend to receive better incomes 
in their work than they would as unskilled formal workers: in my survey, they regularly underlined 
the fact that they earn around 1.5 to 3.5 times higher incomes than they would on minimum wage. 
Esteban (52), a national waste-picker leader, and Carlos (48), a waste-picker leader of La Reina, 
discuss this: 
E: When you stay organised in this job…you can earn three times (the minimum wage)… All (waste-
pickers) earn more than the Chilean minimum salary… I mean around 1.5 times (as much) if they work 
full time. 
 
C: If you offer (a formal job)…to a waste-picker, they wouldn’t accept it… We work for (more than) 
double the minimum salary [USD 362.60] per month… Those who don’t earn so much get 350,000 
pesos [USD 564.11USD], taking into account both recyclable and reusable materials. 
 
 
 Waste-picking also provides stronger non-monetary benefits. These help to account for the 
fact that 75% of waste-pickers would still prefer to keep their current work activity when compared 
with comparably paid formal employment (CASEN 2009). Three non-monetary benefits are 
highlighted: 1) independence and time flexibility; 2) a better combination of work and family 
responsibilities, and; 3) a shorter working day. First, waste-pickers recognise relevant advantages in 
having a working lifestyle where they decide for themselves how much and when to work, and 
without a boss overseeing their work. As Daniela (60) and Hugo (54), from Recoleta, explain:   
D: We earn more than people who work formally. Also, (we have) freedom, you have flexible time, you 
are your own boss. 
H: You’re not dependent on other people…you get used to the (flexible) schedule. You work in the 
street market in the morning and in the afternoon you go to recycle. 
 
 Along similar lines, flexibility in working hours allows waste-pickers to better manage their 
work schedule and attend to family needs. Women particularly perceived this as a highly relevant 
benefit of waste-picking over formal employment, as they can be readily available for their children 
and have more time to share with their families. As articulated by Claudia (48), a waste-picker in 
Peñalolén, and Hugo (45) again: 
C: (When I was in formal work) I lived for six years with my son, never going to any (school) events. I 
was taking him (to school) at 8 a.m., I could never pick him up before 7 p.m. from the nursery and I 
was under a lot of pressure. This hasn’t happened with my (younger) daughter. When she was born, 5 
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years ago, she was the queen… Now (that I am a waste-picker), if there is a (school) event, I go. If the 
(school calls me) because she is sick, I go. These are things that I couldn’t do with my (older) son. 
 
H: (As a waste-picker) I have time to be with my family. I worked as a guard until recently. I (usually) 
woke up at 6 a.m. and went back home at 9 p.m. I didn’t see my family. All of this affected me. 
 
 Finally, waste-pickers emphasise that they spend less time working in this activity than in a 
formal job, leaving them with more leisure time. As explained by Natalia (50), Claudia (48) and 
Victor (60) in my group discussion in Peñalolén: 
 
Everyone: We work fewer hours (than in a formal job). 
N: Half (as much). In any (formal) job you have to work from 9 to 6. Sometimes, (employers) don’t 
respect this schedule. 
C: Because you start at 9 a.m., and they check (your arrival time), and when you finish at 6 p.m., they 
don’t (respect) it in the same way… Sometimes I was leaving at 8 p.m.… They say that you were too 
slow. 
V: Employers don’t respect your working hours. 
 
On the other hand, for the less than one in five who express a desire to move into formal 
employment, the main perceived benefit of this was access to social benefits, such as pension, 
health care and paid sick leave, along with the regular and constant flow of income that a formal job 
provides. Paula (28), a waste-picker from Peñalolén, Esteban (52), a national waste-picker leader, 
and Fernando (56), a waste-picker from Recoleta, explain: 
P: There is more security in formal jobs. You have a pension. 
 
E: We need central state policies to increase our health access… If a waste-picker’s wife is sick, he 
needs to spend all his earnings to save his wife’s life. 
 
F: I would prefer to work in a formal job because you have your money every month, even if you make 
less than waste-picking… (Work in) these markets is relative… Sometimes you can earn fifteen 
thousand…or three thousand (pesos per day), and sometimes you sell nothing  
 
 
In sum, for the majority in Chile, waste-picking provides higher monetary and non-monetary 
benefits than the formal jobs available to them. This leads to two important conclusions. First, 
waste-picking becomes a one-way street. For most people, the initial reason behind moving into 
waste-picking tends to be poverty and economic hardship, and thus the activity expands alongside 
economic crises. However, once engaged in the activity, being a waste-picker tends to become a 
choice, as people discover an activity that provides higher incomes and better working conditions 
than the low end of the formal employment market. In this sense, the expansion of formal 
employment during economic growth is not significantly associated with a decrease in the number 
of waste-pickers, as people tend not to opt out of the activity. As Carlos (48), a waste-picker leader 
of La Reina, summarises: 
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C: I know many people (that entered waste-picking after) becoming unemployed...and they chose to 
remain… They discovered that they were earning the same amount of money or more, in fewer hours, 
compared to working (in the formal sector). We call it a ‘business opportunity’…they saw an 
opportunity in waste-picking and they stayed, they learned and now they are better off than before. 
 
Second, following from this, the reason behind this ‘one-way street’ waste-picking might not 
be a lack of formal employment, as voluntarists, dualists and structuralists have suggested (Geertz 
1963; Maloney 2004; Portes et al. 1989), but rather the poor quality of formal employment offered 
to those at the bottom of the labour market
4
. 
 
Table 4.2: Integrated View: Waste-picking as a One-Way Street 
      
Category Entry No Exit 
Formal economic cycle  Contraction of formal economy Expansion of the formal economy 
Waste-picking reaction 
Counter cyclical                                               
(Expansion of waste-picking) 
Marginal contraction of waste-
picking  (No school of thought) 
Reasoning 
Necessity entry because of eco-
nomic need (dualist prediction) 
Waste-picking provides better work-
ing conditions than formal jobs at the 
bottom of the labour market 
Average time as WP - 10***-12*-16** years 
Accounts for 84.0% of waste-pickers* 75.4%***-81.1%* of waste-pickers 
Note: * Own survey (2010), **Fundacion Casa La Paz 2014, ***House-hold survey (CASEN 2009) 
 
 
Recycling and reuse markets: re-understanding waste-pickers in relation to the 
formal economy 
 
The relationship between the formal economy and waste-picking can be described as a mix 
of a parallel and a vertically integrated market. An integration of theories is thus required to 
understand the complex market dynamics of the activity. Waste-pickers collect materials for two 
very different economic markets: the recycling and reuse market. These two markets are 
summarised in Figure 4.1 and explained below, identifying their relationships with size, capital 
endowments, informality and competition. 
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Figure 4.1: Structure of the Waste-Picker Market 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration
94 
 
 
The recycling market: a vertically integrated market 
 
In the recycling market, waste-pickers are vertically integrated into the formal economy 
through a forward network. According to my 2010 survey, around two-thirds of all material 
collected by waste-pickers is sold for the recycling market. This accounts for around 60% to 
70% of full-time waste-pickers’ income, as reported by my survey and Casa la Paz (2014) 
respectively. This collection of recyclable materials is generated by demand from large formal 
recycling enterprises, which transform waste products into raw material inputs for formal 
industry. For instance, in Chile, the entire demand of the steel market stems from the company 
Gerda Aza, demand for paper and cardboard from SOREPA, demand for Tetra Pak cardboard 
from TETRA PAK, and demand for glass from Cristalerias Chile. Waste-picker leader Carlos 
(48), who manages a recycling centre, explains that the ultimate destination of recyclable 
materials is large formal enterprises: 
 
C: (Our recycling centre) delivers to Reciclados Industriales and SOREPA. Reciclados 
Industriales sells (for example)…200 tonnes of cardboard per week (to SOREPA) in bales of 1,000 
kilos each… (The material) directly enters the pool where paper pulp is processed. 
 
The connection between waste-pickers and large recycling companies is articulated 
through a large network of spatially distributed middlemen. This network can include up to four 
different scales of middlemen that sell upwards to larger enterprises before reaching the largest 
recycling company. This chain is described by Sebastian (62) and Jose (48), two waste-pickers 
of Pudahuel: 
 
S: Each middleman pays (around) 20 pesos [USD 0.03] less per (kilogram of) cardboard… If the 
cardboard is bought at 100, he pays 80. If they pay him 80, the next pays 60. If you sell to a third 
(middleman) he is going to pay you 40. 
J: (I sell all my recyclable material) to a man. He…sells it on to ACE [a large middleman], and 
(then) it passes through three more people… Three different hands! Can you imagine?  
 
 
In this recycling network, size, formality and profits increase upwards, while competition 
increases downwards. Regarding the increase in size, the further up in the network a business is, 
the larger the amount of recyclable material that it needs to keep in stock – they require this 
larger quantity to be able to sell to a buyer on the next level for better prices. Hugo (55) and 
Fernando (56), in a focus group in Recoleta: 
 
H: To sell cardboard directly to SOREPA, you need to accumulate at least one ton, and this is a 
quantity that we cannot reach… So, you have to sell to a middleman. 
F: When you are recycling and the tricycle is full…you can’t store any more in your house (be-
cause you have no more space). So, you sell it…and you get a lower price (than you would selling 
to SOREPA). 
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Even though a clear-cut distinction between formal and informal enterprises does not 
exist, the level of formality tends to increase upwards in the network. As the volume of 
operations becomes larger, middlemen cause more external problems (e.g. noise pollution, 
visual mess and foul odours) and potentially evade more taxes. These factors bring middlemen 
under the radar of the public sector, from both municipalities and the central state. Levels of 
formality vary, as smaller middlemen are able to exploit their size to avoid at least central state 
control, which larger middlemen cannot do. For instance, small-scale middlemen can easily 
obtain municipal permits to operate as home-based enterprises paying municipal taxes, whereas 
large-scale recycling centres require regional and national environmental permits as they would 
otherwise be noticed by national authorities and consequently prosecuted. At the bottom of the 
scale, waste-pickers are operating at a small enough level to evade both central state and 
municipal controls. 
 
Throughout the network, competition decreases upwards, as larger operations demand 
higher levels of capital, thus increasing barriers to entry. A place to store recyclable materials 
and a vehicle to transport them are the key capital components required to move upwards in the 
network. As waste-picking requires only non-motorised vehicles and a small home – or no 
home at all – there is almost no barrier of entry into the activity, leading to a large number of 
waste-pickers. A middleman requires a large space for waste accumulation as well as a 
motorised vehicle. These represent important barriers of entry for people coming from 
backgrounds of poverty and, as a consequence, there are fewer middlemen. At the top of the 
network, a larger recycling industry has capital to transform recyclable materials into 
standardised raw material commodities, which are in demand on a large scale in the national 
and/or international market. At this level, there is a very intensive need for capital to 
accumulate, transform and distribute products, and so only one company or a small number of 
companies purchase all the recycled materials produced by the lower tiers of the recycling 
network. Waste-picker leader Carlos (48), again, comments: 
 
C: To be able to sell to (large recycling) enterprises you need large quantities… This piece of land 
(has been fundamental for this cooperative) to accumulate these large quantities... Without this 
land, we would not be able to sell to (large) enterprises... We would have had to keep selling to a 
middleman…We send a container with 3 to 4 tonnes of paperboard three times a week (to 
SOREPA)… SOREPA is one of the biggest enterprises in this country. They own a pulp mill…and 
other enterprises. They manipulate prices…(and) they buy from other recycling enterprises, such 
as Recupac…who are also very big, but do not have their own pulp mill. 
 
 Finally, profits increase upwards in the network, as decreased competition allows these 
buyers to enjoy greater market power. The key point to understand about pricing power in 
recycling markets, is that sellers face restrictions in space and time, which allows the buyer to 
take advantage of their position of monopsony or oligopsony. At the top tiers of this hierarchy 
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there is a relatively large number of middlemen who sell to a single or a couple of purchasing 
enterprises across a city or the nation. As these middlemen have no alternative option for selling 
recyclable material, the enterprises above them can fix prices at their will. As national waste-
picker leader Esteban (52) stated in another conversation: 
 
E: Cristalerias de Chile...(have) a monopsony, not a monopoly… Since 1998, the price (paid for 
glass) has never increased… We know what determines prices…the (large recycling) enterprises 
have control over (them)…(but) we are not prepared to face this battle… One of the directors (of 
these enterprises)…once told me…’we get together and agree (on prices)’.  
 
Locally, middlemen have the power to negotiate purchasing prices and payment 
conditions downwards, as they have a large reserve of potential sellers to purchase from and 
have time to wait for a better deal, whereas waste-pickers need to sell within a day and can find 
few alternatives. As Rafael (39), a waste-picker from Recoleta, comments: 
 
R: You have to sell to a middleman and he will buy forty, fifty kilograms of cardboard from you, 
but at a much lower price (than he gets from SOREPA)… You have to sell a tricycle’s worth every 
day. You can’t bring it home because you don’t have (storage) space… They pay you a bad price, 
but because you need some money in your pocket, you sell anyway. 
 
 
Antonio (52), Natalia (50), Claudia (48) and David (48), all waste-pickers in Peñalolén, 
futher note the middlemen’s power to fix payment conditions: 
 
A: (The middlemen) haven’t paid us for plastic…in three weeks, and we have two more deliveries 
to do. Now, this guy once again wants more material... We can’t deliver if he hasn’t paid us.   
N: Of course! And he wants to pay us every fifteen days. 
C: It's like you give him the tools to work. 
D: He is working with our money. 
 
 Quantities of sellers and buyers vary across space, and since middlemen compete in a 
spatially restricted area, prices can also vary between municipalities. Waste-pickers are not able 
to exploit these differences, as transport costs outweigh the benefits when selling in small 
quantities. As Esteban (52), a national waste-picker leader, and Paula (28). Claudia (48) and 
Gloria (54), waste-pickers from Peñalolén and Recoleta, report: 
 
E: A girl from Temuco…was delivering 25 tonnes per month but…(middlemen) pay 8 pesos [USD 
0.01] (per kilogram). If she brings the glass (to downtown Santiago), they would pay her 25 pesos 
[USD 0.04]…but she would need to pay 17 (pesos) for transport… Is it convenient? …No. So she 
has to sell (in Temuco).  
 
P: I know that for drink cans, (middlemen in other municipalities) pay 400 pesos [USD 0.64]. In 
San Joaquin they are paying 600 pesos [USD 0.97]. 
 
C: But I wouldn’t spend money on petrol to go to San Joaquin to earn 200 pesos more. In Estación 
Central, (middlemen) are paying 300 pesos [0.48USD] more, but I wouldn’t go there. You need to 
collect large quantities, and I don’t have enough space to accumulate that much. 
 
G: Yes, we can sell all (of the materials that we collect), but it’s always within our neighbourhood. 
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As a result, local middlemen have the power to negotiate purchasing prices and payment 
conditions downwards, as they have a large reserve of potential sellers to purchase from and 
have time to wait for a better deal, whereas waste-pickers need to sell within a day and can find 
few alternatives in an urban area. Gloria (54) and Rafael (39), waste-pickers of Recoleta, 
describe this challenge: 
 
G: Yes, we can sell all (of the recyclable materials that we collect), but it’s always within our 
neighbourhood. 
R: You have to sell to a middleman and he will buy forty, fifty kilograms of cardboard from you, 
but at a much lower price (than the price that he gets from SOREPA)… You have to sell a tricycle’s 
worth every day. You cannot bring it home because you don’t have space (to store it)…and because 
you need some coins in your pocket… If we could only sell cardboard directly to SOREPA. 
G: There (in the middleman's pockets), that’s where the money is. 
 
The picture drawn here matches the neoliberal and structuralist concept of formal 
enterprises and waste-pickers being vertically integrated into the recyclable material market 
(Birkbeck 1979; Medina 2007). In Santiago de Chile, in practice, the hierarchical structure of 
the recyclable market results in unequal market power, where larger enterprises are able to 
impose exploitative prices and conditions of payment onto smaller ones. 
Plate 4.1: Waste-pickers selling recyclable materials to middlemen. 
 
Sources: Pablo Navarrete.  
 
The reuse market: A parallel market dynamic 
 
In contrast to the recycling market, materials collected for reuse form part of a network 
that is segregated from the formal economy. This reuse market is comprised of a network of 
waste-pickers that collects cachureos (bits and pieces) and sells them as cachureros (street 
vendors) in ferias libres (informal street markets). Cachureos can be all manner of old goods – 
such as refrigerators, cookers, furniture, toys, clothing or shoes – that are no longer used by 
households and are thus disposed. Waste-pickers collect these second-hand products door-to-
door in urban areas and sell them to customers in street markets. In this way, the propagation of 
second-hand goods generates a trickle-down effect as they are reused by new households 
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(typically from a lower socioeconomic class than the first owners).  
 
The entire reuse market network is composed of three steps: collection, storage/repairs 
and selling. The collection of cachureos occurs at the same time and in the same way as the 
collection of recyclable materials, as Daniela (60), a waste-picker in Recoleta, explains: 
D: (We collect) all types of materials, anything that is available: iron, scrap…toys, plastic things, 
clothes, anything in good condition. We clean them thoroughly and bring them to the street market. 
 
In the storage and repairs stage, materials for reuse tend to be stored in waste-pickers’ 
houses, and are then organised by their utility as material for reuse or recycling according to 
their profitability. Anything with a higher potential value for reuse is set aside to sell in ferias 
libres, with the rest being sold to middlemen for recycling. Many products for reuse are cleaned 
and repaired (when possible) in waste-pickers’ houses so as to maximise their selling price. 
Daniela (60), Hugo (55), and Fernando (56), all waste-pickers in Recoleta, comment: 
 
H: (We collect) refrigerators, notebooks, books. The things that aren’t in good condition are sold 
by the kilogram (to a middleman). Heaters, kitchens, saucepans…when they are burned we can 
only sell them as aluminium. 
D: I repair the ‘cachureos’. For example, if I get a dress and the zipper is broken, it has to be 
repaired. 
F: Or you get a piece of furniture made of good wood, you glue it, varnish it and look for some 
handles…usually, amongst the odds and ends that you have, you always find something. 
 
 
Being informal sellers, waste-pickers generally have no municipal permits to sell and do 
not pay municipal taxes. They erect precarious stalls in ferias libres at the entrances of street 
markets, where they capture passers-by (see Plate 4.2). As I will show later in Chapter Five, 
street vendors (feriantes) value the presence of waste-pickers, not only because street vendors’ 
products are not in direct competition with these cachureos, but also because they attract more 
clients to the street markets. As Ignacio (65), a waste-picker of Cerrillos, underlines: 
 
I: I collect cachureos and recyclable materials. (…) I gather everything, [and then] I sell the 
‘cachureos’ in the street markets as a ‘cachurero’. 
 
Finally, clients purchase these cachureos in the street markets, generally to use them as 
household items. The whole reuse network is thus completely informal and disconnected from 
the formal market, as dualist theories have suggested, a point emphasised by Santiago (52), an 
officer at Recoleta Council: 
 
S: Waste-pickers collect computers, toys, clothing, shoes, everything, from houses… They sell all 
of these ‘cachureos’ in the street market of Zapadores… They collect and sell completely 
informally [they do not have a municipal permit or pay taxes] 
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Plate 4.2: Waste-Pickers Selling Reused Goods as ‘Cachureos’ 
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete.  
 
In contrast with the recycling market, the reuse market is characterised by its small size, 
intense competition, heterogeneous profitability and, as previously mentioned, complete 
separation from the formal market. First, the reuse market is comprised entirely of small (often 
solo) enterprises, since products are collected, occasionally repaired and then sold on by waste-
pickers. In this process there are no intermediaries or larger enterprises, only self-employed 
workers, sometimes working with their households. Second, there are high levels of competition 
in the reuse market as there are many waste-pickers collecting and selling cachureos in different 
urban areas of a city. Fernando (56 years), Daniela (60) and Lorenzo (45), both waste-pickers 
from Recoleta, explain: 
 
F: (When the tricycle is full) we have to come back to our house (to unload). 
D: When you find a good spot (full of ‘cachureos’), one person stays watching over it and the 
other goes back to unload (at home). Because if you leave, when you come back, you’ll find 
nothing left. (Other waste-pickers) take it. 
L: Nowadays, there is far too much competition…too many (waste-pickers) selling ‘cachureos’. 
 
Finally, although there is high competition at the level of each street market, prices of 
goods and profits amongst waste-pickers are not homogenous. On the one hand, reused products 
vary enormously in terms of type, quality and wear. Therefore, prices and ultimately profits tend 
to be specific to each product. As Lorenzo (45) responded to my question concerning which 
goods provide a better income: 
 
L: It’s relative, because, for example, if I get a television...I can sell a television for 15,000-20,000 
pesos [USD 24.18-32.23] in a few hours. Instead, if I sell clothes, I can stay all morning and make 
12,000 [USD 19.34]… So, this is the thing, prices change (from one product to another). If I get a 
refrigerator, if it’s working, I can sell it for 20,000 pesos [USD 32.23], if not (I can sell it) for 
3,000 pesos [4.84USD]… The quality of a product (also) determines its price… For example…a 
nightstand. If it’s a little broken, I say: ‘Okay, give me 7,000 [USD 11.28]’, (and the client) is 
going to say: ‘But look – it's broken! I'll give you 5,000 [USD 8.06]’. 
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On the other hand, an individual’s capacity to bargain determines selling prices, and thus 
profits vary between waste-pickers working as cachureros. Gloria (54) and Daniela (60), in my 
group discussion in Recoleta: 
 
G: Someone seling without experience will says: 'Look, I made 10,000 [USD 16.12] in an hour!' 
But he sold all of his valuable things for 1,000 [USD 1.61]… He could have made much more, but 
he sold for a very cheap price… The following week he goes and brings the rest (of his 
‘cachureos’) and he won't sell anything... That is experience. 
D: You need to know who you are selling to, as there are some clients who will pay more, and (you 
need to know) the value of what you are selling. 
 
Another defining point of the reuse market is the way that profitability is determined by 
the area in which waste-pickers work. Waste-pickers collecting in wealthy areas obtain better 
quality products and can sell for higher prices, as described by Fernando (56)  a waste-pickers 
from Recoleta: 
 
F: From Vespucio upwards, there are only ‘gold collar’ [very rich] people… We earn much more 
(in this area), because if you go there to collect shoes, they throw away shoes that would cost 
70,000 pesos [USD 112.82] in the shops… You come (to a poor neighbourhood) and you sell 
them for 5,000 or 6,000 pesos [USD 8.06-9.70]. (Local clients) will pay for (second-hand shoes), 
because they know they’re a good brand. 
 
The reuse market has further relevance for economic and environmental reasons. 
According to my survey and data from Casa la Paz, around 30% to 40% of waste-pickers’ 
income is derived from the reuse market. It is thus a significant contributor to the survival of 
vulnerable households and to reducing poverty. In fact, sometimes waste-pickers will make a 
higher income in the reuse market than from recycling. Victor (60), Claudia (48) and Paula (28) 
from Peñalolén, when asked about the largest source of their income:  
 
Everyone: The ‘cachureos’. 
P: But, we can never abandon recycling… 
Everyone: No, no, no. 
C: It's not always good. You can't always get a big amount of ‘cachureos’. 
V: (But) you can survive on (an income from) ‘cachureos’. 
 
Carlos (48), a waste-picker leader of La Reina, complements this: 
 
C: You will have better profits (with ‘cachureos’)…if they are worthwhile… Let’s say you repair a 
a cooker… You can sell a cooker in a street market for 15,000 [USD 24.20], but if you sell it (as 
scrap) you will get 3,000 pesos [USD 4.84]. 
 
The environmental relevance, as with recycling, stems from the prevention of materials 
from ending up in landfills, also saving municipalities’ expenditure on waste disposal. From an 
environmental perspective, the reuse market can be seen as preferable to the recycling market. 
This is for three reasons. First, reused goods act as substitutes for new products, thereby 
reducing energy consumption in the manufacture of new goods. Second, unlike recyclable 
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materials, goods for reuse require minimal energy consumption through processing and 
transforming materials to make them suitable for reincorporation into the market. Finally, after 
ultimately ending their lifespan, reused materials can still be re-processed for recycling. 
According to my survey, around one-third of waste-pickers’ collections are sold for reuse, 
highlighting its significance. In spite of this, the reuse market has been almost completely 
ignored in waste-picker literature, and so there is an urgent need for its incorporation into 
studies assessing waste-picking sustainability. 
 
The life cycle: progress and poverty barriers for waste-picker enterprises 
 
 
In my qualitative analysis, different scales of waste-picker businesses were identified 
according to their levels of capital endowment, organisation and market access, which I have 
divided into four broad categories (see Table 4.3), which follows from de Soto (1989) and Joshi 
et al. (2013) relating to other informal sectors. The process of waste-pickers moving between 
these categories tends to occur extremely slowly, especially without outside assistance: these 
individuals’ initial state of poverty, alongside their exploitative relationship to middlemen and 
larger recycling firms, significantly constrains their mobility. Although waste-pickers are often 
able to see and understand economic opportunities, they face ‘poverty barriers’ that prevent 
them from doing so. As explained by Esteban (52), a national waste-picker leader: 
 
E: If you ask me, ‘what is a waste-picker?’ A waste-picker is an evolutionary process, a state of 
mobility… (there are) different steps of evolution: from an informal activity, to micro-
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship…But is not easy to move from one to another…     
  
 
Waste-pickers, in the early stages of their business, have very limited capital, are not 
organised, and have low levels of market access. Consequently, they face low productivity and 
have low incomes. These waste-pickers have minimal capital endowments, collecting with a 
sack or using precarious vehicles, and having either small spaces or no space at all (as is the 
case with homeless waste-pickers) in which to accumulate material. Although they do develop 
an understanding of the capital investments necessary to scale up their businesses, their living 
conditions create very limited saving capacity (mainly dependent on personal or family savings) 
that prevents significant investment. Furthermore, waste-pickers often collect independent of 
one another, competing for recyclables and cachureos, leading to low collection rates per hour. 
They have few contacts amongst neighbours and local businesses, and thus cannot fully exploit 
the potential access to cachureos and recyclable materials. These waste-pickers sell in small 
quantities, living day-to-day and being at the mercy of exploitation from middlemen, and can be 
locked in this precarious stage for long periods of time. As much as ten percent of my sample of 
waste-pickers lives below the poverty line, leading to a cycle of poverty in which they cannot 
scale up. As articulated by Nicolas (62) and Ramón (57), in a focus group in Cerrillos:  
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Table 4.3: Typology of Waste-Picker Enterprises 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on field notes. 
103 
 
 
 
N: …We don’t have anything that allows us to earn more… (We collect) with a handcart, but it is 
very heavy and you get exhausted quickly… I could make much more (money) with a tricycle be-
cause you ride it and you go very fast…but I don't have (one). A tricycle costs around 180,000 pe-
sos [USD 290.11]. A lot of money!... We pray that someday we will have a house (to store materi-
als), but we don’t have one… You have to save…quite a lot of money, 700,000 pesos [USD 1,128]. 
We don’t make enough for food, when are we going to have enough to buy all of this? 
 
 
 
The first main progression for waste-pickers occurs when they have access to basic capi-
tal for work. In this second stage, they may have access to tricycles or a car and accumulate re-
cycling materials in their houses, in turn allowing them to collect more material in less time, 
thus increasing their profits. However, they continue to be restricted by a lack of organisation, 
leaving them unable to negotiate higher prices for their products, and still suffer from a lack of 
neighbourhood contacts. This stage is exemplified by Olivia (27), a public officer from the 
EDPC: 
O: One example is Carlitos… When he started, he was like everyone else. Then, he got a tricy-
cle…and realised that his colleagues didn’t collect books… He started to gather books in his 
house…(and) started selling them in a street market. 
 
The third step sees waste-pickers organise themselves – generally through the municipali-
ty or with assistance from an NGO – and becoming able to negotiate prices with middlemen. 
This allows for increased market access: competition is reduced within urban areas (as individu-
al routes become respected) and/or community collaboration is established (e.g organising col-
lection operatives where neighbours contribute material), and so waste-pickers increase their 
quantities collected and earn improved incomes. However, they remain unable to accumulate 
material on a large scale and still only collect with simple vehicles or tools. As a result, these 
‘organised’ waste-pickers still cannot acquire large enough quantities of recyclable materials to 
sell directly to the larger recycling companies, and so a significant part of their profits remains 
in the hands of middlemen. As explained by Lorenzo (45), a waste-picker leader from Recoleta: 
L: I store (waste) here at home but there is no more storage space, (my house) is full… I could get 
better prices by storing large quantities and no longer selling to middlemen, instead selling to 
large (recycling) enterprises. (For that) we would need to have a recycling centre. That is the main 
thing limiting us. 
  
 
At the final stage, waste-pickers have acquired a significant level of capital which allows 
them to better collect and accumulate materials. Organisations become formal cooperatives, and 
high levels of collaboration in recycling from the community are achieved. At this stage, waste-
picker cooperatives may own motorised vehicles and provide locations to accumulate material, 
thus allowing workers to collect more efficiently and sell directly to large industry, pocketing 
what would otherwise be profits for middlemen. These extra profits can be shared amongst 
waste-pickers or reinvested. Furthermore, long-term relationships with local authorities are de-
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veloped, which can lead to public sources of funding. Higher levels of cooperation from the 
community allow them to increase their access to recyclable and reusable materials, for in-
stance, by holding a monopoly of collection over specific urban areas or by increasing waste 
segregation at the source. As stated by Angel (39), head of the EDPC, and Carlos (48), a waste-
picker leader of La Reina: 
 
A: Nowadays, (our) waste-pickers have a micro-entrepreneurial organisation and are an example 
in Chile… We have accomplished all the steps. Nowadays, they are in a position to make legal 
contracts. To move even further, a place for waste accumulation is required, where all materials 
can arrive there, be processed, packed. 
 
C: If it wasn’t for the recycling centre…we would not be able to sell to the big enterprises. We 
would have to keep selling to middlemen. 
 
 
 A single theory cannot accurately describe the complexity of waste-picking activity, but 
an integration of different elements of UIE theories is required. First, the dualist perspective 
better describes the necessity entrance of waste-pickers into this sector, as well as the expansion 
of the sector during economic crises due to exclusion from the formal labour market (Geertz 
1963; Germani 1973; Santos 1979), while neoliberal and voluntarist explanations more accu-
rately describe the opportunity reasons that waste-pickers give for staying in the activity (de 
Soto 1989, Maloney 2004), on account of benefits when compared to alternatives in the formal 
market. For most workers waste-picking is a one-way road; expanding with economic crises and 
only marginaly contracting with economic growth. Second, the recycling market, as neoliberals 
and structuralists suggest, is vertically integrated with the formal market producing explotation 
through unequal market power to set prices and time payments, while the reuse market, as dual-
ists propose, is completely disconnected from the formal economy offering better profits alter-
natives but being limited in size. Therefore, waste-pickers face varying levels of integration 
with the formal economy depending on whether they are collecting for recycling or reuse pur-
poses. Furthermore, there are several stages in the evolutionary process of a waste-picker in 
Santiago de Chile, although progression from one stage to another occurs at a very slow speed 
due to the many ‘poverty barriers’ that people face when coming from a background of poverty, 
notably a lack of access to capital, organisation and market access. 
 
RATIONALE OF SUPPORT POLICIES FOR WASTE-PICKERS  
 
 
In order to address some of the main poverty barriers encountered by waste-pickers 
when trying to expand economically, as well as to minimise some of the environmental 
problems associated with solid waste collection, some municipalities in Santiago de Chile have 
been gradually introducing supportive policies since 2008. 
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Accelerating waste-pickers’ business growth: social and environmental gains from 
supportive policies 
 
 As outlined in the section Debates on Waste-Pickers (Chapter 2), authors have proposed 
that waste-picking has the potential to be a sustainable activity, accomplishing economic 
growth, social equity and environmental protection. Supportive municipalities that recognise 
this potential argue that waste-picking significantly increases sustainable performance when 
waste-pickers benefit from the support of a local government. As Fernanda (55), head of the 
PDLR, states: 
 
F: So this is our big challenge, to make a business model that can gather these three components 
[social, economic and environmental] and move (waste-pickers) from an informal activity to a 
formal one… Incorporating them into formal solid waste management means giving them the 
status of ‘urban recyclers’. Up until that point, they are still scavengers. 
  
 
Although supportive municipalities recognise the benefits of waste-picking regarding 
sustainable development, they emphasise social inclusion as being the primary aim behind their 
support. For municipalities such as La Reina and Peñalolén, waste-picking provides social 
benefits for their communities by providing employment and promoting better incomes for a 
marginalised local population that has been historically excluded from labour market 
opportunities. The environmental benefits are also recognised, but they are viewed as a 
secondary objective and, on occasion, a bargaining tool used to gain general community 
support. As Fernanda (55), and Angel (39), head of the EDPC, discuss:  
 
F: We are interested in recycling as a strategy for social inclusion. And we are interested in how 
our waste-pickers of La Reina…form part of this business model… (We) support the activity first 
to achieve social, and then environmental, objectives. No so much economic objectives. 
 
A: (Waste-pickers are) an example of the pillars of sustainability… This programme is 
bulletproof…because it is not even the environmental benefit that motivates us to undertake this 
programme. I think it is the social mobility component, providing employment, performing (social) 
justice… We are creating employment for these people and we are creating a lower amount (of 
waste) for landfills… we believe that social inclusion is a much more powerful motivator than 
(environmental protection). One day, we will (publically) appeal to this (social) factor, but (for 
now) our approach to locals is still…(the promotion of) recycling… Waste-pickers are real heroes 
for us. 
 
 Supportive municipalities consider that support from a local government leads waste-
pickers to experience a significant increase in their productivity and drives them towards a path 
of formalisation, which will simultaneously satisfy other social and environmental goals. 
Supportive policies thus have the power to accelerate waste-pickers’ scaling-up process from 
being ‘cartoneros’ (living as subsistence waste-pickers and working informally) to 
‘recicladores’ (recyclers working in legally constituted cooperatives). As stated by Fernanda 
(55), municipal officers from EDPC: 
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F: I think that these people will evolve to be micro-entrepreneurs, and in the future to larger en-
trepreneurs… We can support their social inclusion.... In the future when (people from) CREA-
COOP move from micro-entrepreneurs to full-scale entrepreneurs, our role will be much less in-
volved and we will support other groups to improve their (socio-economic) conditions. 
 
 For supportive municipalities, the main focus to achieve these goals is overseeing an 
increase in productivity. This is pursued using policies that focus on increasing quantities of 
recyclable material collected and raising the prices paid for them. In turn, the resulting increased 
income pushes waste-pickers out of poverty and provides decent local employment. Secondary 
environmental objectives are met by increasing the quantities of waste recycled and reused, 
allowing poor municipalities to achieve an integral SWM system. Specific supportive policies 
are also used to reduce some of the negative externalities of the activity, such as high rates of 
child work, health hazards, long working days and waste dispersion (a detailed account of these 
policies is presented in the next section). As Angel (39) and Olivia (27), articulate: 
 
A: Waste-pickers aren’t (in this activity) for environmental protection, they are here to make a liv-
ing… We need to develop a municipal model that allows them to collect…(at least) 500,000 kilos 
per year… This allows 25 people to escape poverty and (also) provides the environmental bene-
fits… To do this, we need to improve the efficiency of the system…from a productivity point of 
view… If we do this, we generate employment and improve (incomes) for these people…(and so 
local) social and environmental indicators will also improve. 
 
O: We generate a municipal machine that is able to support (waste-pickers), improve their 
productivity, until they take off their ‘training wheels’… For instance…first we provide them with 
skills…to have positive interaction with locals… Then, they receive a green point to accumulate 
waste… Nowadays, it is like we are in the ‘graduation stage’…so this machine keeps working and 
we take on new people and incorporate them into this machine of capitalisation, training and 
improved skills, moving them out of poverty. 
 
 
 Finally, municipalities offer support in exchange for the gradual integration of 
waste-pickers into the formal SWM system. The formalisation of waste-picking is considered 
necessary to constitute self-governing bodies, secure access to public funds and guarantee 
contracts. These steps would further enhance waste-pickers’ profits and bring them into 
compliance with the law. Although in my sample there are no waste-pickers that have become 
fully formalised (e.g. they still do not pay VAT or income tax), there is a considerable degree of 
formalisation among waste-pickers that have received municipal support, as Angel (39) 
comments:  
 
A: We have passed the first stage… Waste-pickers are starting to have enough income to make a 
living… The next stage is that they should become more formal, more organised… We have 
provided all the support, facilitated all the tools, contact and networks, so they can pass from an 
informal activity to a more formal one… They, as an enterprise (in the future), will have to be able 
to guarantee to all their members pension and health access… Gradually they need to comply with 
all labour regulations. 
 
This is echoed by Sofia (46) and Carlos (48), waste-picker leaders from Peñalolén and La 
Reina:  
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S: The municipality helped us to legally constitute our organisation…to establish our schedule of 
meetings and elections… (Now) we are legally constituted as a cooperative… This allows us to 
access funds as the FOSIS [Solidarity and Social Investment Fund].  
 
C: We are legally constituted with all our associates. Our cooperative complies with municipal 
taxes, applies for projects and signs partnerships and contracts with enterprises. We received a 
commodatum for this plot… We have contracted two people who classify the recyclable materi-
als… They receive monthly payment and have a contract…and contribute to the pension and 
health schemes. 
 
 
These supportive municipalities operate from the fundamental premise that waste-picking 
is not a structurally unprofitable activity, but rather that the barriers to growth for waste-pickers 
can be overcome by policies aiming to raise productivity and integrate them into the municipal 
SWM. Supportive municipalities’ central focus on social inclusion stands in stark contrast to 
other municipalities – such as Pudahuel, Cerrillos and Santiago Centro – that focus on policies 
of tolerance or repression.  
 
Supportive policy measures: enhancing organisation, capital and market access  
 
In practice, a large variety of supportive municipal policies are implemented. These pol-
icies can be classified within three categories: organisation, capital endowment and market ac-
cess. In addition, Peñalolén and La Reina have launched specific policies aimed at reducing 
negative externalities. Below, a detailed compilation of policies in place in Santiago de Chile 
and their expected impacts is presented (Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.2: Supportive Municipal Policies Enhancing the Performance of Waste-Pickers 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Organisation policies 
 
I described earlier how the collective organisation of waste-pickers can be fundamental 
to negotiate better prices, pool resources and access public funds (see section The life cycle: 
Progress and poverty barriers for waste-picker enterprises in this Chapter). However, according 
to the Casa la Paz Survey, only 13% of waste-pickers belong to some sort of organisation. To 
oversee an increase in this number, Peñalolén, Recoleta and La Reina have introduced three 
types of supportive policies: cooperative creation, technical support faciliting access to public 
funds and the coordination of collection operatives. 
 
Waste-picker cooperatives are for-profit businesses in which waste-pickers share owner-
ship, capital and profits. To establish these organisations, Peñalolén and Recoleta have recruited 
unorganised waste-pickers and arranged meetings to establish their legal constitution, first as 
organizaciones de base (grassroots organisations), and then as cooperatives. In the much less 
common case of La Reina, where waste-pickers were already informally organised, the munici-
pality provided support for the legal constitution of this already-existing group. Olivia (27), a 
public officer from EDPC, describes this process: 
 
O: We approached waste-pickers in the street market… It was logical – they collect (reusable) ma-
terials and so they have to sell it somewhere… We first identified waste-pickers and then gathered 
them together. We held meetings with them every Tuesday… The organisation was (ultimately) 
constituted as a society of micro-entrepreneurs. They have their own legal statutes… We continue 
until they act like any (formal) enterprise in the municipality would.  
 
 
Once they are legally established, waste-pickers are able to receive local investment and to 
apply for public funding available to social organisations or small businesses. La Reina and 
Peñalolén provide information on funding that is available and technical assistance when 
applying for central government funds. Karina (39), an officer at the PDLRC, expands on this: 
 
K: It is good (that they are legally organised)… They can apply (for public funds) with projects, 
because if a waste-picker tries to apply on their own, they won’t be considered. They have applied 
to SERCOTEC and FOSIS [two central funds]… We advise them with preparing (for these) 
applications and letting them know about  available funds. 
 
   
Furthermore, these three municipalities coordinate with the cooperatives’ ‘operativos de 
reciclaje’ (collection operatives) to increase the quantity of recyclable and reusable materials 
collected. Operativos de reciclaje refer to a municipal programme in which waste-pickers 
collect recyclable and reusable materials within a specific neighbourhood. To organise these 
operativos, a municipal officer meets with the waste-picker representatives to settle on a 
specific day – always on the weekend, in order to maximise the number of people at home – and 
designate a specific borough in which to carry out the operation. When possible, this is done in 
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higher-income municipal areas, as these tend to provide a higher quanitity of materials. Waste-
pickers and the municipal officer then proceed to distribute flyers over the entire designated area 
to inform neighbours of the day, time and type of materials to be collected. On the day, waste-
pickers go door-to-door collecting the reusable and recyclable materials. Most often, the 
municipality brings one buyer to the neighbourhood who will purchase all recyclable material, 
the profits of which are then distributed equally amongst waste-pickers. The reusable material 
collected by each waste-picker belongs to them individually, and is taken home for storage and 
repair. Finally, waste that cannot be recycled is gathered together and collected by municipal 
waste lorries. Lorenzo (45), the head of the EDRC, expands: 
 
L: We provide the advertising, the pick-up vans, we tell the neighbourhood associations. We facili-
tate moving the (waste)…and have a location to accumulate (materials) and bring a buyer. All of 
that is provided by the municipality for ‘operativos’. In the operatives, (neighbours) provide eve-
rything…’cachureos’…plastic, cardboard, cans… (Waste-pickers) bring the ‘cachureos’ to their 
houses, and the (recyclable) materials that remain are sold by weight. 
 
 
Capital endowment policies 
 
At the same time, supportive municipalities such as La Reina and Peñalolén also help 
waste-pickers to capitalise, by directly providing or facilitating the investments required to grow 
their businesses. To facilitate capitalisation, municipalities simplify waste-pickers’ access to 
credit, provide them with tools and/or machinery for processing recyclable materials, donate 
vehicles, build collection points and provide recycling centres. 
 
Waste-pickers have typically had difficulty in accessing credit, as banks require a 
legally constituted enterprise, complete with cash flows or payslips. Banks that provide 
microcredits to informal enterprises, such as Banco Estado or Banco del Desarrollo, still require 
a municipal permit that proves the existence of these enterprises. Belen (49), head of the PDLR, 
describes how municipalities help with this: 
 
B: When (waste-pickers) are supported by the municipality and they are registered in DIDECO 
[Municipal Community Development Department], they can get certificates (to prove their exist-
ence), and with these can access microcredits in banks. 
 
This is echoed in the contrasting experiences of Daniela (43), a waste-picker from 
Pudahuel, and Victor (60), a waste-picker from the supportive municipality of Peñalolén:   
D: A few (waste-pickers) have access to credit, but it is small – 200,000 pesos [USD 322], as we 
don’t have payslips or contracts. 
V: (In Peñalolén) as micro-entrepreneurs we have a (local) permit, so we can access credit…in 
(several banks)… You have to take advantage of these opportunities… The majority (of us) are try-
ing to buy a (motorised) vehicle, because (the amount of credit) is enough to buy one. 
 
La Reina and Peñalolén have also provided waste-pickers with tools such as gloves, 
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huts and night-lights to facilitate their work. La Reina has furthermore provided its cooperative 
with scales, a ‘chipeadora’ (plastic crusher) and a compactor, thus avoiding the risk of 
middlemen incorrectly calculating weights, increasing prices paid per kilogram and minimising 
transport costs. As explained by Angel (39), head of the EDPC: 
A: We gave them the basics…reflective jackets with identification, gloves, hats…so they can work 
safer… In the recycling centre we will have a compactor, a crushing machine to reduce the volume 
(of the recyclable material) and the scales. When you crush and compact…it adds value…because 
this process is not done by the (recycling) enterprise and there is a lower transport cost… If Tetra 
Pak is currently paid at ten pesos per kilo, after compacting they will pay you fifty. 
 
These two municipalities have provided waste-pickers with tricycles and other modes of 
transport to facilitate their collection, as described by Olivia (27), a public officer of the EDPC, 
and Carlos (48) a waste-picker leader from La Reina:  
O: With the FOSIS project, 25 tricycles were acquired. That was in April. With these, (waste-
pickers) can collect more and faster.  
 
C: Aside from obtaining the land (for the recycling centre), with the help of the municipality, we 
bought a cargo lorry (to collect in gated communities)… Now, we have two cargo lorries. 
 
Further supportive measures include the provision of small ‘puntos limpios’ (‘clean 
points’) where neighbours can leave their recyclable materials. Puntos limpios are composed of 
two halves: in front, there are several disposal compartments for each type of recyclable materi-
al, and behind this there is a large storage and separation space. These points are provided to 
reduce the effort required of waste-pickers in transport and collection, to increase their storage 
capacity, and to increase the total quantities collected. These points are distributed across the 
municipality to maximise the coverage area, while still remaining a reasonable distance from 
residential zones. As Carlos (48) comments: 
 
C: Having a ‘punto limpio’ helps, because we can’t carry out a door-to-door service everywhere – 
it would be unprofitable… But here, people bring (recyclable) material from their homes, so we 
provide a service for them without going to their houses. And of course, we end up collecting 
more… We started with 500 kilos per month (prior to ‘puntos limpios’), and now (we collect) 
10,000.  
 
Finally, La Reina has built, and Peñalolén is in the process of building, a large recycling 
centre for waste accumulation and processing. The La Reina centre contains a punto verde 
(‘green points’), a covered area for material segregation, large containers for storage and two 
cargo lorries for collection within gated communities. It also contains a fully functioning office 
for administrative purposes. The large storage capacities of recycling centres allows for a higher 
income per kilogram when material is sold directly to large recycling enterprises, as explained 
by Angel (39) of the EDPC again: 
A: The centre…will allow (waste-pickers to bring) all (recyclable) materials… This material will 
be classified by colour – material of one colour has a higher value than mixed materials. It is then 
crushed, compacted and baled. So, you can establish a contract with buyers for a certain amount 
of tonnes per month, of a particular standard and format. This allows for much better prices… The 
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municipality will provide the recycling centre, and (waste-pickers) will administrate it…  
 
Market access policies 
 
Supportive municipalities help waste-pickers to expand their market access by integrat-
ing them into the municipal SWM system. This is done through various means, including insti-
tutionalisation, social education and facilitation coordination with public services. 
 
La Reina and Peñalolén provide an institutional backing for waste-pickers, providing 
identification cards and uniforms containing the municipal logo. Moreover, when accompanied 
by a municipal officer, they can visit their collection neighbourhood door-to-door, introducing 
themselves as the local urban recycler. In Chile, waste-pickers can be stigmatised as criminals 
who search for unoccupied houses containing valuables. By providing institutional backing, a 
supportive municipality helps to break down prejudices and increase locals’ trust and coopera-
tion in recycling. To access uniforms, waste-pickers must enrol in a large organisation that reg-
isters its personnel in a municipal office, becoming accountable for complaints in the process. 
Olivia (27) discusses the effectiveness of institutionalisation:  
 
O: (Now) people open their doors to waste-pickers. I’m telling you, it’s amazing. (Waste-pickers) 
are practically municipal officers, asking ‘How are you doing?’ and going into houses, into 
kitchens, and taking (recyclable and reusable materials). There is a lot of trust. So, (the 
municipality) certifies that these waste-pickers are trustworthy people. They go with the municipal 
credentials.  
 
 
Peñalolén promotes the monopoly of a single waste-picker over a specific neighbour-
hood area. In this programme, each waste-picker is registered and assigned an urban area of be-
tween 50 and 200 houses for collection. Each waste-picker must collect door-to-door at least 
once every fifteen days. Here, Peñalolén hopes to provide a regular source of material and thus 
income to each waste-picker. Currently as many as 39 waste-picker monopoly areas exist in Pe-
ñalolén (see Plate 4.3). Angel (39) describes the benefits of these monopolies: 
 
A: What we do is enrol a whole gated community, borough or urban area and assign one waste-
picker who goes almost door-to-door collecting… They have to travel fewer kilometres to get the 
material. They can be sure that they will get material, and won’t have to look through rubbish bins. 
At the same time, they get better prices and quantities, and have (financial) stability. They can say: 
‘I am making X pesos per month’, knowing they have that stable salary. 
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Plate 4.3: Location of waste-picker urban blocks and recycling points in Peñalolén 
 
 
 
 
 
This plate, “Location of waste-picker urban blocks and recycling points in Peñalolén”,  
has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.penalolen.cl/medio-ambiente/programa-reciclaje-inclusivo/ 
 
La Reina and Peñalolén have both promoted the separation of waste by locals. For La 
Reina, this programme applies primarily to collection within gated communities and public 
schools, where the municipality establishes contact, and a waste-picker, sometimes accompa-
nied by a policeman or municipal officer, performs the training in how to properly separate ma-
terial. In Peñalolén, waste separation occurs only in monopoly areas assigned to waste-pickers. 
The training is undertaken door-to-door by each waste-picker, accompanied by a municipal of-
ficer. Olivia (27), again: 
O: …base of everything is a community that is willing to give all their waste to (waste-pickers)… 
Currently, neighbours provide the (material) at their front door, separated, cleaned and in a con-
dition that waste-pickers can handle safely. (Waste-pickers) receive not only paper, cardboard, 
and cans, but also tools, equipment, appliances. 
 
La Reina has promoted a coordination between waste lorry collection schedules and 
waste-pickers. This means that waste-pickers know the exact day and time at which the lorry 
will pass in a certain area, and will travel ahead of it to sort material (when it has not already 
been separated), leaving the remainder to be taken by the lorry. With this approach, the munici-
pality expects to maximise the quantity of recyclable waste recovered, as Carlos (48) elaborates: 
C: The municipality has informed us of the routes and schedules when the lorry comes by, and 
drivers need to stick to that schedule… We start collecting around one hour in advance, so we can 
collect almost everything of value before the lorry passes through.  
 
La Reina and Peñalolén have also promoted the regularisation of waste-pickers’ collec-
tion schedules to increase the predictability of the collection service. By doing this, locals can 
regularly collect recyclable and reusable material and leave them at their front door, knowing 
that they will be collected on a certain day. This is expected to facilitate collaboration and pre-
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vent locals from being let down by the recycling system. As indicated by remarks made by Pau-
la (39) and Olivia (27), municipal officers from the PDLR and EDPC: 
P: (Waste-pickers form) an agreement with each gated community, but it is quite open. They can 
collect early in the morning or late in the afternoon…but the day is fixed. 
 
O: To encourage locals to change their behaviour (and recycle) you need to have a programme 
that allows them to implement their behavioural change… If the waste-picker doesn’t come (on 
their scheduled day), you are back to zero. (The locals) will not trust you again. The predictability 
of the system is key to gaining their contribution.  
  
These two municipalities have facilitated waste-pickers’ access to waste, both from 
businesses and locals. Peñalolén regularly makes contact with industries, requiring their storage 
spaces to be cleaned up, thus allowing waste-pickers to access large quantities of cachureos and 
recyclable materials in a short period of time. These operations are generally supported by mu-
nicipal vans that assist with the transport of material. In the case of La Reina, the municipality 
contacts local industries to offer a recycling service provided by waste-pickers. Both munici-
palities have also made contact with gated communities to offer them the alternative of recy-
cling using waste-pickers. This process is described by Carlos (48), a La Reina waste-picker, 
and Olivia (27): 
C: I think the municipality is the most important partner. I mean, without municipal support…you 
can’t do much… (It) is fundamental to any project that you carry out with locals or enterprises… 
We are (always) backed by the municipality. For example, CALAF is one of the (local) enterprises 
(organised through the municipality). Every day they give us between 400 and 600 kilos of card-
board. 
 
O: We make contact with enterprises, so (waste-pickers) can collect (from them)… The national 
judicial system contacted us to clean up their warehouse… The municipality also has a lot of 
buildings such as surgeries (and) schools that are being refurbished, so waste-pickers take (the 
waste) material. 
 
 
Negative externality policies 
 
In addition to these measures, supportive municipalities help waste-pickers to reduce 
negative externalities, such as child work, waste dispersion or extensive working hours. 
 
La Reina and Peñalolén have facilitated access to public nurseries for waste-pickers. All 
Chilean municipalities have a public nursery for workers, however waste-pickers are sometimes 
excluded from this, as they do not have relevant working documents. These documents have 
been provided by these two municipalities. As Esteban (52) a national waste picker leader, ex-
plains: 
E: The main reason for (children being at work) is a lack of access to nurseries… There are mu-
nicipalities that we have spoken to, and they facilitate (waste-pickers’) access to public nurse-
ries… In Peñalolén, for example, for the organisation members these things are easier. 
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In Chile, waste-pickers are banned from working in landfills as it is often associated 
with very poor working conditions and a high risk of accidents. Landfills are constantly moni-
tored by police and municipal social departments, and safety guides have been provided to min-
imise the accidents that can arise when waste-pickers persist in collecting from landfills. Addi-
tionally, waste-pickers are provided with safety equipment to increase their work security. 
Esteban (52) again comments:  
E: We have a partnership with the PDI [Investigative Police] and the DIDECO… Originally, the 
PDI would be intimidating…but…later they would provide (employment and childcare) alterna-
tives (to waste-pickers)… We created a safety guide for waste-pickers, so they work with reflective 
jackets, gloves. I mean, it is a small detail, but it is very important. 
 
The large range of supportive policies from these three categories shows the broad and 
far-reaching attempts to solve the multidimensional barriers of poverty faced by waste-pickers. 
Given the restrictions that inhibit their growth, these municipalities hope to accelerate the 
process of scaling-up waste-picker businesses. The extent to which these groups of policies 
impact waste-pickers’ performance is discussed in the following section. 
 
Incremental and iterative policy design: maximising efficiency and minimising de-
pendency 
 
Supportive municipalities use an incremental strategy to maximise the effectiveness of 
their policies. With this iterative (trial and error) approach, municipalities can identify the most 
effective policies in a context of many potential policy approaches with limited knowledge of 
their effectiveness: Angel (52) outlines this process: 
A: At the beginning, we didn’t know much about waste-pickers… So, we wanted…to prototype pol-
icies, to define what our recycling system was going to be – what works and what doesn’t. We 
have created and experimented with a range of policies that allows us to be at the avant-garde of 
recycling. 
 
 
Supportive municipalities face enormous uncertainty when designing policies for waste-
pickers. First, tri-dimensional barriers to growth – organisational, capital and market access – 
cannot be solved with a single intervention and thus require a policy package. Second, although 
international experience, particularly from waste-picking policies in Brazil and Colombia, can 
act as guide for supportive policy design, these policies need to be adapted and tested within the 
local context, there being a dearth of evidence as to which kinds of policies might work best 
locally. Third, municipalities have little information on the realities of how waste-picking works 
in their local context. Therefore, the challenge for supportive municipalities is to select the most 
effective interventions from a large range of policy choices. In this scenario, opting for 
traditional planning strategies of large-scale policies could easily result in major expenditure 
and very limited impact. Angel (52) describes this process: 
A: We are making progress, step by step… Initially, we weren’t clear where we were going…we 
realised that as…we achieved the goal of collecting more recyclable materials, we had a problem 
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in waste-pickers’ houses, which were crowded with materials. So, that was the second stage…we 
installed a big green point. 
 
These municipalities tend to implement several small-scale pilot policies simultaneously 
based on informed guesswork as to which policies might be successful. With the feedback 
received from these, amendments are made to ineffective policies when possible, or they are 
otherwise discarded, and an incremental method is used to scale-up effective policies. As an 
example, in La Reina, ‘puntos limpios’ (clean points) were initially unsuccessful and gave way 
to ‘condominios’ (gated community) recycling points. Karina (39), an officer at the PDLRC, 
explains this development: 
K: Some (small green) points were installed and they didn’t work…they became micro-dumps… 
(Waste-pickers) said that they were too small, unprofitable, but we couldn’t put a big (green point) 
in a square, (waste-pickers need to collect with) high frequency to keep it clean… (Now with 
recycling points) in gated communities, they collect once a week… In these eight (communities) it 
has worked and we are now expanding (into other gated communities). 
 
With this approach, policymakers interact closely with the waste-pickers, developing an 
ever-deepening knowledge of the market
 
dynamic of the sector and the types of constraints 
faced. This leads to ever more improved policies as the process is repeated, as Olivia (27) 
describes: 
O: First we did a pilot with a thousand families and we got it wrong. Then we realised that the 
most important indicator to increase efficiency was each recycler’s pedalling per kilo. That is, we 
needed to minimise distance and increase the tonnes collected per kilometre… From then, our 
policies became more accurate. 
 
 Although La Reina and Peñalolén consider active local government support an 
important factor in growing waste-picker businesses, they are wary of creating a long-term 
dependency of these informal businesses on municipal resources. Policy interventions thus 
never take the form of welfare programmes that subsidise the profits of waste-picking, but are 
rather targeted interventions aiming to increase the productivity of waste-pickers. La Reina and 
Peñalolén eventually started to modify their policy interventions by decreasing the involvement 
of human and economic resources along with waste-picker business growth, and progressively 
replacing municipal support with autonomous waste-picker cooperatives that can support their 
members. Angel (52) describes the municipal approach, which is complemented by Carlos’ (48) 
description of waste-picker cooperative growth: 
A: Waste-pickers are not municipal employees. Waste-picking is an independent activity that we 
have been bringing together and organising. We propose that they will become more and more 
autonomous… Our logic has been: at the first step we give everything that is essential… In the 
second stage, we give (them) less… A culminating moment (of this stage) was when (local waste-
pickers) received a (Central Government Fund) entirely by themselves. We went from a stage 
where we gave them everything…(to them being) formalised, presenting their (own) projects, 
buying their own tools. 
 
C: (In our cooperative), we buy per kilo and sell per tonne… Of course, we get a margin from 
selling. These (profits) are shared...as we are a cooperative... We call for a meeting and...among 
all of our members, we say: 'Okay, we have one or two million pesos [USD 1,611.74 – 3,223.47] of 
profit. What do we do?'… We have invested in new tricycles… We bought 710-litre containers to 
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install in gated communities… (Now) people work better, and we get more material and earn more 
money. 
 
To summarise, this section has shown that the primary objective of municipalities pursu-
ing supportive policies is to socially include a traditionally marginalised group and, as a second 
objective, enhance local environmental protection. The policies described above all focus on 
enhancing the economic efficiency of the activity to reach these goals, be it through capital en-
dowment, organisation, market access or negative externality reduction. Supportive municipali-
ties use an incremental strategy to maximise the effectiveness of their policies in an uncertain 
environment, while minimising waste-pickers becoming dependent by slowly moving them into 
a more self-determined, auto-financed and autonomous role. 
 
POLICY IMPACT OF SUPPORTIVE POLICIES: EVALUATION 
 
In this section, I evaluate the specific impacts of each supportive policy on enhancing 
waste-pickers’ sustainable performance and reducing negative externalities. As explained in 
Chapter 3, in the section ‘Second stage: quantitative methodology’, and drawing from the re-
sults of my waste-picker survey, I run Equation 1 where the outcome of interest is one of the 
eleven sustainable performance indicators (see Table A.6.1 in Annex 6). Five main indicators 
are discussed in this section, and a discussion of complementary performance indicators com-
monly addressed in the literature can be found in Annex 6. Explanatory variables in this set of 
regressions are the eleven supportive policies implemented by municipalities (see Table A.6.2 
in Annex 6). I also include several individual socio-economic and municipal controls (Table 
A.6.2 in Annex 6). As custom, the fully saturated model – the one with all controls – is my pre-
ferred specification; therefore the analysis is done using this estimation, and with a significance 
level of 10%. For transparency, I also report all coefficients in the regression, and the way that 
the coefficients change as more controls are added (see Tables A.6.4 through A.6.6 in the An-
nex 6). Education has been excluded as a control variable, as almost all waste-pickers have very 
low levels of education (see Table 3.2 in Chapter 3).  
 
The results of the statistical analyses are summarised in Table 4.4. In OLS model 1.a, 
the impact of policies on economic efficiency (indicators 1) has been tested. In OLS model 2.a, 
the impact of supportive policies on social equity performance is tested. OLS model 3.a assesses 
the impact of policies on outcomes for working conditions, and in OLS model 4.a, negative ex-
ternality variables are introduced. Finally, model 5.a reports the results of supportive policies on 
environmental protection performance. Qualitative analysis is then used to understand the 
mechanisms at play behind the statistically significant impacts of local policy intervention. In 
this section, a quantitative analysis is complemented with qualitative evidence, primarily in the 
form of basic reportage using transcripts from interviews and focus groups
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Table 4.4: Summary of the Impacts of Municipal Policies on the Sustainable Performance of Waste-Pickers 
 
Respose Variable Positively Impacting Policy Negatively Impacting Policy Magnitude Type of policy Overall Impact (a) 
1. Economic Efficiency 
Indicator 1.a: Provision of motorised vehicles   654.2* Capital B 
Earnings per hour worked 
Institutionalisation of waste-pickers   1,260*** Organisation A 
Waste-picker monopoly   833.8*** Organisation A 
Regularisation of schedules   152.3** Organisation A 
2. Social Equity 
Indicator 2.a: Provision of motorised vehicles   0.440** Capital B 
Income relative to minimum wage Institutionalisation of waste-pickers   0.929*** Organisation A 
3. Quality of work 
Indicator 3.a:                         
Donation of tools and machinery   0.0931* Capital A 
Number of hours worked in a week 
4. Negative Externalities 
Indicator 4.a: Place to leave children (social network) -1.813*** Neg. Externalities A 
Child work (b) 
Place to leave children (school/nursery) -1.117** Neg. Externalities A 
  Provision of motorised vehicles 0.879* Capital B 
5. Environmental Protection 
Indicator 5.a: Donation of Tools and Machinery   2.550* Capital A 
Quantity collected per hour 
(recyclable and reusable material) 
Institutionalisation of waste-pickers   12.360** Organisation   
Coordination with waste lorry   3.402*** Organisation A 
Place to leave children (social network) 8.703** Neg. Externality A 
Place to leave children (school/nursery) 7.532* Neg. Externality A 
Notes: a) Overall Impact A denotes municipal policies that have only a positive impact across indicators; B refers to municipal policies that have both positive and negative impacts across 
indicators; C denotes policies that have only negative impacts across indicators. 
  b) Where 1 signifies 'I never go with my child/children to collect waste' and 6 signifies 'I always go with my child/children to collect waste' 
  c) Where 1 signifies 'I always clean up after collecting/sorting waste' and 6 signifies 'I never clean up after collecting/sorting waste' 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses       
 
Respon
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Individual productivity: earnings per hour worked (indicator 1.a) 
The data suggest that a higher level of local government support leads to stronger eco-
nomic performance for waste-pickers. First, productivity per hour of work (indicator 1.a, Table 
4.4) sees an increase that results from a number of supportive policies – the upgrading of waste-
pickers to motorised vehicles increases their productivity by CLP 654 (USD 1.28) per hour, 
granting a monopoly over an urban area by CLP 834 (USD 1.63) per hour, the regularisation of 
waste-picker collection schedules by CLP 152 (USD 0.30) per hour, and the institutionalisation 
of waste-pickers by CLP 1260 (USD 2.47) per hour. 
 
When motorised vehicles are provided to waste-pickers, the entire collection process is 
sped up and they are able to carry more material with each trip, as well as carrying larger reusa-
ble items, resulting in higher returns per hour of work. Claudia (48), a waste-picker from Pe-
ñalolén , expands on this: 
C: (I started with) a shopping trolley…then, I had a tricycle, which was a wonderful step. But I 
was still struggling to work all the way up in Pocuro, since I recycle in Providencia [a downhill 
area]… So I used to get exhausted, but it was still an improvement… When I got the pick-up van, I 
was so happy…now I can go…wherever people call for me. I can carry big things that I couldn’t 
before… I was able to grow, increasing the number and size of things that I collected. 
 
Organisational policies draw positive results as residents become more willing to collabo-
rate with waste-pickers, allowing them to access recyclable and reusable materials of a higher 
quality and in higher quantity in a shorter period of time, thus increasing earnings per hour. As 
Sofia (46), a waste-picker leader in La Reina, comments on the relationship between waste-
pickers and local households: 
S: Each waste-picker has their particular borough where they collect and they must respect that 
area. Neighbours are enrolled (in a recycling programme) and the municipality assigns a local 
waste-picker… We rely on neighbours’ cooperation because (our earnings) depend on what they 
provide… (In each area) we have a strong relationship with the neighbours, they know us…they 
hold on to ‘cachureos’ and provide separated (recycling) material for us. 
 
Esteban (52) explains how the regularisation of waste-pickers’ collection schedules 
means that, in the long run, neighbours can get to know waste-pickers personally, again improv-
ing trust in their relationships: 
E: Here in this street…a waste-picker comes every other day…always following the same sched-
ule… We have worked in this office for 4 to 5 years…it’s always been the same guy… Now, we 
know him… People (in this street) recognise him and gather ‘cachureos’ and (recyclable) material 
for him. 
 
 
Similarly, the institutionalisation of waste-pickers influences this relationship built on 
trust and collaboration. With this policy, waste-pickers are able to access high-income gated 
communities, thus expanding their collection area. As Sofia (46), in another intervention, noted:  
S: (It is important) to have an identification card or our jackets…to show to the locals, because if 
we walk through the street in uniform…they will actively ask us…‘What do you recycle?’…and 
they give us ‘cachureos’ or (recyclable) material… They prefer (giving) to a waste-picker in uni-
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form rather than one without. (Gated communities) can have private guards…who now say hello 
to us…they know that we come from the municipality and they open their doors to us. 
 
 
Poverty reduction: income relative to minimum wage (indicator2.a) 
 
It appears that supportive policies can be effective in moving waste-pickers out of pov-
erty. The provision of motorised vehicles boosts monthly incomes by 0.44 times the minimum 
wage (USD 142.35), and the institutionalisation of waste-pickers increases incomes by 0.93 
times the minimum wage (USD 300.88). 
 
Increases in productivity derived from the provision of motorised vehicles described in 
indicator 1.a create a run-off effect of an increase in incomes. Similarly, the increased trust for 
institutionalised waste-pickers discussed earlier leads to higher incomes, as waste-pickers gain 
access to higher quality and quantities of materials. Moreover, in the Peñalolén municipal areas, 
waste-picker institutionalisation also allow them to secure a stable place in street markets, where 
they are able to sell materials as reusable products for a higher price. As David (48), a waste-
picker in Peñalolén, noted: 
 D: The municipality helps us, and we pay the minimum 200-300 pesos [USD 0.32-0.48] for a 
municipal permit (to sell our ‘cachureos’). We have a good relationship with the police and the 
municipal inspectors… You can get more money for your products… Let’s say you repair a TV... 
you can sell it in a street market for 12,000 [USD 19.25], but in the recycling market you get 
2,000 pesos [USD 3.23]. 
 
 
Working conditions: number of hours worked in a week (indicator 3.a) 
 
The working week length can be reduced through the provision of tools and machinery, 
decreasing a workday by 50 minutes; this equates to a reduction of 18 hours per month. A 
waste-picker’s workday is split between collection and processing. The collection of materials 
can be done only at particular times and on particular days of the week when neighbours leave 
waste outside their home, and tends to be tiring, and so waste-pickers cannot commit limitless 
time to this activity. When the processing time is significantly sped up with tools and machin-
ery, a relative proportion of the workday length is shortened. As explained by David (48), a 
waste-picker from La Reina: 
D: Triturated plastic, when it’s chopped up, (recycling companies) will pay around 700 pesos per 
kilo…because it’s almost raw material… I have a machine that you use to crush the bottles and put 
them in a bag. You can put up to 40 kilos in it… Same for cardboard, it needs to be wrapped, so 
with a baling machine you go much faster. 
 
Child labour: frequency of waste-pickers accompanied by a child (indicator 4.a)  
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The results for the frequency of children located at the workplace (indicator 4.a) raise an 
interesting point. Contrary to the literature, and as female waste-pickers consistently stressed 
during interviews, children are not brought to work as a means of complementing a waste-
pickers’ income (Porto et al. 2004), as this indicator is not statistically significant, but is rather 
the result of having few alternative options for places to leave children during the workday. In 
this sense, the availability of public facilities (nurseries or schools) or waste-pickers using their 
social networks (typically relatives, friends or neighbours) significantly reduces the frequency 
of the indicator by 1.117 and 1.813 standard deviations respectively. Carlos (46), a waste-picker 
leader from Maipú, offers an explanation:  
E: This (problem) affects women more so than men… Our female co-workers have had to leave 
their children at home or take them to work many times, because they don’t have access to public 
childcare. When they do have access to it, since we don’t have a formal job, we have to pick them 
up either in the morning or in the afternoon. If you have a formal job they will keep children all 
day. We have spoken with the municipalities…to allow us to keep them in the nursery longer, so 
we can progress in our work. In some cases they have accepted (our requests). 
 
However, the provision of a motorised vehicle increases the presence of children at work 
by 0.879 standard deviations. This is because, in the absence of childcare facilities, a motorised 
vehicle can provide a comfortable, covered area for children while their parents are working. 
Esteban (52) again explains: 
E: We are fighting for access to nurseries, so we can go to recycle with clear heads… Often waste-
pickers, particularly single mothers or widows, have had to leave their children at home alone… 
But you are always worried that it is going to burn down (since flammable material is stored at 
home)… Tragedies like this have happened many times… In my own case, it was better to go to 
work with my children in my pick-up van…because who could I leave them with? 
 
Prevention of waste entering landfills: quantity of recyclable and reusable material 
(indicator 5.a)  
 
Supportive policies also seem to have a positive impact on waste-pickers’ environmental 
protection indicators. Regarding the prevention of waste from ending up in landfills (indicator 
5.a), the donation of machinery and tools removes 2.550 kilograms from landfilles per hour of 
work, coordination with the waste lorry 3.402 kilograms per hour, the institutionalisation of 
waste-pickers by 12.360 kilograms per hour, and having a place to leave children by between 
7.532 and 8.703 kilograms per hour. 
 
The provision of processing machines frees up time that waste-pickers would otherwise 
spend doing these processes manually, increasing their time available for collection. As stated 
by Esteban (52) in another intervention: 
E: Our cooperative has a baler machine. This saves a lot of time, because some middlemen ask us 
to pre-wrap cardboard, and without the machine it needs to be done manually… You work a little 
bit less, but you have also more time to collect. 
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The coordination of waste-pickers with the waste lorry schedule has a significant impact 
on indicator 5.a. When waste-pickers are aware of the route and timetable of waste lorries, they 
can arrive before the lorry to salvage almost all recyclable and reusable materials in an urban 
area before it is taken away to landfills, increasing the quantity collected per individual. Carlos 
(48), a waste-picker leader from La Reina, explains this point: 
C: Here, everyone knows when the waste lorry passes… Waste-pickers start collecting from the 
top of the hill at 7:00 am and finish here, near the recycling centre, around 1:00 pm… This means 
that almost all the material that can be recycled ends up here (in the recycling centre) and not in 
landfill… If a waste-picker tries to collect at 2:00 pm, he will find very little (material in the 
streets). 
 
As with indicator 1.a, the institutionalisation of waste-pickers increases neighbourhood 
trust compared with those who do not receive support, and since they have increased access to 
recyclable and reusable material, their collection rate increases. As Lorenzo (45), a waste-picker 
leader from the cooperative in La Reina, explains: 
D: (Neighbours would say:) ‘Here come the waste-pickers – be careful, close the door, the waste-
picker is here…he is looking for houses to steal from’. We are stigmatised. If you arrive with an 
identification card, they will say: ‘Okay, he comes from the municipality’… They look at you and 
they see the municipality. For example, when we had our collection day, all of us were wearing 
green municipal uniforms. All (of the neighbours) could identify us and were happy to donate (re-
usable and recyclable materials). 
 
 
Access to childcare services increases collection rates for both recyclable and reusable 
products by up to 8.703 kilograms per hour. Female waste-pickers tend to be more able to gain 
access inside houses, as neighbours in my study tended to be more willing to trust them over 
men, allowing them to obtain more reusable products and to collect large household items. 
Since childcare allows them to be more efficient in their collecting, higher collection rates 
result. Esteban (52) expands on this idea: 
E: Women can collect more, as people give them much more material, especially in low-income 
neighbours. It is incredible, but people are more empathetic towards women, and so they can col-
lect ‘cachureos’ that people wouldn’t give to men. 
 
This analysis has shown that a combination of supportive policies is necessary to yield 
the best results for waste-pickers. The most important policies seem to be those that organise 
waste-pickers to improve the efficiency of the recycling system. This is particularly true for pol-
icies that promote the institutionalisation of waste-pickers, that foster waste separation in 
households prior to collection, that provide guaranteed collection areas to waste-pickers and that 
facilitate the regularisation of waste-pickers’ collection schedules. Given the low-cost imple-
mentation of these types of support policies, this is particularly suitable for improving SWM 
systems in developing world cities. Further highly relevant supportive municipal policies focus 
on increasing the capital endowments of waste-pickers, particularly the provision of a location 
for waste accumulation, assisting waste-pickers with access to motorised vehicles and providing 
machinery and tools for work. Finally, the provision of childcare facilities not only significantly 
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reduces the occurrence of children at work, but also facilities work for female waste-pickers, 
having a positive impact on their productivity. Overall, the positive impact of supportive poli-
cies in increasing the results of all but one of our indicators establish positive local government 
intervention as a central component in achieving sustainable waste-picking (see also Annex 6). 
 
 
FINAL BARRIERS OF WASTE-PICKER BUSINESSES AND ALTERNATIVE 
MARKETS 
 
The final barriers: spatial poverty traps and oligopsony in recycling markets 
 
Spatial poverty traps 
 
The impact of local support policies is limited by their particular spatial jurisdictions. 
Municipalities administrate over a restricted urban space, and thus have a limited area of waste 
production. These restrictions ultimately lead to two limitations, namely profitability and the 
expansion of waste-picking work that yields a decent income. The profitability of waste-
picking is affected by the social conditions of the urban area where waste-pickers collect and 
sell. First, the social condition of a municipality affects the intensity of competition in an urban 
area, influencing the quantities collected per worker and, consequently, the profits made. Poor 
urban areas house more vulnerable people and, as a result, more waste-pickers. Conversely, in 
Santiago de Chile, the most spatially segregated city in OECD countries (OECD 2013), 
wealthier areas have almost no vulnerable people, and so they have few waste-pickers. As 
waste-pickers collect and sell in restricted urban areas, poor areas are highly competitive. 
Nicolas (62), a waste-picker from Cerrillos, explains the impacts of this: 
N: We have been doing badly… There are many (waste-pickers) in the street that use their tricycles 
to go here, there and everywhere… Sometimes you get nothing because someone has already come 
by before you. But since we’re all in the same boat, nobody can get angry with their friend who is 
simply working as well. 
 
 
Second, higher-income areas produce a higher quantity of recyclable waste and better 
quality products for reuse, and are thus more profitable. When a waste-picker sells in one of 
these areas, they benefit from the local population’s higher purchasing power. As a result, richer 
areas have much more potential profit than poorer ones, a point that Sebastian (62), a waste-
picker from Pudahuel, elaborates: 
S: People in a better (economic) situation have better things, so they throw more things away… 
They give good clothes, sometimes white goods… I can make 5,000 [USD 8.05] in a day… In the 
rich areas there are (waste-pickers) who make 20,000 [USD 32.20] per day. Twenty thousand! 
Because there is more material…for example, they get big piles of cardboard. They can get 200 to 
300 kilos of cardboard, so they can make a lot of money. I think they earn…even more than 20,000 
per day. 
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On the other hand, municipalities have a limited carrying capacity for waste-pickers. If 
waste-pickers are to remain in decent working conditions, they need to collect a certain amount 
of waste per month. If we hold this amount of waste per worker constant, supportive 
municipalities can still increase the number of waste-pickers in decent work, by expanding the 
area covered by waste-picking activities or by increasing the intensity of exploitation of their 
urban area. Nevertheless, a municipality is still ultimately limited by the total quantity of 
recyclable or reusable waste available in their locale. As Olivia (27), a worker at the EDPC, 
explains: 
O: With our structure, we provide local families with a tidy system of recycling that generates 
decent employment… Nowadays, we have twenty-five waste-pickers… (We assign) one waste-
picker for every 200 to 300 houses. We estimate that, if we amplify and replicate, we could reach 
20,000 houses… So, we could have 60 to 100 waste-pickers (in our municipality in total). 
 
Following this logic, wealthier areas have the potential to support higher number of 
decent waste-pickers’ jobs, although supportive municipalities tend to be low-income areas. 
Olivia continues:  
O: We have to understand that there are several urban areas in the municipality (that have) 
vulnerable (social conditions). So, the quantity of recyclable material is lower and thus it is more 
difficult for waste-pickers to collect enough to make a good living. 
 
It is important to mention that this represents only an ultimate barrier – at the current rate 
of exploitation, supportive municipalities still currently have large scope for expanding the 
amount of decent waste-picking employment. 
 
Monopsony and oligopsony 
 
 The oligopsonic or monopsonic power of large recycling companies represents a final 
and, arguably, insurmountable barrier to the growth of waste-picking businesses, as it affords 
large recycling enterprises the power to fix the prices paid for materials, extracting profits from 
those at the bottom of the recycling network. As discussed in the subsection ‘The recycling 
market: a vertically integrated market’, the market is structured through a network of middle-
men who connect waste-pickers to only one or just a handful of large recycling enterprises for 
each type of recycled material. Therefore, a single or a few large recycling enterprises generate 
the entire demand for each recyclable material. At a national level, this imperfect market at the 
top of the recycling network gives enormous market power to the large recycling enterprises as 
buyers, allowing them to fix prices at will over even the most advanced waste-picker coopera-
tives and, consequently, to exploit monopsonic or oligopsonic profits. In La Reina, which con-
tains the most advanced waste-picker cooperative with high levels of organisation, capital and 
market access, they are still able to sell directly to only the one or two largest buyers for each 
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type of material, and waste-pickers have no alternative but to accept the prices set by these en-
terprises. Carlos (48), a waste-picker leader of La Reina, describes this predicament: 
C: There is no competition. I mean, SOREPA is SOREPA! So, if you try to negotiate with Reciclajes 
Industriales [a smaller recycling enterprise] they will never say: ‘We'll pay you more’, because, in 
the end, they sell to SOREPA and SOREPA is going to pay them the same (price)… There is just 
one big buyer… It is the same with metals, (the buyer) being Gerdau Aza. They can reduce prices 
from one day to another, because they know that some big middlemen, such as PEZ…cannot stop 
working. So, they keep exploiting downwards through the network. And, in the end, we are the 
most exploited. 
 
 
In the same vein, large recycling companies can attempt to increase profits by paying 
lower prices for recyclable materials. Profits for these recycling companies are determined by 
three factors: international prices of raw materials, production costs and input prices. Large 
companies have little margin to exercise control over the first two factors: they cannot deter-
mine commodity prices in international markets, and in the short run, for a given technology, it 
is difficult to reduce cost by modifying production factors (capital and labour mixes). However, 
given their monopsony power, they can exert an influence on input prices to increase their prof-
its. Lowering input prices in turn reduces the profitability of the whole recycling network, 
which ultimately means lower incomes for smaller businesses, waste-pickers and poor house-
holds. At the time of my first fieldwork, the prices paid to large recycling firms was tending to 
increase (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4), which contrasts with waste-pickers’ own reports of decreases 
in prices paid; it is this feasible then that these profits are being extracted from the bottom of the 
recycling network through exploitative mechanisms. Esteban (52), a national waste-picker lead-
er, and Fernando (56), in my group discussion in Recoleta, speak about this exploitation: 
E: The big recycling enterprises are taking profits out of our work… Okay, they buy from us, but 
their profit margins (are increasing)…they fix the prices… Twenty years ago they used to say that 
the cardboard prices were going down because of forest fires in the south (of Chile). With our 
training, we have discovered that the stock market of New York determines the prices of paper pulp 
and other materials… (Now) they say that since they have too much stock they cannot pay us more, 
but the price of fibre doesn’t go down. On the contrary, it is going up. 
 
F: Look, thirty years ago, prices were different. For instance, newspaper was paid at 60 pesos 
[USD 0.11] and the money was worth more. Now (newspaper) is worth 20 [USD 0.03]. Think! 
Over thirty years, instead of going up, it has gone down, when everything else has gone up. 
 
Firms can continue to extract profits from the recycling network to the point where a 
product is no longer profitable for waste-pickers, and so they stop collecting. Carlos (48), again, 
describes this:  
C: I think the enterprises play with us, I think they profit by changing prices. They try to pay the 
bare minimum… and increase their profits…and then when it is no longer worthwhile (for waste-
pickers) to sell, they raise the prices a little. But in the end it’s us who builds and expands this 
enterprise. We are the ones affected by low prices.   
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Figure 4.3:  International Commodity Metal Prices from 1996 to 2014 (Commodity metal 
prices index, 2005=100.)
5
 
 
 
Source: Idexmundi 2014 (accessed 25/12/2014) 
 
Figure 4.4: International Commodity Paper Pulp Prices 1996-2014 (US Dollars per Tonne) 
 
 
 
Source: Idexmundi 2014 (accessed 25/12/2014) 
 
This situation poses a barrier to the positive impact of supportive municipal policies on 
waste-pickers’ profitability. According to Medina (2007), waste-picking is an activity in which 
profitability is determined by a combination of quantity and prices. While local supportive 
policies can increase quantities collected by waste-pickers, as well as giving them a certain 
degree of collective negotiating power, their impact reaches a barrier at the top of the recycling 
network. A single buyer’s market power can undermine any increase in productivity by 
ultimately denying them an earning that reflects realistic market value. 
 
 
 
127 
 
Overcoming barriers: two complementary alternatives 
 
When faced with the limits placed on waste-pickers’ market gains created by the power 
imbalance within the industry, waste-pickers and municipalities propose two possible solutions: 
developing alternative markets and fighting exploitation. 
 
Escaping vertical exploitation: moving to alternative markets 
 
To some extent, waste-pickers can escape the control of the leading recycling 
enterprises by moving to alternative markets. Three alternative strategies have been identified in 
my fieldwork that offer potential opportunities for finding new markets; notably moving within, 
moving out and scaling up. First, waste-pickers can move within the recyclable market by 
selectively collecting materials that command higher prices. For instance, some waste-pickers 
have stopped collecting Tetra Pak and cardboard in the wake of lower prices paid, and now 
focus on more profitable recyclable materials such as cans and scrap metal. Jose (45), Gloria 
(54) and Daniela (60), in my group discussion in Recoleta, comment on this: 
J: I do not collect cardboard as it takes up too much space, I prefer to collect magazines, 
‘cachureos’ and drink cans, which are better paid. 
G: (I collect) scrap and iron. 
D: No cardboard, it is too poorly paid. It’s not worth the effort. 
 
 If a significant number of waste-pickers adopt this market logic, pressure is put on 
recycling enterprises to increase prices paid. Nevertheless, as most recyclable material markets 
are dominated by large enterprises, this strategy can only have a small overall effect on reducing 
price exploitation.  
 
 
A second market alternative can be found through the process of moving out of the 
recyclable to the reuse market. A large number of waste-pickers are finding the reuse market 
more profitable and increasing the share of reusable materials in their income portfolio. Lorenzo 
(45), a waste-picker of Recoleta, and Esteban (52), a national waste-picker leader, explain: 
L: A kilo of cardboard is worth 30 pesos [USD 0.05]… (With) a van full of 300 kilos of 
cardboard…you get 9,000 pesos [USD 14.51 USD]. If you go to a house, they give you furniture, a 
heater, you sell them and you make 10,000 [USD 16.11]. So, there is a difference… Nowadays, the 
(recyclable) material, cardboard and paper, is poorly paid. 
 
E: The reuse market, nowadays, is an important part of the income portfolio of waste-pickers. If 
we consider five years ago, only a few waste-pickers were selling items in street markets as 
‘coleros’… Last year…we discovered that today almost 70% of waste-pickers (collect and sell) 
reused products. 
 
However, it is worth noting that competition can increase in a particular urban area with 
this movement of more workers into reusable collection, leading to a decrease in profits. 
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A third alternative involves scaling up to the international market. The municipality of 
Peñalolén, in its new recycling centre, will use capital to modify and transform materials, 
meaning it will be able to sell internationally at a price corresponding to that of raw material 
globally. Although this measure would allow waste-picking cooperatives to definitively 
overcome the price exploitation that they currently face, waste-pickers who are not members 
would remain in exploitative conditions. Angel (52), head of the EDPC, recognises this: 
A: To move to (this next) stage, a recycling centre is needed… It will allow us to bring all the 
material (to one place), process it, pack it and even export raw materials. You could make a 
contract with a buyer to provide a (fixed quantity) of tonnes per month… All of this allows for 
much better prices, as you can escape…the national monopoly. Otherwise, we are at the mercy of 
the (large recycling) enterprises. 
 
 
Fighting exploitation: the roles of national waste-picker unions and market regulations 
 
Waste-pickers can go some way to overcoming the power of leading recycling enterprises 
by fighting the structural roots of exploitation. Two particular alternatives are mentioned in my 
qualitative data: national trade union negotiation and state regulation of the recycling market. 
Strong national trade unions would be able to negotiate prices with large enterprises based on 
access to information and bargaining power. By monitoring the international prices of the stock 
market they would be able to argue against unjustified price reductions from enterprises and 
request increases in prices accordingly, as Esteban (52) illustrates: 
E: In Chile, almost no one wants to recycle plastic… (But) in other countries it is the base of 
waste-pickers’ businesses… Nowadays, (large recycling) enterprises understand that they must 
raise the price, because we presented them with the values of the resin… (We) made a diagram 
with the curve of (international) resin prices and the prices (that they pay us). They should buy 
PET from us at $1.10 (USD), and in Chile they are paying less than 50 cents. 
 
Currently, the National Union of Waste-Pickers has been able to argue for better prices by 
accessing and presenting relevant information. However, the lack of organisation amongst 
waste-pickers, at both a local and national level, prevents the development of sufficient 
bargaining power to truly negotiate prices. Esteban (52) continues: 
E: The fight for better prices (of recyclable materials)…it is like the fight…for the minimum salary. 
But we cannot even get at the same table (as recycling companies), even though…we have 
publically complained, we’ve talked, argued. 
  
 
Second, the National Union of Waste-Pickers suggests that public intervention is 
required, in the form of a regulating agency that oversees the prices of the recycled market. This 
agency could compare international value and prices paid to waste-pickers, thus allowing for 
fair profits for both recycling enterprises and waste-pickers. As a result of higher prices, profits, 
efficiency, incomes and labour conditions would all improve for waste-pickers. Esteban (52) 
once again illustrates this: 
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E: If we had a regulated market, everything would be very different, they wouldn’t exploit us and 
we would have fair prices… Some time ago, we argued ‘a decent wage for two tons’, regardless of 
the material… If we had a regulated market, this would be realistic because prices would be 
higher. However, they are not regulated, so waste-pickers have collected two tonnes several times 
and did not receive (a decent wage). 
 
Claudia (48), a waste-picker from Peñalolén, considers the impact that higher prices 
would have on recycling rates: 
C: If we had, in this country, enterprises that bought the material (at a fair rate)…we wouldn’t 
need to go to (sell) in street markets and collect ‘cachureos’. If bottles were paid at 500 pesos 
[USD 0.80] per kilo, beverage tins 1,000 [USD 1.61] per kilo…it would be worth only collecting 
(recyclable) materials.
  
 
In the current climate, supportive policies still have a large scope for increasing incomes 
and working conditions of waste-pickers, but at some point they will ultimately face these 
structural barriers to increasing their market share: a spatially restricted marketplace and mono-
oligopsonic power of large enterprises. The three approaches of moving within, moving out and 
scaling up provide some potential to escape from this imperfect recycling market. However, 
moving within or outside of the recyclable market does not allow waste-pickers to escape low 
profits, while scaling up over a large recycling company can only solve the problem for a 
limited number of local waste-pickers. On the other hand, taking measures to fight exploitation 
could help to end price exploitation in the recycling market for all workers. Collective 
negotiation and market regulation appear to be plausible options, but they lie beyond the scope 
of municipal agency and require intervention at a national level. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The objective of this chapter has been to provide a better understanding of the realities 
of life as a waste-picker, comparing current UIE theory with these realities, and then using this 
as a basis for analysing the role of supportive municipal policies in enhancing waste-pickers’ 
performance. 
 
An integration of theories is needed to accurately describe the reality of the waste-
picking experience and business life cycle in Santiago de Chile. The beginning stages of the 
activity – using waste-picking as a ‘necessity’ or ‘last resort’ source of income – and the 
corresponding increase in waste-picking activities during economic downturns matches with a 
dualist conception, but once a person has entered into the activity, the neoliberal and voluntarist 
picture of waste-picking as an ‘opportunity’ more closely approximates with what is occurring 
on the ground. The dichotomy of a waste-picker’s approach to recyclable and reusable items 
once again leads to varying degrees of relevance for each theory, being at times integrated with 
the formal economy through an exploitative system and other times operating in complete 
isolation (in line with voluntarist and dualist perspectives repectively). However, the reuse 
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market continues to be almost completely ignored by research literature on waste-pickers. 
 
The policies introduced by supportive municipalities are a reflection of this picture of 
waste-picking. Waste-pickers tend to come from a background of poverty, and do not have 
access to the capital required to reinvest in their businesses, nor to become organised structures 
that allow them to negotiate better payments and to access markets to collect/sell their products. 
In response, local policies have been implemented with the aim of overcoming these issues 
while fostering the social inclusion of a marginalised group commonly excluded from society, 
and as secondary objective, achieve an integral SWM system. Enhancing productivity and a 
gradual process of formalisation are seen as the main tools for achieving these objectives, with 
policies concentrated on three main areas: increasing capital endowment, organisation and 
reducing negative externalities. 
 
The majority of the supportive policies evaluated in this study had a positive impact on 
enhancing waste-pickers’ sustainable performance. There is no single ‘magic bullet’ solution 
that can increase the sustainability of waste-picking, but rather a range of policies is required. 
The organisation of waste-pickers is an inexpensive and effective strategy that increases 
sustainable performance, while the provision of capital is a more costly method that also yields 
positive results. This strongly suggests that government support is a necessary tool to help 
waste-pickers reach their full economic, social and environmental potential. 
 
This chapter has also identified that local policy support is not the be-all and end-all of 
improving waste-pickers’ performance, as certain ultimate barriers exist that are firmly 
entrenched in the recycling sector. Local carrying capacity as well as the mono/oligopsonic 
power of leading recycling enterprises can prohibit waste-pickers from reaching their full 
economic potential, and overcoming these obstacles lies beyond the domain of municipal public 
policy and thus requires action at a national scale, particularly concerning the dominant market 
power of large firms. 
 
Notes to Chapter Four 
 
1. Interview and survey data was collected for the municipalities on Cerrillos, Santiago and Maipu 
in the first round of field work in April 2010. Data from the municipalities of Peñalolén, La 
Reina, Recoleta and Pudahuel were collected in a second round of field work from June to 
September 2014. 
2. People with permanent illnesses face the problem of prolonged absenteeism from work. In the 
Chilean context of minimal labour right protection caused by reforms from the 1980s that 
promoted labour flexibility, permanent illness might lead first to unemployment, and then to lack 
of employability.   
3. Disabled people in Chile are entitled to receive a small handicap pension (Pensión Básica 
Solidaria de Invalidez, PBSI) of 89.740 CLP, which they lose if they re-enter into the labour 
market. As these people cannot work formally and the disabled pension scheme only provides a 
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survival-level income, disabled people are pushed into informal work, and some of them into 
waste-picking.  
4. According to neoclassical economic theory, expansion of the economy would increase first the 
number of formal jobs offered at a minimum wage, and only when facing a shortage of labour 
supply would they be pushed to increase salaries. Nevertheless, since waste-pickers can earn 
salaries of more than two times the minimum salary, a marginal increase of salaries in the formal 
sector would not be able to move a significant number of waste-pickers out of the activity. 
Moreover, because of the higher non-monetary benefits from waste-picking when compared 
with formal employment, salaries in the formal sector would need to rise to be higher than the 
current income of waste-pickers, or better working conditions would need to be assigned to 
formal jobs. 
5. Index includes Copper, Aluminium, Iron, Ore, Zinc, Lead and Uranium prices. 
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CHAPTER 5 : STREET VENDORS 
 
The previous chapter identified the use of municipal supportive policies to promote the 
social inclusion of vulnerable populations in the provision of public urban services. Now, I turn 
to the discussion of these policies promoting the provision of essentially private urban services 
in the public space, setting the scene for the cross-sector ‘exit and inclusion’ discussion in 
Chapter 7. This chapter analyses the livelihoods of street vendors in Santiago, and as with the 
previous chapter, studies the reasons, results and limitations of a supportive municipal policy 
approach. 
 
In this chapter, I analyse a particular type of street vendor known as a feriante, working 
in street markets known as ferias libres. Ferias libres are temporary markets that operate on the 
street and are set up and dismantled within a day, moving the following day to a different 
municipal neighbourhood. A feria libre operates six days a week (Tuesday to Sunday) and may 
occur two or three times a week in the same location – on average, a feriante works in two to 
three different locations in one week. Feriantes are regulated only by local regulations 
contained within the Municipal Ordinance of Street Markets (OMFL). This document 
establishes the necessity for holding a municipal permit to work in a feria libre, and sets the 
days of each feria, its hours, location and the size of its stalls. Although the majority of feriantes 
do pay a municipal permit, they rarely satisfy all regulations set by the OMFL. Street vendors 
often expand beyond the permitted stall size, do not adhere to aesthetic requirements or do not 
integrate mandatory electronic scales into their businesses. Feriantes also fail to satisfy national 
VAT or income tax regulations, and do not have legal enterprise status. Feriantes can thus be 
considered to have an intermediate level of formality, satisfying some but not all local 
regulations applicable to ferias libres.  
 
In Chapter 3, in the section ‘Street Vendors in Chile’, I presented a general outline of the 
main characteristics of this activity in Chile, discussing its regulatory framework, employment 
figures, key gender divisions, average incomes and educational levels, while Figure 3.3 
presented a map indicating the four municipalities selected to conduct qualitative interviews and 
group discussions. The table below presents the corresponding interview demographics: 
Table 5.1: Interview Sample by Municipality, Activity, Age and Gender 
Municipality Policy approach Average 
Age 
Range Male  Female Total 
ASOF*  61 55-67 2 0 2 
Macul Supportive  47 38-58 7 2 9 
Conchalí Structuralist 50 49-54 3 3 6 
Maipú Laissez-faire  49 34-58 8 2 9 
La Granja Soft repression 50 44-54 3 4 7 
*ASOF: Chilean National Confederation of Street Markets 
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The selected municipalities represent four policy approaches. The municipality of 
Macul provides strong support for feriantes, transferring administrative power over ferias libres 
as well as backing up street market investment with local financial resources. Conchalí 
municipality provides a soft type of support for feriantes’ trade unions, such as providing a low-
cost street cleaning service and chemical toilet facilities. The municipality of Maipú has a 
laissez-faire approach where permit control and police enforcement of regulations are 
effectively non-existent. La Granja municipality carries out a soft type of repression, with 
municipal inspectors and police tightly controlling local regulations for permit holders. 
 
The qualitative findings in this chapter are extrapolated over the larger population of 
feriantes in Santiago de Chile using primary quantitative data collected from a stratified random 
survey of 402 feriantes, from a total of 27,978 permit holders in 35 municipalities (see the 
Methodology chapter). The table below presents weighted averages for the population of 
feriantes in Santiago de Chile. 
Table 5.2: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Feriantes in Greater Santiago 
Feriante Characteristics N Men Women 
Gender composition (owners) 402 53.8% 46.2% 
    (-14,585) (-12,531) 
Years in the market (mean) 401 25.7 21.4 
Days spent obtaining permit (mean) 389 209.0 249.9 
Work week (hours per week) 398 46.1 45.8 
Less than secondary education 402 58.0% 56.8% 
    (8,458) (7,122) 
Secondary education 402 39.3% 38.8% 
    (5,727) (4,862) 
Tertiary education 402 2.7% 4.4% 
    (400) (548) 
Sector       
Fruit, vegetables, spices and salads 387 63.0% 48.5% 
    (9,057) (5,684) 
Chicken and eggs 387 21.8% 23.4% 
    (3,130) (2,739) 
Dairy and cleaning products 387 6.5% 17.5% 
    (932) (2,054) 
Fish and seafood 387 3.2% 4.7% 
    (446) (548) 
Other activities 387 5.6% 5.9% 
    (799) (684) 
Monthly turnover (mean) 377 CLP 734,342 CLP 757,037 
    (USD 1,184.42) (USD 1,221.03) 
Monthly income* (mean) 383 
CLP 779,026 CLP 824,782 
(USD 1256.49) (USD 1330.29) 
Source: Author survey. Statistics use total weights (design, non-response and post-stratification 
weights).Estimated population using weighted descriptive statistics appears in parentheses. 
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*Includes other sources of personal income such as pension, rental income or a second job. 
In order to examine the extent to which existing informal policy theories of street 
vendors apply to feriante activities to Santiago de Chile, the first section of this chapter analyses 
the correlation between theories and practices. It shows that, as with waste-pickers, street 
vendors tend to follow a pattern of one-way movement into their informal activity. In the second 
section, I proceed to an in-depth discussion of the rationale behind municipal support for the 
provision of private retail services in public space, showing that their primary motivation is the 
social inclusion of vulnerable local populations. The third section analyses the impact of 
supportive policies on feriantes’ performance, showing that increasing feriantes’ individual and 
collective capitalisation leads to higher-quality informal employment. The final section critically 
examines some of the main limitations faced by municipal support strategies.  
 
 
CHARACTERISATION AND MARKET DYNAMICS OF FERIANTES 
 
 
As seen in Chapter 2 and Annex 7, the conflicting academic and policy debates on street 
vending have particularly focused on the motivations behind entering and exiting the activity, 
the relationship between street vending and economic cycles and the connection between the 
activity and the wider formal economy. This section explores the suitability of these theories in 
describing the current situation for feriantes in Santiago de Chile, concluding that additions to 
and integration of existing theories are needed. 
 
Understanding feriantes’ reasons for entry 
 
As with the waste-picker sub-sector, the decision to become a feriante is often the result 
of both rational judgement and forced change. I will first explain the more ‘necessity’ reasons 
for entry, before moving on to ‘opportunity’ reasons for becoming a feriante. Table 5.3 provides 
a summary of factors that motivate entry. 
 
As with waste-pickers, necessity factors are the more significant motivation behind enter-
ing into street markets, accounting for three out of five feriantes. From these, four different fac-
tors are particularly common: unemployment, vulnerability, child rearing, and permanent illness 
or disability. Unemployment is considered the main reason for entry by almost one in four feri-
antes. Guillermo (67), a national leader of the National Confederation of Ferias Libres (ASOF), 
discusses this: 
 
G: This is not an entrepreneurial decision. (Someone) becomes unemployed and goes to the mu-
nicipality to look for employment. As the municipality has no work to give…they have only one 
possibility: working in the street as a ‘feriante’. 
 
Table 5.3: Motivations Behind Starting Work as a Feriante 
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Reason for Starting Employment Men Women Total 
Necessity entry 56.4% 66.9% 61.2% 
  8,172 8,285 16,477 
Unemployment 22.9% 13.3% 18.5% 
  3,310 1,643 4973 
Financial support for child or dependant 1.4% 10.5% 5.6% 
  200 1301 1501 
Other economic need 29.4% 38.7% 33.7% 
  4,262 4,793 9,056 
Illness or disability 2.8% 4.4% 3.5% 
  400 548 947 
        
Opportunity entry 41.7% 30.4% 36.5% 
  6,060 3,767 9,827 
Entrepreneurial spirit 17.9% 9.9% 14.2% 
  2,597 1,233 3,830 
Family member or relative performing similar 
activity 
23.9% 20.4% 22.3% 
  3,463 2534 5,997 
Other reason 1.8% 2.8% 2.3% 
  286 342 608 
Source: Author’s survey using total weights (design, non-response and post-
stratification). 
Estimated population using weighted descriptive statistics shown in parentheses. 
 
 
One in three feriantes mention their vulnerable economic situation as their main reason 
for entry into the activity. In my qualitative analysis, feriantes repeatedly mentioned lack of 
formal employment alternatives and the downgrading of their previous formal employment ar-
rangements as their main motivation. Low-skilled workers find themselves with low levels of 
employability, and when they do find work, it is often quite precarious, and so they end up with 
no choice but to move into street markets. As articulated by Guillermo (67):  
G: Many people start due to the lack of opportunities, a lack of employability… The majority of 
‘feriantes’ have little education – and obviously, to access (formal) employment…you need to have 
studied. So, for the majority of them…(‘feriante’ work) is their only alternative. 
 
 
As described in Chapter 3, the stagnation or downgrading of formal salaries, together 
with the increased flexibility of contract arrangents, has forced workers to look for alternative 
employments where they feel more secure and make a higher income. Nahuel (58), a vendor of 
indigenous Mapuche cuisine, provides one example: 
N: I think that we all started this activity due to an economic need. I started…when enterprises 
started to subcontract workers… They wanted to terminate my full-time contract and decrease my 
salary. I told them: ‘Pay me according to my contract’. They didn’t want to, so they fired me and I 
started work as a ‘feriante’. 
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A fourth reason cited as necessity entry is reconciling parental or carer obligations with 
an income-generating activity. As with waste-pickers, this disproportionately affects women, 
who are eight times more likely than men to mention this as the main factor that led them to 
becoming a feriante. As illustrated by Claudia (38), a dairy vendor in Macul: 
 
C: I started because my son got sick and I had to quit my job and start working in the ‘feria’…I 
had to work too many hours, so the street market was the  only way of getting a job close to home 
(with flexible hours). Then I could work in the morning and stay with (my son) in the afternoon. 
 
Having a permanent illness or disability weighs much less on feriantes’ reason for entry. 
Given the intense physical effort required during daily tasks such as unloading products and 
setting up and dismantling a stall, those with physical disabilities are generally excluded from 
this activity. 
 
A large proportion of feriantes also cited opportunity reasons as a significant factor, with 
two out of three feriantes deciding to enter the activity to seize an economic opportunity. Here, 
the most important motivating factors for feriantes are the desire to start their own micro-
enterprise and having a family member or a relative already working as a street vendor. The first 
‘entrepreneurial’ explanation accounts for just over one in seven feriantes, with a gender bias 
where men are 8% more likely than women to cite this reason
1
. As Claudio (54), a vendor of 
shoes in Maipú, describes:  
C: I wanted to sell in the ‘feria libre’. I had roughly the capital (that I needed), and I went to a 
mall to see which product had the most demand… I saw that the footwear department was always 
full… I started researching online for providers and quality, and saw that I could get a (competi-
tive) price. 
 
 
Having a family member or relative already in the activity accounts for almost one in five 
feriantes, as it allows people to access information regarding average profits made and the 
working conditions for street vendors. This lowers the amount of uncertainty and risk that act as 
barriers for many potential entrepreneurs entering into the activity. The experiences of Raul 
(58), a cheese seller, and Carolina (46), a greengrocer, both in Macul, are illustrative here: 
R: (I started) due to family reasons… My father was a ‘feriante’ until he passed away… When I 
was a boy, I always helped (my father) in the ‘ferias libres’, so I had some experience… (Then) I 
started working with my own stall to generate an income. 
 
C: My mother said to me: ‘You’re wasting your time working so much (as an employee) – being a 
‘feriante’ isn’t going to make you rich, but you will have a good quality of life’. And she wasn’t 
wrong.  
 
Feriante work in Santiago de Chile thus faces a double entry process: times of economic 
crisis push people into the work as formal alternatives dwindle, and during times of economic 
growth, more people are attracted to move into feriante work due to greater economic opportu-
nities. 
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Too late to turn back: marginal contraction with economic expansion 
 
I got an offer of formal employment, looking after the butcher’s shop where I used to work. I was 
his right-hand man. He fired me, but he couldn’t cope with the demand. (When he asked me to 
come back) I told him: I am perfectly fine and happy with what I do. I am going to die doing ‘feri-
ante’ work’.   
Felipe, 54 years, a ‘feriante’ from Maipú 
 
 Again, as with waste-picking, most feriantes choose to remain in this activity in the long 
run, as they perceive higher monetary and non-monetary returns than the type of jobs available 
to them in the formal economy (Table 5.4). The average feriante income is three times the legal 
minimum wage, and consequently over 96% of feriantes would opt to remain in street markets 
if offered minimum wage employment, suggesting that this is perceived as a highly desirable 
livelihood option. Gabriel (55), a leader of the ASOF, corroborates this: 
 
G: For the minimum salary, no one would take (formal) employment. Because in the ‘feria’, no-
body that works six days a week would earn so little… I would say that on average, a ‘feriante’ in-
come is a little more that double (the minimum wage), and there are others who earn much more 
than this. 
 
Table 5.4: Willingness to Move From ‘Feriante’ to Formal Employment 
Leave/Remain N Men Women Total 
1.       At the minimum wage         
  Would leave street vending 398 2.3% 5.0% 3.5% 
      (333) (616) (949) 
  Would stay in street vending   97.7% 95.0% 96.5% 
    (14,251) (11,778) (26,030) 
2.       At equivalent income         
  Would leave street vending 402 17.5% 18.2% 17.8% 
      (2,531) (2,260) (4,790) 
  Would stay in street vending   82.5% 81.8% 82.2% 
      (11,920) (10,135) (22,055) 
 
Source: Author survey. Statistics use total weights (design, non-response and post-stratification). 
Estimated population using weighted descriptive statistics shown in parentheses. 
 
 
Alongside the economic motivations, the non-monetary benefits of work as a feriante 
also play a strong role in the decision to stay in this activity, with more than four in five feri-
antes not opting for formal employment at a similar income. 
 
Table 5.5: Reasons to Remain in ‘Feriante’ Work at Equal Income 
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 Many of these factors remain the same as those cited by waste-pickers: the flexibility of 
work schedules, independence and pride, the facilitation of family tasks and employment securi-
ty (see Table 5.5). The motivations and logic behind several of these factors (independence and 
pride, flexibility of schedules, facilitation of family tasks) follow the reasoning given by waste-
pickers in Chapter 4, and so I will not comment on further on these, but I rather concentrate on 
the specificities of non-monetary street vendors benefits. Working close to home in a way that 
allows feriantes to better adapt their schedules to their family responsibilities was once again 
particularly significant for women, as they were 14.5% more likely than men to mention it as a 
positive aspect of their work.  
 
One factor that is unique to feriantes is the appeal of their general working environment, 
particularly the rewarding social contact between feriantes themselves and with clients. This 
stands in contrast to waste-pickers and HBEs (in chapter 6), who are much more likely to work 
in isolation and have less of a strong community formed around their workplace. Roberta (41), a 
feriante in Maipú, reflects this in her comments: 
 
R: I go to talk with other workers and clients, and we make jokes. That’s a good side of this work – 
you might come to work really upset or angry, you arrive at the ‘feria’ and your day completely 
changes… The ‘feria’ is a great pshychologist… At the end of the day we are a big family. 
 
  Another factor that feriantes experience is the work security that comes with holding a 
municipal permit, something of a side effect of the more formalised nature of feriante 
work. When compared with the current high levels of formal work insecurity in Chile 
(see Chapter 3), feriantes with a municipal permit are guaranteed a more or less perma-
ment space to work, which is often regarded as more stable than an ‘independent worker’ 
or temporary contract for formal work would be. Guillermo (67), a leader of ASOF:  
 
Reason to remain in work Men Women Total 
Time flexibility 69.3% 75.7% 72.2% 
  (8,258) (7,669) (15,927) 
Independence and pride 76.0% 56.8% 66.8% 
  (9,057) (5,683) (14,741) 
Social contact (other ‘feriantes’) 31.3% 30.4% 30.9% 
  (3,729) (3,081) (6,811) 
Social contact (clients) 35.8% 35.8% 35.9% 
  (4,262) (3,629) (7,891) 
Facilitating family tasks 55.0% 69.6% 62.2% 
  (6,560) (7,053) (13,713) 
Other reasons 12.8% 12.8% 12.8% 
  (1,531) (1,301) (2,832) 
Source: Author survey. Statistics use total weights (design, non-response and post-stratification). 
Estimated population using weighted descriptive statistics shown in parentheses. 
The data account for those that would not accept formal employment (n=302) divided by the total sample size (n=402). The 
survey asks the respondent to mark ALL reasons why they would not take on formal employment at a salary equal to their 
street market earnings. 
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G: In Chile, there is no such thing as permanent employment. Up until 1973 [the coup d’état], you 
started a job and worked in the same enterprise until you retired.… Today it is the opposite… You 
can’t have a career in an enterprise… If the ‘feria’ gives something, it is work security…it’s hard 
work but it’s a stable job. The ‘feria’ is always there, every day. You know that every day you’re 
going to have clients. 
 
In turn, slightly less than one in five feriantes would move into formal employment for 
their current income. Among this minority, having a less fatiguing job, access to better pension 
and health coverage and earning a more stable income are cited as the main appeals. Feriante 
work is undeniably tiring, particularly due to physical exertion (loading/unloading products, 
setting up/taking down a stall, constant standing and exposure to adverse weather), making for-
mal work that is less tiring attractive. Tamara (49), a salad vendor in Conchalí, explains: 
 
T: You have to sacrifice yourself in this work, every day you have to pack up (your stall), and you 
have to wake up early to go to buy (products)… You have to move from one place to another (fol-
lowing the street market), in winter it’s cold, in summer it’s hot… It’s not like sitting at a desk. 
 
 
Table 5.6: Reasons for Undertaking Formal Employment at Equal Income 
 
Reason to change work Men Women Total 
Opportunity to work in-
doors 
4.5% 9.5% 6.8% 
  (533) (959) (1,491) 
Better treatment of work-
ers 
1.1% 3.4% 2.2% 
  (133) (342) (475) 
Less tiring 13.4% 14.2% 13.8% 
  (1,598) (1,438) (3,036) 
Better access to pension 7.3% 11.5% 9.2% 
  (865) (1,164) (2,030) 
Better access to health 6.7% 12.8% 9.5% 
  (799) (1,301) (2,100) 
Income stability 8.9% 14.2% 11.4% 
  (1,065) (1,438) (2,504) 
No hassle from police 1.7% 2.0% 1.8% 
  (200) (205) (405) 
Other 6.2% 1.4% 3.9% 
  (733) (137) (870) 
Source: Author survey. Statistics use total weights (design, non-response and post-
stratification). 
Estimated population using weighted descriptive statistics shown in parentheses. 
 
 
Formal work is able to provide workers with improved access to health services and, par-
ticularly, to pension schemes. The survey shows that only one in four feriantes have access to a 
pension, whereas all formally contracted workers make compulsory pension contributions (ex-
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cluding independent workers). Regarding health services, formal employment offers the benefit 
of sick leave, as Rodrigo (52), a fishmonger from Macul, articulates: 
 
R: If one day you don’t feel good, and you are sick, you don’t go to work. So we don’t see this 
money (from the missed day’s work). 
 
 Unlike a formally contracted worker, a feriante’s income stream can be intermittent, 
with demand affected by changes in weather conditions, local tastes or the national economic 
situation. This is reflected in the experiences of Sara (45), a feriante leader in Conchalí: 
 
S: There are good days, bad days, very good days and very bad days… Your income changes eve-
ry day… For instance, we can’t work during rain and strong wind because we only have tents… 
When you’re employed, you can be sure that you will get a fixed amount of money, no matter what. 
 
 
 However, with an average of twenty-five years spent in the activity, feriante work be-
comes a long-term permanent employment solution for the large majority of those who enter 
into the activity, as work in ferias libres provides higher economic and non-economic returns 
when compared with prospects within the formal economy. This leads to the same ‘one-way 
street’ path observed in the waste-picker sub-sector, as commented by Guillermo (67): 
 
G: Whether the country is in a crisis or in a time of growth, the ‘feria’ grows. The strange phe-
nomenon is that it doesn’t decrease in size later on. 
 
Plate 5.1: Accesibility at the feria, Lo Espejo. 
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete.  
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Plate 5.2: Father and son stall, Maipú. 
 
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete.  
 
Plate 5.3: Four feriantes from diferent stalls sharing breakfast 
 
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete.  
 
 
Links between street vending and the formal economy 
 
 
 Feriante work draws another parallel with waste-pickers in its relationship to the formal 
economy, existing as a combination of a vertically integrated market, and a separate informal 
network (Table 5.7). The division between these two connections is to a large extent determined 
by the types of products sold by feriantes – primary products tend to come to street markets 
through informal networks (see Plates 5.4 through 5.7), and manufactured or more elaborate 
goods tend to come from markets vertically integrated with the formal economy (see Plate 5.8 
through 5.11). Figure 5.1 provides a summary of the structure of both markets.  
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Table 5.7: Integrated, Parallel and Mixed Markets 
Relationship with the formal econ-
omy 
Theoretical 
framework 
N  
Estimated 
population 
Percentage 
A. Forward integration                 
(elaborate products)  
Neoliberal-
structuralist 
154 10,408  39.3% 
B. Parallel economies 
(primary products) 
Dualist 231 15,564 58.7% 
C. Mixed markets (elaborate and 
primary products) 
None 8 542 2.0% 
 Source: Author survey. Statistics use total weights (design, non-response and post-stratification). 
Total sample (n=393).   
 
Plate 5.4: Fish and seafood stall (non-elaborated products), Providencia.  
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete. 
 
Plate 5.5: Egg stall (non-elaborated products), Independencia.  
 
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete. 
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Plate 5.6: Vegetable stall (non-elaborated products), Santiago.  
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete. 
 
Plate 5.7: Fruit stall (non-elaborated products), Independencia.  
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete. 
 
Plate 5.8: Grocery stall (national elaborated products), Quilicura 
 
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete. 
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Plate 5.9: Diary stall (national elaborated products), Pedro Aguirre Cerda.  
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete. 
 
Plate 5.10: Beauty and cleaning product stall (national elaborated products), Pedro Aguirre 
Cerda.  
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete. 
 
Plate 5.11: Electronics stall (imported elaborated products), Pedro Aguirre Cerda. 
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete. 
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Figure 5.1: Structure of the ‘Ferias Libres’ Market 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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 Feriantes selling elaborate products connect to the formal economy through a vertical 
integration with large enterprises in backward networks. ‘Elaborate products’ include goods that 
are manufactured, and are generally already branded – the most common examples in ferias li-
bres are national and imported dairy products, cleaning and other home products, toys and mo-
bile phone accessories. According to the survey, just under two in five feriantes sell these types 
of goods, which are produced by formal local, national and international enterprises, showing a 
significant level of integration with the national and international manufacturing industries. As a 
result of this, feriantes aid formal industries by reducing distribution costs, increasing the spatial 
availability of products, and raising the overall demand of their products, in turn increasing 
profitability in the formal sector. As reported by Pablo (54) and Hugo (52), two feriantes from 
La Granja: 
 
P: I sell all my products from an enterprise that makes sweets, named Fruna. Everything that I 
sell, I buy from them. It is a large (national) enterprise. 
H: I sell perfumes, so I get all my products from large (importing) enterprises. 
 
 Feriantes and national or international industries are connected through a network of 
middlemen named distribuidoras who buy in large quantities at wholesale prices, and sell in 
lower quantities at higher prices per unit to feriantes. Agustín (31), previously a manager for 
Procter and Gamble in Chile, and Eduardo (49), a feriante leader from La Granja, explain: 
 
A: We sell to two type of clients: large supermarkets and small enterprises… All of our production 
that ends up at small enterprises is sold to four large ‘distribuidoras’, who then sell to other 
smaller ‘distribuidoras’… who then sell to corner stores, ‘feriantes’, and ambulant vendors. 
 
E: I buy products from ‘distribuidoras’ near here… I buy at wholesale prices, but it is much more 
expensive than buying directly from the enterprise that produces or imports them. 
 
 A network can be large, with a typical product purchased through international trade 
with China or from a national Chilean enterprise, and travelling all the way down the network to 
a feriante in a specific municipality. 
 
  In this vertical network size, formality, and profits tend to increase upwards, and com-
petition increases downwards. This integration is often exploitative, with larger enterprises be-
ing able to charge higher prices to those further down in the network. Since capital and logisti-
cal requirements are higher, at the top of the network there are fewer competitors and larger 
profits to be made. Feriantes face particularly intense competition between themselves due to 
the homogeneity across formal products, which can ultimately damage profitability. As Roberta 
(41), a feriante leader of Maipú, comments: 
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R: Our main competitors are our own colleagues. If you have a good business, they copy it… This 
happened to me… They see that you are making sales, so they know you are earning money… (My 
competitor) copied me, now she is selling the same accessories, which has affected my sales. 
 
The parallel network: Articulated informality. 
 
 The largest quantity of product trade occurring in ferias libres (58.7%) operates in a 
network of near-complete informality, with the entire chain from the first producer to the final 
consumer being articulated through many transactions across a network of micro- and small-
sized informal enterprises that can cover large geographical spaces.  
 
 Feriantes and large retail exist as two parallels chains moving food into the city of San-
tiago, with the former exploiting small- and medium-scale producers and the latter drawing 
from large-scale production. As noted by Guillermo (67), a feriante leader of the ASOF: 
 
G: In Chile, small-scale agriculture is produced in spaces between one-half and two hectares… 
That is our chain (of providers). Supermarkets have a different chain. They are interested in vol-
umes – they can even have their own land for agriculture… From a structural point of view, (street 
markets and supermarkets) have two distinct channels.    
 
 
 Table 5.8: ‘Feria’ Quality and Price when Compared with Supermarkets 
 
  Lower Equal  Higher 
Quality 2.8% 50.7% 46.5% 
  742 13,501 12,334 
Price 92.0% 6.0% 2.0% 
  24,292 1,613 607 
Source: Author survey. Statistics use total weights 
(design, non-response and post-stratification). ‘Fe-
riantes’ declared prices and product quality when 
compared with large retail. 
 
Feriante products tend to be recognised as being of higher, or at least equal quality, and sell at 
lower prices when compared with large retailers (see Table 5.8). In this manner, the trade of 
primary products in ferias libres is not only relevant for the livelihoods of street vendors them-
selves but also for low-income households in urban areas, as well as large populations of small 
farmers in rural areas. 
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Figure 5.2: National Grassroots Business Networks of Trade 
 
 
       Source: Own Elaboration.  
1) Small tomato producers converge on the regional centro de distribución in Arica, where they sell their 
products 
2) Feriantes from Arica buy tomatoes in their regiona centro de distribución and bring them to ferias in 
different locations to sell them. 
3) Arica’s lorry traders buy tomatoes in large quantities and bring them to Santiago’s centro de 
distribución (Lo Ovalledor). There, they sell tomatoes and buy products from the south of Chile to sell 
in Arica.  
4) Santiago’s feriantes buy tomatoes and sell them in ferias distributed across the city. 
5) In Lo Ovalledor, lorry traders from Temuco sell products brought from the south and buy tomatoes 
from Santiago to sell in the Temuco centro de distribución. 
6) In Temuco, feriantes buy tomatoes at their regional centro de distribución and sell them in local ferias. 
A) In each feria, neighbouring households come to purchase tomatoes.  
B) In each centro de distribución, there are small producers selling regional products, feriantes bringing 
products to ferias across the city, and traders moving products across regions.      
 
 The entire informal network of primary products is made up of several individuals who 
perform specialised tasks in four steps: production, distribution, acquisition/value added, and 
selling, allowing for the trading informal products across a large geographical space (see Figure 
5.2). The production of products occurs mostly in rural areas, by small farmers who generally 
work with mono-productive agriculture or specialised fishermen who sell in small quantities. 
These isolated producers have neither the scale of production to draw the interest of large retail-
ers, nor the local market demand to consume their entire production, particularly considering 
that people in their local area tend to produce similar products. In this sense, the city offers to 
farmers not only a market but also access to vital information about real prices and consumers’ 
needs to adapt their production (Davila 2002; Allen et al. 2015). Ian (54), manager of a Centro 
de Distribución Lo Valledor, discusses: 
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I: Most small agriculture is at the mercy of God… Even though they produce in small amounts, 
they can’t sell because everyone living nearby produces more or less the same thing… Most of 
(these) farmers  are mono-producers who have between one and five hectares. 
 
 These small-scale producers use an informal network to sell their goods through centros 
de distribución (distribution centres)
2
. These centres are physical spaces owned both privately 
and publically, distributed across the country, where on the one side local farmers and 
cochenchos (intermediaries who buy products from several producers in small villages and sell 
them on) offer wholesale primary products, and on the other side feriantes and informal traders 
purchase products. As commented by Tomas (48), a greengrocer feriante in Macul: 
T: We buy at Lo Valledor. Everyone knows who they are buying from. The majority of products 
come directly from the countryside, most of them sold by farmers, because now middlemen are 
starting to go out of fashion… (‘Cochenchos’) were taking all the money, so now (small-scale pro-
ducers) come to deliver their products. 
 
 On a national scale, centros de distribución connect with one another through informal 
trading routes: a lorry will typically come from a regional centre to sell products in Santiago, 
and return with a lorry loaded with other types of products to sell in the regional markets for a 
profit. Chile contains twenty-six centros de distribución, with three located in Santiago alone. 
This allows, for instance, a tomato produced in the far north of the country to be sold in Santia-
go to a trader, who will then resell it in Temuco to a local feriante (see Figure 5.2), as described 
by Ian (54), manager of Lo Valledor: 
I: Regarding fruits and vegetables, Lo Valledor trades 60% of national consumption, arriving 
from all over Chile and delivered all over Chile. For instance, from June to September, all toma-
toes come from Arica Centro [Chile’s northernmost city]. These tomatoes travel to Lo Valledor 
brought by traders and from here are distributed to Temuco or Punta Arenas [a city in the extreme 
south].  
 
 Centros de distribución thus provide not only key infrastructure to build reciprocal local 
urban-rural linkages (Allen et al. 2015), but also create a national reciprocal network across 
space, which sustains the livelihood of urban and rural poor across the country.  
Plate 5.12 and Plate 5.13: Centro de Distribución Lo Valledor, Lo Espejo 
 
 
 
 
These plates, Centro de Distribución Lo Valledor, Lo Espejo, has been removed as the copyright 
is owned by another organisation. 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Lo Valledor (2016) (left), La Tercera (2011) (right).  
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 At a regional level, feriantes most commonly acquire their products in these centros de 
distribución to take them directly to one of the 425 ferias libres located in Santiago de Chile. 
The largest distribution centre in Santiago is Lo Valledor, a privatised complex that over the 
course of its forty-year lifespan has expanded from six to thirty-three hectares (see Plate 5.12 
and 5.13). In one day of operation, Lo Valledor sees 30,000 people, 80 lorries and 10 billion 
pesos (USD 16 million) pass through its space. It is responsible for the distribution of 90% of 
fruit and vegetable products consumed in the region, trading around USD 600 million per year 
(Lo Valledor 2014). Ian (54), in another intervention: 
I: At a regional level, you will even have a situation where farmers from Melipilla come to Santia-
go to sell, and a ‘feriante’ from Melipilla will buy from them here in Santiago only to bring the 
products back to Melipilla. 
 
 Although the majority of feriantes sell products without any type of added value, a few 
of them, particularly women, add value through labour by transforming products into salad, 
juices or prepared food. For example, Sara (45), a salad vendor in Conchalí: 
S: (I sell salads) because I like this type of product, I like to prepare them and I earn more by sell-
ing a salad than if I sold it as (raw) fruit or (vegetables). The profits are better. 
 
 
 As with waste-pickers, the feriante parallel market is characterised by its small size, 
informality, intense competition, specialisation and heterogeneous profitability. Regarding size, 
as seen above, the whole network is made up of transactions between small informal enterprises 
that produce distribute or sell goods, and in which in some cases add value to products. Regard-
ing informality, the entire network is devoid of formally contracted workers, pays neither VAT 
nor income tax, and almost all transactions are made in cash. As noted by Guillermo (67), leader 
of the ASOF: 
G: In Lo Valledor, all the movement happens from 3 to 6 a.m.… You can see that every transac-
tion is with cash, no cheques, no debit cards … In the ‘feria’ it is the same, except a few people 
have (debit card) machines. 
 There is intense competitions in almost all stages of the trade networks, particularly in 
the centros and street markets themselves. Ian (54), administrator of Lo Valledor, describes: 
I: At Lo Valledor prices change every day, when fifty lorries arrive (loaded with goods to sell) you 
have one price, when sixty come you have another… When there are ninety, the excess in supply 
brings prices below cost, because they need to be sold (or they will go to waste).   
 
 
 Finally, there are significant differences in profits amongst street vendors, which are on 
the whole determined by the types of product sold, their quality and the internal feria competi-
tion. To obtain a municipal permit, feriantes must assign themselves a certain product category, 
which will determine the products that they are permitted to sell. As feriantes are registered for 
different product categories in varying numbers, each product faces a unique level of competi-
tion within the feria libre, and so margins of profitability vary between product types. Quality 
also plays an important role in determining profitability, for example in the fruit and vegetable 
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category, where different levels of quality command different prices. In this case, feriantes tend 
to select the quality of their products according to the purchasing power of their area and con-
sumer taste preferences, thus fragmenting competition and profits across municipalities. A final 
factor determining divergent levels of profits amongst feriantes is the internal competition be-
tween feriantes and unofficial vendors (coleros). An increase in coleros (non-permit holders) 
leads to an increase in competition within the street market, in turn downgrading feriante prof-
its. Gabriel (55), a leader of ASOF, describes how profits can vary from one feria to the next as 
a consequence: 
G: The appeal of the ‘feria’ (for the public) is that there are one hundred or more street traders. 
You have differences in prices (across ‘ferias’). Often this relates to the number of traders selling 
a particular product type. And (it also relates to) quality, because there are different types of cli-
ents, some demand high- or low-quality (products). 
 
 
 Compared with waste-pickers’ parallel informal markets, the network of feriantes co-
vers large geographical spaces, grants producers and sellers similar market power, has competi-
tive prices, and offers a wide range of products. As will be discussed later in Chapter 7, this ex-
tended grassroots business network offers a unique opportunity for informal enterpises to access 
an alternative market that is fair and large in size.   
 
The structure and life cycle of street markets 
 
Street market vendors in Santiago de Chile can be divided into three types. First, the fo-
cus of this study, feriantes, have both a municipal permit to sell and a fixed position in the heart 
of the street market, where they are able to set up their stall. Another group is made up of cole-
ros, who do not hold permits and sell similar or identical products to feriantes, acquiring goods 
through the same channels. They are located at the entrances of a feria libre, extending the 
physical space of the street market with either basic stalls or by setting up directly on the floor. 
Due to the similarities between colero and feriante products, coleros create direct competition 
which lowers street vendors’ profits. Another much smaller group is that of cachureros, the 
waste-pickers discussed earlier in this study, who sell their reused products at street market en-
trances from the floor, set up on a piece of fabric. The cachureros are generally considered to be 
positive contributors to feriante and colero profits, as their products attract the public to a street 
market, but their reused products are not in direct competition with the profits of feriantes or 
coleros. 
 
Progress and problems encountered by street market enterprises 
 
As with other informal sectors, feriantes generally follow an evolutionary path of in-
creasing capitalisation, formalisation and organisation. Feriantes’ backgrounds of poverty mean 
that they face barriers regarding capital, organisation and market access. 
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Table 5.9: Typology of Feriante Enterprises 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Features Stage1: Subsistance Stage 2: self-enterprises Stage 3: Small entreprises Stage 4: Cooperatives
Degree of informality Totally informal in the selling Partially formal in selling through a 
municipal permit. Paying local taxes. No 
paying national taxes and many not 
accomplishing local regulations
Partially formal in selling through a 
municipal permit. Paying local taxes. Not 
paying national taxes and many not 
accomplishing local regulations
Formally constituted organisation with 
its own regulations.  Selling through a 
municipal permit. Paying local taxes 
and accomplishing most of the local 
regulations. Almost none existance of 
non permit holders
Capital Endowment
Human 
Capital
None or previous work experience Previous business experience Formal skills and/or management 
training. Contracting workers for selling 
tasks.
Formal skills in production and 
management training. Contracting 
workers for selling. 
Physical 
Capital
Ground cloth or precarious stall. 
Low quantity of productsof large 
diversity
Small stall. Large number of products, 
more specifically sectedted to the market.
Higher quality and image of the stall. Full 
set of tools and equipment. Some of them 
owning electrical generators. Ownership 
of a large motorised vehicle. 
Higher quality and image stalls. Some 
of them accessing permanent roof , 
drinkable water and electricity.  Large 
motorised vehicles. Full set of tools 
and  medium technology machinery to 
conserve products. Access to secure 
parking space
Financial 
Capital
Family or personal capital Low busisness saving and small amount 
access, high interest credit loans
Personal savings and access to low credit 
loans
Personal saving, existing assessts plus 
low credits loans negotiated 
collectively.
Organisation
Independent worker Independent worker Independent workerasociated to a street 
market level organisation. 
Legal unions or cooperatives 
associated at the municipal level. Some 
asociated to a larger national 
organisation of feriantes. 
Market Access Informal street market trader as 
'colero'
Establish access to the neighbourhood 
market
Establish access to the neighbourhood 
marketand attracting some clients from 
surrounding neighbourhoods
High local reputation of the place. 
Exploitation high quality reputation to 
attract clinets from other 
neighbourhoods and municipalities.  
Investing in publicity of their street 
markets. 
Tax compliance None Local Local Local and National
Stage4: Social NetworksStage1: Sub istance Stage2: Self-entreprises Stage3: Small entreprises
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In their early stages of development, feriantes have very low levels of capital, do not be-
long to an organisation and may start as unregistered coleros or as helpers (ayudantes). Roberta 
(41), now a feriante leader in Maipú, describes her beginnings: 
R: I came from a managerial job at the airport, with painted nails, nice hair and everything. I felt 
ashamed about shouting out (to promote my products)… A neighbour gave me some fabric to set 
up my products on the pavement because I had nothing. 
 
 
At this stage a major growth obstacle is the feriantes’ lack of administrative skills and 
their immediate need to acquire on-site knowledge. Feriantes are unable to separate their profits 
and account for the money necessary to replenish stock, rather expending both on basic survival 
needs. Alternatively, many lack the on-site experience necessary to identify market demand, 
leading them to offer products in quantities and at quality levels not adapted to their local cus-
tomers. Consequently, many rapidly consume their working capital or are left with unsold mer-
chandise, finding themselves repeatedly starting from zero. Guillermo (67), a feriante leader 
with the ASOF, describes this process: 
G: Becoming a proper ‘feriante’ takes ten years…because you need to learn how to price, how to 
reinvest profits, how to create growth… ‘Feriantes’ need to learn the tastes of their clients… It’s 
not hard to fail, buying products that you can’t sell, or fruit that rots before you sell it. Many ‘feri-
antes’ fail, but because it’s on such a small scale, no one notices. They get money (from relatives) 
and start all over again. 
 
 
Once feriantes have developed the skills necessary to run their enterprise more effective-
ly, they start a gradual process of capital accumulation. This happens predominantly through a 
cyclical process of reinvestment of profits into products that in turn yield higher profits. This 
means that many feriantes have little physical money, rather having almost all of their wealth 
invested in working capital. Feriantes at this point face a significant risk that their product may 
be confiscated, meaning a loss of all accumulated capital and restarting from zero. Feriantes at 
this point also invest in an improved stall that offers protection for their goods, as well as tables 
and hangers to improve product visibility. Jaime (43), a vendor of phone accessories in Maipú, 
comments: 
J: I invest everything that I earn. I keep almost nothing for myself, just enough for everyday 
needs… (My business) requires a lot of product diversity, so for each (type of phone) I have to get 
three to five different designs. I have to reach a stage of growth where my clients ask and I can say 
yes to 90% of their requests. 
 
 
At this point, a lack of access to higher levels of capital, and in some cases not having a 
municipal permit, become relevant barriers to growth by eroding profits. When a feriante does 
not have access to a vehicle to transport products in large volumes from the centro de dis-
tribución to the feria, and to transport their stall from their house to the feria, they are obliged to 
pay for delivery drivers (fleteros), as explained by Eduardo (49), a feriante leader in La Granja: 
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E: Without a (motorised) vehicle it’s difficult to work… Five to six thousand pesos [USD 8.06-9.67 
USD] go every day to a ‘fletero’. Let’s say 5,000 – over six days, that means 30,000 pesos [USD 
48.36] less per week… So (with these costs) it is difficult to grow. 
 
In strongly repressive municipalities, not having a municipal permit means a high risk of 
seize for street vendors. Furthermore, Chilean banks use a municipal permit as proof of exist-
ence for feriante businesses, which allows them to access credit. As Gabriel (55), a leader of the 
ASOF, explains:   
G: A greengrocer with 500,000 pesos [USD 806.45} can fill their stall… But they need more capi-
tal, they need a vehicle… Some banks have opened credit (to ‘feriantes’), but for that you need a 
permit. There is a whole world of people who have no access to credit and instead have to save up 
money. 
 
 
 After growing to a certain size, feriantes have sustainable businesses, working with lo-
cal permits in established stalls and possess their own vehicles to transport their products to and 
from the ferias libres. They have accumulated working capital and, for the most profitable ones, 
start to informally contract labour over weekends to cope with higher demand. At this point, the 
limit to growth faced by feriantes comes from the restrictions of stall space and time schedules 
set by municipal permits. As feriantes’ businesses grow, the single stall generally given to them 
becomes overcrowded with products, limiting profitability. As Roberta (41), a feriante leader in 
Maipú, describes: 
R: I can expand my business by setting up hangers outside the stall and expanding an extra metre 
towards the back, but no more than that, because the municipality allocates me a space of only 
3x3 metres…and don’t give me the opportunity to expand. It’s simple – if you have a small (space) 
you sell a little, if you have a large space you sell a lot. 
 
 
 At this point, organisation of feriantes remains crucial to the continued expansion of 
their businesses, by attracting more clients and to preserve the sustainability of the feria in the 
long run. Organisation allows feriantes to negotiate with local authorities to gain administrative 
power over street markets and pool the investment necessary to develop infrastructure (larger 
stalls, a permanent covering, electricity, potable water, toilets or parking space) that can boost 
profitability.  
 
 Organisation also protects feriantes from two major threats: the overflow of coleros that 
hurts feriante profits, and the shutting down of ferias due to complaints of neighbours. Feri-
antes who are organised as a group are more likely to take direct action and lobby for the mu-
nicipal action necessary to reduce the influx of unofficial workers into their street markets, as 
well as to facilitate negotiations between members, the municipality and neighbourhood associ-
ations to reach agreements when neighbours complain. Guillermo (56), a feriante leader in 
Macul, articulates this point: 
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G: I know two street markets that are at risk of being shut down…because of neighbours’ com-
plaints. The ‘feria’ blocks the street…’feriantes’ arrive at 4 a.m. making noise… (In our organisa-
tion) we don’t tolerate these kinds of things, we have rules (for the ‘feria’) and everyone follows 
them. We have internal rule and we enforce these actions… The relationship with our neighbours 
is what brings sustainability to this business. 
 
 
 As with waste-pickers, no single existing theory can describe the reality of street vend-
ing work, and an integration of theories is required. Individuals move into this field of work 
driven both by opportunity and out of necessity, and street vending expands both during times 
of economic strength and, to a lesser extent, crisis. However, once in the activity, the large ma-
jority of feriantes find themselves to be better off in the informal economy creating a ‘one-way 
street’ type of movement. The activity is at times integrated with the formal economy through 
backward networks and also operates in a separate informal parallel economy composed of a 
large number of grassroot enteprises. 
 
RATIONALE OF SUPPORT POLICIES FOR STREET VENDORS 
 
Over the fifteen years that I have been involved, we have made the ‘feria’ valuable, given it pres-
tige… Twenty or twenty-five years ago, working in the street was a dishonour, and even now in the 
ILO, they speak about the informal economy as an ‘undignified market’. For them, working in the 
street has no dignity, it isn’t (decent) employment… I don’t know if the authorities will someday 
change this view, but I tell you that here, in Latin America, our reality is completely different. 
Guillermo, a leader of the ASOF 
 
 
 As a strategy to provide good quality local employment and increase the affordability of 
local products, some municipalities in Santiago de Chile– with Macul as the pioneer – have 
been incorporating supportive policies to improve feriantes’ economic outcomes and the quality 
of their services, as well as reducing the negative externalities of street vending. 
 
 
Accelerating feriante business growth: economic and social gains from supportive 
policies 
 
We have been lucky that here in Macul the mayor has always helped us, but in other municipalities 
‘feriantes’ have not been so lucky… We have had excellent results from an economic, social and 
administrative point of view. 
Francisco, a ‘feriante’ leader of Macul. 
  
 Supportive municipalities justify their actions based on the belief that street markets 
play a relevant social role for their community. Feriantes generally constitute an otherwise 
vulnerable local population with low levels of employability, and so supportive municipalities 
and officers, such as Mario (55) from Macul, see in feriante work the potential to provide decent 
local employment alternatives:  
 
M: The ‘feria libre’ allows us to decrease local unemployment… It is employment that can poten-
tially generate high economic returns… You see that some make progress over the years.  
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 Additionally, street markets are recognised to be main providers of fresh fruit, 
vegetables and seafood in their urban areas providing food of higher quality and at a cheaper 
price than formal retailers. Street markets thus also play a key role in reducing costs and 
improving the health of a vulnerable local population. Ignacio (35), another public officer in 
Macul, comments: 
 
I: ‘Ferias’ contribute most strongly to the local economy… The products provided have cheaper 
prices, are higher quality and are fresher than in supermarkets. So people are able to eat healthy 
food and extend the reach of their (household) budget… This is a serious issue when our popula-
tion generally has small salaries. 
 
 
 Supportive municipalities consider the negative community impacts of street markets – 
most commonly related to neighbourhood life disturbance – to be minimal when compared with 
the benefits of the activity, and potentially entirely surmountable with the right support 
strategies, as suggested by Mario (55): 
 
M: We are involved (in supporting ‘feriantes’) mainly because of the social benefits that this activ-
ity produces for our community…but also because it allows us to reduce their nuisance… We have 
always had small problems between neighbours and the ‘ferias’ located on the street…(but) our 
intervention brings calm to the neighbourhood… We have invested in setting them up on a large 
traffic island…and in exchange they keep it clean and safe, and make less noise… We minimise is-
sues for neighbours. 
 
 
 As with waste-pickers, supportive municipalities sustain ferias libres mainly on grounds 
of social inclusion, considering them to be a highly competitive alternative to large-scale retail 
organisations with generally decent employment standards, and that municipal support can help 
feriantes to reduce the negative externalities that they may create for the surrounding 
community. 
 
Unleashing street vendors’ potential: Training, capitalising, organising and 
opening markets to street vendors 
 
Macul municipality considers supportive policies to be essential for the modernisation 
and sustainability of street markets in the long run. Municipal support is seen as relevant to 
overcome feriantes’ poverty barriers, enhancing investment, assisting with organisational 
difficulties and regulating markets that guarantee long-term profitability and sustainability of 
feriante businesses. Figure 5.3 provides a summary of policies implemented in Macul, along 
with their corresponding expected impacts, which are described in detail below. 
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Figure 5.3: Supportive Policies towards Street Markets 
 
 Source: Own elaboration 
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Training ‘feriantes’ 
Human capital is a key component for ensuring the sustainability and capital accumula-
tion of feriante businesses. As with waste-pickers, administrative skills are critical to produce a 
sustainably growing working capital, and vocational skills allow feriantes to create added value 
to products. Additionally, experience is relevant for understanding the market and selecting 
products in suitable quantities and of appropriate quality. The municipality of Macul provides 
training in cooperation with the ASOF and with NGOs, as described by Francisco (50), a feri-
ante leader in Macul: 
F: The large majority of ‘feriantes’ have received training in food management, business admin-
istration and IT. The municipality has helped to provide this, and has obtained additional training 
through other institutions. For instance, my business received spreadsheets that allow me to calcu-
late how much I invest and how much I take in as profit. 
 
Capitalising street markets 
Plate 5.14: Precarious stall, Lo Espejo.  
 
Sources: Pablo Navarrete.  
 
Plate 5.15: Traditional stall, La Granja.  
 
Sources: Pablo Navarrete.  
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Plate 5.16: Superior stall, Estación Central.  
 
 
 
Macul has also directly provided physical capital at both the individual and collective 
levels. The majority of individual support concentrates on the provision of tools, uniforms and 
stall upgrades (see Plates 5.14 to 5.16). Supportive municipalities also provide technical support 
for feriantes’ applications for central funds to obtain more advanced tools and machinery, with 
the aim of improving retail service standards, profit margins and working conditions. Carolina 
(38), a food and salad vendor in Macul, provides an example: 
C: (The municipal department) helped me to develop my (application) using the right words…so I 
received a sum of capital. I bought a refrigerator, a vacuum seal machine and industrial pans to 
cook food in large quantities… I was selling (my salad) for 200 pesos, now I sell for 1,000. 
 
Second, feriante permits in supportive municipalities tend to allow vendors a larger num-
ber of square metres to set up their stalls and permit longer opening hours as a means of enhanc-
ing potential profitability. As Guillermo (67), an ASOF leader, explains: 
G: There are some municipalities that give you only 3 square metres! (Generally) you have 4x2 
metres, you start at 10 a.m. and finish at 3 p.m., so you can’t sell any more than your space and 
schedule allow… In Macul, you get 4x3 metres and operate from 9.30am to 3.30 p.m. It is a very 
good space and time. 
 
 
 At the same time, supportive municipalities – not only the municipality of Macul, but 
also Puente Alto, Conchalí and Ovalle – have supported the renovation of stalls by committing 
their own money or obtaining national funds from SERCOTEC. This is once again an attempt to 
increase the working conditions of feriantes and increase the overall attactiveness of street mar-
kets to clients. Sara (45), a salad seller in Conchalí, describes her experience: 
S: We received the first prize (from a national fund) to get new stalls… The tents are made of good 
quality material so they don’t fall apart like before. We are now covered from rain and sun… The 
image of the ‘feria’ was really improved… People from other municipalities came here, because 
they saw that our ‘feria’ was beautiful. 
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 At a collective level, supportive municipalities in Santiago engaged in an aggresive pol-
icy of transforming their traditional street markets into ‘modernised street markets’ (ferias 
modelos). Initially the municipality of Macul, and now those of Puente Alto, San Bernardo and 
Ovalle, are currently co-financing with feriantes and the central government large investments 
in feria infrastructure. A feria modelo refers to a street market that is located in the public 
sphere, and no longer on the street itself, with a minimum of a permanent roof, electricity and 
potable water (see Plates 5.18 through 5.21). The most advanced ferias modelos include sewer-
age for seafood stalls, public toilets, parking and green spaces. Additionally, administration du-
ties are commonly transferred to the union of feriantes in exchange for legal constitution, a reg-
ulatory act and accountability. These investments are expected to increase productivity, add val-
ue to products, improve working conditions and reduce the negative externalities of ferias. As 
articulated by Mario (55), a municipal officer in Macul:   
M:  Building the infrastructure was a combined effort… The municipality contributed with the cost 
of the ‘feria’ infrastructure…and with the (public) land, they lay a concrete slab and covered the 
cost of the structure and the roof… The street vendors also contributed money… (The ‘feria 
modelo’) has a pre-installed structure, it is permanent. So they don’t need to bring their stall or to 
set it up. They only need to bring their products. 
 
 
Plate 5.17 and Plate 5.18:  Feria Modelo Lo Ovalle 
 
Sources: Riquelme (2016) (left), TripAdvisor (2015) (right).  
 
 
Plate 5.19 and Plate 5.20: Feria Modelo Quilín and Juan Pinto Duran, Macul 
 
Sources: SITRAFELI (2016) (left), Renteria (2011) (right).  
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Regulating street markets and attracting clients  
 
In order to to guarantee sustainable profits and working condition for feriantes, support-
ive municipalities have introduced a range of regulatory measures around the activity. The first 
measure, pioneered in Conchalí, was to regulate the ‘space-time distance’ between ferias libres 
to minimise their competition with one another, and to guarantee that all municipal urban areas 
are covered, as described by Nicolas (48), a municipal officer of Conchalí: 
N: Our system tries to avoid market oversaturation… Say ‘feria’ number one takes Wednesday in 
Vivaceta Street… If on the same day I set up another ‘feria’ close to that area, they kill each other 
off… Alternatively, I can’t put the same ‘feria’ in the same place for two consecutive days, because 
the (neighbourhood) market is saturated. So, I space them far apart. 
 
 Working alongside feriantes, the municipality of Macul also follows strict controls re-
garding the number of coleros working, putting them on waiting lists to access a local permit. 
As Ignacio (35), another public officer in Macul, explains: 
I: Our local regulations have fixed a carrying capacity for each ‘feria’… Overcrowding them 
would impact the quality of ‘feriante’ employment and the community… To be honest, the ‘ferias’ 
can’t grow any more, they’re very large at the moment… To allocate new permits we have a wait-
ing list, determined by seniority. 
 
 Macul is also supporting the efforts of feriantes to attract greater numbers of clients by 
setting up in spaces that have availability for public parking, which is directly administratrated 
by feriantes. As commented by Francisco (50), a feriante leader in Macul: 
F: ‘Ferias modelos’ have parking space…located on an island between streets. The ‘feria’ use the 
central island space, and then on the two street sides there are parking spaces… We administrate 
this and provide security for clients. 
 
Supporting organisations 
 
Among the three informal sub-sectors in this study, feriantes are the most highly organ-
ised. Most feriantes are involved in organisation at the level of their feria, and some are even 
organised at municipal, regional and national levels. Supportive municipalities go one step fu-
ther by establishing their legal constitution as ‘social organisations’ (organizaciones sociales), 
which allows them to collectively access local and central state funding and grants them collec-
tive control over public infrastructure and space. As noted by Francisco (50): 
F: The organisation has always existed, but the municipality has provided a lot of support to our 
collective entrepreneurship. It helped us to  legally constituted, to coordinate… it has provided 
space for us to meet… 
 
 With this legal organisation, the municipality of Macul has slowly transferred plots of 
land, infrastructure and the direct administration rights over ferias modelos for a twenty-year 
period to their local feriante union, in exchange for full accountability for the satisfaction of 
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local regulations. In doing this, the municipality aims not only to empower the feriante trade 
union but also to increase levels of regulation compliance and reduce the operational costs that 
arise from the enforcement of local regulations. As Raul (58), a feriante leader in Macul, ex-
plains: 
R: (Our organisation) fully administrates over four ‘ferias’… The municipality was unable to fully 
enforce local regulations, which endangered the relationship with the local community, with the 
municipality, with the police… As a legal trade union, we had to intervene… We made ‘feriantes’ 
sign a contract in front of a notary…(stating that) if they don’t satisfy the internal bylaw, they are 
sanctioned first with a fine, second with a period of time with no assistance, and in some cases, 
‘feriantes’ can even lose their location in the ‘feria modelo’. 
  
 Feria unions also become responsible for administrative tasks such as managing park-
ing space, security and cleaning of the feria, which are issues that tend to be the most common 
sources of conflict between markets and municipalities. Francisco (50), a feriante leader in 
Macul: 
F: We contract a private street-cleaning enterprise that operates during and after market hours… 
We (also) set up a parking security service because…there was a lot of crime… The police and us 
control them all the time. 
 
 
Reduction of negative externalities 
 
Supportive municipalities also consider the reduction of negative externalities to be an-
other major policy objective, and target this in two ways: feriante working conditions and 
neighbourhood disturbance. Working conditions are improved through the aforementioned in-
terventions provided through ferias modelos, such as permanent stalls, a permanent roof or 
clean water facilities. For instance, a permanent stall eliminates the need to set up and pack 
away heavy stalls, a permanent roof protects feriantes from adverse weather, and clean water 
increases hygiene and food safety overall. Raul (58) and Francisco (50), two feriante leaders in 
Macul, comment: 
R: Having a roof protects you from sun and rain… Before, we used to work in the mud. 
F: There are a lot of people handling food, (for example) making salads. For them, having potable 
water is fundamental… You don’t need to bring water in heavy containers… 
 
 
 Public toilets in particular can greatly improve quality of work and hygiene standards, 
as feriantes can go to a clean place and wash their hands. Moreover, and of particular note for 
women, changing from chemical public toilets to a clean, solid toilet, separated between men 
and women, means that many people would simply no longer ‘hold it in’ rather than use the in-
sanitary and undignified facilities. Claudia (57), a dairy product seller in Macul, describes this: 
C: Toilets changed (our working conditions) one hundred per cent. You enter a clean toilet where 
you can wash your hands with drinkable water…where you have toilet paper and soap. With (the 
old) chemical toilets, you had none of that… There are even people that don’t wash their hands… I 
often would refuse to use a chemical toilet because it is disgusting. 
 
163 
 
 
Finally, the transfer of infrastructure to the control of feriante unions over the course of 
twenty years has created greater employment security for those who feared the impermanence 
of ferias libres. In the words of Tomas (44), a greengrocer in Macul: 
T: ‘Ferias’ are always at risk of being removed… I know of some ‘ferias’ that were removed when 
the municipal administration changed… ‘Ferias modelos’ provide work security as we have a 
twenty-year legal contract. We don’t have a precarious permit like everywhere else. 
 
Supportive policies are also focused on reducing the externalities of ferias libres on sur-
rounding neighbourhoods. Common negative externalities of this type include stalls blocking 
residential cars from leaving the area, the disturbance of early morning noise, and food waste – 
particularly fish – leaving foul-smelling streets, which filters into local houses. Policies to re-
duce these disturbances focus on the establishment (or relocation) of ferias on street islands, 
provision of cleaning services and provision of public space.As Guillermo (67) a leader of the 
ASOF, comments: 
G: As we say: ‘everyone wants a ‘feria’, but not in front of their house’… The neighbours were 
complaining (to the municipality) because of the noise and the street blockages… In Macul, the 
mayor suggested that we set up on a median strip down the road, and it was big – two hectares 
and…we paved it and made something beautiful… That solved a major problem. 
 
As seen above, the municipality of Macul has transferred cleaning responsibilities to feri-
antes with agreed standards, and sewage has been installed in ferias modelos to remove fish 
waste from the street. According to Raul (58) a cheese vendor in Macul: 
R: In Macul, we have the highest cleaning standards in all of Chile… If something is poorly done, 
the municipality tells us: ‘There is something that was not clean’, so we can fix it… These are the 
only ‘ferias’ that have sewage for the fish stalls. 
 
 
 As a major innovation, supportive municipalities are incorporating public space into 
ferias libres, such as green spaces and recreational areas, as part of their strategy to enhance the 
benefits of having a local feria by modifying their public image. As illustrated by the experience 
of Mario (55), a municipal inspector in Macul: 
Mario: (‘Ferias Modelos’) have greatly improved the quality of life of the community… The ‘feria’ 
has, little by little, become the only (local) public space. Juan Pinto Duran street market is a pe-
destrian walkway, providing recreational spaces for kids and green spaces… Young people go 
skating or biking there, older people go for walks or to the green areas. 
  
 Finally, the provision of public lighting during night time by the feriante trade union 
transforms a potentially dark, permanent infrastructure into a lit area that brings security to lo-
cals, as Ignacio (35) another municipal officer in Macul, explains: 
I: The security has improved in the two roofed areas. (The ‘feria modelo’) could have created a 
problem for neighbourhoods during the night, but everything is lit up all night and this has actual-
ly improved the security for neighbours. 
 
 
 The wide range of supportive initiative provided by municipalities to train, capitalise, 
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organise, increase markets and reduce the negative externalities of street markets serve to im-
prove economic outcomes and working conditions. In particular, the construction of ferias 
modelos has been a significant step of investment and trust towards feriantes. 
 
Incremental and iterative policy design: maximising efficiency through agreements 
 
 
 The current supportive process from the municipality of Macul works from the bottom 
up. That is to say, the initial push comes from a strong trade union of feriantes who find a pro-
gressive mayor, and are able to negotiate supportive interventions in exchange for better prac-
tices by feriantes. Guillermo (67), a leader of ASOF, expands: 
G: This whole (recent) tendency to support ‘ferias libres’ started in Macul several years ago… 
(Mayor) Sergio Puyol saw our proposition to make a law regarding ‘feriantes’. He said: ‘this 
won’t see the light for at least twenty years. I am going to introduce this here’… The ‘feriante’ 
president (in Macul) at the time said this would be a win-win (for the municipality, street vendors 
and the community). 
 
 
 From this point, the process follows a similar pattern to waste-pickers. The design of 
supportive interventions is a collective process rooted in proposals from feriantes, where new 
waves of support are traded against higher standards for consumers, and the success or failure of 
these actions are considered. As illustrated by Francisco (50), a feriante leader in Macul: 
F: We presented the municipality with the idea of creating a permanent structure for the street 
market… We had a magnificent reception from the mayor, the best… In fact, it became the first 
‘feria modelo’… We played an important role in the idea, contributed some of the funds and in ex-
change were put in charge of the administration of security and cleaning. But the municipality 
contributed the architects, the infrastructure, everything else. 
 
 
 The familiar iterative process follows from here: after a new policy is first tested in one 
street market, it is either discarded, modified or rolled-out to the other street markets. Paulo 
(54), a feriante leader in Macul, contrasts the experiences of ferias modelos and night-time 
street markets: 
P: We are working with the municipality to create new ferias modelos. As many as possible… Our 
joint vision is to extend the model of fixed, covered ‘ferias’ … We have also tried other approach-
es, such as night-time street markets in Quilín, but they didn’t work.  
 
 Finally, as with waste-pickers, supportive policies are aimed at minimising the risk of 
feriantes becoming dependent on municipalities, by strengthening feriantes’ local trade unions 
and granting them regulatory power, administrative responsibility and accountability for their 
results. Guillermo (67), a leader of the ASOF, summarises: 
G: When the municipality wants to empower organisations, they can. For instance, in the ‘feria’ in 
(Macul), nowadays we pay for and build the stalls, we maintain them, and we accept all the 
costs… We have security guards, we pay for chemical toilets, and we take action (against mem-
bers that don’t follow the rules)… The municipality has always supported us and we have created 
a culture of self-management. 
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All of these supportive steps have the social inclusion of a vulnerable local population as 
their primary aim, and attempt to do so by introducing them into a profitable, lively and em-
powering employment sector. In doing so, the municipality also supports the livelihood of their 
local population by increasing their access to cheaper and, often, higher-quality products. 
 
 
POLICY IMPACT OF SUPPORTIVE POLICIES: AN EVALUATION 
 
 
This section evaluates the impacts that supportive policies have on their objectives of 
improved economic, social and working condition outcomes and in reducing the negative exter-
nalities of street vending. A stratified random sample of 402 feriantes from a total of 27,978 
municipal permit holders operating across 35 municipalities in Santiago de Chile has been used 
(for more detail, see Chapter 3). OLS models are once again employed to disentangle the impact 
of supportive policies across twelve performance indicators drawn from the literature (see Table 
A.7.1 in Annex 7). Four main indicators are discussed here, while additional discussion on 
complementary performance indicators commonly discussed in the literature can be found in 
Annex 7. Explanatory variables represent the diversity of policies implemented by different 
municipalities, controlling for socioeconomic conditions of feriantes, the characteristics of their 
micro-enterprises, street market location and the municipality in which they operate (see Tables 
A.7.2 and A.7.3 in Annex 7). Binary logistic regressions (BLR) and multiple linear regressions 
(MLR) are used depending on the type of data of the dependent variable (see also Table A.7.1 in 
Annex 7). I report only statistically significant results that resisted four different model specifi-
cations by adding the four dimensions of control variables (socio-demographic, micro-
enterprise, spatial, municipal characteristics) and still remained significant by a factor of at least 
10%, and results can thus be considered more robust. For transparency, Tables A.7.5 through 
A.7.7 (in Annex 7) also report all coefficients in the regression, and the way that the coefficients 
change as more controls are added. 
 
Table 5.10 reports the significant results of OLS regressions for the four models with all 
controls. Model 1.a shows the impact of supportive policies on an economic indicator; Model 
2.a, assesses the impact of policies on a social indicator; Model 3.a, reports the results of sup-
portive policies on working condition indicators; and Model 4.a analyses the impact of munici-
pal policies on reducing negative externalities. Qualitative analysis supports these results 
through quotes from interviews and group discussions, commenting on the mechanisms at play. 
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Table 5.10: Summary of the Impacts of Municipal Policies on the Performance of Feriantes 
Respose Variable Positively Impacting Policy Negatively Impacting Policy Magnitude SE Type of policy 
Overall Impact 
(a) 
1. Economic Efficiency 
Indicator 1.a: Pick up van   2,823** -1,249 Physical Capital B 
Earnings per hour 
worked 
Truck   3,785** -1,485 Physical Capital B 
Warehouse storage   3,038** -1,217 Physical Capital A 
Chemical toilet in the street market   2,054** -964.3 Colletive Capital B 
  Number hours permit -69.87** -29 Access to market C 
2. Social Equity 
Indicator 2.a: Number of street vendors   0.00107*** -0.000413 Regulation A 
Income relative to 
poverty line 
Truck   2.091*** -0.736 Physical Capital B 
Warehouse storage   1.358** -0.625 Physical Capital A 
Fridge at the stall   2.522* -1.284 Physical Capital A 
 Electric generator   7.663* -4.00E+00 Physical Capital A 
Municipal support   0.177** -0.0705   C 
  Valor patente -5.31e-06* -2.75E-06 Regulation C 
3. Quality of work 
Indicator 3.a:   Van 13.95* -7.51E+00 Physical Capital B 
Number of hours worked 
in a week 
  Truck 13.54** -6.00E+00 Physical Capital B 
 
Number hours permit 1.129*** -1.19E-01 Regulation C 
4. Negative Externalities 
Indicator 4.a: Number of Stalls   -0.993** -0.463 Access to markets A 
Child work (b) 
Refrigerated storage   -2.731*** -0.896 Physical Capital A 
Parking in a street island   -4.261** -1.881 Neg. Externalities A 
Notes: a) Overall Impact A denotes municipal policies that have only a positive impact across indicators; B refers to municipal policies that have both positive and negative impacts across indicators; C 
denotes policies that have only negative impacts across indicators. 
  b) In a perceptual continous scale where 1 meas never go with my child/chidren to collect and 7 means always go to collect with my child/children 
  c) In a perceptual continous scale where 1means neighbours living in my same street are unhappy with my business  and 7 means hneighbours living in my same street are happy with my business. 
  d) Declare price of products compared with large retail prices where O means is cheaper and 1means equal or more expensive 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses         
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HBE productivity: earnings per hour worked (indicator 1.a) 
 
 Regression 1.a suggests that supportive policies can lead to higher economic perfor-
mance for feriantes. Productivity per hour (indicator 1.a) is increased between 2,823 and 3,785 
pesos (USD 4.55-6.10) from having access to large motorised vehicles, having access to a 
warehouse by 3,038 pesos (USD 4.90) and incorporating toilet facilities into street markets 
2,054 pesos (USD 3.31). Access to large vehicles (pick-up vans or trucks), when compared with 
handcarts, allow feriantes to bring larger quantities of goods to the street market, and to bring 
better display equipment, thus increasing the potential for profits. Victor (34), a greengrocer in 
Maipú, provides an example: 
V: Of course (the vehicle has an impact)… You can’t make two trips to the ‘feria’. You can only go 
once a day… Neighbours need to get out and other ‘feriantes’ have to set up their stalls – that’s 
why there is a schedule. I have a van (in which) I can fit 36 banana boxes and a small stall, and 
that is all the stock that I have to sell… With a (large) motorised vehicle, you can bring a larger 
stall and more products, so you can sell more. 
 
 
 Having a warehouse for storage similarly allows feriantes to buy products in larger 
quantities at cheaper prices and have a larger quantity of products to sell, as emphasised by 
Roberta (41), a seller of fashion accessories in Maipú: 
R: I had to make a warehouse at home…because in this way you can buy and store more. Some-
times I’d find good deals, but when you don’t have anywhere for storage, you can’t take them. So 
you have to buy day-by-day in small quantities, and it’s more expensive. 
 
 
 The impact of having access to toilet facilities is a surprising outcome, but it may save 
time as stallholders don’t have to go home or pay for access to local toilets, allowing more time 
to be spent at the stall. 
 
 Productivity of feriantes suffers a very small negative effect of 70 pesos (USD 0.11) 
with an expansion of permitted working hours in the ferias libres. Peak sales times occur during 
the late morning and early afternoon, and so extending beyond this period increases the total 
number of hours of work without creating a substantial increase in the number of sales, thus 
reducing productivity per hour. As Felipe (54), a dairy product vendor in Maipú, discusses: 
F: (If our work schedule is extended) I think we would earn more or less the same, because ‘feri-
as’ experience just a few peak hours of selling... It happens in stages – people whose children are 
at school in the morning come between 11 a.m. and midday… When they are there in the after-
noon, people come between 1 and 2 p.m. 
 
 
Poverty Reduction: Household income per capita relative to the minimum wage (indica-
tor 2.a) 
 
 Municipal policies can reduce poverty by facilitating access to larger motorised vehi-
cles, boosting incomes to two times the monthly minimum wage, supporting the electrification 
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of stalls to 7.6 times, acquisition of freezers to 2.5 times, and adjusting the number of feriantes 
per street market by a very small 0.001 times. Since having access to a large motorised vehicle 
increase productivity per hour (indicator 1.a), this naturally translates into higher monthly in-
comes, moving people above the poverty line. 
 
 Feriantes with an electric generator have access to a whole new range of products that 
either require refrigeration or are processed in some way at the moment of sale (for example 
natural juices or meat), and are the only ones able to offer these products in the feria. This ties 
in with having access to a freezer in the stall, due to its dependency on electricity. As Guillermo 
(67), a feriante leader in Macul, provides examples: 
G: There are people who sell dairy products, ice cream… We have natural juices… (These are) all 
things that wouldn’t be possible without electricity… There is one stall that sells chicken, and an-
other that sells hamburgers… (With) electricity they can keep their food refrigerated. 
 
 Another factor that can reduce poverty, though only on a very small scale, is a careful 
increase in the number of feriantes. It seems that, up to a certain point, a higher number of feri-
antes increases the number of clients attracted by the diverse range of products on offer, without 
significantly depleting feriantes’ profits due to competition. As Raul (58), a cheese vendor in 
Macul, explains: 
R: If you can have a hundred stalls rather than fifty, more people are attracted to the market… 
(‘Feriantes’) are going to sell more if there is diversity because there aren’t fifty egg stalls or fifty 
clothing stalls, but only two or three. The fundamental attractions for ‘ferias’ are the fruit, vegeta-
bles, and to a lesser extent seafood… You will find those at every street market. Everything else 
adds to the diversity. 
 
 
 However, poverty is magnified through expensive municipal permits. An expensive 
permit means a direct increase in operational costs for feriantes, and at the lower end of feria 
earnings, this might mean sacrificing a relevant portion of their profits, bringing people closer to 
poverty. As Eduardo (49), a feriante leader in La Granja, comments:  
E: We used to pay 100,000 [USD 161.29] every six months for a municipal permit, and now we 
have to pay 115,000 [USD 185.48]… Not everyone in my ‘feria’ has enough money to pay this… 
These people have to save up for these costs, and they can’t use the money for work, to invest in 
products. 
 
Working week: number of hours worked per week (indicator 3.a) 
 
 The average working week of street vendors is almost equal to the Chilean legal maxi-
mum of 45 hours. An extensive workday length seems to be promoted by the number of hours 
permitted by municipal permits, increasing the working week by 1.1 hours and the provision of 
large vehicles, which increases the working week by more than 13 hours. First, local permits fix 
a specific number of days to work in a week, along with the feria’s opening and closing hours. 
Since attendance is often compulsory, more days or longer schedules increase the number of 
hours that feriantes spend at work. As explained by Marisol (58), a municipal officer in Maipú: 
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M: The largest proportion (of ‘feriantes’) have three locations lasting two days each, so from 
Tuesday to Sunday… ‘Feriantes’ can start setting up their stalls from 6:00 a.m. The ‘feria’ (is 
packed down) on weekdays 3:30 p.m. and weekends at 4:30… Attendance is compulsory.. 
 
 Even though having a large motorised vehicle reduces the transport time for products 
coming to the street market, this reduction is offset by an increase in time spent preparing prod-
ucts, loading and unloading. Gastón (46), a vinegar seller in Maipú: 
G: (I used to have a handcart) and now I have a van… I can bring a lot of products, and even the 
stall fits inside... I have to wake up earlier because I have to pack more onions… I don’t know 
about the others, but I start packing down at 3 p.m. and am finished by 5 p.m.  
 
 
Child labour: Children performing sales or production in ‘ferias’ (indicator 4.a) 
 
 Although in my survey feriantes declared that they only occasionally brought their chil-
dren to work, the data suggest that further reductions in child labour occur when feriantes have 
a higher number of stalls, use refrigerated storage facilities and have traffic island parking. As 
with waste-pickers, the presence of children in street markets is generally not used as part of the 
production equation, but rather occurs due to a lack of alternative options for vendors to leave 
their children during weekends
5
. As Guillermo (67), a leader of the ASOF, comments: 
G: Child labour is rare in ‘ferias’, and chidren are not used as proper workers… Often female 
vendors are the head of the household, and from Monday to Friday they can leave their kids in a 
public nursery, but nurseries don’t operate on weekends, so they have to bring them to the ‘fe-
ria’… But it is nothing like child exploitation, or like those children stop going to school… In fact, 
many go on to university. 
 
 Having more than one stall requires feriantes to move throughout or across street mar-
kets, reducing their free time to look after children, and thus disincentivising them from bring-
ing children to the street market. As Hugo (52) a fruit seller in La Granja, recounts: 
H: Children have fun (at the market) and they want to come with (me)…but I leave them with their 
mother on weekends, because I need to move around to look after my stalls. 
 
 
 Moreover, having street island parking for markets seems to reduce the presence of 
children, as teenagers (or even younger children) are no longer required to mind vehicles or to 
move them to free space for traffic. As commented by Claudio (54) a shoe vendor in Maipú: 
C: Yes, there are children who come with their parents. Some of them have learnt how to drive. I 
have seen little children driving their father’s pick-up to unblock a street… Or they are sent to 
mind the trucks (in case of thieves). 
 
 It also seems plausible that having storage facilities, particularly refrigerated facilities, 
can reduce child labour as it decreases the frequency with which feriantes need to shop for new 
products, thus reducing the presence of children accompanying them. As noted by Hugo (52), a 
fruit seller in La Granja:  
H: I bring my sons (to the street market) on weekends. They want to come because they have fun… 
They want to go with you to get the groceries, to sell, everywhere. 
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The unique supportive policies aimed at feriantes can significantly transform produc-
tivity, social and working condition outcomes and reduce negative externalities. The most nota-
ble outcome here is that street makets can make improvements for both clients and workers by 
modernising, investing in capital enhancement at the individual and collective level. 
 
FINAL BARRIERS TO STREET VENDOR GROWTH AND ALTERNATIVE 
MARKET SOLUTIONS 
 
The final barriers: a spatial poverty trap, political changes and national 
regulations 
 
Although some municipalities in Santiago have made many efforts to advance the live-
lihood of street vendors, they ultimately face three structural limitations: a spatial poverty trap 
that limits the municipal capacity to create decent jobs in ferias; the lack of political continuity 
within a municipality that compromises the stability of feriante employment; and restrictions of 
national regulations that prevent feriantes from exploiting potentially profitable new products. 
 
Spatial poverty trap: The limited municipal carrying capacity for decent jobs 
 
As with waste-pickers, supportive municipalities have limited capacity to create decent 
jobs within their own administrative area. Municipalities remain ultimately restricted by the to-
tal demand of clients within their administrative municipal area. My survey shows that 90.3% of 
street market clients live within the same municipal area, and many live in the immediate vicini-
ty, as Marisol (58) a municial officer in Maipú, comments: 
M: Yes, within a municipal area people do move around looking for the closest and cheapest ‘fe-
ria’. But clients mostly (come) from the surrounding areas… I calculate that the market must be 
mostly within around eight blocks. 
 
The purchasing power of the local population thus determines a limited number of well-
paid feriante jobs that remain sustainable in a municipality. 
 
Due to this local determinant of feriante income, those in higher- and lower-income urban 
areas have different career prospects. This is influeneced by two interacting factors: the number 
of street vendors (supply), and the purchasing power of clients (demand). Given the high socio-
economic spatial segregation of Santiago de Chile, certain municipalities contain homogenously 
low-income or high-income inhabitants (OECD 2013). There is thus a resultant ‘congestion’ 
effect on supply in low-income municipalities, while the few feriantes in wealthier municipali-
ties enjoy large profits. With poorer municipalities facing pressure from their vulnerable local 
population to offer employment solutions, many mayors expand the number of municipal per-
mits for feriantes, and/or relax municipal controls over coleros, thus increasing competition and 
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reducing profits for each feriante. As Guillermo (67), a national feriante leader, and Felipe (49), 
in a focus group in Maipú, comment: 
G: The problem is that mayors have expanded the problem (of congested markets)… ‘Feriante’ 
permits are supposed to achieve social outcomes, so mayors (tend to) fill the streets with ‘feri-
antes’… For instance, in Lo Espejo, in the Feria Fernandez Albano, there are 1,200 ‘feriantes’ 
and around 6,000 or 7,000 ‘coleros’. 
 
F: The ‘feria’ has a total inflow of money… (Clients) bring a certain quantity of cash with 
them…and that amount is distributed (amongst the ‘feriantes’ and ‘coleros’)… Let’s say five mil-
lion pesos [USD 8064.64] a day is brought by clients...and that amount is distributed (amongst the 
workers). So, if there were five ‘feriantes’, each earning one million pesos [1612.90 USD], and 
you bring five more ‘feriantes’, now this money is distributed between ten people, with each get-
ting 500,000 [USD 332.58]. 
 
 
 Regarding demand, clients with higher purchasing power create the potential for a high-
er carrying capacity. However, lower demand for permits from a generally non-vulnerable local 
community and a higher resistance from municipalities to expand the number of feriantes, 
means that only a few feriantes enjoy the full profitability of these areas. For instance, in La 
Pintana, the poorest municipality of Santiago de Chile, the average purchasing power of an in-
habitant is seven times lower that in Vitacura, the richest municipal area, yet La Pintana has 
twenty-five times more feriantes per inhabitant. As observed by Guillermo (67): 
G: (In higher-income neghbourhoods) you can sell one million (pesos’ worth) on Saturday and 
(again) on Sunday, so you are making 300,000 [USD 483.87] (profit) each day. That is a different 
business, much more profitable than in poor neighbourhoods. That is why (informally buying) a 
stall costs 14 million (USD 22,580) 
 
 
 Therefore, feriantes in low-income areas face a spatial poverty trap, from the combina-
tion of being located in an area of high competition and low purchasing power, while space with 
the potential for good-quality feriante employment remains unexploited in wealthier municipali-
ties. 
 
Dependency on stable politics: An uncertain future for feriantes 
 
 The sustainability of ferias libres, and thus their prospects for growth, is limited by the 
willingness (or lack thereof) of the mayor to extend their municipal permits. According to the 
Chilean law 18.659 of Municipal Organic Constitution of 1988 (Articles 36 and 63), the munic-
ipal permits provided to feriantes for the use of public spaces are declared as ‘precarious’ – es-
sentially meaning that the municipality (represented by the mayor) can unilaterally end their 
existence (as well as create them) at any moment, without giving a reason and without compen-
sation. This means that continuity of feriante enterprises is always in the hands of the mayor. As 
commented by Lucia (49), a public officer in La Granja:   
L: The municipal permits are closed at the moment… Generating or removing permits is complete-
ly the mayor’s decision… We aren’t giving out more permits because we are in a crisis. 
 
 
 In the short term, feriantes’ enterprises are affected by a change of position within the 
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municipality – for instance, as the result of complaints from neighbours – which can lead to a 
decision to close street markets. In the words of Paulo (54), a plastic bag seller in Macul: 
P: ‘Ferias’ are at risk. We have been lucky here in Macul because the mayor has always had a 
positive view of ‘ferias libres’… I know others that have been removed, shut down… It is simply a 
matter of a nighbourhood association getting together to collect signatures, and they remove it. 
 
 
 In the long term, the future of street markets can also be at the mercy of the results of 
local elections. As Dávila (2009) identifies, in the Latin American context, devolution has seen 
great autonomy given to municipalities to determine policies, but their continuity over time ul-
timately depends on the continuity of mayors. This means then that prior-made agreements and 
the continuity of supportive municipal policies are always under threat. Paulo (54) and Raul 
(58), in a focus group with feriantes in Macul, express their concerns: 
P: We have a direct relationship with the mayor. We sit face to face and talk. We have three years 
until this all this ends, because the mayor has been in power for 24 years and he hasn’t put himself 
forward for the next elections… We don’t know what is going to happen in the future… It all de-
pends on who gets elected. 
R: People have big concerns about this. 
 
 
National and regional regulations: Restrictions to market expansion 
 
A final aspect of municipal policies that limits their efforts to foster growth in feriante 
businesses is national and regional regulation which forbids the trade of certain products in the 
street, particularly food cooked on-site and food which requires refrigeration. As Nicolas (48), a 
municipal officer of Conchalí, notes: 
N: Even though there has never been any sanitary or hygiene research on the topic, ‘feriante’ 
permits don’t allow the sale of cooked food… (For instance,) everything that is fried can’t be sold 
in the street. The health authority doesn’t give permission. If a stall starts selling these things, we 
have to shut down their business. 
 
 
In turn, this prevents feriantes from moving into retail markets that face minimal compe-
tition within the ferias, from exploiting the value-added potential of cooking or processing fruit 
and vegetables, and from enhancing the appeal of street markets by bringing more diversity to 
the type of products offered. As Paulina (44), a clothing seller in La Granja, comments: 
P: If street markets are (more diversified), everyone wins because more people will come... We 
can’t earn more than 25% or 30% profit (selling branded products)…but you could by (selling) 
prepared juices or cooked food, because you use a small quantity of fruit and vegetables…but this 
is not allowed. 
 
 
Overcoming municipal barriers: Creating more sustainable and secure feriante 
jobs 
 
In order to overcome the barriers described above and increase the sustainability and se-
curity of feriante employment, municipal officers and feriantes themselves have three pro-
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posals: reinforcing national organisations, planning for street markets and changes in national 
regulation. 
 
National organisation to strike deals for support 
 
Nowadays, unlike the waste-picking sub-sector, feriantes are well organised at a national 
level, being able to successfully lobby municipalities and regional and national public institu-
tions to gain support from the public sector. The key here has been a change of mentality re-
garding organisation, moving from a union-type structure to more of an enterprise-styled organ-
isation. Under this mindset, rather than battling against authorities, organisations are able to ne-
gotiate and lobby them to introduce state support to enhance the competitiveness, profitability 
and working conditions for feriantes. In the words of Guillermo (67), a leader of the ASOF: 
G: For many years, ‘feriantes’ thought that fighting authorities, not negotiating with them, was the 
way to get things done… So we started changing this logic. We have to work with the municipality 
and compete with retail, but also the municipality needs to accept that we are not a problem, that 
we are part of the solution, that we can be good collaborators and together solve many (social) 
problems.  
 
At a local level, a strong national organisation has helped feriantes to settle deals and 
solve conflict with municipalities that threatens the continuity of ferias libres. It also further 
supports feriantes’ self-organisation and increases their competitiveness, as articulated by Nico-
las (48), a municipal officer in Conchalí: 
N: ‘Feriantes’ are organised at the national level in the ASOF… It is a new organisation with a 
bright future. They were even able to negotiate with Macul, La Florida and Puente Alto, for the 
creation of ‘ferias modelos’… They do training for food management, product displays, ‘feriante’ 
uniforms, so they can sell more and become more competitive. 
 
At the regional level, this national organisation has been able to negotiate with authorities 
to redefine infrastructure projects focused on the continuity of ferias libres. The most notable of 
these is the ASOF negotiation with ‘Transantiago’, a Santiago-based transport plan that threat-
ened to eliminate several ferias libres. As Guillermo (67) notes: 
G: If ‘feriantes’ are going to be removed, then they will riot in the streets. Transantiago (the rapid 
bus service in Santiago)could have turned the city into a battlefield… Everyone saw that their ‘fe-
rias’ were going to be removed… We got a meeting with the Transantiago general manager 
and…he did want to find a solution. So I told him: “There are around 30,000 ‘feriantes’ in Santi-
ago… (We can) stop 5,000 vehicles on the main avenue.”… So from then on, we met every Mon-
day to solve problems in each municipality… They changed three main routes and 28 secondary 
routes, and we change three ‘ferias’…  
 
At the national level, the organisation has been able to secure national funding for the fe-
rias modelos programme of 1,028 million pesos (USD 1,658,064) per year, and more recently 
has been lobbying to implement a national law for ferias libres. As Gabriel (55), a leader of the 
ASOF, explains:  
G: In 2008, we started a program of street market modernisation with (President) Bachelet that is 
generating results. ‘Feriantes’ had to contribute 25% of the funds, and the rest came from the 
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(state) fund… In this new government, we organised with the president for this to become a per-
manent financing scheme of 1,000 million pesos (per year) 
 
Planning for sustaining street markets 
 
In order to sustainably expand the amount of good quality employment in ferias libres, 
the spatial poverty trap of a high concentration of low-income clients and a large number of fe-
riantes in low-income municipalities must be broken. Supportive municipal officers and feri-
antes have agreed on two complementary solutions: incorporating street markets as part of re-
gional planning schemes, and managing the size of street markets. Including ferias libres as part 
of the regional planning system is seen as a means to allow the expansion of street markets into 
higher-income municipalities, thus unlocking these profitable areas to sustain the growth of re-
gional employment. It has been proposed that the incorporation of ferias libres into new devel-
opments and into unexploited existing developments could be made compulsory. As Nicolas 
(48), a public officer of Conchalí, and Guillermo (67), a leader of the ASOF, discuss: 
N: …There are places where there are no ‘ferias’…only supermarkets… Or in Vitacura [a high-
income area] there is only one… They need to be incorporated into the planning system. It is the 
only way to incorporate ‘ferias’ into all areas of the city, and not just in poor ones.  
 
G: Between 1992 and 2001, Santiago grew by one million inhabitants…(and) between 2002 and 
2012 at least 600,000 more… The planning system doesn’t account for ‘ferias’ (so) the city grew 
without street markets… We can have regional and national plans that leave space for street mar-
kets – smaller ‘ferias’ with better infrastructure. 
 
 
Second, street vendors suggest that ferias should have a limited size that represents the 
real demand from clients, where new permits should be given on the basis of real increases in 
demand, as well as being a method of replacing feriantes that have moved out of the market. In 
the long run, this would protect feriantes from the negative effects of the oversupply of local 
permits. Gabriel (55), a leader of the ASOF:  
G: Every municipality should say: “This ‘feria’ is going to have 220 stalls, this one 150 and this 
other one 300”. And then the mayor (should) not give any more permits – only to replace people 
that leave, or if there is increased demand. So, ‘ferias’ will always have a size appropriate for (lo-
cal) demand. If the mayor wants to create new permits, an economic feasibility study should be 
conducted to show that there is a demand. This should be part of the planning (system)... Other-
wise you are sending new and old permit holders into bankruptcy. 
 
A national feriante law 
 
Alongside this, the ASOF is promoting ‘The National Law of Ferias Libres’ to overcome 
the restrictions imposed by regional and national regulatory frameworks. The main concept be-
hind this is to establish a common regulatory framework that guarantees the sustainability and 
security of feriante jobs, protecting them from unilateral state action (by local, regional and na-
tional goverments) in exchange for street vendors’ higher levels of collaboration and autonomy 
over ferias. The law proposes a change from precarious municipal permits to standard contracts 
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that guarantee the right to work in the public sphere for extended periods of time, as Guillermo 
(67) comments: 
G: The ‘ferias libres’ law would eliminate the temporary nature of the municipal permit and will 
allow us to work in the street through an administrative contract…which will have a minimum du-
ration of twenty years.  
  
To enhance the sustainability of profits over time, ASOF further propose that a contract 
should be signed with the municipality that establishes the total number of stalls per feria, and 
fixes a minimum distance from new street markets of 1,000 metres. This is reflected in the fol-
lowing observation by Gabriel (55), a leader of the ASOF: 
G: With the national law, the municipality will not be able to arbitrarily increase the number of 
‘feriantes’… It also…respects the commercial market of each ‘feria’, and not pushing them into a 
destructive type of competition… This only applies to the new markets. 
 
The law also proposes the creation of a permanent national source of funding for the crea-
tion of ferias modelos across the country. Further comments from Gabriel (55): 
G: Also, the current modernisation programme, managed by SERCOTED, will be transformed in-
to a source of permanent funding protected by the new law. 
 
 
Finally, in exchange for this support to feriantes, national law empowers the municipality 
and local feriante organisations to sanction feriantes who do not follow their common agree-
ments. These agreements make it compulsory for any permit holder to join their local trade un-
ion, fixes a democratic election mechanism, and transfers administrative and sanctioning power 
over members to the trade union. This union power is then balanced by municipalities having 
the power to dissolve both permits and whole ferias libres if feriantes do not fulfil the terms of 
contracted agreements. In the words of Guillermo (67), a leader of the ASOF: 
G: The responsibility (under this law) would not be individual but collective, because the contract 
is signed at the ‘feria’ level… But ‘feria’ trade unions will also be empowered…because currently 
their leader does not have the power to create order. This will bring higher levels of organisation 
and discipline to ‘ferias’, and a better relationship with their local community. 
 
 
Against all predictions, the ASOF project has been welcomed with support from feri-
antes, municipalities and the central government, and the process of transition began in 2015. 
This is typified by Guillermo’s (67) statement that: 
G: Now the law has started through the legislative process. It is still in the Ministry of Economy. 
Then it will be delivered to the president to be signed, and from there to the parlament.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has aimed to form a clearer understanding of the effects of supportive mu-
nicipal policies towards feriantes. As with the previous chapter, I first focused on understanding 
the life cycle of feriantes, contrasting this with existing theories, and finally advocating for an 
integration of these theories to fully understand the complexity of the informal enterpreneurship 
that occurs in street markets. Feriantes’ entry into the activity is driven by a combination of mo-
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tivating factors, both drawn from necessity and opportunity, with this employment becoming 
long term through choice, thus creating a one-way informality. Existing theories also have vary-
ing levels of relevance regarding the informal-formal linkages between the formal and informal 
economies. A minority of feriantes connect vertically with the formal economy in a backward 
network, contributing to the extension of larger enterprises’ market reach into poor and middle-
class neighbourhoods. However, the majority of feriantes operate in a parallel grassroots busi-
ness network, bringing together thousand of informal entrepreneurs across the country and sus-
taining both the livelihood of households in urban areas and small-scale enterprises in rural are-
as. In this sense, positive rural-urban linkages (Allen et al. 2015), allow for the establishment of 
a reciprocal network that reinforces the economic progress of poor rural and urban populations 
across national space.   
 
In contrast with waste-pickers, feriantes operate with quite high levels of organisation, 
and so supportive policies tend to be implemented in close tandem with feriante cooperatives or 
organisations. As with other informal sub-sectors, most feriantes come from a background of 
poverty that hinders their ability to progress in their business, and so the supportive policies im-
plemented focus first and foremost on providing employment to a vulnerable population, with a 
secondary aim of sustaining the purchasing power of their local populations. Supportive munic-
ipalities design these policies through a bottom-up process of direct collaboration and negotia-
tion with street vendors, and the risk of dependency is minimised by fostering the already-
established feriantes organisations and their capacity to self-govern, administrate and invest into 
street markets. 
 
The large majority of supportive municipalities evaluated currenlty in place have a posi-
tive impact on the economic, social and working conditions of street vendors, while reducing 
the negative externalities commonly mentioned in the literature. This strongly supports the case 
for a more positive involvement of municipal support as a key player to obtain more socially 
desirable outcomes from street vending activities.  
 
As with waste-pickers, although there is still considerable scope to improve both eco-
nomic and working condition outcomes for feriantes, structural limits do exist that municipal 
policies alone cannot solve, including spatial poverty traps, precarious conditions of municipal 
permits and upper government-level regulations. Overcoming this ultimate barrier to facilitate 
the full development of street market work will require an increase in feriantes’ organisation, 
modifications to the current system of municipal and regional planning and the implementation 
of national law, which are all routes into which feriantes have started to make headway. 
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Notes to Chapter Five 
 
 
1. One factor related to the observed gender bias in entrepreneurial spirit is the facts that, in the 
patriarchal society that exists in Chile, most single parent households are female-headed. In such 
type of households, women simply cannot afford the uncertainty over economic returns and the 
risk of entrepreneurial failure, as this would mean not only risking the continuity of their 
enterprise but also their own and their family’s livelihoods. They are therefore more risk adverse. 
2. Centros de distribución are exchange hubs where farmers, fishermen, intermediaries and 
feriantes gather to sell and purchase wholesale primary products. There is a cost to entry for 
middlemen that depends of the type of vehicle required and the product to be sold, and for 
feriantes that depends only on they type of vehicle required.  
3. Coleros, literally ‘the last ones’, are street vendors without a permit who gather at street market 
entrances. While in some ferias libres they are almost non-existent, in others can be close as 
many or more in number than feriantes. 
4. It is worth noting that uncontrolled expansions of the number of feriantes are likely to result in 
high competition to levels that outweigh the gains obtained by increasing the diversity of 
products, thus complementing feriante profits (see section on Final Barriers of Street Vendors). 
5. Regression point estimates, though not at a statistically significant level, indicate a positive 
association between the provision of childcare facilities and a reduction in child labour. In 
contrast, street vendor income is weakly and positively associated with child labour. Interviews 
further confirm this hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER 6 : HOME-BASED ENTERPRISES 
 
As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, social inclusion has been articulated as the 
main argument to justify municipal support for informal entrepreneurs in their provision of 
public and private urban services in public space. In this chapter, I will analyse the support of 
private urban services provided in private spaces, setting the final empirical block for the cross-
sector ‘exit and inclusion’ discussion in the next chapter. This chapter focuses on home-based 
enterprises, once again studying the various aspects of a supportive municipal policy approach. 
 
Home-based enterprises constitute the most formalised economic activity of the three 
sub-sectors analysed in this study. They generally pay the necessary local permits and may be 
registered for tax payments; however HBEs rarely satisfy all Chilean planning regulations re-
garding infrastructure, extensions, electricity, and as many as 73% of HBEs fail to pay VAT, 
thus earning undeclared profits. In Chapter 3, the section ‘Home-based enterprises in Chile’ pre-
sented a general outline of the activity throughout Chile and Santiago, addressing its regulatory 
framework, employment figures, key gender divisions, average incomes and education levels, 
and Figure 3.4 presented a map indicating the location of the four municipalities selected for the 
collection of qualitative data. The table below presents their corresponding interviewee de-
mographics: 
 
Table 6.1: Interview Sample by Municipality, Activity, Age and Gender. 
Municipality Policy approach 
Average 
Age 
Range Male Female Total 
CONUPIA*  52 52 1 0 1 
Santiago Supportive  45 34-56 2 6 8 
Lo Prado Supportive/Structuralist 56 41-61 4 5 9 
La Granja Laissez-faire  49 44-52 0 5 5 
Las Condes Soft Repression 48 34-62 2 5 7 
*CONUPIA:  National Confederation of Small Industry and Handcraft 
 
 The four selected municipalities represent a variety of policy approaches. HBE 
development is strongly supported within the municipality of Santiago, with the Entrepreneurial 
Development Unit of Santiago (EDUS) having been created as a special municipal division 
created to assist HBE growth. The municipality of Lo Prado, through its Department for 
Industrial Development (DIDLP), provides partial support for the development of HBEs, 
offering a soft type of support aimed primarily at increasing productivity, to help HBEs become 
part of the formal economy. HBEs in La Granja operate in laissez-faire environment, being 
subject to almost no municipal controls. Las Condes applies a combination of soft repression 
policies with soft support for the ‘upper crust’ of HBEs1.  
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 As in the previous chapters, qualitative findings are presented along with quantitative 
data collected in a stratified survey across the 35 municipalities of Santiago de Chile, which is 
used to generalise qualitative findings over the larger population of HBEs in the region. Table 
6.2 below outlines the corresponding socio-economic data of the HBEs in this study: 
 
Table 6.2: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of HBEs in Greater Santiago 
HBEs Characteristics N Men Women 
Gender composition (owners) 406 35.8% 64.2% 
  (11,093) (19,913) 
HBEs with non-Chilean owners 406 2.5% 1.9% 
  (271) (381) 
Years in the market (mean) 406 10.2 6.9 
Number of HBEs previously owned (mean) 405 0.6 0.4 
Days to obtain an HBE permit (mean) 405 93.8 72.4 
Working week (hours per week) 400 72.4 73.8 
Lower than secondary education 406 32,7% 36.1% 
  (3,629) (7,179) 
Secondary education 406 48,9% 52.6% 
  (5.427) (10,466) 
Tertiary education 406 18.4% 11.4% 
  (2,037) (2,268) 
Sector    
     Retail  406 11.4% 8.4% 
  (1,668) (1,269) 
     Manufacturing  406 64.4% 75.7% 
  (7,144.5) (15,064) 
      Service Sector 406 24.2% 16.0% 
  (2,679) (5,859) 
Monthly turnover of HBE (mean) 383 
CLP 595,911 
(USD 961.15) 
CLP 378,850 (USD 611.05) 
HBE’s monthly income* (mean) 383 
CLP 655,503 
(USD 1057.26) 
CLP 447,697 
(USD 722.09) 
 
Source: Author survey. Statistics use total weights (design, non-response and post-stratification weights). 
Estimated population using weighted descriptive statistics appears in parentheses. 
*Includes other sources of personal income such as pension, rental income or second job. 
  
 Given the gravity of previous theoretical development in HBE research, the first section 
of this chapter examines the correspondence between existing theories and the realities of HBEs 
in Santiago de Chile, showing an alignment with waste-pickers’ and street vendors’ ‘one-way 
road’ movement into informal entrepreneurship and a large variety of formal-informal linkages. 
The second section explores the arguments used by municipalities in support of HBE 
development, arguing that, once again, social inclusion remains their core discourse of public 
engagement. The third section analyses the impacts of these supportive policies in place on the 
performance of HBEs, concluding that the most effective policies hinge on increasing HBEs’ 
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access to markets in which to trade their products, as well as increasing their access to capital. 
The fourth section focuses on some of the main limitations that municipalities face in their 
support of HBE development. 
 
CHARACTERISATION AND MARKET DYNAMICS OF HOME-BASED 
ENTERPRISES 
 
Chapter 2 presented the contrasting points of view regarding the motivations behind 
starting and continuing to run HBEs, alongside the response of HBEs to economic crises and the 
interrelation between the activity and the formal economy. The qualitative and quantitative 
analysis in this section concludes that, as with waste-picking and street vendors, no single 
existing theory can fully explain the dynamics of HBEs in Santiago de Chile, suggesting the 
need for a more ‘hybrid’ approach.  
 
Exploring reasons behind entry into home-based enterprises 
 
In this section, my analysis shows that for some people, starting an HBE is more of a 
conscious decision to seize an economic opportunity, whilst others are more motivated to start 
an HBE out of necessity when faced with few employment alternatives
2
. Again, as with waste-
pickers and street vendors, HBEs cannot be precisely grouped into ‘opportunity’ and ‘necessity’ 
entrants, and so my survey results reflect broad motivations for entering into the activity.  
 
       Table 6.3: Motivations Behind Establishing a Home-Based Enterprise 
Reason for starting HBE Men Women Total 
‘Necessity’ entry 44.9% 66.5% 58.8% 
  (4,953) (13,239) (18,192) 
Unemployment 16.2% 18.2% 17.4% 
  (1,785) (3,615) (54,00) 
Failure of previous HBE 3.5% 2.4% 2.8% 
  (386) (469) (855) 
Other economic need 23.5% 39.2% 33.6% 
  (2,589) (7,809) (10,398) 
Illness or disability 1.8% 6.8% 5.0% 
  (193) (1,346) (1,539) 
‘Opportunity’ entry 55.1% 31.9% 40.2% 
  (6,081) (6,346) (12,427) 
Entrepreneurial spirit 39.7% 27.0% 31.5% 
  (4,378) (5,383) (9,761) 
Family member or relative doing similar activity 15.4% 4.8% 8.6% 
  (1,703) (963) (2,666) 
Other reason 0.00% 1.7% 1.2% 
  (0) (329) (329) 
Source: Author’s survey using total weights (design, non-response and post-stratification). 
Estimated population using weighted descriptive statistics shown in parentheses. 
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 Around three out of five HBEs emerged from a background where entrepreneurs had 
few alternative job prospects (see Table 6.3). Four main motivations for establishing an HBE 
can be discerned from this group: exclusion, unemployment, unsatisfactory wage or pension and 
gendered labour division. As with waste-pickers, a person’s inability to fully incorporate into 
labour markets as a result of their vulnerable conditions provides a motivating factor. This ex-
clusion occurs for two main reasons: being close to the pension age and having a permanent 
illness. Irrespective of experience or skill level, workers close to the pension age are systemati-
cally excluded from the Chilean labour market, as they are considered too old to work and as 
having outdated skills. Raul (73), a manufacturer of iron handicrafts from Las Condes, provides 
a typical case: 
R: I am an industrial engineer…. (I worked for) 23 years outside Chile… I came back when I was 
55… It was impossible to find a job (after working as an engineer in Spain, France, Germany, 
Venezuela and Bolivia)… I dyed my hair. I looked like I was 40 but I still couldn’t find a job.  
 
 
 People who have a permanent illness or disability are also excluded from the formal 
labour market, as they are perceived as requiring larger periods of sick leave, and thus turn to 
HBEs out of necessity as an alternative source of income. This motivation for establishing an 
HBE accounts for 5.0% of the responses in the survey. As the experiences of Carmen (56), from 
Santiago, illustrate: 
C: I know how to do a lot of things, I’ve done many job training sessions but I have a (permanent) 
problem in my right hand and a neurological problem… I could be earning more in another job, 
but (my HBE) is the only type of work where people don’t see all my problems. 
 
 
 Again like waste-pickers and street vendors, factors of unemployment or a lack of em-
ployability constitute a second group of entrepreneurs driven by necessity – this group accounts 
for 17.5% of survey responses. As Mariana (41), from Lo Prado, comments: 
M: I had a good job before this (HBE). I worked there for ten years. So, when they fired me I 
started looking for a job but couldn’t find one… Life took me along a different path… I had learnt 
how to make chocolates… I found a niche in chocolates and now it captivates me. 
 
 The third group of ‘necessity’ entrepreneurs – and the largest, at 33.6% – cites the need 
to generate a survival-level income as the main motivation for starting an HBE. This is often as 
a means of complementing an unsatisfactory working wage, as Elisabeth (58), a garment pro-
ducer in Las Condes, and Claudia (36), a producer of flavoured sea salt in Santiago, comment: 
 
E: My husband passed away… I used to (formally) work with clothing fabric…(but) I needed to 
keep up with household costs and it wasn’t enough. So I decided to set up my own atelier for cloth-
ing manufacture… 
 
C: I studied art and it was very difficult to generate a constant, adequate flow of income. So, I 
started little by little to elaborate on my own products and now I live off them. 
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 Similarly, low levels of skill and education can see workers locked in petty jobs on 
temporary contracts, forcing them to look for a more stable source of income. Augusto (55) 
from Lo Prado, owner of a corner store, illustrates this: 
A: I was (formally) hired temporarily to collect beans in Quilicura [a village close to Santiago] 
and was paid 1,500 [USD 2.41] per sack (of 50 kilograms). It was very hard to fill one sack. So… 
I said (to a friend): ‘Look, we need something more stable, I know how to make tables and you can 
make bread…we have a neighbour who rents out his oven’… He told me: ‘let’s buy what we can’. 
I bought everything and we started our HBE. 
 
 
 Raul (52), a leader of The National Federation of Micro, Small and Medium-Sized En-
terprise Trade Union (CONUPIA), comments on how a poor pension can also be a motivating 
factor: 
R: (When formal workers move onto a pension) their salaries are immediately reduced to less than 
one-third… So, this person, with the small amount of capital that they have, will…buy an oven, a 
small lathe or a sewing machine and start production at home. 
 
The incorporation of women into the labour market appears as a relevant factor behind 
the emergence and over-representation of women in informal HBEs (see Table 6.3). 
Entrepreneurial beginnings of ‘necessity’ are cited 20% more often by women than men. As 
with waste-pickers, a common factor amongst these women is the effect of gender-stereotyped 
roles that force women to become housewives and assume child-rearing duties alongside the 
generation of an income, leaving them in a position that places huge demands on their time (see 
Chant 2014, p.298; Gough 1993; 2016). As Claudia (61), owner of a hairdresser salon in Lo 
Prado, stated: 
C: I worked in a friend’s hairdressing salon… My daughters were getting older and they needed 
my help…with their homework. My husband told me: ‘you have to take care of our children’. So, I 
began operating a hairdressing salon at home. 
 
At the same time, and particularly relevant for single female parents, many women see in 
HBEs the opportunity to use a single space for both work and family (see also Car et al. 2000; 
Chant 2014, p.298; Chant & McIlwaine 2009; 2016; ILO 202; Tipple 2004, p.374; WIEGO 
2014b). As expressed by Ana (41), now an owner of a dog grooming shop in Lo Prado: 
A: I started making chocolates… I was on my own and I had the problem of saying: ‘Oh Lord, I 
need money, I need money for my children and I can’t leave them alone’. That gave the courage 
and the strength (to start an HBE) 
 
Nevertheless, in contrast with waste-pickers and more similarly to street vendors, two out 
of five HBE owners in my survey cited entrepreneurial motivations behind starting their 
business. Here, four categories can be identified: small-scale, young educated, relatives and 
family entrepreneurs. A large group of people (31.5% of my sample) are those who wish to start 
a business but have low capital availability, and so initially sell on a small scale, scaling up over 
time with regard to the volume and diversity of their products. As the majority of these 
entrepreneurs come from low-income backgrounds and have low-level qualifications, their 
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enterprises operate from their homes – be they rented or owned – allowing them to save on 
fixed costs. Ana (48), the owner of a small fast-food shop in La Granja, discusses: 
A: (I started my HBE) because there is this one family shop that always has a lot of leftover cheese 
corners. So, I started to take all of these cheese corners…to make empanadas at home, and then 
everything started. I’m talking about twelve years ago… Today, I sell Italian, Peruvian and 
Chilean food. 
 
 
Young entrepreneurs, typically with a bachelor’s degree in IT programming or design, 
constitute another much smaller group. This type of entrepreneur aims to establish an enterprise 
based on their professional expertise and concentrate their efforts on high-quality products or 
services, sometimes making use of digital technologies. Tomas (49), chief of the Enterprise 
Development Unit of Santiago Municipality (EDUS), explains: 
T: There is a minority of young people. They think: ‘I don’t want to work for an enterprise. I have 
an idea, I’ve started to develop it, I have some money that my family lent me’… They sometimes 
use technology such as iPhone applications and GPS… These are HBEs of a much higher status. 
 
 
 As in previous sub-sectors, many individuals establish an HBE when they have a family 
member who is currently performing a similar activity, a motivation that was mentioned in 8.6% 
of cases (see Plate 6.1). This allows them to acquire first-hand knowledge of the particular skills 
required, the potential market demand and the potential profitability of the enterprise, thus re-
ducing their risk of failure. Ana (48), from La Granja, describes this process:  
 
A: I told my husband: ‘quit your job and come to work in our business’… I took him out of (for-
mal) work… He used to come home with 400,000 pesos [USD 645.16], but now he makes 800,000 
[USD 1,290.32] and we have good working (conditions). 
 
Plate 6.1: Three generations of home-based entrepreneurs, corner shop in Lo Espejo. 
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete.  
 
A final motivation behind starting an HBE relates to a family-driven decision, where 
somebody sees in HBEs an opportunity to conduct their work in a way that allows them more 
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family time. This was the reasoning for Maria (52) from La Granja and Gabriel (50), an 
advertisement producer in Las Condes: 
M: I have my hairdressing salon at home because I have kids and, honestly, I don’t want to leave 
them alone… I used to work outside (the home, in a formal job) and I left (one of my children) 
alone too much. He was alone until age fifteen. 
G: God gave me a gift – he gave me twins… I said: ‘I have to enjoy my children from the moment 
they are born’. So, I quit my job and started my own marketing company at home. 
 
 Qualitative and quantitative data both support the idea that people enter into HBEs sim-
ultaneously out of necessity (as proposed by dualist and structuralist literature) and by choice 
(as voluntarist and neoliberal arguments suggest). There is however a clear gender division: 
women are more than men likely to cite necessity as a factor (see Table 6.3). Economic cycles 
should thus relate to the expansion of HBEs in two ways. First, as dualist theory suggests, un-
employment increases during times of economic crisis, as it leads to exclusion from the formal 
labour market and an increase in HBEs started out of necessity. Second, as structuralist, neolib-
eral and voluntarist theories suggest, economic expansion increases the demand for goods and 
services, which enhances the economic prospects of starting a business, leading to an increase in 
the amount of opportunistic entry into HBEs. 
 
Home-based enterprises: a long-term prospect  
 
 
As with other informal sub-sectors, the majority of HBE owners choose to remain in this 
informal activity in the long term, perceiving higher benefits than in formal employment 
relative to their skill level. In my survey, only 92.6% of HBE owners declared that they would 
not undertake formal employment for the minimum wage given the opportunity. This figure 
increases to only 75.2% when asked if they would move to formal work for their current HBE 
income.  
 
Table 6.4: Willingness to Move From HBEs to Formal Employment 
Exit/ Remain N Men Women Total 
1. At the minimum wage  
   
 Exit HBE 404 6.1% 8.1% 7.4% 
   (677) (1,598) (2.276) 
 
Stay in HBE 
 
93.9% 91.9% 92.6% 
  (10,355) (18,241) (28.586) 
2. At HBE-equivalent income  
   
 Exit HBE 402 24.4% 25.0% 24.8% 
   (2,677) (4,934) (7,611) 
 
Stay in HBE 
 
75.6% 75.0% 75.2% 
   (8,288) (14,830) (23,119) 
Source: Author survey. Statistics use total weights (design, non-response and post-stratification). 
Estimated population using weighted descriptive statistics shown in parentheses. 
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Table 6.5: Reasons to Not Undertake Comparably Remunerated Formal Employment  
Reason to remain in HBEs Men Women Total 
Flexibility of time 47.1% 50.3% 49.1% 
  (5,160) (9,934) (15,094) 
More free time 23.4% 28.1% 26.4% 
  (2,570) (5,547) (8,117) 
Independence and pride 50.7% 39.7% 43.6% 
  (5,557) (7,854) (13,411) 
Social contact  20.8% 25.5% 23.8% 
  (2,281) (5,030) (7,311) 
Facilitating family tasks 42.0% 53.5% 49.4% 
 
(4,601) (10,577) (15,178) 
Other reasons 9.2% 13.2% 11.8% 
  (1,009) (2,613) (3,622) 
Source: Author survey. Statistics use total weights (design, non-response and post-
stratification). 
Estimated population using weighted descriptive statistics shown in parentheses. 
The data account for to those that would not accept formal employment (n=302) divided 
by the total sample size (n=402). The survey asks the respondent to mark ALL reasons 
why they would not take on formal employment at a income equal to their HBE earn-
ings. 
 
The larger group – those who would continue to work in their HBEs rather than change to 
the formal market – tend to cite higher incomes and better employment conditions as their main 
motivating factors. Considering that 88.6% of HBE owners in Santiago de Chile have only 
reached a secondary level of education, most of them would receive an income around the 
minimum wage if they were working in the formal economy. Similarly to waste-pickers and 
street vendors, as many as 92.6% of HBE workers would not undertake formal employment for 
this type of wage, as they receive higher economic returns in their informal enterprises. These 
results are reinforced by the data in Table 6.6, showing that HBE owners earn on average almost 
double the minimum wage. As illustrated by Gabriela (48) and Maria (52), both owners of 
hairdressing salons from La Granja: 
G: Yes, I earn much more with my business than what I was earning in Paris [a large retail chain].  
M: Yes, you earn more. And much more! ...Also it is more calm, if you want to open you do, if you 
don’t want to open you don’t. 
 
 
 Although the economic returns of HBEs do come into consideration for their owners, 
non-monetary benefits seem to play a much more relevant role in their decision to continue in 
these businesses. The fact that around three out of four of those surveyed would not move to 
comparably remunerated formal work reveals the high value placed on other aspects of working 
in an HBE. Non-monetary factors account for the facilitation of family tasks (49.5%), independ-
ence and pride (43.6%), flexibility of schedules (49.1%) and an increase in free time (26.4%). 
As with the previous chapter, I will not discuss these factors in depth, as the logic and reasoning 
behind them remain consistent across sub-sectors, but I will focus on the particularities of non-
monetary benefits for HBEs. First, since HBEs concentrate living and working space in a single 
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location, they provide a unique opportunity to reduce workday lengths. This is particularly rele-
vant as the majority of these entrepreneurs live far from employment hubs. As noted by Susana 
(48), Augusto (55), and Barbara (52), in a focus group in Lo Prado: 
 
A:(In a formal job) you need to take public transport and you waste too much time… (In an HBE) 
you wake up and you have your work right there where you are. 
S: No, I would never take the underground… (In formal employment) you would spend two hours 
to get there and two hours to come home at least. 
A: It would have to be a really (well-paid) job (to justify it).  
 
 HBEs also allow parents to accommodate work and family tasks in one single space, 
which seems particularly relevant for women, and they are around 11% more inclined than men 
to mention family advantages as a factor for staying in work as a home-based entrepreneur. Fur-
thermore, formal employment in the form of ‘trabajador independiente’3 allows employers to 
impose schedules that run beyond the legal workday length. Gabriela (48), owner of hairdress-
ing salons in La Granja, faced this situation: 
 
G: I had a job offer but I rejected it… You work from Monday to Sunday…and the schedule was 
from 8:00am to 8:00pm. That’s twelve hours – all day long! …So I said no…and it paid 1,600,000 
[USD 2580.60] – which would have been a lot for me. 
 
Table 6.6: Reasons to Undertake Formal Employment at Equal Income 
 
Reasons to exit HBEs Men Women Total 
Better treatment of workers 0.6% 1.7% 1.3% 
  (65) (326) (391) 
Fewer working hours 10.5% 13.6% 12.5% 
  (1,146) (2,687) (3,833) 
Less tiring 17.8% 15.8% 16.5% 
  (1,948) (3,128) (5,076) 
Better access to pensions 9.5% 10.6% 10.2% 
  (1,036) (2,089) (3,125) 
Better access to health 11.3% 12.4% 12.0% 
  (1,241) (2,450) (3,691) 
Stable income 19.1% 19.0% 19.0% 
  (2093) (3,748) (5841) 
Avoid police controls 1.2% 0.8% 1.0% 
  (132) (166) (298) 
Other reasons 3.0% 0.9% 1.6% 
  (330) (169) (499) 
Source: Author survey. Statistics use total weights (design, non-response and post-
stratification). 
Estimated population using weighted descriptive statistics shown in parentheses 
The data account for those that would take on formal employment (n=100) divided by the 
total sample (n=402). The survey question asks the respondent to mark ALL reasons why 
they would take on formal employment. 
  
Another group tends to be comprised of the fewer than one in ten whose HBE incomes 
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are lower than the current minimum wage. As Daniela (47), an artisan from Santiago, 
comments: 
 
D: I would like to work again as a wage earner… I wanted to dedicate myself 100% to craft 
production, but it is difficult and I have had rather bad economic results. 
 
 Non-monetary benefits are much more common motivating factors for undertaking for-
mal employment. Among those that would move to the formal economy for their current in-
come, as with waste-pickers, a more stable source of income ranks as the most appealing ad-
vantage of formal employment, with 19.0% of interviewees mentioning it as a key reason. This 
seems particularly relevant for low-skilled workers who produce goods and suffer from restrict-
ed demand or a lack of access to selling spaces. As stated by Maria (45), a handicraft producer 
in Santiago: 
M: There are moments when I would change (to a formal job), mainly to have a stable income… 
I’ve spent this year dealing with paperwork to acquire these (handicraft fair) spaces (from the 
municipality)... I will take whatever job is offered to me… It’s been a desperate period. You see 
your production piling up. 
 
 
For some workers, accessing a better healthcare system is another advantage of formal 
employment, although at 12.0% this represents a relatively small group, including Susana (48), 
owner of a hairdresser salon in Lo Prado: 
S: I’d take (formal employment) only for the health insurance… Only because of that, for every-
thing else I’d never take it in my life. 
 
 
The ability to make pension contributions accounts for 10.2% of those willing to move to 
a formal job. This seems particularly relevant for highly skilled labourers who were previously 
making large contributions to their private pension scheme. As noted by Raul (73), an iron 
product artisan in Las Condes:  
R: I was always an ‘on-site’ engineer… I’ve been doing these (iron) handicrafts now for 18 
years…and yes (I would move to formal employment)…(because) I miss my pension contributions, 
my eight hours of work, my holidays, having a rest on weekends. 
 
A final advantage of formal work is the prospect of working fewer hours, accounting for 
12.5% of this group. It is particularly true for those in the retail and food sectors that have long 
opening hours. As Ana (48), owner of a fast-food restaurant in La Granja, notes:  
 
A: If you want to have a rest, you can’t… I work seven days a week… From Monday to Wednesday, 
we open at 11am and we close at 8pm. However, from Thursday to Sunday we open at 10am and 
we don’t close until (the last client is gone)… Sometimes you close (as late as) 3 a.m.  
 
 
 These data indicate that, for the large majority of HBE owners, their informal self-
employment represents a permanent job prospect. While formal employment can be an attrac-
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tive option for a smaller number of workers with low-productivity enterprises, the large majori-
ty considers that informal enterprises allow them access to higher incomes and better working 
conditions. Regarding economic cycles, although there is a significant movement of people into 
HBEs out of necessity in periods of economic crisis, and a opportunity movement into HBEs in 
times of economic expansion, the activity only marginally contracts in periods of economic 
growth when formal employment becomes more widely available. This aligns with the conclu-
sions drawn for waste-pickers and street vendors – that the permanence of HBEs over time in 
Santiago de Chile is not the result of a shortage in the amount of formal employment available, 
but rather the uncompetitive low quality of entry-level formal employment. 
 
Table 6.7: Integrated View: HBEs as a One-Way Street 
      
Category         Entry No Exit 
Reaction of HBEs to 
economic cycles 
a. Counter-cyclical                                               
(dualist) 
b. Pro-cyclical 
(structuralist and neoliberal) 
Marginal contraction of opportunity 
and necessity HBEs with economic ex-
pansion (no school of thought). 
 
Underpinning drivers  a. Entrepreneurs out of 
necessity 
b.  Opportunity  entrepreneurs 
HBEs provide better working condi-
tions than formal jobs at the lower end 
of the labour market 
Accounts for 
a. 58.78% of HBEs* 
c. 40.15% of HBEs* 
92.63% (at minimum salary)  
75.23%* (at HBE-equivalent income) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
Integration, parallel economies and mixed markets: re-understanding the 
relationship between HBEs and the formal economy 
 
 
HBEs maintain a complex relationship with the formal economy that cannot be reduced 
to one single existing theory (see Figure 6.1). To fully understand this relationship within 
Santiago de Chile, we need to distinguish at least three different levels of interaction: vertical 
integration, parallel economies and mixed markets (see Table 6.8 and Figure 6.1).  
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Figure 6.1: Structure of the Home-Based Enterprise Market 
 
Source: Own elaboration.
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Table 6.8: Integrated, parallel and mixed markets 
Relationship with the formal economy 
Theoretical 
framework 
N  
Estimated 
population 
Percentage 
A. Backward and/or forward integration 
Neoliberal-
structuralist 
196 14,833 49.1% 
  A.1 Only forward connection (producers)   13 13,897 3.1%  
  A.2 Only backward connection (sellers)   183 13,897  46.0% 
B. Parallel economies Dualist 
75 5,816 
19.3% 
  Sellers   35 2,803 9.3% 
  Producers    40 3,013 10.0% 
C. Mixed markets  None 125 9,546 31.6% 
  Sellers   95 7,432 24.6% 
  Producers    30 2,114 7.0% 
 Source: Author survey. Statistics use total weights (design, non-response and post-stratification). 
Total sample (n=396).   
 
            Table 6.9: Types of HBEs activities 
HBEs Activities Male Female Total 
Cornershops and minimarkets 5,531 13,273 7,742 
  50.1% 66.7% 60.8% 
Car repairs 1,340 241 1,581 
  12.2% 1.2% 5.1% 
Beauty salons 451 1,290 1,741 
  4.1% 6.5% 5.6% 
Cyber cafes  65 502 567 
  0.6% 2.5% 1.8% 
Prepared food and restaurants 1,066 1,609 2,675 
  9.7% 8.1% 8.6% 
Tailors and clothing manufacturing 201 1015 1,216 
  1.8% 5.1% 3.9% 
Handicrafts 273 393 666 
  2.5% 2.0% 2.2% 
Furniture makers 253 240 493 
  2.3% 1.2% 1.6% 
Other 1,981 2,428 4,409 
  17.3% 9.4% 12.3% 
Source: Author survey. Statistics use total weights (design, non-response and post-
stratification). 
Estimated population using weighted descriptive statistics shown in parentheses. 
Total sample (n=396).   
 
 
Vertical integration in backward and/or forward networks 
 
 
Using Thomas’ (1995b) distinction of formal-informal linkages, we can identify that 
HBEs can be vertically integrated with the formal economy through subcontracting production 
(forward networks) or by using HBEs to increase the sales of formal products (backward 
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networks). Following from the quantitative analysis drawn from my survey, this vertical 
integration of HBEs with the formal economy accounts for almost half of cases in Santiago de 
Chile. 
 
‘Forward networks’ refers to HBEs that sell products or services to enterprises in the 
formal economy (see Figure 6.2, A.1). In the case of HBEs in Santiago, these are quite rare 
(3.1%), showing the low level of integration that manufacturing and service industries have with 
this informal sector. In these few cases, an HBE with a specialisation in the production of a 
particular good or service generates demand from medium-sized or large formal enterprises 
(Tipple 2005, p.620; see also Chant & McIlwaine 2009, Ruthven 2010). Small home-based 
workers can sell directly to formal enterprises, or through subcontratadores (subcontractors) 
who allocate orders, gather products and deliver them to the larger formal enterprise. This 
category concentrates HBEs operating in clothing manufacture, egg production and as 
electricians. These enterprises receive orders from formal enterprises and are paid according to 
the hours of service provided or on a piece rate basis. This is the situation for Mariela (56), a 
producer of porcelain figures in Lo Prado: 
M: (Now), I sell to a big distributor in Maipú. It is a big shop… (My products) are distributed as 
far as Puerto Montt [913 kilometres south of Santiago].  
 
In this forward network, size, formality, and profits increase upwards, while 
competition increases downwards. This follows a similar logic to the relationship between 
waste-pickers and forward networks: the requirements of middlemen and enterprises for storage, 
distributional logistics and a space for sales, along with the possibility of being subject to 
controls from public officers, higher in the network lead to a growth in size and formality. The 
largest of these enterprises can employ thousands of employees, while the HBEs at the bottom 
of this network use only family members (paid and unpaid) or informal contract labour – the 
average size of production-based HBEs in Santiago is 5.9 workers while Wal-Mart Chile has 
47,369 formal employees (Wal-Mart 2015). As summarised by Camila (49), a public officer 
from La Granja: 
C: (In La Granja) there are some HBEs that sell to the large retail companies. For instance, 
Claudia sells to Fallabella [one of the largest retail stores in Chile]… These (HBEs) obtain the 
fabric and sew everything together…and then (Falabella) add the labels.  
 
 
As with waste-pickers and feriantes, the lowest end of the network faces high levels of 
competition, since establishing an HBE can be done with low skill levels and minimal capital 
investment, whereas higher levels require a combination of skills, business connections and 
capital. Once again, whereas large formal enterprises at the top of these networks are able to fix 
prices, determine conditions of payment and transfer risk to those below them, and these 
pervasive effect filter down through subcontractors and distributors to HBEs. In the words of 
Raul (52), a leader of CONUPIA: 
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R: For instance, HBEs who sell quail eggs to supermarkets… The amount paid by supermarkets is 
very low…and they take 90 days or more to pay, and only pay for what has been sold. Sometimes 
the demand decreases. If one HBE was selling 4,000 eggs per month, and then the supermarket 
tells them that next month they will buy 2,000… They will have to kill the quails and make pâté out 
of them because they are too expensive to keep. 
 
‘Backward networks’ refers to the practice of HBEs selling formal products to 
households (see Figure 6.2, A.2). These are generally products that originate from large national 
or international enterprises. In Santiago de Chile, backward networks are the most common way 
that HBEs connect with the formal economy (46% of businesses surveyed), and allow formal 
products to expand their market coverage, particularly into poor neighbourhoods (Ezeadichie 
2012, p.52; Gough et al. 2013, p.261; Tipple 2005 p.374). These products connect with HBEs 
through a network of middlemen called distribuidoras, who have the capacity to buy in larger 
quantities at wholesale prices, which they sell on in smaller amounts. As reported by Raul (52) 
and Carmen (56), a producer of beauty products in Santiago: 
R: Some products for sale in corner stores are mass produced … Normally they are bought from 
‘distribuidoras’ in small quantities… Meiggs [a commercial neighbourhood] is a place of mass 
distribution that specialises in micro-enterprises.  
 
C: I buy (material for production) from chemical stores or from large pharmaceutical companies.  
 
As with forward networks, size, formality and profits tend to increase upwards, and 
competition increases downwards. The HBEs at the lower end of these forward networks are 
generally located in low-income neighbourhoods that receive little attention from authorities, 
and are most commonly almacenes (corner stores) or minimarkets. These enterprises employ an 
average of 3.6 workers, with less than one in ten being formally contracted, as highlighted in the 
case of Paula (44), owner of a corner store in La Granja:  
P: I work with one lady, but without a contract…and on Sundays I hire (four) more people 
(without contracts). 
 
 
As with backward networks, the low barriers to entry lead to increased competition 
amongst these HBEs. Augusto (55), owner of a corner store in Lo Prado, has faced high 
competition: 
P: (Your profits) depend on the market in your neighbourhood, and your prices (depend on it, 
too). In my case, I have a lot of competition…so you have to lower prices 
 
The people’s market: parallel economies 
 
HBEs also produce and sell goods through an informal network that is almost entirely 
segregated from the formal market (see Figure 6.2, B.1 & B.2). This is a less common situation, 
with enterprises operating within a parallel market structure representing approximately only 
one in five HBEs. These businesses tend to produce, store and sell from home, with their market 
reach generally not extending beyond their immediate neighbourhood. Less frequently, they sell 
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in ferias libres as coleros (street vendors)
3
, gaining them access to surrounding neighbourhood 
markets. Mariana (41), a chocolate maker from Lo Prado, describes her sales process: 
M: I do not have a shop to sell from, (but) I work a lot in street markets… I can sell one million, 
two million [USD 1,612-3,225] (per month). The other days at home I am working on production.  
 
Alternatively, HBEs can sell their products through their established social networks. 
This normally starts by selling directly to family members, friends and previous co-workers, but 
over time networks can grow through word of mouth, expanding their reputation beyond their 
immediate neighbourhood and extending their market reach. The most successful HBEs go on 
to become picadas – places with a reputation for competitive prices and high-quality products, 
attracting clients from other municipalities. Susana (48), a hairdresser from Lo Prado, and Raul 
(52), a national leader of CONUPIA, describe this process: 
S: At the start, my clients were my husband’s and my father’s co-workers... But word of mouth is 
essential (to get clients)… Your old clients bring you new ones. I have people coming from San 
Joaquín [16 kilometers south]. 
 
C: When (an HBE) has unique products and becomes the king of ‘x’…(people say): look, over 
there is the ‘picada’ of sandwiches… You will even take your car and drive twenty blocks to eat a 
sandwich because it’s so good.  
 
HBEs also use the internet as a means of channelling their products into the market. 
They exploit a combination of blogs, websites, Facebook pages and e-commerce, using them to 
publicise their products, contact clients and receive payments. With an online presence, HBEs 
are able to penetrate markets far beyond their immediate neighbourhood or social network, 
sometimes enabling sales at a national level. Nicole (50), a jewellery maker in Las Condes, il-
lustrates: 
N: There are people that have bought from my website… They buy without knowing me, pay the 
deposit and I send the jewellery to the north (of Chile).  
 
These parallel markets of HBEs are characterised by their informality, small size, in-
tense competition and varying profitability. Informality is the common denominator across the 
whole network. Ana (48), owner of a fast-food restaurant, describes how both the production 
and sales aspects of her business are completely separated from the formal economy: 
A: I have a person (in the street market) that provides me with everything… In Lo Ovalledor [a 
large informal market] I get all the fish, all from small producers… We prepare 70 lunches (per 
day). People call us or they come to our (home-based) restaurant. 
 
 HBEs can also be the producers, distributors and sellers of their own products (Figure 
6.2, B.1), or the distributors and sellers of other informal products (Figure 6.2, B.2), and due to 
the near-complete absence of middlemen, these enterprises tend to be small; typically contain-
ing fewer than three workers per enterprise. The small-scale, localised nature of these business-
es means that barriers to entry are greatly minimised, and so HBEs operating in parallel markets 
also face high levels of competition. 
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There are various levels of profitability across HBEs in parallel markets, and two fac-
tors can explain the most salient discrepancies: product characteristics and access to markets. 
First, HBE activities vary enormously in type (see Table 6.8), as do products in quality, with 
more exclusive products returning higher profits as they face lower competition and can be sold 
at higher prices. Claudia (36) produces flavoured sea salt in Santiago, a relatively unique prod-
uct: 
C: I don’t have too much competition. There are only two businesses that compete with me (na-
tionwide)… Others are starting to appear little by little – I have seen them on Facebook…but 
that’s nothing. I have my public, my clients.  
 
 
Second, the method of selling plays a relevant role, as HBEs that are able to efficiently 
exploit their reputation and social network, and that have ready internet access, can overcome 
the restricted demand and purchasing power of their localised neighbourhoods. Rosa (34), a bal-
loon decorator form Santiago, explains her tactics for growing her business market: 
R: (I have built my clients through) word of mouth, social networks and product fairs… I sit for 
hours posting on free advertising websites… There is nowhere that I wouldn’t post advertise-
ments… Clients call me thinking that my business has twenty shops… They call me a lot.  
 
HBEs operating in mixed markets 
 
Finally, almost one in three HBEs in Santiago de Chile operate in a mixed market, 
where they buy and sell products in both the formal and informal economies as a strategy for 
diversifying market access. Two categories can be distinguished from the qualitative data: 
HBEs as producers and as vendors. Among those involved in production, 7.0% deliver their 
products to both formal and informal markets (see Figure 6.2, C.1). Most of these enterprises 
prefer working with the informal market, as they are generally paid a higher price per unit, are 
subject to better payment conditions and are paid instantly. As identified by Raul (73), an iron 
artisan in Las Condes: 
R: Now my products are at Homy [the largest home decoration store in Chile]… I am selling there 
through a subcontractor…and I also sell in the street market. Let’s say If I sell for 5 pesos to them, 
in the ‘feria’ I sell at 10 pesos. But (Homy)…sell for 30 pesos – three times higher than my price 
(in the market)!… But for every 50 products I make, I only sell five in the street market. 
 
Although selling in informal markets is convenient, for many of these HBEs it is impos-
sible to sell their entire stock through this route. Rather, they will sell as much as possible in the 
informal market, with their remaining products sold on to a subcontractor, obtaining a much 
lower profit per unit in the process. Echoing Raul’s sentiment, Daniela (47), a cloth artisan in 
Santiago, recounts: 
D: (Selling to subcontractors) is terrible, because they want you to give your products away al-
most for free, they take so much time to make payment and so often they don’t even pay at all. 
They know that you have to come back home with money… I prefer to sell in the street markets, 
but you can’t always sell everything.  
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Regarding HBEs as vendors, 24.6% of enterprises purchase products from both the 
informal and formal economies, based on prices and availability of goods. Most of these 
enterprises prefer to buy from the informal market, as they have higher negotiating power than 
in the formal market, allowing them to obtain a lower price – since HBE vendors buy in small 
quantities, they do not have access to wholesale prices in the formal market. Augusto (55), 
owner of a corner store, explains: 
A: I could buy (formal products) cheaper but I don’t have the investment capital (to buy) the quan-
tity (required). I’ll give you an example… If I buy a bag of 50 candies direct from the producer I 
pay 100, but if I buy it from a distributor I pay 500… In the supermarket I pay 1,000.  
 
Within the informal economy, transactions are made one-to-one with the producer in 
street markets or at distribution centres (large markets for informal products) in small quantities. 
This guarantees a high level of market competition and a more balanced negotiating dynamic 
between sellers and producers, and means that purchases in smaller quantities can have a larger 
bargaining margin. In this sense, the informal economy is able to provide competitive prices for 
most raw and basic products. For more elaborate goods, informal products are simply not 
available, and thus formal products become the sole option, as in the case of Paula (44), owner 
of a corner store in La Granja: 
P: I buy the fruits, vegetables and eggs in the street market and the pastries from a lady who 
brings them here… They are cheaper (than in the supermarkets)… All of the household supplies – 
detergent, preserved food, sweets – all of that comes from ‘distrubuidoras’.  
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Figure 6.2: Three Types of Home-Based Enterprise Market Integration 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration.
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This threefold relationship between HBEs and the informal economy connects with 
existing theories in varying ways. The largest group – those that connect to formal enterprises in 
backward and/or forward networks – is in line with structuralist and neoliberal theories. As 
dualist theory proposes, a small number of HBEs in Santiago have no connection with the 
formal economy. Finally, there remains a large group of HBEs that operate using a mixture of 
both formal and informal markets simultaneously. This latter group does not currently fit into 
any specific theoretical framework. 
 
The life cycle: progress and inhibitions to growth encountered by HBEs 
 
Similarly to waste-pickers and street vendors, my qualitative analysis identifies four dif-
ferent ‘idealised’ stages in the evolution of an HBE: subsistence, self-enterprise, small enter-
prise and clusters/cooperatives. In spite of the diversity of HBE activities – involving manufac-
ture, service and retail – all of them follow similar career trajectories. As noted by Raul (52), 
national leader of CONUPIA: 
 
R: The Estación Central cooperative has a history together… Initially, they were small artisans 
selling (their products) almost as ambulant vendors. Then, they set up a point of sale… Now, they 
are a cooperative with a large market and quality products… They set up a shopping 
mall…(which) attracts hundreds of people. 
 
By the same token, they also face four poverty barriers that make the process of scaling-
up occur at an extremely slow pace: lack of legal recognition, low levels of capital endowments, 
lack of organisation, and reduced access to markets. 
 
Subsistence HBEs 
 
HBEs in a subsistence stage work informally with precarious levels of capital, organisa-
tion and market access, and consequently face low profits. These enterprises operate in total 
informality, paying no local or national taxes. Since these HBEs face difficulty in navigating the 
expensive and time-consuming pathway towards obtaining a local permit, and they frequently 
remain in informality. As explained by Daniela (47) a clothing artisan in Santiago Centro: 
 
D: (Obtaining a municipal permit) has been so much paperwork, they send us from here to there… 
(Becoming formal) was a bad economic decision… They think that you like to be illegal, that you 
have time to wait for fifteen days… They could have told us (that the process was so long) and not 
make us invest so much time and money to do all this paperwork.  
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Table 6.10: Typologies of Home-Based Enterprises (Service, Retail and Manufacture) 
Source: Own elaboration 
Features
Degree of informality Totally informal in production 
and selling 
Partially formal production or vending; 
paying local taxes; largely underpaying 
national taxes and not satisfying planning 
regulations
Partially formal production or vending; 
paying local taxes; largely underpaying 
national taxes; satisfying most planning 
regulations
Formal in the production and vending 
of services; paying local and national 
taxes; satisfying most planning 
regulations
Capital endowment
Human capital None or previous work experiencePrevious business experience or informal 
training
Formal skills and/or management 
training
Formal production skills and 
management training; contracting 
other workers for production, sales 
and/or accounting
Physical capital No division between business 
and living space; adapted home 
space to provide services; few 
tools and simple machinery.
No or minimal separation between 
business and living space; several simple 
tools and some more complex machinery
Separated business and living spaces; 
full set of tools and access to the most 
critical more complex machinery
Totally separate business and living 
space; additional location for 
production, sales or storage; full set 
of tools and more complex machinery
Financial capital Family or personal capital Small business savings and access to low-
level, high-interest credit loans
Business savings and access to medium-
interest credit loans
Business savings and access to low-
interest business loans
Organisation
Independent informal worker Independent worker Legal enterpise Legal enterprises; some association 
with a local informal organisation
Market access Direct personal social network 
or street vending
Restricted personal network and high 
competition for neighbourhood market
High exploitation of direct and indirect 
personal social network through mouth 
of word; exploitation of internet; 
competition for municipal market; some 
sales to subcontractors
Strong local reputation for products 
or area; exploitation of indirect social 
network built through brand 
reputation; selling to small, medium 
or large enterprises; competition at 
municipal and regional market
Tax compliance None Local Local and partial national Local and national
Limitation to growth Cost of legality and human 
capital
Market access and human capital Production capacity (space and 
subsidiaries)
Low level of organisation (pooling 
capital and powers of negotiation) 
Stage 4: Socially integratedStage 3: Small enterprisesStage 2: Solo enterprisesStage 1: Subsistence 
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 These HBEs generally have no formal training, but rather only prior work experience. 
Since many HBE owners choose their primary activity based on their own skill set (37.3%), 
these businesses can find themselves locked into nationally declining or highly competitive sec-
tors. A lack of administrative training represents another constraint, as HBEs often under-price 
their products (e.g. not fully including labour and/or input costs) and do not separate household 
from business expenses, risking an erosion of their working capital
4
. Raul (52), a national leader 
of CONUPIA, and Ana (41) owner of a dog grooming shop in Lo Prado, describe these chal-
lenges: 
R: (An HBE) normally consumes its own working capital two or three times over its lifetime. This 
is one of the main reasons that the most precarious HBEs fail: they consume themselves. They 
start a corner store and eat the products (from the shop), regardless of whether they sell or not.  
 
A: Sometimes a client pays 40,000 [USD 64.52] in cash and you (decide to buy) shoes for your 
children, food…and you ask: ‘What did I with the money?’. Then you struggle to buy your inputs.  
 
 Since subsistence HBEs typically have no division between living and production space 
and do not have the recognisable exterior appearance of a business, they can also be difficult to 
identify for clients (see Plate 6.2). Moreover, they have almost no machinery and produce only 
with rudimentary tools, leading to very low productivity. Augusto (55), now the owner of a cor-
ner store, explains his origins: 
 
A: You won’t believe it, (I started) selling soil…that I brought from San Pablo (Street). I used to 
take a small bucket, a hand-pushed cart and my sisters’ stockings, and I would sift earth… I was 
bringing it home to sell it.  
 
 Aligned with Gough and Kellet’s (2001) findings for HBEs in Colombia, and also with 
the other informal sub-sectors in this study, the initial start-up capital of an HBE comes only 
from their limited personal savings and/or credits from family members in similar conditions of 
poverty, and HBE owners have minimal access to micro-credit. Since subsistence HBEs are not 
organised and buy in small quantities, they pay high prices for their inputs. Moreover, their 
market is mostly restricted to their personal network due to a lack of visible street signage, even 
if opportunities can and do arrive periodically, as explained by Antonia (41), owner of a dog 
grooming shop: 
 
A: Six or seven years ago…at my son’s school, they needed chocolates for Father’s Day. That was 
my opportunity… After that, I made plaster figures to be painted… For a long time I was selling in 
the same school. Then I started to extend my network, from teacher to teacher, and to other 
schools nearby. Later on I moved into dog grooming. 
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HBE exterior publicity  
 
Plate 6.2: A garment producer, Ñuñoa.              Plate 6.3: Corner store, Quita Normal.              Plate 6.4: Corner store, Santiago. 
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete.  
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 Due to these barriers to growth, the process of a subsistence HBE to capitalise and build 
a market for its products can take several years. 
 
Self-enterprise HBEs 
 
 At the next stage of development, self-enterprise, the most significant developments 
arise from obtaining local permits and the accumulation of human capital. In this second stage, 
sometimes after years of activity, an HBE obtains a municipal permit to operate. This does not 
necessarily mean that an HBE fully satisfies local and national regulations, however it does 
permit enterprises to open their shops up to the street, granting them full access to their neigh-
bourhood market and passers-by, and also reduces the many risks faced by subsistence HBEs 
such as municipal fines and closure. As Maria (52), a hairdresser in La Granja, comments: 
M: Getting a local permit brought me more security, and made my work more relaxed… Being 
confident that…(the municipality) will not fine you, will not close you down. Otherwise, you have 
to pay attention and close (your shop) if the (municipal) inspector passes by. 
 
 The municipal permit also acts as a certificate of seniority and stability, and is a widely 
accepted document for access to microcredits – although generally at high interest rates – allow-
ing for faster capitalisation. As Ana (48), owner of a fast-food restaurant in La Granja, states:: 
A: I have ideas for growing (my business)…(but) I wasted ten years because I didn’t have any 
documentation… Ten years of experience that could have helped me to go to a bank and say: 
‘Here, you have my documents. I need ten million pesos [USD 16,129]’. But I have only had (the 
municipal permit) for two years... (The bank) says: ‘Your HBE has only existed for two years, 
maybe you’re going to go bankrupt’.  
 
 At this self-enterprise stage, HBEs owners have accumulated business experience and, 
through their own mistakes, learnt how to improve administration and consolidate profits. They 
start to divide their household and business expenses, and fully incorporate production costs 
into the price of their products (e.g. costs of inputs, labour, and a profit margin), allowing them 
to obtain a more stable source of revenue that enhances their saving and investment capacities. 
As Susana (48), a hairdresser from Lo Prado, illustrates: 
S: For years I wasn’t breaking even, never!… But I thought that I was making money… With expe-
rience, you realise: ‘I’m doing badly, I don’t make enough’. You calculate all your inputs, the time 
that you spend, how much you want to make (before deciding on prices).  
 
 Self-enterprise HBEs have not yet fully separated their living and production spaces, 
and with their limited savings they buy the most basic tools one by one and have perhaps a few 
machines, keeping them at a low level of productivity, as described by Nicol (54), a jewellery 
maker in Las Condes: 
N: I started at the most basic level, (producing) in the living room…making the simplest jewellery, 
and I started to sell some… With the profits that I made, I started to buy tools… Tools are very ex-
pensive, but I continued selling stock and buying (tools), selling and buying. Now I make more re-
fined and expensive jewellery. 
 
 
 The major poverty barriers that place inhibitions on growth of HBEs operating as self-
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enterprises are their low skill level and lack of a market. At this level, being trapped in a declin-
ing or highly competitive sector starts to become a significant barrier to capitalise on their grow-
ing production capacity. Even when HBE owners might have identified a market niche to avoid 
low demand, they often lack the skills required to produce the specific higher-quality good or 
service. Augusto (55), owner of a corner store in Lo Prado, and Tomas (49), a public officer for 
EDUS, illustrate this: 
A: (My competitors are) the corner stores in the area… Sometimes you set a price to make a profit, 
and your clients say: ‘but Don Cornelio sells this for 10 pesos [USD 0.02] cheaper’. I tell them to 
go there…but you can’t play too much, otherwise they won’t come back.  
 
T: The majority of micro-entrepreneurs start with what they have, their infrastructure, their 
capital, their experience… There is a lot of competition in particular activities…but few people 
have the skills to produce (more profitable) things… They don’t start the other way around…from a 
market analysis, identifiying the demand and (then) acquiring knowledge. 
 
Small enterprise HBEs 
 
 At the next step of the ideal life cycle, the small enterprise, an HBE has obtained a 
higher level of human capital – generally through municipal training or self-funded courses – 
reducing pressure from competition and raising the standard of their products. Formal training 
in production allows an HBE to move into more profitable activities and increase the quality of 
their product or service, allowing them to build a reputation that expands their market demand. 
With managerial training, an HBE can also at last absorb their full production costs into their 
prices, including the less tangible inputs of electricity, water and rent. Mariela (56), a producer 
of porcelain figurines, describes her development: 
M: I started selling Tupperware, clothes… I made sales, but I thought that porcelain figurines 
would do better, so I took courses in miniature porcelain figurines and management… Now, I 
know that I need to keep some savings, because at some point I’m going to run out of inputs. 
 
 As a result of increased demand and controlled expenditure, HBEs increase their profits 
and savings and can boost their investments to keep up with a slowly expanding market. It is in 
this stage that HBEs incrementally expand their workspace or truly separate their production 
and living spaces, although any house extensions are rarely formalised (see Plates 6.5 and 6.6) 
(for a further discussion on the contribution of HBEs to the consolidation of self-help housing, 
see Gough & Kellett 2001). Moreover, an increase in demand means that more workers are 
hired, both formally and informally, and an HBE makes the shift from being one independent 
worker to becoming an enterprise with legal status. Susana (48), a hairdresser from Lo Prado, 
describes her business growth: 
S: I started working in a corner of my living room, one square metre. Then a space of two square 
metres, and then I built an extension of two by four (metres)...because more people started coming 
and you want to keep growing. So, I needed another hairdresser… I have a neighbour that comes 
to help me.  
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Plate 6.5: Shop extension over house parking space, Cerrillos. 
 
 
 
Plate 6.6: Ground floor corner store, and first floor living space. Cerrillos.  
 
Source: Pablo Navarrete.  
 
 An HBE at this point struggles to expand its productive capacity due to capital barriers. 
A house is one of major assets of a home-based entrepreneur allowing them to significantly re-
duce the permanent cost of running their business (Chen & Sinha 2016). However, the close 
link between a small house size and HBE owners’ background of poverty means that their pro-
ductive expansion meets a swift end as their small houses quickly become saturated by the in-
creasing demand for space to produce, store and/or sell (see Plates 6.7 through 6.9). Alternative 
solutions, such as buying or renting another space, are a high-risk option for many, as any large 
permanent costs could easily offset their profits, jeopardising the survival of the enterprise. At 
this point, many of these HBEs are not willing to make this ‘big leap’ and reach a limit to their 
growth, ultimately rejecting orders. As illustrated by Elisabeth (58), a garment producer in Las 
Condes: 
E: People say: ‘I have the capacity to produce 100 but I sell only ten’… I could produce 100 but I 
only have space for ten… My workshop was too small… I have to reject orders because, where 
can I put 500 T-shirts?… I need to expand somewhere else, but our household can’t pay the rental 
costs. 
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Congested house space: no more space to growth 
 
Plate 6.7: Corner store, ground and first floor commercial space, third floor living space. El Bosque. (left image) 
Plate 6.8: Drinks store, ground floor commercial space, first floor living space. (central image)  
Plate 6.9: Corner store. Two-floor commercial space extension. Quilicura. (right image) 
 
 
 
Sources: Pablo Navarrete.  
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Socially integrated (medium-sized HBEs and cooperatives) 
 
 At the final stage, HBEs have built significant levels of capital and have a well-
established market. They become almost completely formal, paying most applicable national 
and local taxes, and satisfying the majority of planning regulations. The formality of tax pay-
ment means that HBEs can generate invoices, which are fundamental to extend their market by 
selling to larger enterprises. By satisfying the full set of ministry and planning regulations, they 
are not at risk of fines or closure as they become more visible to local and regional authorities. 
Additionally, by moving from a worker to an enterprise tax scheme, their net payment of taxes 
is significantly reduced
5
. As Elisabeth (58) mentioned in another intervention: 
E: Becoming formal has been really helpful, because I have receipts and invoices and I pay taxes 
as (an enterprise)… I can produce for enterprises; I can produce at that level… Inspectors come 
to perform audits once or twice a year, but when they come I have all the receipts and accounting 
books updated.  
 
 HBEs at this stage can expand their production capacity due to their higher financial 
capital availability. Their near-complete incorporation into the formal market and structured 
accounting system qualify them for enterprise bank credits, accessing better credit interest rates 
and increasing their saving capacity. These financial benefits allow HBEs to expand their pro-
duction capacity by acquiring a higher quality and quantity of machinery with which they can 
produce and sell medium- to high-standard products. In order to overcome their space limita-
tions, HBEs rent or buy a small location to produce, store and/or sell, or opt to subcontract other 
producers, which seems to be the case for furniture makers, as Camila (35), a public officer in 
La Granja, highlights: 
C: The furniture makers are quite advanced… They have access to (enterprise) credits, some spe-
cialised machinery… They produce here (in La Granja) and sell (in Franklin, downtown).  
 
 At this point, some HBEs choose to follow an alternative growth path by clustering to-
gether, normally in cooperatives or associations, to pool capital, access large amounts of credit 
and attract the public by becoming a ‘network’ of enterprises. Tomas (49), chief of the EDUS, 
comments: 
T: Some HBEs say: ‘We need space, there are thirty of us and we can’t do it individually’… They 
understand…that they’re in a trap, that they need to pool capital and they need a legal figure, so 
they constitute a cooperative… (For example) the Cooperative Alameda-Maipú…received a credit 
of 5,300 million pesos [USD 8.54 million] and they’ve built a common shopping space. 
 
 
The preceding sections have shown that, like waste-pickers and street vendors, no exist-
ing theory can fully describe the complexity of HBEs, but that a hybrid of theories is needed. 
Dualist and structuralist perspectives account for HBEs that arise out of necessity, as well as the 
expansion of HBE activity in times of economic crisis, whereas voluntarist and neoliberal ar-
guments describe workers that opt out of the formal market when driven by economic opportu-
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nities, as well as the expansion of HBEs during periods of economic growth. Since remaining in 
this informal activity is largely a choice decision for most existing HBEs, this activity has the 
dynamic of a ‘one-way street’, only marginally contracting during times of economic expan-
sion. Second, as structuralists and neoliberals suggest, HBEs connect with the formal economy 
in both backward and forward networks, but also, as dualists propose, a smaller group of HBEs 
is trading within an almost entirely informal network. Another large group of HBEs operate in a 
mixed market, combining both of these approaches. Moreover, HBEs pass through different 
stages of evolution where progression occurs at a very slow pace, mostly due to poverty barriers 
faced by entrepreneurs.  
 
RATIONALE OF SUPPORT POLICIES FOR HOME-BASED ENTERPRISES 
 
 Since the National Congress of Chile passed a law accepting the existence of HBEs in 
any residential area in 2001, some municipalities in Santiago de Chile, such as Santiago Centro 
or Lo Prado, have been slowly incorporating a variety of supportive policies towards HBEs 
aimed at helping people to overcome the aforementioned poverty barriers. The main objective 
of these local policies is to improve social conditions in their local area. Enhancing the econom-
ic efficiency of HBEs – in terms of knowledge, capitalisation, organisation and access to mar-
kets – is regarded as the main policy tool to achieve this aim. 
 
Accelerating the growth of home-based enterprises: economic and social gains 
from supportive policies 
 
A: I am going to tell you my dream… I want to develop my enterprise, but I don’t want things given 
to me. The state asks: ‘What would you like to do?’… We will give you a state credit…and you are 
going to pay it back monthly as it is due. We are going to work beside you, and we’ll tell you why 
you have failed: you did this wrong, let’s try this instead’… I mean, guiding you, because to 
become a big enterprise you need state support… Instead, when you start from the bottom, from 
poverty, the state crushes you… They destroy your enterprise. 
Ana (48), Owner of a fast-food shop, La Granja 
 
 As seen in Chapter 2, in the section ‘Debates on Home-Based Enterprises’, HBEs pro-
vide a large source of employment and income for the most marginalised people in society, alt-
hough many of these businesses are small and have low profitability. Supportive municipalities 
argue that low skill levels, low market penetration and low productivity are not structural condi-
tions, but can rather be overcome through supportive policy packages. For these municipalities, 
working to develop HBEs means advancing their vulnerable and poor local populations socially 
and economically. As explained by Tomas (49), chief of the EDUS: 
 
T: We deal with the most marginal entrepreneurs in our community… This municipality believes 
that we can achieve social inclusion and economic development… We understand that these peo-
ple have made an effort by investing (in their enterprises), so we need to make an effort to support 
them in the creation of new work. 
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 Supportive municipalities emphasise social inclusion as the key goal of their active sup-
port for the activity. In particular, the municipality of Santiago argues that, with the support of 
public policies, HBEs have the potential to be a large source of decent employment for the most 
marginalised local population. Along with this, the development of HBEs is also seen as a tool 
for increasing local economic activity and, in the long run, enhancing local tax revenue, alt-
hough these elements play a secondary objective, as revealed by the emphasis placed by Alberto 
(41) a public officer at the EDUS: 
A: We can increase the efficiency, expand the production and in turn improve the quantity and 
quality of employment, but we need aggressive policies of support… We focus on increasing the ef-
ficiency of home-based enterprises…because they have a large impact on employment and income 
for individuals and the municipality. 
 
 Through their repeated interaction with micro-entrepreneurs, supportive municipalities 
have recognised the slow evolutionary path of HBEs described in the previous section, and 
perceive a variety of poverty barriers as its main cause. These municipalities then argue that 
policies targeted at increasing the productivity of HBEs can radically accelerate the process of 
scaling up, moving them from subsistence entrepreneurs to socially-integrated businesses, 
sometimes as part of a cooperative. As Nicolas (56), a public officer at the DIDLP, and Tomas 
(49), head of the EUDS, explain: 
N: For many municipalities, giving a ‘permiso social’ [local HBE permit] to one person in a 
precarious condition is a dead end for the entrepreneur... We are convinced that it is rather a 
starting point, that with municipal support, they can become proper enterprises in the near 
future… These guys are climbing a ladder, where they can acquire capital and knowledge, and 
(increasingly) understand the market. 
 
T: The municipality can play a role in the evolution (of HBEs)… For instance, reducing the cost of 
credits or improving the technology of microenterprises would help them to grow… These are the 
kinds of policies that we try to implement… We promote the association of enterprises…that can 
purchase together, attract clients (to a neighbourhood) or make larger investments. 
 
 
 In line with the discussion of other sub-sectors in this study, the main tool for achieving 
social objectives is increasing the productivity of HBEs, leading to improvements of incomes 
and working conditions for their marginalised owners, with supportive policies adapted to the 
poverty barriers of HBEs at specific stages (see Table 6.9). Carlos (50), head of the DIDLP, de-
scribes their strategy: 
 
C: This municipality is different from others. This entrepreneurship unit, although it has social ob-
jectives, doesn’t support HBEs with social aid. It aims to increase their productive value… We 
have information and with (our knowledge), we can help HBEs to read markets…(to identify) 
which markets are expanding and which are declining, provide training to keep skills updated in 
growing sectors or help movement into expanding markets… More advanced HBEs need different 
types of support, like technology or financial resources for expansion… Those that are at the final 
stage, we help to create networks, for instance the cluster of car repair businesses in Neptuno 
Street. 
 
 For supportive municipalities like Lo Prado, formalisation will occur naturally as HBEs 
grow, and acts as a trade-off to access further municipal support. From a municipal perspective, 
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formalisation is a rational choice weighting the costs of legality (payments and time spent on 
paperwork) against the costs of policing (fines and decommissions). At a subsistence level, the 
cost of legality is higher than policing costs, but as an HBE expands and becomes more visible 
to inspectors and police controls, legalising eventually becomes the rational choice. When a 
municipality fosters HBE growth along with lowering these different costs of legality, most 
HBEs rapidly follow the path towards formalisation. In the words of Carlos (50), head of the 
DIDLP: 
 
C: If the benefit of formalising is higher than the cost, you will formalise… If you are making less 
money than the cost of the local permit, the cost of time to do the paperwork…you won’t formal-
ise… We settled at a low threshold for the first step of formalisation… The (cheapest) permit costs 
2,000 [USD 3.23] per month, and we guarantee that if the police come to check the business, there 
won’t be any problems. But it is a limited permit that only lets you sell a few things. There are oth-
er (more expensive) permits that allow you to sell more diverse types of goods. 
 
 Although the municipality of Lo Prado support HBEs regardless of whether they do or 
do not have a local permit, they are required to start the process of formalisation to receive their 
initial help, and eventually to fully formalise to access continued support. In this way, support-
ive municipalities hope to bring informal enterprises under the rule of law through a new ap-
proach – providing positive incentives to formalise – rather than the more common municipal 
technique of increasing the cost of informality through repression. Nicolas (56), a public officer 
at the DIDLP, explains: 
 
N: We think that formalisation occurs when you give them opportunities… Informal entrepreneurs 
(have) a profitable enterprise (but) are still not ready to formalise. So, we provide a range of sup-
port to help them to improve their returns and formalise… We provide benefits to both formal and 
informal (businesses), but formalising in the short to medium term….is a key requirement for ac-
cessing further support. 
 
 
This supportive approach fundamentally assumes the value of using ‘carrot’ rather than 
‘stick’ policies to promote formalisation, and recognises that there is no inherent structural issue 
within HBEs that leads to a lack of productivity. 
 
Supportive policies: capital, organisation and market access 
 
In practice, supportive municipalities implement a variety of policies that can be 
classified in three categories: capital endowment, market access and organisation. This section 
provides a detailed account of the types of supportive policies implemented in Santiago Centro 
and Lo Prado, along with their corresponding expected impacts, with a graphic summary 
provided in Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3: Supportive Policies Towards Home-Based Enterprises  
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Capital endowment policies: increasing human, physical and financial capital 
 
 Supportive municipalities help HBE owners to increase their capital endowments in 
three areas: human, physical and financial capital. As explained above, a low level of human 
capital becomes a major poverty barrier as HBEs become locked in saturated markets, unable to 
upgrade their production techniques and/or finding their existing capital eroding. Municipalities 
such as Santiago Centro and Lo Prado have introduced basic productive skills training pro-
grammes to help HBEs overcome these prohibitive issues. Thomas (55), a public officer in San-
tiago, explains: 
T: I tell them that if they want to to earn around (USD) $700 profit you need to sell around $3000. 
So, they start considering markets they can do this in… Also, this unit establishes partnerships 
with universities, institutes, NGOs to provide training programmes...in marketing, e-marketing, 
technical skills that help them to make this move.  
 
 
 Moreover, administrative training has been provided to help HBEs with separating 
household and business expenses, managing income streams, and coping with the new tax and 
legal responsibilities that come with the increasing formalisation of their businesses. Nicolas 
(56), a public officer at the DIDLP, expands: 
N: (We) help them to obtain a municipal permit, show them how to register in the SII [National 
Tax Service], how to deal with SEREMI [Regional Ministry Secretary] permits… All of the legal 
aspects that help them move towards formality… We also provide courses of business management 
(and) pricing. 
 
 
 Like supportive waste-picker and street vendor municipalities, Santiago Centro and Lo 
Prado also aid in the acquisition of physical capital. Alongside financial support for the pur-
chase of necessary inputs and raw materials to create a good or service, Santiago and Lo Prado 
also provide small funds of between 250,000 (USD 403.20) and 500,000 (USD 806.50) pesos 
for the purchase of tools and machinery. These are assigned on a competitive basis to the most 
promising HBE initiatives. Claudia (61), a hairdresser in Lo Prado, received this funding: 
C: With the 500,000 pesos…I bought the Climason [upright hairdryer], the vaporiser, some spe-
cialised scissors, the heated table… I got many things that have helped me to improve my hair sa-
lon. 
 
 Santiago Centro municipality also provides a limited number of larger funds to help to 
assist with expanding and improving infrastructure and the working space of HBEs. Seventy 
funds of up to two million pesos (USD 3,225.80) are provided to the most successful HBEs that 
face an urgent demand for more space, so long as they follow a path of steady growth towards 
formalisation. Nevertheless, as Tomas (49), chief of the EDUS, recognises, these funds run 
short of the demand that they face: 
T: ‘Impulsa Santiago’ gives on average 1 to 1.2 million pesos [USD 1,612.90-1,935.50]. But this 
is small compared with demand. In total, we distribute 70 million per year… People often propose 
house extensions or renovations to increase selling space or expand their production capacity. 
 
 Supportive municipalities are also helping HBEs with applications for national funds 
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and the issuing of zero-interest credits. FOSIS (Solidarity and Social Investment Fund) is a 
competitive central state fund which grants up to 250,000 pesos (USD 403.23) per enterprise 
with the aim of increasing HBEs’ physical and human capital. Moreover, SERCOTEC (Tech-
nical Cooperation Service) and CORFO (Corporation for Production Development) provide 
competition-based investment funds of up to 30 million pesos (USD 48,387.10). Since applica-
tions for these funds are complex for those with low education levels, and the evaluation pro-
cess is based on quality of projects, Santiago Centro and Lo Prado provide technical assistance 
for the preparation of HBE applications. Alberto (41), a public officer at the EDUS, expands: 
T: We have four people who work with obtaining (central government) resources for HBEs. Like 
fundraising, but by public institutions… We have had good results… In the last three months we 
have obtained around 130 million [USD 209,677.41]. 
 
 Santiago Centro municipality has created an innovative ‘zero-interest credits’ pro-
gramme. In Chile, the high interest rate of most microcredits – ranging from 29 to 40% – re-
stricts credit options to only a small percentage of very highly profitable HBEs. To facilitate 
access to credit, Santiago Centro has created a programme that subsidises the total interest cost 
from credits, while the remaining capital cost is repaid by the HBE owner. As noted by Tomas 
(49), chief of the EDUS: 
T: One of the barriers to growth (for HBEs) is the cost of access to (financial) capital… We think 
that a policy that reduces the cost of access to finance can boost micro-enterprise productivity , 
having an impact in job creation and incomes… We say: ‘You need five million pesos [USD 
8,064.52], so go to the bank’… Instead of giving them (capital)…we cover the interest rate cost, 
which is one million… What do we get from this? For every million (that we spend), HBEs invests 
five million in their enterprises. 
 
Market access policies 
 
 Supportive municipalities attempt to help HBEs to grow beyond their dependency on a 
low-income, localised market by facilitating access to e-markets, product fairs, street markets 
and commercialisation hubs. The municipality of Santiago Centro provides training in the use of 
social network platforms, e-commerce, website design and internet payment methods to expand 
the spatial market of HBEs. Moreover, Lo Prado municipality has created an e-platform – with 
high search engine visibility – that contains all the relevant contact information of HBEs, mak-
ing HBE-based products and services easy to locate. This was very positive for Mariela (56), a 
producer of porcelain figurines in Lo Prado, and Rosa (34), a balloon decorator in Santiago 
Centro: 
M: In the municipality there is a website…where they show our work… I have had people coming 
from other municipalities… I have got a lot of people.  
 
R: The recent training in website design was a good contribution… I have built my client base 
thanks to (online) social networks and the internet…on Google, Facebook.  
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These two municipalities promote also HBE participation in product fairs, with two 
objectives: primarily, to promote products from HBEs to new clients, and secondarily, to boost 
HBE profits over periods of high demand, such as the Christmas period or Chilean 
Independence Day. As articulated by Tomas (55), head of the EDUS: 
T: (This) is less strategic but helps them to expand their sales and to find new clients… (During) 
fairs for ‘El Dieciocho’ [Chilean Independence Day] or Christmas…we call the HBEs to display 
and sell their products. Same for the sales nights. 
 
Plate 6.10: Micro-Entrepreneur Fairs in Lo Prado 
 
 
This plate, “Micro-Entrepreneur Fairs in Lo Prado”,  has been removed as the copy-
right is owned by another organization. 
 
 
Source: Fair of Lo Prado, 2015 
 
 On a more regular basis, the municipality of Lo Prado grants HBEs with vending per-
mits for street markets, giving them the same rights as a feriante (see Chapter 5); HBEs then 
have access to a selling point with a location that rotates around various municipal neighbour-
hoods. As affirmed by Nicolas (56), a public officer at the DIDLP: 
N: HBEs working in production can get permits to sell in the street market… They can sell more, 
they can develop their ideas, their products. 
 
 
 Lo Prado has also built a ‘productive centre’ (a commercial building that gathers HBEs 
together) that, for a low monthly rental cost, provides 200 micro-enterprises with a brand office 
to work and sell. To access this centre, HBEs must have a valid local permit and complete an 
application. When a space becomes available, HBEs are selected on a first-come, first-served 
basis. As described by Carlos (55), Chief of the DIDLP: 
A: The Neptuno hub…is a production, commercial and service centre… (There are) commercial 
activities…(such as) hairdressers, small restaurants…and production activities such as leather 
production, a lot of furniture manufacturing… (It is a) municipal property rented through a (low-
cost) usage permit…in a strategic location in front of an underground station. 
  
Collective organisation 
 
 In Chile and across the world, HBEs constitute one of the least organised informal sub-
sectors (Chen & Sinha 2016; WIEGO 2014b). The isolation of housing space and the diversity 
of activities undertaken by HBEs makes it difficult for these entrepreneurs to meet and identify 
common problems, and thus form professional connections. In my survey, only 7.6% of HBEs 
belong to a union. This lack of organisation ultimately limits an HBE’s capacity to pool invest-
ment and negotiate with large producers/sellers. In response to this, Santiago Centro and Lo 
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Prado municipalities have created ‘entrepreneur centres’ where business leaders can meet, dis-
cuss issues, organise and receive support. Furthermore, these municipalities promote network-
ing between HBEs working in similar activities at a neighbourhood level, in order to create lo-
calised clusters of specialised businesses to attract clients from outside their immediate neigh-
bourhood and to allow producers to jointly negotiate with large enterprises. As stated by Carlos 
(50), head of the DIDLP: 
 
C: In Neptuno Street, we are trying to make a cluster of mechanics that is becoming a mini ‘10 de 
Julio’ [a street specialising in car services]… It is very important (for local development) because 
it generates employment, attracts money from other municipalities and keeps money inside the 
municipality… But we also want to create several specialised neighbourhoods that can attract 
people and provide services for those outside of the (municipal) area.  
 
 Additionally, Santiago Centro promotes the creation of HBE cooperatives, allowing 
businesses to expand their capacity to invest in infrastructure, attract clients and negotiate pric-
es. According to Tomas (49), chief of the EDUS: 
 
T: We understand that associations are part of the HBE growth equation. This is why we foster 
cooperatives… We have a group of consolidated HBEs in the graphic design industry in San 
Francisco Street…(who) have a technical-economic problem… Their land price is increasing and 
this is reducing their profitability… They are a group of 30, and…they need to act collectively, so 
they constitute a cooperative to invest together… We are going to support them with their business 
plan, with infrastructure, marketing, because it means they can develop over the next twenty 
years…(and) because it will generate fifty to seventy jobs… 
  
 
Incremental and iterative policy design: maximising efficiency through agreements 
 
The design and implementation of supportive policies for HBEs occurs in an 
incremental way, as with those of the other two sub-sectors, where policies are adapted to 
concerns raised by HBE owners. Santiago Centro and Lo Prado have migrated from 
administrating national social aid programmes for HBEs through municipal departments, to 
designing a strategy of social development by concentrating local human and economic 
resources available to HBEs in specialised economic development units. As explained by Tomas 
(49), head of the EDUS: 
T: We understand this as a space for social development… We have created the Entrepreneur 
Development Unit that concentrates all of our entrepreneurship services. It has 23 employees, six 
of whom are economists… We have a clear political leadership and the technical capacities to 
smooth the process of micro-enterprise growth. 
 
 
The creation of supportive policies is guided by the constant feedback that 
administrative and in-the-field officers receive from HBE owners, helping them to evaluate 
results and modify policies accordingly. As Alberto (41), a public officer at the EDUS, 
expressed: 
214 
 
A: I think that our municipality is in a constant stage of understanding and exploration of what 
works and what the problems are… We have people working in the field, in different 
neighborhoods working with HBEs… We have a constant dialogue that helps us to make 
decisions about incorporating new programmes, or refocusing resources when things don’t work.  
 
 
POLICY IMPACT OF SUPPORTIVE POLICIES: EVALUATION 
 
 As described in Chapter 3, a stratified random sample of 406 HBEs was selected from a 
total of 30,039 HBEs registered across 35 municipalities in Santiago de Chile. As with waste-
pickers and street vendors, OLS models were built to disentangle the impacts of existing poli-
cies on twelve HBE performance indicators – based on economic factors, social factors, work-
ing conditions and negative externalities – drawn from the literature (Table A.8.1 in Annex 8). 
In this section, four main indicators are discussed, whereas further discussion on complemen-
tary performance indicators can be found in Annex 8. Explanatory variables are represented by 
twenty policy variables currently implemented in Santiago de Chile (the main ones having been 
presented in the previous section), controlled by fifteen control variables representing four ele-
ments: socio-demographic (six control variables), enterprise characteristics (three control varia-
bles), spatial proximity (three control variables) and municipal characteristics (three control var-
iables) (see Table A.8.2 in Annex 8). Linear multiple regression models are applied for continu-
ous response variables, while binary response variables are analysed through logistic binary re-
gressions following Equation 1. This section only reports variables that are statistically signifi-
cant by a factor of at least 10% when accounting for all control variables. 
  
 The results of regression models are summarised in Table 6.11. Models 1.a reports the 
impact of policies on economic outcomes; Model 2.a reports the impact of policies on social 
outcomes; Models 3.b assesses the impact of policies on outcomes for working conditions; and 
Models 4.a analyses the impact of policies on the reduction of negative externalities for HBEs. 
For transparency, full models are presented in Tables A.8.4 through A.8.6 in Annex 8. As with 
Chapter 4 and 5, qualitative analyses is used to complement the quantitative analysis through 
quotes taken from group discussions and interviews. 
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Table 6.11: Summary of the Impacts of Municipal Policies on the Performance of Home-Based Enterprises  
 
 
Respose Variable Positively Impacting Policy Negatively Impacting Policy Magnitude SE Type of policy Overall Impact (a) 
1. Economic Efficiency 
Indicator 1.a: Branch office    2,473** -1,192 Access to markets A 
Earnings per hour 
worked 
Advanced machinery   861.0* -492.9 Physical Capital A 
Diversity of accepted payments 459.6*** -111.1 Access to markets B 
  Private parking  -1,183*** -435.8 Physical Capital C 
2. Social Equity 
Indicator 2.a: Branch office    3.336** -1.33 Access to markets A 
Income relative to 
poverty line 
Diversity of accepted payments 0.407* -0.209 Access to markets B 
  Contacting clients -2.310** -0.993 Access to markets C 
3. Quality of work 
Indicator 3.a:             Branch office    -10.74** -4.37E+00 Access to markets A 
Number of hours 
worked in a week 
  Access to credit 6.561** -2.95E+00 Financial Capital B 
  Tranning support 7.285** -3.58E+00 Human Capital B 
  Contacting clients 15.38* -9.12E+00 Access to markets C 
  Non motorised 13.11* -6.85E+00 Physical Capital B 
4. Negative Externalities 
Indicator 4.a: Other type of storage Space   -2.755*** -0.925 Physical Capital A 
Child work (b) 
Contacting providers    -2.191** -0.914 Access to markets   
  Harrasment policy 0.162** -0.0781 Regulation B 
  Precarious selling space 1.265** -0.635 Physical Capital B 
Notes: 
a) Overall Impact A denotes municipal policies that have only a positive impact across indicators; B refers to municipal policies that have both positive and negative impacts across 
indicators; C denotes policies that have only negative impacts across indicators. 
  b) Where 1 signifies 'I never go with my child/chidren to collect waste' and 6 signifies 'I always go with my child/children to collect waste' 
  c) Where 1 signifies 'I always clean up after collecting/sorting waste' and 6 signifies 'I never clean up after collecting/sorting waste' 
  c) Level of formality is measured as the number of legal regulations that they accomplish with a maximum of five 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses         
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HBE productivity: earnings per hour worked (indicator 1.a) 
 The data suggest that higher levels of municipal policy support lead to an increase in 
indicator 1.a. The provision of advanced machinery increases earnings by CLP 861 (USD 1.69) 
per hour, the creation of branch offices by CLP 2,473 (USD 4.84) per hour, and promoting a 
diversity of payments methods by CLP 459 (USD 0.90) per hour. 
 
 Providing more advanced machinery increases the production capacity of a business and 
allows them to incorporate new varieties of products to be offered. Moreover, some small ma-
chinery can expand the market of HBEs by allowing them to deliver home services. As noted by 
Silvia (40), a chiropodist in Santiago: 
S: I received a Seed Capital [local investment programme]… With that I bought input and ma-
chinery that has helped me to earn more… Everyone used to ask me if I do epilation, and I had to 
say no, because I didn’t have a wax pot. I bought a large and small pot… With the small one, I can 
take it with me and do services at home. So, that is a big change.  
 
 The promotion of branch offices in a new location allows HBEs to source new consum-
ers outside their neighbourhoods, thus expanding their sales. This corroborates the research of 
Esson et al. (2016) in Ghana showing that, when given the possibility, many entrepreneurs pre-
fer to set up their businesses in more central and wealthy locations. As described by Ana (40), 
owner of a dog grooming shop in Lo Prado: 
A: I set up another branch employing three people. I have it in Independencia municipality… (I 
earn more) because I can work with a different class of clients, I’m expanding my client base.  
 
 By expanding from cash to other payment methods, particularly electronic payments 
(debit or credit cards) customers are able to make purchases beyond their immediate cash avail-
ability in an HBE. However, the high commissions taken by banking services can compromise 
the higher productivity, and stops this technology from spreading across a larger number of 
HBEs. Claudia (36), a sea salt producer in Santiago Centro, explains: 
C: (I accept debit card payments) and it is great… Everybody carries debit and credit cards to 
make payments – otherwise, they have to go to withdraw money and you never see them again… 
But you have to pay (for the service), and it’s expensive… The VAT, because I have to file a re-
ceipt, plus the 3% (in bank fees), and 22% when it’s with a credit card… You’re selling your soul 
to the devil. 
 
 
 On the contrary, the existence of a private parking space for clients reduces the produc-
tivity of HBEs by CLP 1,183 (USD 2.32). In the small plots where these enterprises operate, a 
parking area is not necessarily the most suitable use of this space as it takes up space for the 
more profitable activities of production or selling. As Gabriela (48), a hairdresser from La Gran-
ja, illustrates: 
G: I used to have a parking space that clients could use… I have people that come from other 
(municipalities)… But the majority of people come from the neighbouring area. Let’s say that the 
neighbours make up 80% and the rest come from other places. So, this space is more useful as 
part of my shop, and people can park on the street.  
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 Poverty reduction: Household income per capita relative to the minimum wage (indica-
tor 2.a) 
 
 The data analysis suggests that similar policies that enhance HBE productivity (indica-
tor 1.a) can also effectively reduce poverty
6
. Providing branch offices increases household in-
comes by over three times the monthly minimum wage, and diversifying payment methods sees 
an increase by two-fifths of the minimum wage, being effective means of moving families out 
of poverty. The previously established increases in productivity from these types of supportive 
policies will naturally deliver significant reductions in poverty levels, with the same mecha-
nisms at play as for indicator 1.a. 
 
In contrast, the data show that a municipality providing support for client contact seems 
to result in an increase in poverty levels. Although this relationship is statistically significant, it 
must be carefully interpreted, particularly as the qualitative data do not provide further evidence 
for a plausible mechanism explaining the observed negative results. This quantitative 
methodology does not allow for the elimination of the issue of reverse causality: it is quite 
possible that the less productive enterprises and more vulnerable households self-select for 
client contact programmes, thus explaining the observed poverty outcomes. 
 
 
Working week: Number of hours worked per week (indicator 3.a) 
 
 An extensive working week can be reduced by 1.76 hours per week through the creation 
of other workplace branches. By geographically separating their work and home spaces, it be-
comes easier for home-based owners to put a definite endtime to their workday, rather than con-
tinuing to work for every new client request. Ana (41), a dog groomer, and Susana (48), a hair-
dresser, both from Lo Prado, illustrate this through contrasting personal experiences: 
A: I have my business close to home… I finish at the shop and then I go to my home so I can dis-
connect myself. The freedom that you have as a micro-entrepreneur is that you work when you 
want. I earn enough, so to me it is not a priority…to open every day. 
S: In the past ten years I have been working all the time from morning until evening. Clients knock 
on the door and say: ‘Hello!’, even at midnight. On New Year’s Eve I was finishing at five past 
midnight.  
 
 
 However, policies that facilitate access to credits extend the working week by 6.6 hours, 
those that offer training support by 7.3 hours, creating client contacts by 15.4 hours and the use 
of non-motorised vehicles by 13.1 hours. Although access to credits allows HBEs to enhance 
their capital endowments, owners can face long workdays due to the necessity of repaying the 
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credit, particularly for high-interest loans. As Raul (52), a national leader of CONUPIA, ex-
plains: 
R: The impact of a credit is not always positive…because if the interest rate is too high, often the 
micro-enterprises need to start working more just to pay the interest. If I receive one million [USD 
1,612.90] and I have to pay back two million [USD 3,225.80], I end up working more just to pay 
back the interest.  
 
 Training programmes, particularly those in administrative or IT skills, create an extra 
activity that requires dedicated time. The process of building clients, designing online advertis-
ing or keeping accounting records in turn increases workday length, as discovered by Rosa (34), 
a balloon decorator: 
R: (Due to) the website design course…I save the cost of paying someone to make my website… 
Now I don’t need anyone. I upload the picture, I enlarge, I reduce. However, I spend hours making 
them how I want. 
 
 Although HBEs save on transport time by combining their work and home spaces, they 
still travel to purchase products (Gough et al. 2016, p.185). In this sense, the use of non-
motorised vehicles increases workday length, as transport times become longer when compared 
to public transport. Non-motorised transport is not preferable due to its efficiency, but rather 
due to being a means by which poor households can save on transport costs and carry large 
loads not accepted on public transport (Dávila & Daste 2012, p.7). Rodrigo (55), now the owner 
of a corner of a corner store, describes: 
R: I used to sell soil… I used to take a small bucket, a hand-pushed cart and my sisters’ 
stockings...and I would sift earth… It was far, but I didn’t take a bus, because I didn’t have the 
means to pay for it. 
 
Finally, the positive association between the municipality facilitating client contacts and 
an extensive HBE workday length needs to be interpreted carefully, as again qualitative data do 
not provide evidence for a plausible mechanism explaining these results. Once, it is quite 
possible that the more vulnerable households that tend to work more hours to sustain their 
families self-select into the programme. 
 
Child Labour: Perception of Children Performing Sales or Production in an HBE (indi-
cator 4.a) 
 
 Child labour reduces with an enterprise being more visible, the integration of special-
ised storage spaces and the promotion of a more stable network of suppliers. In Santiago de 
Chile, it seems that the majority of child labour does not factor in as a fundamental part of the 
HBE workplace, but rather is the result of a parent trying to keep their children occupied while 
they work by delegating soft tasks such as shop minding, moving products or going out to buy 
inputs. For Mariela (56), a porcelain figurine maker of Lo Prado, this has in fact had a rather 
positive impact: 
M: This is a beautiful job… My son grew up making (porcelain) leaves and flowers, and my 
daughter did, too. When they had finished their homework, they became bored, so they came to the 
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table (to make porcelain figures) and we talked for hours. This work is very gratifying because I 
didn’t miss out on seeing them grow up. We grew close, working together. 
  
 
 A specialised storage space in the shop or atelier reduces child labour simply because 
products are already located in the workplace, and so parents do not need to send children out to 
collect them. As explained by Maria (52), a hairdresser from La Granja: 
M: I started working in my living room… Everyone got involved … (My children) were helping me 
with small things, bringing things that I needed – shampoo, a hairdryer… You can’t give them 
your time…so you have to give them something to do… (Now) I have my salon (with everything in-
side), so my kids can stay at home, watching TV, playing.  
 
 Similarly, child labour is reduced through policies that help HBEs to build a network of 
providers that deliver products on a regular basis, as this reduces the need of a parent to send 
children away or to accompany parents with purchases. Raul (52), a leader of CONUPIA, com-
ments: 
R: There is child labour…in the purchasing of products and distribution, in a few cases…because 
the child is like an obligatory helper… When you need something but you cannot leave the shop… 
But, I don’t know of any cases where children work and stop going to school.  
 
 Along similar lines, the lack of a specialised vending space means that the home living 
area is mixed with the business, thus increasing the presence of children at work. Susana (48), a 
hairdresser in Lo Prado, gives an example: 
S: Our work is personalised – you have to stay with the clients. So I am in my shop and I look 
through the window to my son, doing his homework.  
 
 Harassment from police or municipal inspectors can result in increased levels of child 
labour, as HBEs attempt to become less visible and tend not to expand into specialised spaces to 
avoid the risk of controls and fines. This results in a closer environment between family and 
work activities, thus creating more opportunities for child labour. In the words of Ana (48), a 
fast-food restaurant owner in La Granja: 
A: I’m not growing (my business) any more because it’s too risky… I’ve gone fifty thousand times 
to get a local permit, but they don’t want to give me one… They came to inspect me and made me 
close… I go to Santiago Centro and I see that the shops are all dirty, and mine looks like a mir-
ror…(but) they are open and I’m not… So, I have to keep working inside my home, in secret. I was 
thinking about expanding and baking bread, but I wouldn’t go through that process again. 
 
 
A combination of supportive policies is required to increase the productivity and work-
ing condition of HBEs. The most important municipal policies seem to be those aimed at in-
creasing HBEs’ access to markets and then their capitalisation, allowing for broadening the po-
tential client base for entrepreneurs through new branch offices and diversifying payment alter-
natives, to then augment their capacity to meet demand through more advances tools and ma-
chinery, and a larger production space.   
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FINAL BARRIERS TO HOME-BASED ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT AND 
THE ROAD AHEAD 
 
The final barriers: spatial poverty traps, gender inequality, and exploitative 
formal-informal integration 
 
Area-restricted markets 
 
 As with the other two sub-sectors, the success and profitability of HBEs is, to a large 
extent, determined not only by the policy environment in which they operate, but also by the 
socio-economic characteristics associated with their spatial location. Indeed, as many as 85.4% 
of HBE products and services are sold to clients within their municipal area. Since housing 
prices positively correlate with a better business location, and most self-entrepreneurs come 
from a background of poverty, their houses and thus their businesses are located in low-income 
municipalities. This limits the profitability of HBEs in two ways. First, since there is more pres-
sure to generate a survival-level income in poorer neighbourhoods, HBEs face high competi-
tion. Raul (52), a leader of CONUPIA, and Susana (48), owner of hairdressing salon, explain: 
 
R: Micro-enterprises are normally limited to the market of their own neighbourhood… The prob-
lem in the (low-income neighbourhoods) is that the market starts to subdivide (over time)… If five 
micro-entrepreneurs appear, the market divides into fifths. 
S: I always have competition and it affects me a lot, because people prefer lower prices. I charge 
3,000 pesos [USD 4.84]…she charged 1,000 [USD 1.61]… There is a big difference… I used to 
work with my sister, and we went broke, and I stayed here alone.  
 
 
 The second problem that emerges is the low purchasing power of the surrounding 
neighbourhoods of HBEs, meaning that HBEs must set their prices lower than what they could 
potentially achieve in higher-income neighbourhoods. As Ana (41), owner of a dog grooming 
shop, explains:  
A: (I have to set my prices) depending on the (income of the) market area… In my case I don’t 
have too much competition. I made sure that no hairdressers were close by… Even though I am 
well trained, I can’t ask for 15,000 or 20,000 pesos [USD 24.90-32.26], since that’s what they 
charge in Las Condes [a wealthy area] for the same job. Here, no one will pay that much. 
 
 
 This concentration of HBEs in poor areas of high competition and low demand ulti-
mately has negative consequences on their profits. For instance, the poorest municipality of 
Santiago de Chile, La Pintana, concentrates three times more HBEs than the richest, Las Con-
des, but the average income is six times lower. This further triangulates with the regression re-
sults, where municipal inhabitant income per capita stands out as a significant determinant of an 
HBE’s productivity (see indicator 1, Table A.8.4 in Annex 8). Therefore, the impact of support-
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ive municipal policies is limited by their jurisdictional area of administration, and is not able to 
help HBEs in exploiting more profitable extra-municipal markets. 
 
The triple burden of gender in entrepreneurship  
 
 Supportive municipal policies appear to do little to solve gender income inequalities that 
exist among HBEs. Men earn almost double the amount that women do in HBEs, and current 
local policies fail to address three structural sources of gender inequality. First, following from 
conventional understandings of the ‘feminisation of poverty’ (Chant, 2014), poverty dispropor-
tionally affects women, meaning that women face higher poverty constraints – lower levels of 
human capital, capitalisation, market access and organisation – inhibiting their enterprise devel-
opment when compared with their male counterparts. As noted by Tomas (49), chief of the 
EDUS: 
 
T: A male entrepreneur normally has the capital. For instance, in housing and property… In 
Chile, financial capital…is basically all in the hands of men… It’s unbelievable that today the 
evaluation for any kind of support for micro-enterprises is the same for male and female entrepre-
neurs. It shouldn’t be the same, they don’t face the same constraints. 
 
 Second, traditional gender roles see that women are disproportionally assigned the task 
of child-rearing, thus having less and lower-quality time to develop productive activities when 
compared with men, in turn resulting in less productivity per hour and lower monthly incomes. 
As Mariana (41), a chocolatier, comments: 
 
M: It is very difficult to make my own timetable, because my son gets home from school and says: 
‘Ah! I’m hungry’. The other day, my daughter came and told me: ‘I got four (out of seven on a 
test) because you didn’t study with me , you were making chocolates’… The dishes then pile up… 
This is a big disadvantage for me. Either I make chocolates or I take care of the house. 
 
 
 Third, gender role stereotypes once again mean that women tend to be concentrated in 
less productive activities within less productive sectors, while the more productive activities 
contain a higher percentage of men. For instance, the manufacturing sector contains 11.3% more 
women than men. However, the services sector concentrates 8.1% more men than women, and 
within the service sector, women are more highly concentrated in hairdressing (one man for 
three women) rather than vehicle repair (twelve men for each woman). As Raul (52), a leader of 
CONUPIA, explains: 
 
R: (An HBE’s sector) is mainly based on the person’s skill set… This is why women are concen-
trated mainly in food and garment production… These are the two big activities that women do at 
home. 
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 Current supportive municipal policies thus do little to correct the observed gender ine-
quality among HBE owners. This is partially the result of minimal integration of a gendered 
policy approach to supportive municipal policy, but more fundamentally, it appears to be 
grounded in a structural problem rooted in gendered role stereotypes and the historical exclusion 
of women from capital that may prove difficult to transform from the local level. 
 
Exploitation through vertical integration with the formal economy 
 
 The vertical integration of the formal over the informal economy seems to be outside 
the sphere of influence of local supportive policies. As described earlier (see section ‘Vertical 
integration in backwards and/or forwards networks’), for the relatively small group of HBEs 
that engage in forward connections with the formal economy, large formal enterprises enjoy 
unequal power to set price standards and payment conditions over the smaller businesses. Simi-
larly, informal enterprises engaged in backward networks face high competition from large re-
tail enterprises that, given the large scale of their purchases, are able to buy and sell products at 
lower prices. As a result, these HBEs have a very limited space-time market, capturing profits 
based on proximity to consumers, or by being open at times when large retail stores are closed. 
As large retail expands into new spaces, with stores extending their opening times, the market of 
HBEs is rapidly shrinking. As illustrated by Raul (52), a national leader of CONUPIA: 
 
R: It is horrible for corner stores when a supermarket opens a branch in their neighbourhood. And 
this is becoming more common. They can’t compete because of the volumes (of purchase)… 
(HBEs) sell in poorer urban areas at higher prices than supermarkets.  
 
 
 In both cases, municipal policy is ill suited to support the growth of HBEs that are verti-
cally integrated with the formal economy. In the case of forward integration, the municipal level 
does not have the power to change contract regulations or intervene in private negotiations, thus 
having little margin for manoeuvring. For backward integration, municipalities in Chile cannot 
pass planning regulation to restrict the establishment of large-scale retail or to regulate its oper-
ating hours. 
 
Overcoming barriers to the growth of HBEs 
 
Overcoming area-restricted markets 
 
Two alternative policies could be introduced to break the spatial trap of HBEs in low 
demand/high competition poor neighbourhoods, though both of these alternatives lie beyond the 
scope of municipal policy. First, national and regional policies promoting mixed-income hous-
ing developments have potential to be part of the solution, as they bring poor households into 
223 
 
upper income areas and vice versa, facilitating the access of businesses of the poor to better-off 
clients. This is articulated by Nicolas (56), a DIDLP public officer: 
 
N: I think one of the problems is that this city is too socially segregated… In the poor neighbour-
hoods there are too many micro-enterprises but too few clients… We need a different pattern of 
city, of housing development – more mixed… Micro-enterprises would have less competition 
and/or would have access to people with higher purchasing power. 
 
Alternatively, regional policies could promote the clustering of HBEs into specialised 
marketplaces that attract better-off clients. Creating a cluster of HBEs in a shopping centre, 
where HBE producers or traders sell directly to their clients on a regional scale, seems to be a 
plausible solution. As seen in the first section, producers selling directly into the informal mar-
ket obtain higher prices per unit sold than those selling goods into the formal market, however 
they risk facing a lower demand for their products. Clusters of HBEs in a geographical area can 
create a regional reputation for quality products, in turn attracting clients and compensating for 
the lower demand of selling in the informal market while maintaining higher profits per unit 
sold. This is the case for furniture and garment producers in Barrio Franklin and Estación Cen-
tral. Raul (52), a national leader of CONUPIA, comments: 
 
R: At a regional level, you could organise all micro-entrepreneurs from the food or clothing sec-
tors… (For example), there is this cooperative (of) clothing producers that…searched for a market 
together, buy inputs in large volumes, get credits together. They even built a five-storey building, 
El Mall Chileno…that attracts people to the area.  
 
 
 Although this has shown to be an effective alternative, the lack of involvement of na-
tional or regional government in promoting these types of spaces, compounded by traditionally 
negative attitudes towards the UIE, means that these spaces are often at risk of closure. Indeed, 
on October 21, 2015, following the expiration of the rental contract on the property in Barrio 
Franklin where the ‘Mall del Mueble’ operated, its 220 furniture sellers were removed by spe-
cial police forces to make way for a new Wal-Mart supermarket (see Plates 6.11 through 6.14). 
Plate 6.11 and Plate 6.12: El Mall del Mueble, Barrio Franklin 
 
 
 
These plates, “El Mall del Mueble, Barrio Franklin”, have been removed as the copyright is 
owned by another organisation. 
 
 
 
 
224 
 
Sources: Morales 2015 (left), Perez 2012 (right).  
 
Plate Plate 6.13 and Plate 6.14: Removal of the Mall del Mueble, Barrio Franklin. 
 
 
These plates, “Removal of the Mall del Mueble, Barrio Franklin, Barrio Franklin”, have been 
removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
 
 
Sources: Publimetro, 2015 (left), Vargas & Perez, 2015 (right) 
 
Overcoming gender barriers 
  
 Government intervention can arguably improve some of the aforementioned gender 
equality problems faced by HBEs by introducing a gendered support policy agenda that com-
pensates for the inequality amongst the workforce. At the local level, policies that incorporate 
gender quotas could boost women’s access to funds, capital and market, thus facilitating a break 
in the productivity and income gender gap. As suggested by Tomas (49), chief of the EDUS: 
T: To facilitate the economic empowerment of women, we must incorporate a gender perspective 
in the provision of services to micro-enterprise development …in the provision of public funds, in 
facilitating access to credits and incorporating quotas in the assigning of projects. 
  
 At the national level, governments can focus on more aggressive policies of economic 
incentives and skills training programmes to allow women to move from less profitable activi-
ties into more profitable, currently male-dominated sectors. Raul (52) a national leader of 
CONUPIA, describes this: 
R: National (training) programmes for micro-entrepreneurs are very limited… The SENCE 
[National Service of Training and Employment] is designed for employed workers… We argued 
that micro-entrepreneurs are also workers, but they don’t agree, they consider them to be 
businesspeople…and they don’t have the right (to receive training). This is particularly relevant 
for moving women into more profitable markets. 
 
 
Nevertheless, it seems that the type of cultural transformation necessary to create a more 
equal allocation of family tasks between men and women is unlikely to happen in the near 
future. These gendered familial roles are deeply rooted in Chilean culture, and in both 
policymakers and micro-entrepreneurs themselves. This is evident in comments from Raul (52), 
a national leader of CONUPIA, and Gabriela (48), owner of a hairdressing salon in La Granja: 
R: We need to help (women) to solve the problem of taking care of children… Women could work 
outside the home…(but) working from home has other benefits: they are at home, they can take 
care of the children, take care of their husband. 
 
G: (I have an HBE) because I am a mother, so I have to take care of my children and the house… 
Here in the (low-income neighbourhood) we are all housewives. We do the groceries in the 
morning, and cook for lunch. 
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Fighting exploitation from vertical integration 
  
 Like waste-pickers and street vendors, HBEs can potentially escape the pervasive verti-
cal integration with formal enterprises by using alternative markets. Three strategies provide 
potential solutions: purchasing from the informal market, collective purchases from the formal 
market and national regulations for subcontracting. First, HBEs involved in backward connec-
tions with the formal economy can opt out of purchasing formal products entirely and start buy-
ing from within the informal sector. This is the case for many corner stores or food producers, 
who buy more elaborate products from small, unknown brands whenever possible, and less 
elaborate products from informal producers. This means that HBEs could have a more equal 
negotiating power with producers and, in most cases, command better prices. As illustrated by 
Claudia (36) a seller of flavoured sea salt in Santiago, and Paula (44), owner of a corner store in 
La Granja: 
C: I buy from a family of workers of Cahuis, who traditionally (produce sea salt)… I try to main-
tain the principles of fair trade… I buy as much as possible directly from producer or otherwise in 
La Vega [distribution centre for informal products]… I get much better prices.  
 
P: I buy everything that I can in Lo Ovalledor [distribution centre for informal products]… Fruit, 
eggs, cheese…because you buy directly from the producers so it is cheaper… I even buy (un-
branded) toilet paper.  
 
 
 Alternatively, HBEs could use combined purchasing power as a means of buying in 
larger quantities from formal producers, increasing their negotiating power and obtaining better 
prices, as with the aforementioned case of the association in El Mall Chileno. Nevertheless, at 
current HBE organisational levels, there is still a long way to go before these kind of collective 
purchases become the norm rather than the exception. As Alberto (41), a public officer at the 
EDUS, mentioned: 
T: We haven’t yet promoted collective purchases for obtaining better prices. It’s rare, but it exists. 
For example, this cluster of printing micro-enterprises are collectively buying ink, so they get bet-
ter prices. 
 
 The exploitation of HBEs involved in forward networks could be improved through 
HBEs becoming organised by activity, or through national laws that regulate subcontracting 
arrangements. HBE organisations, such as CONUPIA, see in collective organisation a way to 
negotiate better prices and payment conditions with large enterprises. Once again, at current 
organisational levels, much development is required before this becomes a realistic option. As 
Raul (55) cautions:  
R: For us, the golden rule is becoming organised. I mean if (HBEs) reach a level of structure, or-
ganise themselves in cooperatives, of course they could negotiate… If all the quail egg producers 
gathered together they could negotiate prices with supermarkets… But with the current level of 
disorganisation, it is the supermarket that fixes prices and payment conditions. 
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 A more realistic option seems to be the implementation of regulations for subcontract-
ing that advocate for fair pricing, stable demand and payments within a short period of time. 
Regarding the third point, the congressional proposal to fix a maximum time period of thirty 
days between the provision of products/services and payment for small providers seems to be a 
step in the right direction. This proposal would speed up the cash flow of payments and reduce 
the reliance of HBEs on credits to cover operational costs. Similar mechanisms need to be de-
signed to secure demand and guarantee fair prices, so that HBEs can provide better working 
conditions. An extract of the law reform proposal, written by the deputy Juan Pablo Letelier 
(2012), illustrates this: 
A widely used mechanism of (large) enterprises is the payment of providers over periods that can 
be upwards of 120 days… Who is affected? The answer is clear: the smaller entrepreneur… To 
survive, an entrepreneur needs to acquire credits or pay factoring costs, delaying investments and 
paying interest costs… Establishing a maximum payment time of thirty days suppresses the poten-
tial for ‘agreements between parties’ with the objective being to prevent the abusive practices of 
large enterprises over their providers... 
 
 
 Although supportive municipal policies possess significant scope for improving the 
productivity, incomes and working conditions of workers in HBEs, municipal policies still face 
significant structural barriers to the sustained growth of these enterprises. The potential solu-
tions for these barriers – socially-mixed housing and business clusters, gendered policy ap-
proaches, skills training, collective organisation, favouring purchases in the informal industry 
and national subcontracting regulation – exist on a spectrum between municipal and national 
policy. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
This chapter has aimed to provide a better understanding of the role of municipal poli-
cies in improving HBE performance outcomes. By analysing the life cycle of HBEs in Santiago, 
it is clear that an integrated or hybrid view must be adopted to fully understand the complexity 
of the activity. In this regard, HBEs share similarities with waste-picking and street vendors, in 
that many socially vulnerable people move into the activity out of necessity. However, a signifi-
cant number of HBEs are established by choice, being seen as an opportunity to improve work-
ing conditions. A flow of ‘necessity’ workers tends to occur in times of economic crisis, and 
‘voluntary’ workers during strong economic periods. Once entered into the activity, those in the 
HBE sector almost always remain through choice due to their higher monetary and non-
monetary returns, matching neoliberal and voluntarist conceptions. These factors together create 
an expanding HBE sector, i.e. a one-way street towards informality, even if the breaking of 
poverty barriers along the way can sometimes lead to formalisation. Similarly, no one theory 
227 
 
accounts for the various ways that HBEs interact with the formal economy, particularly those 
that exist in mixed markets, moving between the formal and informal economies in their work. 
 
Supportive policies aimed at HBEs attempt to solve the multidimensional poverty barri-
ers faced by home-based entrepreneurs by promote the social integration of vulnerable social 
groups through increasing performance in the sub-sector. They seem to achieve this by enhanc-
ing various economic, social and working conditions, and reducing the outcomes of negative 
externalities. These results provide evidence for the idea that government support is necessary to 
help HBEs to reach their maximum potential, and that this constitutes a socially desirable de-
velopment policy. Of particular relevance are policies that aim to expand the market access of 
HBEs, coupled with measures that increase their production capacity. This further indicates that 
there is no single policy that can solve the multidimensional poverty constraints faced by home-
based entrepreneurs in developing their enterprises.  
 
Notes to Chapter Six 
 
1. HBEs are often subject to the controls of municipal officers and face penalties when they do not 
meet standards set by local or national regulations. However, the municipality also provides soft 
support for HBEs producing what they consider to be ‘quality or innovative products’ – 
generally granted to professionals with start-up businesses. Support for this ‘upper crust’ of 
HBEs is provided through access to two annual fairs and a one-time grant of CLP 250,000 (USD 
403). 
2. The survey asks a designed question to explore motivations behind starting an HBE. The 
interviewees are asked to select the main motivation to start an HBE from seven different 
categories. To present the results, these seven categories are presented individually and then split 
into categories of ‘obligatory’ or ‘necessity’ motivations. 
3. Trabajadores independientes literally means independent workers. They are freelance workers 
that are formally contracted by hours per month, or to deliver a service independent of any 
employer. They are subject to a 10% tax payment, but access to health and pension depends 
solely on their own voluntary contributions to the system (although since 2015, contribution to 
the system is compulsory). Employers have no legal responsibility over trabajadores 
independientes. 
4. Working capital or capital de trabajo is referred to by interviewees as the inputs and products 
that they sell. Normally, HBEs do not accumulate capital in the form of cash but rather invest 
profits in new inputs and products allowing them to sell more. The problem of declining working 
capital appears when HBEs consume their products for household needs or spend their profits, 
leaving nothing to cover the replacement costs of inputs or products, thus declining the 
profitability of their businesses. 
5. In the Chilean tax system, enterprises are permitted a VAT discount on input costs and do not pay 
income taxes when generating less than USD 80,000. In contrast, independent workers must pay 
income taxes as well as VAT on inputs. 
6. Poverty reduction is measured as the total monthly income generated by the owner of the HBE 
from all types of sources (e.g. pension, property letting, employment) divided by the number of 
members of the household, which is then compared with the Chilean individual poverty line 
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established by the Ministry of Social Development for 2015. This should not be taken as an 
indicator of the poverty rate of families that own an HBE in Greater Santiago, as it does not 
include the income of other household members, but rather as the maximum poverty rate of 
families owning an HBE, as it underestimate households’ income. 
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CHAPTER 7 : EXIT AND INCLUSION: LEARNING FROM THE 
INFORMAL ECONOMY IN SANTIAGO DE CHILE  
 
 
Having covered the empirical findings regarding the rationality, impact and limitations 
of supportive municipal initiatives in each of the three informal sub-sectors, in this chapter I aim 
to ascertain whether there is a common rhetoric of supportive municipal approaches and, if so, 
how we can theoretically frame these progressive social transformations. Acknowledging that 
support to informal enterprises occurs across a variety of sub-sectors, including those that pro-
vide both public and private urban services, in both public and private spaces, this chapter 
brings together cross-sector findings, contextualising progressive local initiatives within the 
global scholarly and policy debate. The main theoretical conclusions of this study are provided 
here, contributing a deeper knowledge of informal entrepreneurship and the implications of 
emerging supportive policy approaches. 
 
The first section examines the correlation between policy theories and the realities of in-
formal entrepreneurs, showing that in a context of low-quality formal jobs, informality becomes 
a ‘one-way road’. Attention is also given to formal-informal linkages and the relevance of paral-
lel informal-infomal networks of informal enterprises (as per dualist perspectives) – often de-
scribed as a fairer alternative to trade informal enterprises products. In the second section, I 
draw out a cross-sector rationale of support under a framing of the ‘right to succeed’, and de-
scribe how this extends beyond the co-production theoretical framework. In the third section, I 
discuss the main barriers to this progressive policy approach, arguing for the need of higher lev-
el government involvement to unlock the full potential of informal enterprises. 
 
 
RETHINKING INFORMALITY: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED VIEW OF 
INFORMAL ENTERPRISES 
 
The rule of law: A variegated geography of informality 
 
This study of three informal sub-sectors has shown a variegated sector-space-time geog-
raphy of informality. Although the informal economy has sometimes been conceptualised and 
treated as a single unit, particularly in quantitative studies (Bosh et al 2004; Fajnzylber et al. 
2011; Fiess et al. 2010; Maloney 2004; OECD 2009b; Perry et al. 2007; Schneider et al 2010; 
Vuletin 2008), Chapters 4 through 6 have shown the diversity of practices, dynamics and poli-
cies applied within Santiago de Chile alone, a single city in a single country. This necessarily 
calls for studies that acknowledge the variegated geography of informality accounting for sub-
sector-, place- and time-specific dynamics (see Figure 7.1). 
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Regarding sector specificity, building on previous studies (Allen et al. 2005; Chen 2008; 
Chen et al. 2016; Portes et al. 1989; Williams et al. 2016), the three empirical cases suggest that 
we should move away from informal-formal dualism, and even from any concept of concrete 
boundaries, to understand the various degrees/levels of informality that coexist across sub-
sectors. Centeno and Portes’ (2006), classification of economic activities as being crimi-
nal/informal/formal provides a useful starting point for analysing varying levels of informality, 
in spite of its ‘boxed’ conception (see also Portes et al. 1989)1. Fernández-Kelly and Shefner 
(2006, p.4) expanded upon this, arguing that these types of enterprises do not have clear bound-
aries, but rather a porous membrane where frontiers are unclear, blurred and transgress. The 
findings presented here are in line with these ideas, suggesting that informal enterprises in dif-
ferent sub-sectors exist in transition in a continuous space between completely informal and 
formal activity (see Table 3.1). For instance, waste-pickers are the least formalised of the sub-
sectors, being legally unrecognised by both national and local authorities, not paying any types 
of taxes, and not adhering to working codes or planning regulations. Street vendors exist be-
tween informality and formality, as they are locally recognised, locally regulated and pay local 
taxes, but are not recognised at the national level. HBEs are more closely aligned with formal 
activity, recently achieving both national and local recognition, paying local taxes and some-
times paying national taxes, although they do not necessarily comply with planning regulations 
or product-specific regulatory codes. 
 
Figure 7.1: Variegated Time-Space-Sector Geography of Informality  
 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Informality also varies across space, existing in a geographically specific context. Previous 
chapters demonstrated that regulations can be highly variable, even across small geographical 
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areas. At the local level, for instance, waste-picker organisations in Peñalolén and La Reina 
have obtained recognition and legal authorisation to operate, moving them closer to formality, 
while in most municipalities waste-pickers have been largely ignored or – as is the case in San-
tiago Centro – actively repressed, lacking any kind of legal recognition. Levels of informality 
also vary internationally. For instance, the lack of legal recognition of waste-pickers in Chile 
contrasts with the experiences of those in Peru, where waste-pickers achieved legal recognition 
in 2010, and municipalities were forced to include them into their SWM systems (WIEGO 
2015). 
 
Finally, informality is time-variant. As presented in Chapter 3 (see section ‘Home-Based 
Enterprises in Chile’) a law targeting HBEs granted these micro-enterprises legal national 
recognition only in 2001, moving them away from a sort of ‘halfway’ informality, closer to-
wards formality. Street vendors, with the promotion of the national ferias libres law, are fighting 
to obtain national legal recognition, thus hoping to move in this same direction. Waste-pickers, 
however, have not come close to a change in their national legal recognition over more than for-
ty years of existence, with only a few cooperatives achieving recognition at the local level. This 
variegated sector-space-time geography of the informal economy has significant implications 
for determining appropriate policy responses, as the best solutions are not going to be identical 
in different fields of works, in different locations or at different moments in time. 
 
The informal economy: A source of resistance or exclusion?  
 
The analysis of these three sub-sectors shows that the origins of these businesses are essen-
tially multifactorial, involving both choice and constraint (see Table 7.1). Two different motiva-
tions have been repeatedly discussed by academics and form much of the UIE debate: ‘oppor-
tunity’ versus ‘necessity’ entry (Maloney 2004; Portes et al. 1989; Reynolds et al.; 2002; De 
Soto 1989). However, the detailed analysis here shows that no sub-sectors can be described in 
their full complexity by one standalone theory, but rather an integration of theories is required. 
In my analysis, I have seen that even a single entrepreneur can be motivated by factors of both 
choice and restraint, and so the results presented in Table 7.1 provide an indicator of the balance 
or weighting of these two factors in the entry decisions of informal workers across sectors.  
 
For most workers within the UIE, reasons of ‘necessity’ seem to be the most powerful 
motivator behind informal entrepreneurship. This is most significant for waste-pickers, cited in 
more than four in every five cases. There is a wide variety in these reasons of ‘necessity’ 
provided in the results, often representing different theoretical perspectives, again implying that 
an integration of theories is needed. The dualist perspective (Boeke 1942; Harris & Todaro 
1970; Lewis 1954) of a lack of economic growth, as well as Mike Davis’ (2006) argument of 
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neoliberalism failing to deliver formal employment (see ‘Unemployment’ in Table 7.1), are key 
reasons mentioned by waste-pickers. Moreover, the argument provided by Portes et al. (1989) 
regarding the degradation of social protection systems is relevant for around one in five cases 
across sectors, particularly for those who were pushed into informality as the result of 
permanent illness, disability, or an insufficient pension. Other relevant economic factors should 
also be further incorporated into theory, including the gendered need to combine family and 
work commitments, and the inability to find formal employment for those with low levels of 
education which were mentioned in three out of five cases across sub-sectors. Finally, state 
exclusion, as mentioned by de Soto (1989), is rarely identified as a motivating factor behind 
informal entrepreneurship. 
 
Table 7.1: Motivations Behind Establishing an Informal Enterprise (Across Sub-Sectors) 
Reason for starting business HBEs 
Street Ven-
dors 
Waste-
Pickers 
Necessity entry 58.8% 61.2% 84.0% 
  (239) (254) (84) 
  [18,192] [16,477]   
Unemployment 17.4% 18.5% 44.0% 
  (71) (77) (44) 
  [5,400] [4,973]   
Failure of previous business 2.8% 5.5% - 
  (11) (23)   
  [855] [1,501]   
Other economic need 33.6% 33.7% 29.0% 
  (137) (140) (29) 
  [10,398] [9,056]   
Illness or disability 5.0% 3.5% 11.0% 
  (20) (15) (11) 
  [1,539] [947]   
Obligatory entry  40.2% 36.5% 15.0% 
  (163) (152) (15) 
  [12,427] [9,827]   
Entrepreneurial spirit 31.5% 14.2% 7.0% 
  (128) (59) (7) 
  [9,761] [3,830]   
Family member or relative doing similar activity 8.6% 22.3% 8.0% 
  (35) (93) (8) 
  [2,666] [5,997]   
Other reason 1.2% 2.2% 1.0% 
  (4) (9) (1) 
  [329] [608]   
 
Source: Author’s survey using total weights (design, non-response and post-stratification). 
Number of surveys shown in round parentheses. 
Estimated population using weighted descriptive statistics shown in round parentheses. 
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Opportunity motivation seems to be a less significant factor, although it has more relevance 
for HBEs and feriantes. While for few of these entrepreneurs, informal self-employment pro-
vides a means of avoiding tax payment (Maloney 2004), many mentioned their enterprise as a 
way of resisting exploitation in the formal system (Holston 2007; Whitson 2007) – a means of 
social progression to escape low salaries, long working hours and minimal career prospects. 
Another motivation that should be included more strongly in the literature is workers following 
another family member into informal entrepreneurship. This strategy allows entrepreneurs to 
access information and knowledge through social networks, being a powerful means of reducing 
the risk of failure when starting a enterprise. This is present across sectors, but seems particular-
ly relevant for street vendors. 
 
Feminist theories of exclusion must also be incorporated into the picture of informal activity. 
There is a clear and persistent division by gender across sub-sectors: in Santiago de Chile, start-
ing an informal enterprise appears to be more of a necessity decision for women than it is for 
men. This seems to be mainly the result of the gender division of responsibility and obligation 
(see Chant 2008) that obliges women in Chile, as in many other countries, to assume child-
rearing responsibilities and take care of disabled or permanently ill family members, while still 
facing pressing needs to contribute income to their household. This leaves them with no other 
option than informal employment, which allows them greater flexibility and proximity to their 
homes. 
 
An integration of theories that simultaneously recognises necessity and opportunity, and 
these variegated sector- and gender-specific reasons of entry into informal entrepreneurship will 
provide a much truer picture of informal activity. 
 
‘One-way’ informality for those at the bottom of the labour market  
 
 
The results presented in the previous empirical chapters suggest that, for a large majority of 
people, informal activities become a one-way street. As seen across sub-sectors, regardless of 
the multiple reasons for initially undertaking informal self-employment, once in the activity, 
people tend to decide to stay (Table 7.2). This is generally because the majority of people in 
these informal sub-sectors obtain higher monetary and non-monetary benefits than they would 
in the type of employment available to them in the formal economy. The permanence of infor-
mal enterprises is likely to result in a dynamic of overall stability or expansion for informal en-
trepreneurial activity, which is consistent with a non-declining or expanding informal sector 
across the developing world (OECD 2009a). 
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Across sub-sectors, more than 85% of workers have only secondary education. In the Chile-
an labour market, at this level of qualification, the formal employment available to these work-
ers would most probably provide a income close to the minimum wage, and with poor working 
conditions in terms of work schedule, job security, access to health and pension (see Chapter 3, 
‘The Erosion of Formal Work Quality’). However, most people working in the UIE analysed 
here obtain a income higher than this in their current informal employment (see Figures 7.2 to 
7.4)
2
. With the minimum wage being 241,000 CLP (USD 345.16) (Ministerio del Trabajo 2015, 
Law N° 20.763, Article 1), average incomes in informal employment are 1.5 times the mini-
mum wage for waste-pickers, 2 times the minimum wage for HBEs and 3.3 times for street 
vendors. Moreover, as in other Latin American cities, Santiago’s poor population faces high 
relative transport costs and times (Oviedo-Hernandez & Davila 2016). Given that formal em-
ployment tends to be centred around distant, wealthier parts of the city, this work would lead to 
between 26,880 and 31,080 pesos (USD 43.31-50.13) being spent every month on transport 
costs, with an additional two unpaid hours spent on transport every day (Ministerio de Trans-
portes [on-line], 2015). By factoring in these costs, average informal incomes grow to around 
1.7 and 2.3 times the minimum wage for waste-pickers and HBEs respectively
2
. Due to these 
factors, across all informal sub-sectors, more than 80% of all informal self-employed workers 
would not take on formal employment at the minimum wage. 
 
Table 7.2: Willingness to Move to Formal Employment 
 
 
Exit/ Remain N HBEs 
Street 
Vendors 
Waste-
Pickers 
1. At the minimum wage   
 
  Leave   7.4% 3.5% 19.0% 
  
Stay in informal 
work 
92.6% 96.5% 81.0% 
2. At informal-equivalent income   
 
  Leave   24.8% 17.8% -* 
  
Stay in informal 
work 
75.2% 82.2% -* 
Sample     404 402 100 
Source: Author survey. Statistics use total weights (design, non-
response and post-stratification). * The waste-picker survey did not 
contain this question. 
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Figure 7.2: Reported Monthly Waste-picker Income versus Legal Minimum Wage 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s survey. 2010 minimum salaries determined by the Ministry of Social Development 
of Chile for a family of four individuals.waste-pickers salaries as reported in the author’s 2010 
survey. Income taxes according to the Chilean National Tax scheme 2010.   
 
Figure 7.3: Reported Monthly Feriante Income versus Legal Minimum Wage 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s survey. 2015 minimum salaries determined by the Ministry of Social Development 
of Chile for a family of four individuals.Feriantes’ salaries as reported in the author’s 2015 survey. 
Income taxes according to the Chilean National Tax scheme 2015.   
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Figure 7.4: Reported Monthly HBEs Income versus Legal Minimum Wage 
 
 
Source: Author’s survey. 2015 minimum salaries determined by the Ministry of Social Development 
of Chile for a family of four individuals.Feriantes’ salaries as reported in the author’s 2015 survey. 
Income taxes according to the Chilean National Tax Scheme 2015.    
 
At the same time, the non-monetary benefits of informal employment seem to outweigh 
those of formal employment for many vulnerable people. An income is not the only considera-
tion for the informal self-employed when deciding to stay in informal work, nor is it even nec-
essarily the most important: at an equal income, three-quarters of informal entrepreneurs would 
choose to remain in informal work. The most consistently mentioned of these benefits are a 
greater amount of free time and flexibility, independence and pride in their work, the facilitation 
of family tasks, and job security (see Table 7.3). Across sub-sectors, informal workers are more 
flexible, allowing them often work fewer hours, determine their work schedules, and share more 
time with their family. They also considered the independence and self-direction of informal 
work to be a source of pride when compared to the submission required in formal work. Facili-
tating family tasks is another significant advantage, particularly for women, with many stating 
that raising a child becomes more convenient when in informal work, and also that they are able 
to spend more time with their children. Moreover, across sectors, people working in the UIE 
perceive their current employment as more secure and stable than equivalent formal employ-
ment. Informal entrepreneurs claim that having a steady source of income is only reliant only on 
their own effort, ability, and a willingness to work, so long as they are not actively repressed by 
municipalities. In contrast, as Chile is a country with high labour flexibility, informal workers 
see a risk of arbitrary dismissal from formal jobs, due to factors beyond worker control. 
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 Table 7.3: Reasons Across Sectors for Not Undertaking Formal Employment at Current Wage 
Reason to remain in work Street Vendors HBEs 
Flexibility of work schedule 72.2% 49.1% 
  (15,927) (15,094) 
More free time - 26.4% 
  - (8,117) 
Independence and pride 66.8% 43.6% 
  (14,741) (13,411) 
Social contact  30.9% 23.8% 
  (6,811) (7,311) 
Facilitating family tasks 62.2% 49.4% 
  (13,713) (15,178) 
Other reasons 12.8% 11.8% 
  (2,832) (-3,622) 
Source: Author survey.  
NB: The waste-picker survey did not contain this question. 
Estimated population using weighted descriptive statistics shown in 
round parentheses. 
 
 
In contrast with much of the existing literature (Perry et al 2007, p.22; see also Bitran 
2014; Chen et al. 2001, p.10; Thomas 1995; RESYST 2014, p.2), many informal entrepreneurs 
do not seem to perceive health and pension benefits to be better in formal jobs when compared 
with the minimum universal benefits provided to the general population. Only a small number 
of informal workers (with a maximum of 12% in the HBE sector) considered improved access 
to social protection as a relevant reason to undertake formal employment. Although Chilean 
universal health care services (FONASA) are very basic, the private health system requires ex-
penditure well beyond what a worker on minimum wage could reasonably afford (ECLAC 
2004, pp. 7-8). Furthermore, since 2008, any Chilean citizen belonging to the poorest 60% of 
the population is entitled to receive a basic survival pension of 93,543 pesos (USD 150.88) per 
month. Those who opt to contribute 10% of their monthly salary to the private pension system 
see few additional benefits: an individual working in the formal sector for the minimum wage, 
making contributions to the private pension system over thirty years, would receive 106,596 
pesos (USD 171.93) per month – only USD 21.05 more than they would receive if they had not 
contributed to the scheme
3
. Those in informal work are also still free to join the private social 
security systems, should they decide to pay for it out of their earnings. Therefore, the ad-
vantages of these social protection benefit from formal employment for those at the bottom of 
the labour market are so minimal that they provide little better than the most basic public system 
available to informal workers. 
 
It is this combination of low-level monetary and non-monetary benefits amongst formal 
minimum wage-earners in Chile that inspires even the least productive entrepreneurs to stay in 
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informal work. The central finding here is that the poor quality of formal jobs at the bottom of 
the labour market appears to turn the Chilean informal economy into a one-way street. Even 
though informal self-enterprises have diverse origins and operate in varied sectors, once a work-
er moves into informal activity they seize the economic opportunities presented by informal en-
trepreneurship and become unwilling to move back into the less desirable formal job market. In 
turn, the size of these three sub-sectors of informal economy is unlikely to contract in any sig-
nificant way with economic cycles. 
 
Is formal employment always a source of “decent work”?  
 
The lack of competitiveness of formal jobs at the bottom of the labour market should 
open our eyes to two relevant issues: first, the possibility that formal work does not necessarily 
guarantee satisfactory working conditions, and second, the capacity (or lack thereof) that current 
development policies have for bringing decent working conditions to vulnerable populations 
through formalisation. 
 
As presented in Chapter 3 the section ‘The Erosion of Formal Work Quality at the Bot-
tom of the Labour Market’, the massive deregulation of formal employment in Chile over last 
forty years has seen a significant decrease in work quality at the bottom of the labour market. 
The ILO (2002, p.1) may state that ‘the informal economy cannot be termed “decent” compared 
to recognised, protected, secure, formal employment’, however this picture becomes unrealistic 
when considering the current low wages, social protection and work stability in entry-level for-
mal work. 
 
Policies that promote formalisation with an aim of providing decent work can thus be-
come meaningless, and even have adverse effects on vulnerable populations when promoted in a 
context of poor formal work. As described in greater detail in Chapter 1 (see section ‘Concep-
tions and Policy Approaches Towards the Informal Economy’), international and national policy 
has commonly sought to move workers towards formality as a means of achieving decent work, 
being guided by the notion that the formal sector offers fundamentally better quality employ-
ment than informal work. Policies from the 1950s to the 1970s were implemented in a context 
where the real minimum wage was increasing in the formal economy, and workers had strong 
motivations for moving into formal work, and this vision has persisted into the 2000s 
(Bangesser 2000, p.4; Perry et al. 2007). But in the Chilean context where low-end formal work 
is of poor quality, the current promotion of policies encouraging (or forcing people into) formal-
isation can be ineffective in promoting decent work, and could conceivably make vulnerable 
populations worse off. 
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A recent World Bank policy proposition for formalisation in Latin America has empha-
sised the need to expand the number of formal jobs on offer (a ‘carrot’ policy) and increase the 
cost of informality (a ‘stick’ policy), to produce an informal-formal flow of workers (for further 
detail see Chapter 2, ‘Voluntarist Policy Approaches’). First, however, it is doubtful that a car-
rot policy will make any steps towards decent work when it focuses solely on the creation of 
more formal work – particularly when this is achieved through the very liberalisation of labour 
markets that further degrades formal employment quality. This voluntarist approach advocates 
for an expansion of formal jobs through a low minimum wage that attracts investment, and an 
increase in labour flexibility to reduce enterprises’ transaction costs of firing/hiring. However, 
these precise changes lie at the root of the lack of competitiveness of formal work, and are ex-
plicitly to the advantage of the employer. These type of reforms would continue to reinforce the 
divergent path between formal work and decent work, and would conceivably increase the mo-
tivation for workers to remain in the informal sector.  
 
Furthermore, applying ‘sticks’ policy propositions in the Chilean context creates a risk 
of serious adverse effects. The World Bank has advocated for increasing the costs of informality 
through repressive policies, in particular law and tax enforcement, as well as downgrading 
universal social services, thus promoting a forced formalisation. Given the contemporary 
conditions of the labour market in Santiago de Chile, introducing confiscation of property or 
other repressive tactics toward the UIE would artificially dispossess a vulnerable population 
from their accumulated capital, permanently downgrading their wages and forcing them to 
migrate to formal employment with even worse working conditions. Enforcing the taxation of 
informal enterprises would impose burdens amongst income levels that are normally not taxed 
in Chile, as tax is not paid by those who earn up to 606,892 pesos (USD 978.86) per month. 
Downgrading universal services would damage both informal and formal workers at the bottom 
of the labour market, and more importantly, it would drag these public services below a basic 
survival level. 
 
In the Chilean context, the concept of a formal market that necessarily provides decent work 
seems to have become a mirage, and current ‘formalisation’ policy recommendations that pro-
pose an increase in labour flexibility and a decrease in minimum wage will most likely only 
serve to lessen the appeal of the formal market further. 
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Re-thinking formal-informal economy linkages: A binary economy 
 
 
As observed across the three sub-sectors, current standalone theories are incapable of ex-
plaining the simultaneous disconnection and integration of informal activities with the formal 
economy in Santiago de Chile. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the informal economy was 
characterised as a parallel sector operating in complete isolation from the formal economy 
(Boeke 1942; Harris & Todaro 1970; Lewis 1954). Later, as economic adjustment reforms were 
applied on a global scale, the informal economy was described as vertically integrated into the 
formal economy (Birkbeck 1978; 1979; Moser 1978; Weeks 1975). Some authors claimed that 
this integration acted as a source of exploitation (Moser 1978; Nadvi, 2004; Portes et al. 1989; 
Ruthven 2010; Siggel 2010), while others saw it as a source of economic growth (Breman 2010; 
de Soto 1989; 2000) or even as an opportunity for the economic inclusion of the poor (London 
& Hart 2010; Prahalad & Hart 2002; UNDP 2008) (for further discussion refer to Chapter 2).  
 
Table 7.4: Types of Formal-Informal Linkages and Parallel Informal Economies 
 
  Waste-Pickers Street Vendors HBEs 
Integration with the 
formal economy 
Vertical forward 
network 
Vertical backward net-
work  
Vertical backward and 
forward networks 
Parallel informal 
economy 
Horizontal producer-
client connection 
Horizontal network of 
specialised microenter-
prises 
Producer-client connec-
tion or neighbourhood 
cluster of microenter-
prises 
Source: Own elaboration. Forward and backward linkages according to Thomas 1995. 
 
This study of Santiago de Chile reveals a diversity of informal-formal dynamics, where 
the two markets can be simultaneously integrated and function in parallel (see Table 7.4). For 
instance, street vendors selling elaborated products connect to formal enterprises through a net-
work of distributors, while those selling primary products exploit a horizontal network of in-
formal entrepreneurs to connect with other informal producers. Similarly, HBEs selling elabo-
rated products expand the market of formal industries, or sell their own products to subcontrac-
tors who introduce them into the formal market, while HBE producers and vendors of primary 
products operate in complete informality. Further, in some cases a single informal entrepreneur 
can participate simultaneously in both integrated and parallel markets as a strategy for maximis-
ing prices per unit and selling large volumes. For example, waste-pickers contribute to large-
scale formal recycling projects but also try to sell as many of their products as possible for reuse 
in street markets, and street vendors and particularly HBEs often sell both formal and informal 
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products simultaneously. This evidence suggests that an integration of theories and a closer 
analysis of dynamics is needed to understand the simultaneous separation and integration occur-
ring, as well as the way that participating in parallel and/or vertical markets can influence an 
individual’s strategies for livelihood. 
 
An exploitative structure of informal-formal value chains 
 
The varied ways that informality can integrate into formal value chains –forward, 
backwards, or both – has led to divergent levels of market power and various sources of 
exploitation between formal and informal businesses. 
  
On the one hand, informal entrepreneurs can be functionally integrated as low-cost 
production for large formal enterprises, i.e. in forward production networks that reduce fixed 
costs of labour and infrastructure for enterprises. This is the case for waste-pickers, who connect 
with large recycling companies through a network of middlemen. On the other hand, informality 
can connect with the formal economy through backward sales networks that extend the market 
reach of formal products. This is the case for street vendors who sell formal products fabricated 
by large multinational corporations in ferias libres provided by distribuidoras. Finally, in a 
single sub-sector, informal enterprises can be connected in both backward production and 
forward sales networks. This is the case for HBEs: informal manufacturers or producers receive 
orders from large formal enterprises and connect through a forward network, for example in the 
garment, retail, mining or supermarket industries. Simultaneously, HBEs directly involved in 
sales offer formal goods (such as those sold in corner shops), or use formal products as inputs 
for service provision (such as hairdressers), thus connecting in a backward network.  
 
Across the three sectors, and regardless of the type of connection between the formal 
economy and informal sub-sectors, degrees of formality, size and profitability increase upwards 
while competition increases downwards. As described in the chapters on each specific sub-
sector, informality is pronounced, enterprises are small and competition is high at the low level 
where street vendors, HBEs and waste-pickers operate. Further up the network, there are a 
smaller number of subcontractors, middlemen or distribuidoras who connect informal and 
formal enterprises. Finally, at the top of the network, large enterprises face little competition, 
reinforcing their higher profitability. This is mainly due to having high barriers to entry – 
mainly the need for capital and a strong social network – and the risk of detection. For instance, 
distribuidoras who provide products to street vendors and HBEs require storage space, and 
subcontractors require a dependable social network to receive production orders. Both of these 
factors inhibit vulnerable entrepreneurs’ ability to grow in their position within the network. 
Larger enterprises are also easier to detect by the authorities and thus need to be able to cope 
242 
 
with the costs of legality, necessitating higher levels of formality. 
 
Inclusion or exploitation in formal value chains? 
 
The exploitation of informal entrepreneurs in a formal value chain is driven by 
differences in their market size and intensity of competition across the network as described 
above. Although scholars debate the positive or negative effects of these networks
4
, for Santiago 
de Chile, the uneven distribution of market (negotiating) power nearly always creates a dynamic 
that favours the profits of larger players at the cost of the smaller. Ultimately, the negative 
effects of this filter down to informal enterprises, hindering their ability to progress further. 
 
The previous empirical chapters have shown different degrees of exploitation in 
backward and forward networks. In forward networks, the key to understanding the exploitative 
nature of formal-informal integration is the unequal market power that a business at the top 
(formal enterprises) has over one at a lower level (subcontractors and middlemen), and the 
power of these lower workers over those at the absolute bottom (informal entrepreneurs). For 
instance, waste-pickers can only sell recyclable material in particular urban areas, where only a 
few potential middlemen buyers exist. Each of these middlemen has the means to accumulate 
capital and no urgency to buy, and can thus impose very low prices on waste-pickers. Further up 
the chain, the larger middlemen must sell at prices determined at will by a single or a small 
number of large recycling enterprises which have the capital to transform recyclable input into 
raw materials. Similarly, in the case of HBE manufacturers, formal enterprises have the power 
to settle prices, quantities, standards and delivery times to subcontractors, which in turn filter 
down to lower HBEs who must integrate these reductions as a loss. 
 
On the other hand, exploitation in backward networks is less pronounced. Given the 
minimal access to funds and storage among informal entrepreneurs, these businesses purchase 
formal products in small quantities at higher prices, which means lower potential profit margins 
when compared with large retailers. The homogeneity of products available also means that 
high competition exists from formal retailers, and among informal entrepreneurs, again 
decreasing profitability. Formal enterprises involved in production are not negatively affected 
by this high product competition, as they still have the means to extend the spatial reach and 
quantity of sales of their products. The exploitation faced by informal enterprises here, however, 
remains less pronounced and ingrained than in forward networks. 
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Policy approaches: A vertical escape for informal entrepreneurs?  
 
 
As the scenario currently stands, it is doubtful that there is any real possibility for the 
social inclusion of the poor through vertical integration in formal value chains, due to the 
structure of the network itself. Although not discussed at length in the literature, local 
policymakers and informal entrepreneur organisations in Santiago de Chile have proposed that a 
sort of ‘upgrading’ within a vertically integrated network may provide a potential means of 
escaping exploitation. This could be achieved, for example, through a collective organisation of 
multiple entrepreneurs working together, with their combined force allowing them to become 
bigger players within the formal market. For instance, regarding forward networks,waste-
pickers currently supported by local governments have started to self-organise as cooperatives. 
This has allowed them to ‘upgrade’ from waste-pickers to middlemen, allowing them to sell 
directly to the primary large recycling enterprise. Despite these positive examples, the 
fundamental structural conditions of exploitation remain intact in the vertical integration of 
formal value chains – the larger enterprises at the top are still able to set prices and conditions, 
extracting profits from the waste-picker organisations’ productivity gains. Later in this chapter 
(see section ‘Limited Agency at the Local Level and the Need to Tackle the Structural Roots of 
Exploitation’), I will discuss the lack of success of current informal trade unions to effectively 
negotiate with formal enterprises in Santiago de Chile.    
 
A grassroots economy: Precarious markets or the next alternative? 
 
 
Early conceptualisations of parallel formal-informal markets no longer form a 
significant part of current academic discourse, being dismissed in favour of a focus on linkages 
between formal and informal economies (London & Hart 2010; Nadvi 2004; Portes et al. 1989; 
Prahalad & Hart 2002; Ruthven 2010; Siggel 2010; UNDP 2008). However, as the empirical 
chapters show, they continue to play a rather central role in livelihood strategies: parallel 
informal economies represent a large share of informal activity and income across sub-sectors, 
and also provide an advantageous market that can offer informal entrepreneurs fairer and more 
desirable trade conditions when compared to integration with formal markets.  
 
In Santiago de Chile, almost all waste-pickers engage simultaneously in recycling (a 
vertically integrated formal-informal maket) and the selling of products for reuse (parallel 
informal economy), with 30% to 40% of their total income derived from this parallel economic 
structure. Moreover, around 20% of HBEs operate exclusively within a parallel economy 
structure, with a further 31% participating simultaneously in both parallel and vertical market 
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structures. Among street vendors, close to 40% of feriantes work only in a parallel structure, 
due to larger profit margins. Parallel economies are also systematically described by informal 
entrepreneurs as being preferable and fairer economic structures than formal value chains, 
allowing for more equal market power. Informal entrepreneurs are systematically able to claim 
higher prices per unit and to have a stronger capacity for negotiation with clients when 
operating in informal networks, and thus prefer to sell or acquire their products in as high a 
quantity as possible through this means.  
 
Parallel economies across the three sub-sectors share similar characteristics. First, 
unlike integrated markets, waste-pickers, HBEs and street vendors operate in near-complete 
informality: for example, street vendors purchase products directly from small farmers or 
distribution centres and then sell them in street markets. Second, this whole network from 
producer to consumer is characterised by the small size of enterprises. No ‘big players’ exist in 
parallel networks, as informal enterprises are almost entirely own-account businesses or employ 
a small number of paid or unpaid workers. Third, since parallel informal economies have a large 
number of people both selling and purchasing, there are high levels of competition, which leads 
to a more equal market power for both buyers and sellers, minimising the type of exploitative 
mechanisms observed in backward and forward markets. For example, waste-pickers can 
negotiate prices with households in ferias libres, where they would have little margin to 
negotiate with middlemen in the recycling market. Finally, parallel economies across sub-
sectors are characterised by heterogeneous levels of profits, where prices per unit paid to 
informal entrepreneurs are generally higher than those obtained through connections with the 
formal economy. The heterogeneity of product types and quality allows enterprises to exploit 
product distinctions: for instance, each feriante sells a particular type of product, be it one or 
two types of vegetables, or only seafood, and these vary in quality, leading to varying levels of 
demand and profits. 
 
Articulating informality: Precarious markets or the next alternative? 
 
 
While parallel markets offer a preferable market option regarding fairer trade conditions 
and product prices, their often limited reach prevents informal entrepreneurs from selling in 
large quantities, thus preventing them from obtaining higher economic gains. This is mainly due 
to the restricted market, often limited within a local neighbourhood or an entrepreneur’s direct 
social network. For instance, waste-pickers collect reusable goods in a limited spatial area from 
poor households, and then sell in ferias libres, in total covering an area of only a few city 
blocks. They thus struggle to trade large quantities of goods in this spatially restricted market 
(see Figure 7.5). As a result, informal entrepreneurs tend to sell as much as possible in the 
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informal parallel market, and then sell the remainder of their products into formal value chains 
at a lower profit as a strategy to maximise profits. For example, waste-pickers will typically sell 
leftover odds and ends by the kilogram to recycling markets. 
 
Figure 7.5: Isolated Informality: A Restricted Informal Neighbourhood Network  
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
1) Waste-pickers collect reusable materials within their local municipal area 
2) Waste-pickers sell reusable products in their neighbouring feria as coleros 
3) Households within a restricted neighbourhood area come to ferias to buy cachureos (reusable goods) 
 
Two strategies provide potential to extend this limited parallel market reach: clustering, 
and articulating into networks of grassroots entrepreneurs. As seen in Chapter 5 (see ‘The 
people’s market: parallel economies’) the first is an alternative strategy used by some HBEs, 
notably clustering themselves into dedicated infrastructure (as is the case for the cooperative El 
Mall Chileno) or at the neighbourhood level (for example, with El Mall del Mueble), attracting a 
large number of visitors and subcontractors from across the city to one area. Businesses are thus 
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enabled to expand from their neighbourhood into a city-wide market, and can sell higher 
quantities for better prices, obtaining large economic gains within a parallel informal economy 
(Figure 7.6). Although this allows isolated informal enterprises to overcome barriers of small 
sales volumes and lower unit prices, it requires a level of organisation that many informal 
entrepreneurs are not able to achieve.  
 
Figure 7.6: Clustered Informality: A City-Wide Grassroots Network of Entrepreneurs 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
1) Clients from across Santiago come to buy furniture at Mall del Mueble in Barrio Frankling.  
2) In Mall del Mueble, several traders have shops where they will receive orders 
3) Furniture is then produced by HBEs in different neighbourhoods across Santiago 
 
 A final strategy, used by feriantes, is to articulate into grassroots networks of entrepre-
neurs containing thousands of producers, distributors and sellers that move informal products 
throughout the country. As seen in Chapter 6 (see ‘The parallel network: Articulated informali-
ty’). These networks allow informal enterprises to definitively overcome limited local market 
demand, allowing them to trade large quantities of informal products in fairer market condi-
tions. Grassroots networks accomplish this through four distinctive characteristics: specialisa-
tion, wide spatial reach, competition and small enterprise clustering (Figure 7.7). First, there are 
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a large number of small entrepreneurs specialised in production (small-scale farmers and fish-
ermen), distribution (traders) or sales (feriantes) that connect through nodes (centros de dis-
tribución). Second, compared to isolated entrepreneurs, these products are traded within a large 
spatial market, moving from a sole restricted neighbourhood market to a national scale. This is 
due to the regional centros de distribución, which bring together producers, traders (who move 
informal products across regional centros de distribución) and local feriantes (who then sell the 
products within their region). Third, the confluence of a large number of sellers and buyers in a 
single physical space (centros de distribución) tends to equalise market power among actors, 
bringing a fairer mechanism for negotiating prices. Finally, at the sales end of the network a 
large number of independent feriantes cluster at the neighbourhood level, in ferias libres dis-
tributed across the city, attracting clients and expanding the reach of informal products to almost 
all urban spaces of the city. This means of organising is the most complex but also the most 
profitable of the strategies studied here – since it significantly enlarges the spatial reach of the 
parallel informal market, it allows producers and sellers to grow demand and command higher 
prices.  
 
Figure 7.7: Articulated Informality: A National Grassroots Network of Entrepreneurs 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
For a detail description see Figure 6.3 
 
Through these processes of clustering and, in particular, the creation of grassroots 
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networks of entrepreneurs, parallel economies are far from being precarious, as has been 
commonly conceptualised (Boeke 1942; Harris & Todaro 1970; Lewis 1954), but rather offer 
opportunities for large vulnerable populations to support themselves through a complex 
grassroots economy. 
 
Drawing from the cross-sub-sector realities of the UIE in Santiago de Chile, the main 
conclusion is that no single existing theory can accurately describe complex reality of informal 
enterprises in this geographical context, and that both an integration and extension of theories 
are needed. First, I have argued for a variegated geography of informality, recognising that 
different levels of informality coexist across sub-sectors, changing across space and time. 
Second, I have argued that people enter into informality through multiple motivations, both 
from necessity and through opportunity, with the former being a more prominent factor. Third, 
regardless of the reasons for entering into informality, the majority of informal workers view 
their work as a one-way street, since monetary and non-monetary gains tend to be higher in 
informal activities than in formal employment at the bottom of the labour market. This is 
particularly significant, given current policies that increase labour market flexibility and/or 
repress informal activity, which will likely only serve to further degrade the quality of this work 
for vulnerable populations. Finally, I have shown that informal sub-sectors are both integrated 
with and parallel to formal value chains. While the vertical integration in backward and/or 
forward networks is almost always exploitative, parallel markets offer an advantageous 
alternative for fairer trade options through clustering or large informal national networks, which 
can afford better livelihoods for vulnerable people. 
 
SUSTAINING THE ENTERPRISES OF THE POOR: BEYOND THE CO-
PRODUCTION FRAMEWORK  
 
 
Given the evidence presented in the previous section, it is clear that the informal econ-
omy in Santiago the Chile, as in most developing countries, is ‘here to stay’ (Chen et al. 2001, 
p.iii; see also ILO 2013a, p.31; OECD 2009a, p.2). The type of “forced formalisation” policies 
promoted by international agencies, such as the World Bank, are likely to further downgrade the 
quality of formal work, reinforcing the factors that make even the least productive informal en-
trepeneurship attractive, or pushing an already vulnerable population into even worse labour 
conditions. For these reasons, it is key that we understand the rationality and impact of alterna-
tive policies that, through support to informal enterprises, aim to improve the livelihoods of 
vulnerable populations. 
 
This section will define the evolutionary path that enterprises in the three informal sub-
sectors tend to follow. This is a path of increases in capitalisation, market penetration, formali-
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sation and organisation, hindered by multidimensional poverty barriers. I will argue that it is 
necessary to go beyond a co-production framework, as municipal support is currently mainly 
based on the social inclusion of vulnerable populations, exchanging supportive policies for in-
creases in formalisation and self-autonomy. Finally, this section demonstrates that a cross-
sectoral, bottom-up approach for supportive policymaking has been fundamental for improving 
the economic and social outcomes of informal enterprises and reducing the negative externali-
ties of these activities. 
 
Accumulation of disadvantages: Understanding multidimensional poverty traps 
faced by poor entrepreneurs  
 
Chapters 4 through 6 established three poverty traps typically faced by informal enter-
prises: a lack of legal recognition, precarious capital endowments (human, physical and finan-
cial) and a lack of organisation (de Soto; Portes et al. 1989; Rakodi 1999; WIEGO 2014a & 
2014c). Further to this, we have seen that informal enterprises also face restricted market access 
and a spatial poverty trap that limits their profitability. Using the concept proposed by González 
de la Rocha (2016, p.38; see also González de la Rocha 2006), this “accumulation of disad-
vantages” for the poor makes for slow growth for their enterprises. 
 
The human capital poverty trap 
 
A low level of human capital imposes two constraints on informal entrepreneurs at an 
early stage of development: a lack of administrative skills and a lack of productive skills. Due to 
low levels of administrative expertise, informal entrepreneurs are often unable to separate their 
household and business expenses. This reinforces a cycle where the business consumes its 
working capital, compromising business profits and often leading to failure, requiring the entre-
preneur to restart from scratch. A lack of production skills leads to entrepreneurs entering into 
the production of a particular product (or the delivery of a particular service) based solely on 
their pre-existing skill set, heightening the risk of becoming locked into nationally-declining 
sectors or economic sectors with intense competition, and thus threatening their profitability 
from the very beginning. Even when a business moves into a less congested economic sector, 
many entrepreneurs lack the necessary skills to do so efficiently. Without any official support 
networks in place, experience becomes the most relevant means of acquiring administrative and 
productive skills. This is a time-consuming strategy that puts severe pressure on the livelihoods 
of the poor, as they often experience several business failures throughout their learning process. 
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The physical capital poverty trap 
 
Once an entrepreneur has gathered a sufficient knowledge base, my cross-sectoral anal-
ysis found that informal enterprises most commonly fall into a ‘physical capital poverty trap’. 
These businesses often only have access to the most basic work equipment and very reduced 
infrastructure, which hinders their capacity to produce and sell. From here, informal entrepre-
neurs slowly and incrementally accumulate capital, reinvesting their small profits. With this, 
they begin a long cycle of capital consolidation: using their limited savings, they buy one-by-
one the most basic inputs or products, and then a few tools, and later perhaps more specialised 
machinery, allowing them to gradually continue to grow their business. They have learnt to di-
vide their household and business expenses, and fully incorporate production costs (e.g. inputs, 
labour and a profit margin) into product prices. This allows them to build a more stable income 
and grow their saving and investment capacities. This slow process of capital accumulation 
means that many sustainable businesses can become stuck in this stage, sometimes for many 
years, with low productivity and low profit margins. 
 
The financial poverty trap 
 
Low levels of financial capital are commonly the consequence of dependency on in-
vestment from scant personal savings, loans from equally disadvantaged family members or 
relatives, and restricted access to credits, often with high interest rates
5
. Although credits are 
increasingly available, they commonly are small amounts with high interest rates, and so those 
on a survival-level income are not willing to take that risk. Public funds are equally inaccessi-
ble, as they are commonly targeted at fully formalised enterprises rather than informal microen-
terprises. As a consequence, the lack of access to financial resources prevents faster capitalisa-
tion for informal businesses.     
 
The illegality poverty trap 
 
 
The illegality poverty trap that follows informal entrepreneurs thoughout their develop-
ment significantly inhibits higher profitability. Informal enterprises are often unable to navigate 
the complexity of bureaucracy or cannot afford the costs (time and monetary) of becoming for-
mal. This lack of a legal existence prevents them from accessing public funds and further pre-
vents their access to credit at fair interest rates and in decent amounts. Moreover, in strongly 
repressive municipalities, not having a municipal permit translates into a high risk of decom-
mission, forcing entrepreneurs to re-start their business from scratch. Finally, not having a per-
mit to sell or produce reduces their market access, as they tend to avoid publicising their enter-
prises, as well as needing to shut down their business at specific times or constantly changing 
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location in order to avoid police controls and fines. For enterprises at a higher level, the lack of 
legal existence prevents individuals or organisations from negotiating contracts with larger for-
mal enterprises or accessing large national funds. 
 
The market access poverty trap 
 
 
Once entrepreneurs have grown their businesses through gradual capitalisation, the ma-
jor barrier to further development is gaining access to markets that allow the businesses to keep 
pace with their expanding production capacity. As demonstrated in the previous section, entre-
preneurs have access to a limited market as the result of exclusion from public space and central 
urban areas. For most, the sales point is either inside the home itself or located nearby, and thus 
businesses only reach to a small number of local customers. Many also sell to their direct social 
network, further restricting their reach. Regardless of their output level or product quality, these 
enterprises generally struggle to widen their market. While high-quality products can develop a 
reputation spread by word of mouth, building a significant client base in this way can take sev-
eral years. 
 
The isolation poverty trap 
 
 
 An informal enterprise that possesses considerable levels of human capital and produc-
tion capacity, and that exists within a stable market, can still face significant difficulty in ex-
panding beyond the size of a micro-enterprise. Even the most successful small informal enter-
prises face difficulty in securing the type of large investment required to scale up in size and 
continue to grow. If businesses are able to develop organisation amongst themselves on a larger 
scale, this would increase their potential to pool capital and secure large public investment, 
alongside increasing their negotiating power with middlemen to access fairer deals. However, 
the isolated nature of many informal enterprises makes this organisation difficult to establish. 
 
Spatial poverty trap 
 
As proposed by Davila (2002), location is vital for the poor to access assets. In this 
sense, the concentration of informal enterprises in poor urban areas creates a double burden – 
high competition among informal enterprises and low purchasing power from low-income cli-
ents – depleting their capacity to access profitable market opportunites, thus limiting their pro-
gress, regardless of their productivity or product quality (a detailed discussion is provided below 
in the following section, ‘Spatial Poverty Traps and the Right to Access the City’). Without 
support, accessing high-cost land in more profitable central locations becomes a final barrier 
that most informal enterprises, both individually and collectively, are not able to overcome. 
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The right to succeed: A new local governance for the informal economy 
 
 
 As we have seen previously, informality, low-level productivity and precarious working 
conditions are not the cause of poverty, but more often are the result of starting an enterprise 
whilst living in poverty. Across informal sub-sectors, municipalites propose that by supporting 
vulnerable populations in their efforts to escape poverty, the multidimensional barriers of pov-
erty can potentially be overcome, increasing the productivity and economic sustainability of 
informal enterprises. I call this policy approach ‘the right to succeed’. 
 
 Across sub-sectors in Santiago de Chile, municipal support is motivated mainly by the 
desire of some municipalities to socially and economically include traditionally marginalised 
local populations, with a secondary objective of providing services for local residents. Policies 
thus focus mainly on increasing informal enterprise productivity, as municipalities see in this a 
direct way to increase incomes, improve working conditions and decrease the negative external-
ities of informal enterprises. Since the poverty traps of informal entrepreneurs are multidimen-
sional, supportive municipalities implement holistic policy packages, rather than isolated initia-
tives (for further detail see the second sections of Chapters 4 through 6). For instance, in Pe-
ñalolén, waste-pickers are supported in their access to vehicles and storage facilities (physical 
capital) and structuring a comprehensive system of collection (organisation), while HBEs in Lo 
Prado are helped to improve their tools and machinery, and set up the branch office of Persa 
Neptuno (physical capital) as well as accessing administrative skills training (human capital).  
 
 Municipal policy support towards all three informal sub-sectors is developed as a bot-
tom-up, incremental and iterative strategy. Municipalities that implement supportive policies 
establish strong local partnerships with informal entrepreneurs, designing and implementing 
policies in tandem. These partnerships are essential to municipalities’ success. In the initial 
phase of policy design, municipalities tend to meet with informal entrepreneurs and settle on a 
new initiative, gaining the support and collaboration of these local businesses in its implementa-
tion. For instance, the municipality of Peñalolén conducts weekly meetings with waste-pickers 
to design new actions, Macul has settled on most of its regulatory policies and the relocation 
process for street vendors in tandem with the feriantes themselves, and Lo Prado closely follows 
the advice of HBEs when implementing new initiatives.  
  
 Partnerships are essential for negotiating incremental support policies that benefit from 
the in-depth, on-the-ground feedback from informal entrepreneurs on what does and does not 
work, improving the cost efficiency of scarce local resources. Supportive policies are commonly 
designed as pilot initiatives, which are then implemented and re-designed multiple times, with 
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the most successful policies being increased in scale. This is the case for waste-pickers in Pe-
ñalolén and La Reina: different strategies for recycling and collection were implemented on a 
small scale, which were then modified following feedback from informal entrepreneurs, with 
only a few efficient policies ultimately being scaled up. Similarly, Macul designed a feria 
modelo, which was modified according to input from informal enterprises, finally leading to a 
developed prototype that has been extended to other municipalities across the country. In this 
approach, informal entrepreneurs take an important seat at the policymaking table.  
 
 In exchange for their support, municipalities often request increasing levels of organisa-
tion and formalisation from informal enterprises, thus reducing their long-term dependency and 
bringing them in line with legal requirements. For municipalities, enhancing informal collec-
tives or organisations is essential for reducing their administrative costs, as they can easily ne-
gotiate with one representative for multiple businesses, and because the collectives are self-
administrating and therefore require fewer public resources. More importantly, organisations are 
over time able to reach the collective investment capacity to become much less dependent on 
municipal investment. In the case of La Reina, the municipality helped to organise waste-
pickers into a cooperative that provides a reliable recycling system and has a substantial capaci-
ty to invest, while Peñalolén is slowly moving waste-pickers along the same path. Street ven-
dors in Macul have created a cohesive municipal-level organisation, and at the level of ferias, 
self-governing bodies have been established that ensure that local regulations are satisfied and 
invest in tandem with the municipality to create new ferias modelos. Municipalities also require 
increasing levels of formalisation from informal entrepreneurs in exchange of further support. 
While the waste-pickers cooperatives of La Reina and Peñalolén are legally constituted, with the 
former having workers with legal contracts, feriantes in Macul are organised as local communi-
ty organisations with legal regulations. Although Lo Prado and Santiago Centro do not require 
HBEs to establish larger-scale organisation, support is traded against an increasing in obtaining 
permits and satisfying relevant regulations.  
 
 Unlike other “forced formalisation” approaches, municipalities supporting the right to 
succeed of poor entrepreneurs allow informal enterprises to achieve real gains in productivity, 
while also increasing their levels of organisation and incrementally satisfying a greater number 
of regulations. This type of ‘carrot’ approach ultimately develops self-sustainable businesses 
that operate legally. 
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Beyond co-production: Including the poor in the provision of private and public 
urban services 
 
 As seen in in Chapter 2 (see ‘Supportive Policies Towards Waste-Pickers’), co-
production theory has consistently argued that the main justification for providing public sup-
port to the informal economy is the improvements that it can bring to public service provision in 
poor urban areas, although it is always less preferable when compared with municipal or formal 
private services. The cross-sub-sector analysis shows the limitations of this theoretical frame-
work in understanding local efforts to support informal enterprises. These efforts do not consid-
er the wide range of services offered in the UIE to be a ‘second-best’ option, but rather a desira-
ble solution that works towards the social inclusion of vulnerable populations. This calls for the 
need to move beyond co-production, to a more holistic support approach based on the ‘right to 
succeed’.   
 
 In light of these findings, at least four theoretical extensions to the co-production con-
cept are added by this focus on the right to succeed: support based on social inclusion, support 
for private service provision, public-informal partnership as a preferred option, and holistic pol-
icy support packages. First, the co-production assumption that municipal support is focused 
primarily on the need to provide public services to unserviced populations is problematic as it 
fails to account for the most significant motivation behind support policies: the social inclusion 
of the poor. For instance, waste-pickers in Peñalolén and La Reina were initially supported first 
with the aim of improving their conditions of livelihood, and the secondary objectives used to 
reach this goal were the provision of recycling and environmental protection. Similarly, HBEs 
were supported as a localised means of improving the employment conditions of a vulnerable 
population.  
 
 A second assumption of co-production is that informal service provision should only be 
promoted when public services are inadequate (Joshi & Moore 2004; Ostrom 1996). However, 
by refocusing the argument on social inclusion, it becomes clear that supporting informal enter-
prises in their provision of private services can also be beneficial. For instance, street vendors in 
Macul and HBEs in Santiago Centro and Lo Prado, are supported in their provision of what are 
essentially private services, even when formal alternatives are available. Since the overarching 
goal is the economic inclusion of the poor, traditional private markets also provide fertile 
ground for an extension of municipal support, and co-production theory must be expanded to 
recognise this. 
 
 Co-production theory must also recognise that informal microenterprises may at times 
be the best possible option to provide urban services. Joshi and Moore’s (2004) argument that 
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the informal sector only provides a second-best alternative when public and private provisions 
are unsatisfactory is problematic in two ways. First, it fails to recognise the innovative capacity 
of the informal economy, and second, it fails to recognise the efficiency of an articulated net-
work of informal enterprises. Regarding the former, Josie and Moore’s framework does not ac-
count for informal entrepreneurs who are able to establish new urban services. For instance, 
waste-pickers provide an innovative urban service of the waste management of reusable prod-
ucts, a system that is more environmentally friendly than traditional recycling. Moreover, waste-
pickers established a recycling waste management system in Santiago de Chile more than forty 
years ago, well before the existence of any comprehensive regional or national recycling plan 
even existed. Regarding efficiency, co-production does not recognise that informal business is 
often able to offer services that are preferable for consumers due to their competitive nature. 
Street vendors, for example, tend to be the most desirable retail network option for the poor, as 
often they are highly price-competitive and can provide products of a similar level of quality as 
the formal market (see Chapter 6, Table 5.8). When considered alongside the large vulnerable 
populations in rural and urban areas sustained by informal enterprises, the extent to which co-
production theory dismisses the value and potential of these businesses becomes clear. 
 
 One final policy problem arises with the co-production approach of municipal support 
being a ‘second best’ option: it assumes the temporality of the solution, and implies that ulti-
mately the informal provision of services will be replaced by improved formal services. This 
perpetuates a cycle of weak, precarious, and temporary support policies that fail to address the 
fundamental problem of multidimensional poverty traps that inhibit the growth of informal en-
terprises. It is thus unlikely that co-production will provide the kind of comprehensive policies 
necessary to improve the productivity and living conditions of the poor. As we have seen across 
sub-sectors, this is at odds with the supportive policy packages provided by municipalities, en-
hancing the productivity gains of waste-pickers, feriantes and HBEs. 
 
Unlocking the potential of the informal economy   
 
 Supportive policy approaches have been focused on four areas aligned with the afore-
mentioned poverty barriers – skills, capital, market access and organisation – with specific poli-
cies for each sub-sector. My qualitative and quantitative analysis of implemented policies shows 
that, across sub-sectors, local support policies have been able to provide tangible improvements 
in productivity, incomes, and the reduction of negative externalities, moving a vulnerable popu-
lation closer to decent working conditions. This demostrates the potential of a ‘right to succeed’ 
approach as an effective social inclusion strategy. Table 7.5 summarises the effective local poli-
cies for each of the three informal subsectors. Impact indicators and mechanisms can be found 
in the third sections of Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
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Table 7.5: Local Supportive Policy Toolkit for the Informal Economy 
 
 The enhancement of human capital for informal enterprises can create a self-
perpetuating cycle of higher incomes, higher saving and investment capacities and improved 
working conditions. My qualitative data indicate that the provision of vocational training has 
been particularly relevant in allowing some HBEs in Lo Prado and Santiago Centro to disen-
gage themselves from declining or congested markets, and helping them to move towards more 
commercially viable activities. Moreover, training in administration and marketing techniques 
has helped entrepreneurs in Lo Prado to reach a sustainable pricing system that accounts for 
their full production costs, and ultimately enhances the sustainability and profitability of their 
enterprises. Additional training is also provided in e-marketing and technical skills to HBEs in 
Santiago Centro, helping them to extend their market and produce more value-added products. 
Nevertheless, the scale of programmes is small and training programmes do not always provide 
the set of skills required for an informal enterprise, inhibiting the potential benefits of these pol-
Policy Result Waste-Picker Policies HBE Policies Street Vendor Policies 
Positive results       
  
Provision of identification card 
& uniform 
Branch office  Storage 
 
  
Waste monopoly Diversity of accepted 
payments  
 
Fridge at stall 
 
  
Regularisation of schedules Advanced machinery Parking facilities 
 
  
Access to recycling centre Work clothing  Number of stalls 
 
  
Place to leave children  Child care (network) 
 
Electric generator 
 
  
Promoting waste segregation Access to motorised vehicle 
(truck, pick-up, van) 
 
Potable water at street market 
 
  
Access to credits Sales space 
 
Standard and permanent stall 
 
  
Restriction on work in landfills Storage facility outside 
home 
 
Uniform 
 
  
  Work clothes Other type of municipal 
support 
 
  
    National small fund 
 
  
    Permanent roof  
 
  
    Square metre stall 
 
  
    Police support 
 
  
    Provision of green space  
 
  
    Child care access (other) 
 
Mixed results        
  Donation of tools & machinery Access to credit Motorised vehicle 
  Donation of vehicles Plot size Toilet in street market 
  Coordination with waste lorry 
  
Source: Own elaboration 
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icies.   
The direct provision of physical capital from governments to informal enterprises can 
lead to dramatic increases in the productivity, incomes and working conditions of informal self-
entrepreneurs. The municipalities of La Reina and Peñalolén have invested in providing small 
capital solutions to local waste-pickers by providing them with tricycles, tools and uniforms, 
helping to generate substantial increases in productivity and profits. Peñalolén additionally pro-
vides local permits of certification for waste-picker enterprises, facilitating their access to bank 
credit. La Reina has invested in large capital solutions to support their local waste-picker coop-
erative (CREACOOP) with a recycling centre, as well as co-funding investment in recycling 
trucks. CREACOOP has thus been able to collect better quality material in larger quantities, and 
receive higher prices per kilogram, as they sell pre-compacted material directly to the larger re-
cycling enterprise without intermediaries. Similarly, within the feria modelo scheme, street ven-
dors have been provided with significant investments in access to clean water, electricity and 
permanent roofing, extending the days that they are able to work, moving them into higher qual-
ity products and dramatically enhancing their working conditions. 
  
 Support policies can also have a positive impact on increasing the market access of in-
formal enterprises. Lo Prado is currently strongly promoting the wider access of informal enter-
prises to their local market by incorporating HBEs into existing business hubs, and by helping 
them to cluster together. By granting HBEs local permits to sell in street markets, they are pro-
vided with a space in which they can develop their products and sales strategies, as well as 
reaching new clients not within their immediate neighbourhood. Furthermore, their clustering 
into a localised space through the establishment of production fairs and, most significantly, the 
creation of a micro-enterprise commercial centres allows HBEs not only to attract new clients 
from within the municipality, but also from other urban areas of Santiago de Chile. Santiago 
Centro has helped HBEs to increase their online visibility by providing training and funding for 
development in e-commerce platforms. The municipality of Peñalolén has managed to broaden 
the reach of waste-pickers by providing them with identification, increasing the trust placed in 
them by households and thus the amount of reusable products collected. This is complemented 
by offering a permit to sell as cachureros in street markets, which extends their capacity to gain 
profit in the parallel market. 
 
 The municipal support provided for the establishment of cooperatives and the clustering 
of informal enterprises can be significant in allowing informal entrepreneurs to increase their 
collective investment capacity, expand their market and productivity, and enhance the collective 
power to negotiate with the public and private sectors. Thanks to the shared profits of CREA-
COOP, waste-pickers in La Reina have purchased two waste lorries and processing machinery, 
leading to an overall increase in the quantities of waste handled. The municipality of Peñalolén 
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has helped to organised a cooperative, the Association of Micro-Entrepreneurial Recyclers, who 
make use of ‘green collection points’, where their neighbours bring pre-sorted recyclable mate-
rials, in turn increasing their collection rate. Since this cooperative collectively sells these recy-
clable materials, they are able to negotiate better prices with middlemen. Macul has offered or-
ganised street vendors a twenty-year commodatum for public spaces, which they used to build 
two covered street markets – Feria Modelo Juan Pinto Duran and Feria Quilín – along with 
investing in potable water, electricity, public toilets, green spaces and a children’s playground. 
This has in turn seen increases in their sales, profits and job security. 
 
 My empirical results also show strong effects of policies aimed at reducing negative 
externalities. Waste-pickers in La Reina have been provided with a recycling centre, tools and 
machinery to increase workplace safety, as well as taking steps to minimise their direct contact 
with waste material. Similarly, Peñalolén has introduced policy that recognises waste-picking as 
a legitimate field of employment, in turn opening up child care facilities to waste-pickers, dra-
matically reducing the occurrence of children at work. Policies in Lo Prado have led to the pro-
vision of a branch office in a hub centre for HBEs, leading to reductions in accidents at the 
workplace, the total working week length and family life disturbance. Street market infrastruc-
ture provided in Macul, such as permanent roofing, green spaces, lighting and parking, have 
reduced accidents at the workplace and the neighbourhood life disturbance of ferias. 
 
 It appears that we should move from a narrow conception of co-production to an ex-
tended version that promotes the right of informal entrepreneurs to succeed, as there are large 
gains to be made from a pragmatic supportive policy approach focused on the inclusion of vul-
nerable populations by sustaining their efforts to grow their enterprises. In particular, there are 
substantial benefits to be made from a pro-productivity approach, and the improvement of 
working conditions for the informal economy based on increasing their capital (human, physical 
and financial), local organisation and promoting their access to markets. Going beyond a co-
production framework that grants the poor with not only the right to work, but also the right to 
succeed and grow, aligns more closely with the ILO’s (1991) policy concerns on “attacking the 
underlying causes (of poverty) and not just the symptoms” through “a comprehensive and multi-
faceted strategy”. 
 
LIMITED AGENCY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL AND THE NEED TO TACKLE 
THE STRUCTURAL ROOTS OF EXPLOITATION  
 
Although municipalities and informal entrepreneurs are able to make significant im-
provements to the incomes and working conditions of a traditionally marginalised population at 
the local level, we have seen across sub-sectors that these bodies encounter structural limitations 
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when attempting to make change at a higher level. There is a strong need to open up new areas 
of the city to vulnerable populations, to help informal enterprises to become organised and to 
initiate supportive national regulations. However, these lie beyond the scope of municipal poli-
cymaking, and thus require the commitment of other players. This section focuses on the struc-
tural limits of a local ‘right to succeed’ approach towards the UIE, and the changes required to 
break through these limits to fully allow informal entrepreneurs to progress. 
 
Spatial poverty traps and the right to access the city 
 
As seen earlier in this chapter, informal entrepreneurs can face a spatial poverty trap 
that ultimately limits the progress of their enterprises. This poverty trap contributes to the accu-
mulated disadvantages of informal entrepreneurs. This can only be reversed by guaranteeing 
them access to profitable central and wealthy urban areas. 
Figure 7.8: Socio-Economic Spatial Segregation in Santiago de Chile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This map, “Socio-Economic Spatial Segregation in Santiago de Chile”, has been removed as 
the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Green et al. 2008. 
 
In Santiago de Chile, as in most Latin American cities, the urban population is highly 
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spatially segregated by socio-economic conditions (Dávila 2012), meaning that low- and high-
income residents are concentrated in different municipal areas (see Figure 7.8). As Oviedo-
Hernández and Dávila (2016, p.191) underline, in the context of a socio-spatial concentration 
of earning opportunities in central and wealthy areas, access to these areas can become a 
determining factor on entrepreneurs’ capacity to overcome poverty. As seen across informal 
sub-sectors, this spatial location of informal enterprises in poor urban areas leads to two 
limitations: a spatial competition barrier, when excessively high local competition decreases 
wages, and a spatial purchasing power barrier, as lower local purchasing in poor urban areas 
limits market size. These factors ultimately restrict the capacity of supportive municipal 
policies to expand local informal entrepreneurs’ livelihoods. 
 
The issue of spatial competition arises when poor urban areas contain more vulnerable 
populations and a resulting higher need for income generation, drawing ever more people into 
informal entrepreneurship. Conversely, wealthier areas have very small vulnerable populations, 
and so informal enterprises in these areas are uncommon. This disparity can be huge – as 
mentioned previously, the municipality of La Pintana (a low-income area) contains six times 
the number of HBEs and twenty-five times the number of feriantes than Vitacura (a high-
income area). This localised competition negatively affects wages, for instance in Cerrillos, 
where waste-pickers have complained about the number of people collecting materials, leading 
to divided profits. In Lo Prado and La Granja, owners of corner stores commented that an 
increase in the number of stores per block has led to a similar splitting of profits. Street vendors 
in Maipú and La Granja similarly complained about the high number of feriantes and coleros. 
 
Regarding the spatial purchasing power barrier, demand per household in wealthier urban 
areas is greater than poorer areas, meaning that informal enterprises tend to concentrate in areas 
with smaller markets. In the case of waste-pickers, higher income areas produce a higher 
quantity of recyclable waste, so collecting in these areas is more profitable, and provides better 
quality products for re-use waste. Similarly, waste-pickers reported higher prices paid for 
reusable goods when they are able to sell in street markets in these areas. Ferias libres and 
feriante workers in wealthy areas target a local population with a higher purchasing power, 
creating the potential for higher profit margins and a greater number of sales. HBEs similarly 
have higher potential margins in these areas, as retail stores, services and manufacturers all 
benefit from higher local demand from wealthy households, and are often able to charge higher 
prices per item. This spatial fragmentation of purchasing power severely restricts the 
profitability of poorer urban areas where informal enterprises tend to cluster. 
 
This divergence is maintained over time, as the spatial exclusion of informal enterprises 
from more profitable areas is combined with repressive mechanisms. Although some informal 
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enterprises do attempt to exploit the offer-demand discrepancies between poor and wealthier 
city areas, this proves difficult when faced with the extensive policing policies of higher income 
municipalities. As seen in Chapter 4, waste-pickers from Recoleta who move into the Barrio 
Alto areas are often subject to police control, criminalised and finally removed from the wealth-
ier neighbourhoods. For street vendors, the lack of new ferias and the absence of new permits 
being issued in wealthy municipalities prevent them from accessing additional locations in offi-
cial street markets. Further, they are unable to attempt working unofficially as coleros in exist-
ing ferias, as they are actively prosecuted by police. HBEs face restrictions due to the high 
property prices in wealthy neighbourhoods, and thus have no choice but to establish their busi-
nesses far away, in poor peripheral city areas. Similarly to coleros, HBE producers who attempt 
to access wealthier neighbourhoods as ambulant sellers are actively prosecuted by police.  
 
Many interviewees across sectors commented that there is significant unexploited space 
in wealthier areas with the potential to creating high-quality informal work, yet businesses 
remain locked in their homogenously poor local areas. This spatial poverty trap must be 
overcome to sustainably expand the amount of decent employment in informal enterprises. This 
not only includes the much-needed transport improvements in peripheral areas to revitalise 
economically poor neighbourhoods (Davila 2012), but also new national regulation that grants 
what I call ‘the right of access to the city’ for informal enterprises, as it has the potential to open 
up the market of wealthy municipalities to informal operations. This would mean guaranteeing 
to non-resident waste-pickers the right to collect and sell across the city, guaranteeing feriantes 
the right to create new street markets along with urban development, and creating HBE hubs 
that provide branch offices, allowing for sales to high-income clients. Regional governments 
must also partner with the poor to initiate planning regulations that are able to extend the spatial 
reach of parallel informal markets, in which entrepreneurs tend to have a more equal market 
power and obtain fairer prices. For instance, more integrated urban planning models that work 
to build mixed-income neighbourhoods could further contribute to fighting the spatial socio-
economic pattern of segregation of Santiago de Chile, and potentially other cities, by moving 
informal entrepreneurs into more profitable neighbourhoods. 
 
A landscape of self-organisation: The need for larger-scale collective action 
 
Across sub-sectors, organisation at the local and national levels is critical to being able to 
bargain for higher levels of support and changes in the law that account for informal entrepre-
neurs (Carré 2013). This bargaining occurs with three different groups – upper-level public sec-
tor, private sector and local government – but reaches limits when attempting to negotiate with 
formal enterprises over exploitative trade conditions. Table 7.6 summarises the main character-
istics and achievements of informal organisations across subsectors in Santiago de Chile. 
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Table 7.6: Informal Entrepreneur Organisations: A Cross-Sector Panorama  
Characterisation Waste-Pickers Street-Vendors HBEs 
National Organisation MNRCH ASOF CONUPIA 
  Power Weak Strong Strong 
  Type Only waste-pickers Only feriantes HBEs as part of a larger median, 
small and micro enterprises 
movement 
Archivements       
  Formal Enterprises (Prices) Some support Access to credits at lower 
interest 
None 
  Formal Enterprises (extending market 
support) 
Weak negotiation power 
over prices 
None None 
  National Law Recognition Weak recognition as part of 
the recycling system 
High level lobby for changes 
in law 
Recognition in the Law 
  National Funding No funding support to the 
activity 
Dedicated souce of funding to 
support the activity 
Dedicated sources of funding 
Local Organisation       
  Power Mainly weak Strong Almost non-existent 
  Type Only waste-pickers Only Feriantes Part of local enterprises chamber 
  Municipal recognition Commonly weak or inex-
istant recognition as part of 
the local recycling system 
Strong recognition, regulation 
and medium job security.   
Strong recognition with little 
regulation. Recognition without 
support 
    Mostly no funding support 
to the activity 
Weak to moderate access to 
funding support to the activity 
Weak to moderate access to 
funding support to the activity 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Upper-level public sector bargaining power 
 
Comparing levels of organisation across informal sectors shows that strong national unions 
of informal workers are often able to negotiate support and favourable changes in the law vis-à-
vis high-level authorities. For instance, the actions of CONUPIA were crucial for the change in 
regulations in 2001 that guaranteed HBEs the right to exist in any location, regardless of city 
land uses. Similarly, as described in Chapter 5, the increasing national organisation of feriantes 
has allowed them to receive support from high-level national authorities, including senators, 
ministers and even the president. They are now on the verge of recognition in national law, giv-
ing them the fundamental right to exist and to enhance their job security. Although waste-
pickers are mentioned as part of the solution of regional waste management, along with many 
other actors, for an increase in the extended producer responsibility law in Chile (Law 20.920), 
their existence as enterprises is not legally recognised and thus not regulated by any Chilean 
law.  
 
Strong informal organisations are also able to negotiate economic support from national au-
thorities, often working towards dedicated government programs targeting their economic inclu-
sion. The most powerful example of this is the lobbying for the ‘Modernisation Fund for Ferias 
Libres’ by the ASOF in 2015. Although small grants and training programmes were open to 
feriantes – such as the FOSIS or the Fondo Nacional de Capacitación – the national association 
of feriantes was able to secure large and exclusive funds for their Ferias Modelos project. This 
fund allocated 1,028 million pesos (USD 1,658,064) per year for the renewal of infrastructure 
and improvement of working conditions in ferias libres. On a smaller scale, the CONUPIA has 
been key to securing HBEs with universal access to small grants, such as Capital Abeja, a fund 
of 3.5 million pesos (USD 5,645) dedicated exclusively to female entrepreneurs. In the case of 
waste-pickers, the MNRCH has not been able to secure universal access to national grants, even 
those such as FOSIS, which is open to any kind of entrepreneurship. These grants require regis-
tration at the municipal level, and the business must have been active for a certain number of 
years. However, since most waste-picker enterprises are neither supported by their municipality 
nor able to prove their date of establishment, they do not qualify for the programme. This has 
been overcome in the case of supported municipalities such as Peñalolén and La Reina – as they 
recognise waste-picker enterprises, these workers have been able to access FOSIS grants (FO-
SIS 2014; La Tercera 2011). 
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Private sector bargaining power 
 
When negotiating with large companies, the outcomes for national organisations of informal 
entrepreneurs have been mixed: whilst effective in obtaining support to increase productivity, 
they have been almost ineffective in negotiating better payments. The national organisations of 
MNRCH and ASOF have been able to effectively negotiate support for informal enterprises 
from private enterprises to increase their productivity – this extends the market and profits of 
formal enterprises, and is thus in their interest. For instance, SOREPA has supported waste-
pickers in La Reina by providing collection containers, facilitating their work and increasing the 
speed of collecting recyclable materials which the larger enterprise will ultimately process. 
ASOF has obtained preferential access to microcredits at below-average commercial interest 
rates for members, as well as accessing credits to purchase vehicles from automobile vendors, 
actions that extend that market of all of the affected formal companies. Although CONUPIA has 
not directly negotiated a specific agreement, large national and international companies such as 
Coca-Cola, Pepsi, and Super Pollo, provide HBEs with shop banners featuring their logo and 
the necessary equipment to sell their products in low-income neighbourhoods, again increasing 
their market penetration. 
 
Hypothetically, national organisations could provide effective mechanisms with which in-
formal entrepreneurs could effectively bargain for fairer trade deals with large formal enterpris-
es (Carré 2013), however informal organisations at present are far from having the size and im-
pact required to exert pressure on large companies. As shown across sub-sectors, the CONUPIA 
had little power when holding conversations about setting prices and conditions of subcontract-
ing for HBEs, and the ASOF has not even attempted to bargain for a direct line of provisioning 
of elaborated products from large industries for street vendors. The MNRCH has had no success 
in negotiating better prices with large recycling corporations, although small achievements have 
been made in stopping the arbitrary reductions of prices paid in the paper sector. As a result, 
when taken at the national level, the current scope and size of organisations across all informal 
sub-sectors is effective for brokering supportive deals when they involve direct gains for large 
formal companies, but they still cannot effectively change the exploitative influence that large 
companies exert over small informal entrepreneurs through market power mechanisms. 
 
Local government bargaining power 
 
At the local level, larger informal organisations are able to argue for favourable local 
regulations, sometimes opening local channels of funding. Among HBEs in Santiago Centro, 
small and well-organised cooperatives have been able to lobby the municipality to access infra-
265 
 
structure investment or to create business clusters. Non-organised HBEs, such as those in La 
Granja, are less effective in accessing national funds and establishing local support programs. In 
the waste-picker sector, CREACOOP successfully lobbied the municipality of La Reina to re-
ceive support with legal constitution and with gaining access to central government funds. This 
cooperative also received additional local funds to support the capitalisation of waste-pickers, 
both at the individual level and as a cooperative. In contrast, in Pudahuel and Santiago Centro, 
non-organised waste-pickers have received minimal recognition, more often being actively per-
secuted. Feriantes tend to be the most organised of the three subsectors at the local level, with 
almost all belonging to an organisation on either a feria or a municipal scale. All of these are 
recognised by municipal regulation and have official schedules and permits for operation. The 
most organised groups, such as those in Macul, are more effective in lobbying for financial sup-
port to invest in infrastructure and to envolun control against non-permit holders from entering 
their market areas. There is thus a recurrent correlation between strong organisation amongst 
informal enterprises, higher levels of municipal recognition and access to local and national 
municipal support.  
 
Partnering with the poor: A new role for central and regional governments?  
  
 
As seen in the empirical chapters, if the poor are to overcome the structural limitations 
that they face as entrepreneurs, there must be a partnership made with central government that 
recognises these vulnerable populations (Chen et al. 2016). Based on the experience of the sub-
sectors analysed here, three strategies are arguably required: adopting a favourable rule of law 
that promotes inclusion, providing resources at the local level, and promoting successful prac-
tices across space. First, to break the pervasive cycle of exploitation through vertical integration 
with formal enterprises described at the beginning of Chapters 4 through 6, national government 
must regulate the formal-informal network. This would ensure that informal entrepreneurs ob-
tain fair prices, are met with stable demand and receive regular, dependable payments, bringing 
an equilibrium to the disparate market power of small versus large industry. As seen in Chapter 
5, some steps have been taken to regulate delays in payment to HBEs, however further laws are 
required to regulate prices and standards to ensure income security. Waste-pickers face a partic-
ularly urgent need for the regulation of recycling prices. Through regulation that keeps the pric-
es of recyclable materials tracked to the international prices of raw materials, waste-pickers may 
no longer be faced with the arbitrary reductions in prices paid to them due to unequal market 
power. This will have the run-off effect of making the recycling market more attractive, result-
ing in increased recycling rates, incomes, investment capacity and labour conditions. 
 
 Central and regional governments must transfer to the lower levels of government the 
resources necessary to implement innovative policy solutions for the informal economy. Munic-
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ipalities in Chile in general – and in poorer urban and rural areas in particular– often lack the 
necessary human and financial resources to fully promote the right to succeed amongst informal 
enterprises. For instance, although Lo Prado has a hub of HBEs, and this allows enterprises to 
reach higher profits, it is compromised by rather poor infrastructure, and the municipality has 
financially struggled to expand this site and to create new hubs. Similarly, Peñalolén has not 
been able to implement a recycling centre due to their incapacity to finance the large investment 
necessary. The investment in Macul for ferias modelos was relatively minimal, leading to a lack 
of solid infrastructure, and while successful, the programme has struggled to expand into new 
urban areas due to this lack of resources. The recent creation of central government funds in 
2015 for the “Fondo de Modernización de Ferias Libres”, is a much-needed initiative to speed 
up the expansion of the programme. Following this lead, existing sources of funding need to be 
expanded, while new funding schemes are required to support the implementation of successful 
policies for HBEs and waste-pickers. 
 
 Finally, higher-level government must become a promoter of successful practices across 
space. Municipalities traditionally have a history of perceiving informal enterprises in a nega-
tive light, and while in some cases this has evolved to a more tolerant attitude, this is far from 
being the case in all municipalities or informal sub-sectors. It is key then that central govern-
ment promotes a wide, positive attitude towards these enterprises, helping to determine which 
methodologies and policies work, and expanding them across other local governments. While 
policies such as the ferias modelos programme have been promoted jointly by government 
agencies and the ASOF, there is still much more to be done to spread the successful stories of 
waste-pickers and HBEs throughout Chile as a whole. With this knowledge, other local gov-
ernments and informal businesses could come together in new geographical spaces and negoti-
ate an inclusive local development agenda.  
 
THEORETICAL CONCLUSION: A SUPPORTIVE POLICY FRAMEWORK OF 
INFORMALITY 
 
This chapter has provided the main theoretical conclusions of this study, deepening our 
knowledge of informal entrepreneurship and the rationality, impacts and limitations of support-
ive policies. I summarise here the findings pertaining to the research questions posed in the in-
troduction (see Chapter 1).  
 
I have shown that, across sectors, standalone economic theories as they currently exist cannot 
describe the complexity of informal entrepreneurs’ on-the-ground experience in Santiago de 
Chile. I have argued that an amalgamated theory would give a better account of the complexity 
of a variegated sector-space-time geography of informal entrepreneurship. This would allow us 
to account for two factors: the one-way nature of informality and the multidimensional nature of 
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informal-formal linkages. First, a ‘one-way street’ type of movement towards the UIE emerges 
as individuals are driven into these activities both by opportunity and out of necessity, and so 
the UIE expands during times of both economic strength and crisis. However, once in the activi-
ty, the large majority of individuals find that their prospects are better when remaining in the 
UIE, thus opting to maintain their informal enterprises in the long run. Second, informal activi-
ties are at times integrated with the formal economy through backward and/or forward net-
works, and also operate in a separate informal parallel economy comprised of a large number of 
grassroots enterprises. Here, we must recognise that parallel informal markets provide an oppor-
tunity to escape the exploitative nature of vertical markets, as they are often a preferable option 
allowing for fairer negotiating power and better prices. In particular, UIE theory must account 
for the potential to articulate efficient informal markets into clusters, as is done by HBEs, and 
into grassroots networks of entrepreneurs, such as those of feriantes, which significantly in-
crease their spatial reach and allow informal entrepreneurs to sell in larger quantities. 
 
This study has also explored the common discourses articulated by municipalities to 
support the UIE. Across informal sub-sectors, municipal support is motivated mainly by a desire 
for the social and economic inclusion of traditionally marginalised local populations, with a 
secondary objective of providing services for local residents. Most informal entrepreneurs face 
accumulated disadvantages – of low human, physical, and financial capital, as well as a lack of 
organisation, access to markets and spatial poverty traps – that inhibit their development. Mu-
nicipalities thus propose supportive policies as being key to overcoming these multidimensional 
poverty barriers and unlocking the potential of these informal businesses. In practise, policies 
focus mainly on increasing business productivity, as municipalities see in this a direct way to 
increase incomes, improve working conditions and decrease the negative externalities of infor-
mal enterprises. Given that the primary aim of supportive municipal policies is the economic 
inclusion of vulnerable populations, and not public service provision, the current co-production 
framework needs to be extended. I propose a theoretical extension focused on the ‘right to suc-
ceed’, re-centring social inclusion as the core objective of supportive policymaking. This ap-
proach would also account for the value of informal enterprises as providers of private services, 
the capacity of these businesses to be efficient and innovative, and the high productivity gains to 
be made from a bottom-up negotiation approach to policymaking. 
 
Across case studies, the consistently positive impacts of supportive municipal policies 
on informal entrepreneurs makes a strong case for the positive involvement of public govern-
ment as a key player in advancing decent work within the UIE. Local support policies have been 
able to provide tangible improvements in productivity, incomes, and the reduction of negative 
externalities, moving vulnerable waste-pickers, street vendors and home-based entrepreneurs 
closer to decent working conditions. In particular, there are substantial benefits to be made from 
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a pro-productivity approach based on increasing their capital (human, physical and financial), 
local organisation and promoting their access to markets. 
 
Finally, a major extension must be included to understand the limits of local govern-
ment agency and the urgent need for larger-scale intervention. By being spatially trapped in 
places of high competition and low purchasing power, vulnerable populations face a limit when 
building sustainable informal businesses. This limit can potentially be eliminated through re-
gional planning reforms, which grant the poor with the right to access the city for commercial 
purposes. Self-organisation amongst informal entrepreneurs is also necessary to enable them to 
lobby local and central government for funding and favourable regulation. However, these or-
ganisations alone are less likely to reduce the exploitative relation between informal enterprises 
and large formal enterprises. To overcome this restriction on local agency, central government 
must undergo a shift of mindset, partnering with the poor to support their efforts to improve 
their living conditions. Higher levels of government must regulate exploitative formal-informal 
relationships, provide the resources required by local government to implement supportive poli-
cy strategies and learn from what has worked in other areas, allowing successful stories to travel 
across space. 
 
 
 
 
Notes to Chapter Seven 
 
1. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Centeno and Portes (2006) distinguish between three types of 
economic activities - criminal, informal and formal - depending on the legality of products and 
whether the processes of production/distribution are legal or illegal. 
2. Given problem of under declaration of profits in the informal economy, these declared income 
levels are likely to be an under estimated (Gough &Kellett 2001, pp.237-238), therefore even 
stronger the conclutions that perceived informal income are better than formal salaries at the 
bottom of the labour market.   
3. Street vendors are unable to avoid transport cost, as they must travel to carry out purchases in 
other municipal areas.  
4. Calculated on the basis of the AFP Habitat Simulator in October 2016. I account for a male with 
a wage of 241,000 pesos (minimum monthly wage), making continuous monthly payments for 
thirty years.  
5. Cheng and Gereffi (1994) (see also ILO 1972, Weeks 1975) proposed that forward integration 
might be inclusive and a potential source of downward capital transfer, leading to productivity 
increases and a more stable and higher source of income for the poor. However, other authors 
have contradicted this, focusing on formal enterprises’ use of subcontracting to avoid the 
payment of worker benefits, and exploitation of reductions in prices through their market power. 
Forward networks have faced similar debates: Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP) literature contends 
that these networks form part of a corporate strategy of social inclusion into the modern market 
economy, bringing employment and (higher quality) formal products to the poor (London & Hart 
2010; Prahalad & Hart 2002; UNDP 2008). Contrasting debates have criticised the potential for 
these types of networks to become a primary source of income for informal workers, with no 
guarantee of workers receiving better working conditions nor of the higher quality of formal 
products (Nadvi, 2004; Ruthven 2010; Siggel 2010). 
6. Contrary to the much-advocated opening of financial services for the poor to avoid this poverty 
barrier, this is often ineffective. Although in Chile the private banking system has increased the 
availability of credit to poorer people, this credit is typically high-interest and provided in only 
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very limited amounts. At interest rates of 29 to 40 per cent, only a small proportion of high-
productivity and highly profitable enterprises can afford to take out credit, while the much larger 
number of mid- or low-productivity entrepreneurs – typically those from poorer backgrounds – 
are excluded from the system. 
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CHAPTER 8 : POLICY AND METHOD CONCLUSIONS 
 
With the main theoretical implications of the study being covered in the previous chap-
ter, in this chapter I focus on the key methodological and policy implications. First, I wish to 
argue for recentering informal economy studies on the question of work quality for those at the 
bottom of the labour market, arguing that it forms a meaningful debate that helps us to consider 
formal work conditions as part of the problem and informal entrepreneurship as part of the solu-
tion. Thereafter, I wish to draw out a methodological conclusion, pointing to the need for a re-
search agenda that considers a more variegated geography of informality, and that better ac-
counts for sector-, space- and time-specificity of working condition for vulnerable populations. 
Finally, I propose a two-sided policy approach to promote decent work throughout the lower 
end of the labour market, one that advocates for rising formal work standards to foster a favour-
able incorporation of workers, and another that support the right to succeed of informal entre-
preneurs through supportive government interventions. 
 
QUALITY OF WORK: THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 
 
 
The informal economy represents two-thirds of worldwide employment (OECD 2009a) 
and contributes more than 40% of global GDP (Schneider et al. 2010). It is an especially signif-
icant feature of urban labour markets in the Global South, having been a persistent phenomenon 
in all regions, including expanding in the wake of economic growth in Latin America and Asia 
in recent decades (OECD 2009a). Although, in an urban context, an estimated 900 million peo-
ple in the developing world depend on the informal economy for their livelihood, it has tradi-
tionally been characterised as having low productivity, low wages and poor working condi-
tions(OECD 2009a). The informal economy has thus been perceived as a significant impedi-
ment to the creation of decent work on a global scale, and this has led to more than four decades 
of policy interventions with the ultimate aim of making it disappear (see Chapter 2). Some argue 
that this should be done using an ‘iron fist’ approach, involving repressive policies and strong 
regulations. Others suggest that barriers to formalisation should be reduced, while others sup-
port softer methods, assisting workers to move out of the poor working conditions in the infor-
mal economy. 
 
In spite of this negative attitude lying at the heart of development policy discourse, this is not 
always the case. As we have seen in each of the previous empirical chapters, the decision to en-
ter, exit and continue in informality are not only the result of a lack of formal employment op-
portunities, but more fundamentally are the result of poor working conditions in the formal 
economy, combined with the desire of those at the bottom of the labour market to achieve social 
progress for themselves and their families, whose prospects are often more assured by informal 
activities. 
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These findings encourage us to consider whether a paradigm shift might be necessary in 
our policy approach to the UIE, since they raise the fundamental question: is the informal econ-
omy the main problem that needs to be tackled, or it is rather a piece of the larger puzzle called 
poor quality of work? If it is the latter, tackling informality alone may prove to be impossible 
without first comprehending and addressing the broader issue of the quality of work at the bot-
tom of the labour market. As the seminal ILO (1972, p.3) report put it – a report that in my view 
has been insufficiently taken into account in more recent development policy design – ‘if the 
problem is primarily (formal) jobs, the solution must be the provision of more (formal) jobs. But 
if the problem is primarily an imbalance in opportunities, the solution must be to put right the 
imbalance’. 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have shown that informal entrepreneurship is not necessarily 
the problem, at least not in all geographical contexts, leading me to argue that the primary issue 
to address in this domain of development studies is the poor overall quality of jobs available to 
vulnerable populations, requiring analyses of both the informal and the formal economies. In 
my view, re-centring the debate on quality of work draws the attention to three fundamental is-
sues. First, it forces us to question our preliminary (perhaps Global North) assumptions, that 
formal employment alternatives are necessarily of a good quality and highly productive, and 
that informal work is of precarious quality and low productivity. By challenging this, we are 
then able to determine whether these assumptions really hold true across diverse (geographical) 
contexts, including within the same metropolitan area. As the three case studies have shown, in 
a context where labour market liberalisation has deeply degraded formal work conditions, in-
formal entrepreneurship offers an alternative with prospects of social progression for those at 
the lowest end of society and their household members. This is true for most informal entrepre-
neurs, even in the current adverse context where policies of repression or tolerance from central 
and local governments are common. Second, by focusing on the employment opportunities for 
those at the bottom of the labour market, we are able to understand formal work in its heteroge-
neity, moving beyond the average wages and working conditions which often mask the ex-
tremely low quality of jobs available to those coming from backgrounds of poverty and limited 
education in the developing world. It is by focusing on this lower-end demographic, rather than 
solely on informality itself, that we observe how near-minimum wage formal employment may 
often not offer better incomes, working conditions and career prospects than informal entrepre-
neurship in the developing world. Finally, focusing on the quality of work for vulnerable popu-
lations allows us to understand that policies aimed at moving workers from one end of the for-
mal/informal divide to the other can prove fruitless, as they are unable to improve workers’ 
conditions when operating in a context of formal work of low calibre.      
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IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY: A VARIEGATED 
GEOGRAPHY OF INFORMALITY AND FORMALITY  
 
In Chapter 7, I established the purpose of a variegated geography of informality for 
research which involves making more detailed accounts, both qualitative and quantitative, of 
employment conditions, incomes and opportunities for social progression offered by both the 
formal and informal economies at the bottom of the labour market, and how this affects the 
employment opportunities of poor citizens in different geographical contexts. Only then can we 
assess whether, in a particular context, the focus should be on increasing the number of formal 
jobs, or rather addressing the imbalance of low returns from formal work and slow social 
progression of informal enterprises in the absence of support – or perhaps a combination of both 
factors. 
 
To understand contemporary work quality for vulnerable populations, we need data on 
the informal economy in greater quantity and of higher quality. In my own research, I found a 
significant lack of detailed data for informal sub-sectors: qualitative studies tended not to give a 
complete picture of supportive initiatives of Chilean informal subsectors, and particularly, 
quantitative data was not sufficiently large nor detailed enough to explore the full range of 
motivations, and the impact of local policies on heterogeneous informal subsectors
1
. 
 
For a more accurate representation of the variegated geography of informality, 
qualitative studies need to map not only exploitative conditions within the informal economy, 
but also contrast them with the alternative, sometimes exploitative, formal labour conditions 
that affect vulnerable populations. Moreover, a more detailed account of current public support 
initiatives towards the informal economy in particular geographical contexts is necessary. 
Indeed, much remains to be researched regarding policies and interventions that may be able to 
support poor entrepreneurs in various informal sub-sectors at local scales. This is particularly 
important not only to avoid policy generalisation and to build effective local/contextualised 
policy strategies of inclusion, but more fundamentally to use evidence to challenge the 
international policy consensus that has pegged informality itself as the problem. 
 
At the same time, given the lack of more detailed data in developing countries, 
quantitative research has commonly worked from the initial assumption that formal employment 
is necessarily desirable, with policy intervention analysis reflecting this. In my view, three 
extensions to quantitative studies are integral to lessen this pro-formality bias. First, survey data 
should include reasons for entry, exit and continuity in informal work, to understand how much 
of the problem stems from a lack of formal employment opportunities and how much emanates 
from the poor quality of formal employment and a lack of alternative means of socio-economic 
273 
 
mobility. Second, while data analysing the negative aspects of the informal economy are 
relevant, we also need data that account for its benefits, as this would help us to better 
understand its persistence, and sometimes expansion, over time. Finally, we need more detailed 
data, particularly at the local level, on the type of policy approaches and specific policies that 
are targeting informal enterprises. This will help us to understand their impact, not only on the 
enterprises’ decision to formalise, but more fundamentally on their productivity and ability to 
improve the livelihoods of the households that these businesses sustain. With this approach, we 
will be better equipped to understand what works and does not work to improve the working 
lives of vulnerable populations. 
 
A POLICY AGENDA OF DECENT WORK FOR THE BOTTOM OF THE 
LABOUR MARKET 
 
As the seminal ILO (1972) report pointed out more than four decades ago, both infor-
mal and formal employment represent aspects of the same problem. In my opinion, the labour 
market conditions in Santiago de Chile, though they provide an isolated case, are relevant as 
they resonate with a substantial body of research that reports the degradation of formal working 
conditions in Latin America (González de la Rocha 2006; Thomas 1995; Whitson 2007b;) 
through consistent programmes of labour market flexibilisation and social security privatisation. 
In this declining formal labour market context, two policy strategies may offer the potential to 
correct this work quality imbalance: ‘Favourable Incorporation’ as workers and ‘The Right to 
Succeed’ as entrepreneurs. While the first aims to improve working conditions at the bottom of 
the formal labour market by increasing its attractiveness, and then motivating individuals to 
voluntarily exit informality in favour of better formal working conditions, the second aims to 
support informal enterprises in overcoming poverty barriers such that they can transform their 
enterprises into a real alternative of socio-economic mobility. 
 
Favourable incorporation: Growing decent work opportunities in the formal 
labour market 
 
Informality is expanding (or at the very least not decreasing) in the developing world 
and, as Chapter 7 has explained, a significant contributing factor may be the ‘poverty-level’ re-
turns of formal work . As we have seen in the context of Chile, economic progress has not nec-
essarily led to significant increases in low-end formal work quality, but has arguably instead led 
to stagnant wages, declining job stability and minimal access to social protection. This has led a 
group of disenfranchised workers, unable to obtain satisfactory remuneration and reasonable 
benefits, to turn towards alternative routes of entrepreneurship that afford them the opportunity 
of socio-economic mobility, even with their limited assets. Another group, excluded from for-
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mal employment opportunities, were pushed into the informal economy, ultimately finding in it 
a more promising opportunity for economic progression. 
 
This clearly makes a case for challenging the advancement of a ‘forced formalisation’ 
programme (Perry et al. 2007) – using traditional carrot-and-stick policies – to what I call a 
‘voluntary formalisation’, which grants vulnerable populations favourable incorporation into 
formal work. An approach which forces an informal-formal migration might mean that vulnera-
ble populations will lose monetary and non-monetary rewards in exchange for working condi-
tions that are even more precarious. Furthermore, a ‘forced formalisation’ approach can also 
produce legal and monetary burdens well beyond the investment and returns capacity of the 
poor, suffocating their entrepreneurial capacity. In the current Chilean context, one might even 
conclude that a forced formalisation policy could erode social inclusion by adversely incorporat-
ing workers into the formal economy, or threaten family livelihoods and their prospects for 
capitalisation by setting exclusionary barriers to entrepreneurship. The pertinent question to ask 
regarding World Bank policy is thus: formality at what cost for vulnerable populations? In my 
view, formalisation is the logical policy choice only if it helps to improve the working condi-
tions for these workers. 
 
With this in mind, formalisation has the potential to become a ‘pro-poor’ policy agenda 
if it is able to transform the one-way migration to informal work into a voluntary U-turn back to 
the formal economy. Through a shift in attitude away from forcing workers into formal em-
ployment, in favour of allowing them to voluntarily move to formal work (still with the alterna-
tive of pursuing their informal enterprise), governments may take a step forward in favourably 
incorporating vulnerable populations into the formal economy. Logically speaking, voluntary 
migration will occur only when returns from formal work at the bottom of the labour market – 
both monetary and non-monetary – are higher than those obtained in informal entrepreneurship. 
This means that the formal economy would be less reliant on repressive mechanisms of the 
state, and more focused on improving working conditions to attract vulnerable workers. Further 
to this, the formal economy should also establish a more competitive level of employment quali-
ty for those at the bottom of the labour market, to be able to attract labour back from the infor-
mal economy. These factors have the potential to come together, along with a minimum wage 
mechanism, to push against the prevalence of low-quality formal and informal work. 
 
As far as state policies are concerned, promoting voluntary movement into formal work 
would mean reversing forced formalisation policies, that is to say promoting migration into 
formal work with carrots rather than sticks. In the case of Santiago de Chile, this necessarily 
involves a shift from decades of flexibilisation in the formal labour market towards policies 
aimed at raising minimum wages, increasing social benefits offered through the workplace and 
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providing more security and stability in formal jobs. Orientating policy actions in this direction 
could, in my opinion, set off an informal-formal work migration that would favourably integrate 
vulnerable populations, as the less productive and competitive informal entrepreneurs opt into 
the better alternative of formal work. As a result of this, the more ‘survival’ or unproductive 
component of the informal economy will decrease in size, improving these workers’ liveli-
hoods.  
 
The right to succeed: Growing the capacity to escape conditions of poverty 
 
 
In Chapter 7, I raised questions about the capacity of the ‘co-production’ agenda to 
capture the motivations behind governmental support and the diversity of expanding supportive 
practices across informal sub-sectors. If the conceptualisation of ‘co-production’ is ill-suited to 
understanding local government rationality and limits our more meaningful reflections on the 
potential of a grassroots (informal) economy, then we require a more holistic terminology: for 
example, ‘the right to succeed’. 
 
I consider that the concept of a ‘right to succeed’, proposed in Chapter 7, extends our 
policy conceptualisation of the informal economy in three fundamental ways. First, it moves 
policy discussion away from issues of legality, to the more fundamental discussion of the rights 
of vulnerable people, regardless of their legal status, to access both a choice in the way they will 
progress in their work (be it as employee or entrepreneur) and increased opportunity for social 
progress more broadly
2
. Second, rather than focusing only on public service provision, it re-
centres the objective of government-informal entrepreneur partnerships on the social inclusion 
of vulnerable entrepreneurs, thus extending the horizon of support policies and their 
applicability to the whole informal economy. Finally, under this approach, such partnerships 
would enable the promotion of productive small enterprise structures (what I have referred to as 
clusters and networks of grassroots entrepreneurs). These grassroot structures have the potential 
to offer a highly desirable alternative for the organisation of the economy, given their 
employment generation capacity and effects on income distribution (by increasing the income of 
the poor). It is by following this concept that I venture six general policy actions that have been 
effective for opening up opportunities of development to informal entrepreneurs in Santiago de 
Chile. By no means do I aim to provide a full account of emerging ‘right to succeed’ policies, 
but rather a glance at the possibilities opened by approaching informality from this perspective. 
 
Policy approach 1: Capacitating informality 
 
The enhancement of human capital in the informal economy has a direct positive impact 
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on the enterprises of the poor, establishing a self-reinforcing cycle of higher incomes, higher 
saving and investment capacities and, as a result, improved working conditions, meaning more 
‘decent work’. This type of government support effectively provides no fundamental dilemma – 
an increase in training skills provided to a vulnerable population can be seen as an objective in 
and of itself, leading to higher overall labour productivity, economic growth and a reduction in 
public sector dependency. Training programmes ought to be implemented within both national 
and local contexts, and adapted to the specific skills required within each informal sub-sector. 
Comprehensive training programmes currently implemented in Santiago Centro are limited to 
HBEs, but a wider geographical and sector scope of programmes would benefit many more 
informal enterprises. Since HBEs tend to face similar challenges to one another, the skills 
training provided in Santiago Centro could be adapted, or be directly applicable to other 
municipal contexts. Furthermore, many of the skills offered by these programmes could, with 
some additions or adaptations, be applicable in other informal sub-sectors. Training programmes 
should be offered at little or no cost, since many poor families would be excluded from 
enrolling in courses if they were forced to make a trade-off between investing in training (which 
would divert money and time away from income-generating activities) and meeting a survival-
level income. 
 
Policy approach 2: Capitalising informality 
 
The qualitative and quantitative analysis in this thesis substantiates the idea that the 
direct provision of capital from governments to informal enterprises – from its simplest form, 
such as the provision of tools to waste-pickers, to higher investment schemes such as the 
creation of recycling centres or ferias modelos – can lead to dramatic increases in the 
productivity, incomes and working conditions of informal entrepreneurs. These provisions 
should thus be incorporated as part of the development policy toolkit, both for self-sustaining 
and functional informal enterprises hoping to further develop their business, and perhaps more 
urgently for informal entrepreneurs facing pressing survival needs. 
 
Policy approach 3: Financing informality 
 
Although the private banking system has increased the availability of so called ‘micro-
credits’ to poorer people, this credit is typically high-interest and is provided only in very 
limited amounts. Only a small proportion of high-productivity profitable enterprises can afford 
to take out this credit, while the much larger number of mid- or low-productivity entrepreneurs 
– typically those from a poorer background – are excluded from the system. Zero-interest credit 
schemes, a form of credit subsidisation discussed earlier, would provide an excellent means to 
foster further growth for an established enterprise that already has access to credit. As well as 
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making credits available to the poorest self-entrepreneurs, this strategy also massively leverages 
and maximises the injection of capital into informal enterprises as public and private financial 
resources are pooled together. Zero-interest credits thus allow small businesses to reach their 
‘next level’ without being hampered by a growing stream of interest debt, while still holding 
them accountable for repaying the loan in full and thus demanding financial responsibility. 
Support for the capitalisation of informal enterprises in all its forms – human, physical and 
financial capital – can thus be a huge contributing factor in the promotion of decent work for the 
poor. 
 
Policy approach 4: Broadening market perspectives 
 
Scholars and policymakers have conceptualised the higher articulation of formal-
informal economy linkages as creating a transfer of capital to the poor, extending their markets 
and creating stronger employment opportunities (Cheng & Gereffi 1994; London & Hart 2010; 
Prahalad & Hart 2002; UNDP 2008). The dearth of quantitative data on this topic renders it 
impossible to establish for every country overall levels of integration between the informal and 
the formal economy, as well as the payments to, and general working conditions within, 
informal enterprises. However, my qualitative study in Santiago shows that there is sufficient 
evidence to question whether real progress will be achieved for vulnerable populations through 
higher formal-informal articulation. It seems rather that, in this situation at least, the relationship 
is moving in a more structuralist direction of exploitative integration. To overcome this, I 
propose that policies should focus on broadening the market alternatives of informal enterprises 
by regulating formal-informal linkages, and developing clusters and networks of grassroots 
entrepreneurs. 
 
A more favourable articulation between the two economies can only be ensured if 
governments step in to guarantee that informal enterprises receive fair prices and reliable orders 
with timely payments from formal businesses. Here, we first need extended, network-wide 
producer responsibility: since subcontracting prices, standards and payments are drawn from 
demand from large established formal enterprises before filtering down through the networks, 
the higher level must be held accountable for the responsibility of minimising exploitation. 
Governments should demand higher levels of product and component traceability, to be able to 
identify the entire stream of subcontracting through to the lowest level of self-enterprises. This 
will allow for the extension of fiscalisation to the bottom of the network, making large 
enterprises accountable for the consequences of their production practices at all levels. A 
complementary policy to facilitate fiscalisation could be to open up labour office services to 
informal entrepreneurs, so that they are able to make official criticisms of subcontractors when 
facing mistreatment, which can then be traced back to formal enterprises. Finally, in some 
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markets where vulnerable populations are particularly exposed to exploitation, such as in 
amongst waste-pickers, minimum price payments should be regulated. 
 
From my perspective, the most preferable alternative for supporting the growth of 
informal enterprises is broadening market perspectives in parallel informal markets by 
articulating clusters and networks of grassroots entrepreneurs. As was shown for HBEs, clusters 
of businesses are able to attract clients to poor neighbourhoods on a regional scale, breaking 
limited demand in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. In the case of street vendors, networks of 
grassroots entrepreneurs allow several small enterprises to engrain themselves in networks that 
directly reach clients across large geographical spaces. This can provide them with much larger 
demand and create fairer market power in their ability to set favourable standards and prices. As 
also demonstrated earlier, the public sector may play a crucial role by supporting the articulation 
of entrepreneurs and the construction of large infrastructure to support the exchange and 
distribution of products across cities and regions, or throughout the nation. Further support to 
expand the demand of these clusters and networks could be achieved through the public sector 
contracting services from the enterprises of the poor. As first suggested in Weeks’ (1975) paper, 
though this proposal could be administratively demanding, it would potentially provide the 
transfer of capital, fair payments and sustainable demand that are vital for the expansion of 
small enterprises. 
 
At the level of individual enterprises, the idea of the right to access the city is essential 
for breaking spatial poverty traps. Government has the power to open up central and wealthy 
urban areas by providing permits or infrastructure for vulnerable non-residents. This would 
allow an expansion of economic returns for informal entrepreneurs along with a dramatic 
increase in their number of prospective clients. The exploitation of e-commerce platforms offers 
a further alternative for increasing both the visibility and market penetration of informal 
products to potential clients. If governments take an active role in broadening market 
perspectives, the resulting increases in productivity in the informal sector could truly be 
transformed into higher profits and improved working conditions. 
 
Policy approach 5: Organising informality 
 
Supportive government bodies should recognise that, when promoting a ‘right to 
succeed’ policy agenda, as is promoted by organisations such as WIEGO, a collection of 
informal entrepreneurs that works in a organised way is preferable to a large, disparate group of 
disconnected enterprises. As Davila and Brand (2012, p.58) underline, this local social capital 
allows local governments to obtain vital information to solve complex social problems, and acts 
as a strategy to compromise social actors in the implementation of agreed-upon policies. First, 
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as seen across sectors, organisations such as cooperatives or informal unions not only facilitate 
negotiations between informal enterprises and government, but also increase the efficiency of 
the interactive trial-and-error process of public investment. This is done by facilitating policy 
compliance among members, and allowing leaders to provide feedback and recommendations 
from informal entrepreneurs to local governments. Second, by having a degree of organisation, 
an administrative structure develops within which informal entrepreneurs share capital, profits 
and expand their investment capacity, allowing them to take advantage of the economies of 
scale. Since organisations can consolidate economically, their dependency on government 
resources is thus reduced. Organising thus allows isolated informal businesses to develop 
together, achieving better results than they could on their own. 
 
At this point it is worth noting that, although organisation is crucial for vulnerable 
populations to achieve social mobility, it should not be seen as standalone policy to replace the 
regulatory role of the state (described in Policy Approach 3). In my view, what can sometimes 
amount to an excess of (structuralist) confidence in the capacity of collective action of informal 
entrepreneurs (Budlender 2013; Dias 2016; Chen et al. 2016) may be unrealistic and, more 
importantly, may damage the very population that it is attempting to help. As seen in Chapter 7, 
organisations have the power to obtain support from formal enterprises so long as it expands 
their market, but even the strongest organisations have a very limited capacity to prevent 
exploitation through prices, payment condition and standards that also benefit formal enterprises. 
In turn, overconfidence in the power of collective organisation might lead to reductions in the 
much-needed pressure that is put upon governments to provide interventions that minimise the 
exploitation of formal-informal relations. 
 
Policy approach 6: Supporting formalisation  
 
While formalisation is not a sufficient condition to secure business growth among poor 
populations, it still both necessary and desirable. In line with de Soto’s (1989) conception, my 
research shows that the process of formalisation is essential for accessing public and private 
benefits, but remains difficult for those coming from a background of poverty, thus hindering 
their legal status (for further detail see Chaper 7, section ‘Accumulation of Disadvantages’). 
Here I can contrast three policy scenarios to foster the formalisation of informal entrepreneurs: 
no reward with responsibility, rewards without responsibility and rewards with (incremental) 
responsibility. The most commonly applied approach, no reward with responsibility, would not 
lead to significant tax collection (Bruhn & McKenzie 2014; de Mel et al. 2013; Joshi et al. 
2014), but instead would lead to many informal workers seeing formalisation as a burden, since 
it involves high expenses and/or the strict satisfaction of regulations without any immediate 
benefits for their business. This is problematic as it leads to individuals attempting to keep their 
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businesses ‘under the radar’ of government, inhibiting their future growth, while others who are 
willing to comply may simply collapse as they fail to satisfy the rule of law and cover the costs 
of formalising, threating their livelihoods. The second approach of rewards without 
responsibility could have the potential to foster the economic progression of vulnerable 
populations more broadly, but it may face the ethical problem of supporting tax evation (Joshi et 
al. 2014) . My research sustains that, although most informal entrepreneurs would not be taxed 
at their current income level, there is a small portion of high-productivity entrepreneurs that 
have taxable incomes (see Figures, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4). For instance, in the most profitable sectors 
of HBEs and street vendors, 1% to 3% of these informal entrepreneurs respectively earn 
incomes above USD 4,877 per month. At this income, they belong to the top 10% of Chilean 
income distribution and evade taxes ranging between 10% and 20% of their monthly income 
(INE 2017, p.4). For those that remain informal for tax evasion purposes, their informality may 
always be a more convenient option, in the context of support without responsibility.  
 
In my view, for a gradual process of formalisation that enhances livelihoods and extends 
legal and social protection (ILO 2014), it is only the third of these policy alternatives, 
exchanging rewards for increased responsibility, that has the potential to both increase 
formalisation and foster capitalisation and growth for the enterprises of the poor at the same 
time. Nevertheless, this means that, in most cases, governments must step out of their ‘policing’ 
role, into more of a ‘leadership’ role. A ‘leadership’ approach would mean collaboration with 
informal entrepreneurs, in exchange for satisfaction of reasonable levels of regulations and 
increased levels of formality over time. These types of negotiations have the capacity to give 
informal enterprises a voice, allowing them to better explain their inabilities to satisfy 
regulations, reach agreements with local authorities and work out alternative means of 
increasingly in formality. On the part of informal entrepreneurs, there is appeal in being part of 
these negotiations, as they can access the opportunities of formalisation and gain government 
support. On the part of governments, incremental formality will mean greater compliance with 
regulation and tax obligations. This in turn strengthens the state income stream and reduces 
dependence on public funds. 
 
As the experiences of supportive municipalities – such as La Reina, Peñalolén, Santiago 
Centro or Macul – show, the six supportive policies aproches described above  are essential for 
strengthening the opportunities of the poor, while negotiations with government have 
simultaneously brought them closer to the rule of law. Promoting this ‘right to succeed’ 
approach does not mean that governments will devalue the importance of formality, nor that 
they need to promote informality, but simply that they will bring informal enterprises under the 
rule of law using carrots rather than sticks. 
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Beyond the particular methodological tools and policy solutions presented above, a 
profound cultural shift is needed when dealing with informality, both in academia and in the 
policy environment. It is imperative to promote a greater social acceptance of informal 
entrepreneurs from local and national authorities as part of (rather than apart from) their social 
and growth strategies. 
 
Notes to Chapter Eight 
 
i. It was necessary to conduct my own randomised survey for this point.   
ii. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a right as: ‘a moral or legal entitlement to have or do 
something’. 
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ANNEXES 
 
ANNEX 1: A NOTE ON SANTIAGO DE CHILE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STRUCTURE.  
 
In Chile, as in many other parts of Latin America, local government has since the 1980s enjoyed 
increase responsibilities, power and the capacity to collect local revenues, transforming them 
into places of potential political innovation (Davila 2009, p.37). The administrative structure of 
Santiago de Chile is composed of two superimposed administrative structures: regional and 
local goverments. First, there is the Gobierno Regional Metropolitano (GORE Metropolitano), 
the regional government of Santiago that administrates 52 municipalities, 34 of which are highly 
urbanised with the rest being mostly rural. The GORE Metropolitano is governs by a regional 
mayor referred to as the intendente, who represents the President of Chile in the region (and is 
appointed by the president him or herself), and an elected assembly of consejeros regionales 
(COREs) (Ley Orgánica Constitucional 19.175 sobre Gobierno y Administración Regional). 
The GORE Metropolitano is responsible for economic, social and cultural development (Law 
19.175, art. 13). Effectively, the GORE does not directly provide any services itself, but has four 
soft powers: regional planning, territorial coordination of ministries’ investments, autonomous 
investment functions and regional development. Additionally, each ministry has a regional 
structure, the Secretarias Regionales Ministeriales (SEREMIs), led by secretarios regionales 
(SEREMIs) (the ministry’s representative in the region) who report directly to the intendente 
(who acts as the President’s representative) in all aspects related to the design, implementation 
and coordination of ministry interventions in the region (Law 19.175, art. 61-64). Given the fact 
that both the intendente and the SEREMIs are appointed by the central government, there is 
always political alignment.  
 
Second, Santiago de Chile has 52 municipalities governed by a mayor and a municipal 
assembly, who are democratically elected every four years. Municipalities are powerful 
autonomous administrative units in charge of the economic, social and cultural development of 
their communities, and are totally independent from regional and central government powers 
(Law 18,695, art. 1). They possess administrative autonomy, their own patrimony and budget 
and the power to generate local regulations and fix local taxes within the parameters of national 
laws. They also have a large number of functions including urban development, urban planning, 
the delivery of public infrastructure and housing, basic service provision (notably primary 
health, primary and secondary education, and waste manangement), local transport and transit, 
employment promotion and local development, law enforcement, promoting equality of 
opportunities and social development, among others (Law 18,695, art. 3). 
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The municipal autonomy, independence of budget allocation and the variety of  roles gives great 
independence to municipalities over decision-making and incorporation of innovative policy 
approaches that do not necessarily align with upper-level government policy. Moreover, the 
diversity of socio-economic realities throughout municipalities means that a variegated 
panorama of municipal policies exists within the region.   
 
Although the GORE Metropolitano does have some power to influence policy by deciding 
whether or not to invest in supporting policies in a particular municipal area, given the small 
autonomous budget of regional government and the fact that ministry investment is defined by a 
clear-cut deficit, in reality they have little influence over socio-economic development policies. 
This, combined with the lack of any legal power to act over municipal policies, results in a 
rather undermined capacity to influence municipal policy. Therefore, municipalities have full 
competency to independently define their policies towards the informal economy in most of the 
aspects relevant to the development of these businesses. 
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ANNEX 2: A GLOBAL DECENT WORK AGENDA AND DIFICULTIES IN 
MEASURING THE CONCEPT 
 
Since the ILO’s launch of the concept of ‘decent work’ in 1999, this has been increasingly pro-
moted as the key global strategy for eliminating poverty and promoting social inclusion (ILO 
2003b; World Bank 2012; OECD 2009c). Although, since its constitution, the idea of quality of 
work has been part of the internal ILO debate, it was not until 1999 that the new ILO director-
general made ‘decent work’ a core function, which was then further cemented in 2008 in the 
Decent Work Agenda, as the framework of all ILO work (Frey & MacNaughton 2016). The 
ILO was also fundamental to the increased incorporation of decent work across all international 
agencies. While originally, the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) in the year 2000 did not 
contain explicit reference to promoting decent work, the ILO campaigned for the incorporation 
of the concept as a ninth MDG objective in two major reports, Working Out of Poverty (ILO 
2003c) and A Fair Globalisation: Creating Opportunities for All, in the veil of the World Sum-
mit 2005, which reviews the MDGs. Decent work became integrated into the MDGs in 2007, 
however they unfortunately did not incorporate the four ILO Decent Agenda pillars (but only its 
income dimension), and it was not incorporated as a single objective, but rather as part of an 
objective on poverty eradication. Furthermore, Frey and MacNaughton (2016) underline that its 
incorporation was rather more symbolic than being a definitive action plan, since it came at a 
later point in time when the MDG action plan had already been completed, and so had no time 
target associated with it. Regardless of this incorporation in the MDG, in 2015 there were four 
times as many unemployed people compared to 1991, meaning 204 million people in unem-
ployment, with an additional 1.45 billion people in vulnerable working conditions (UN-DESA 
2015). Under the lead of the ILO and UNDP, during the thematic consultation on ‘growth and 
employment’ in preparation for the establishment of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), ‘decent work’ was incorporated under Goal 8 – although again not as a standalone ob-
jective – becoming a top priority for international development agencies (for a more detailed 
review of the incorporation of decent work into the MDGs and SDGs, see Frey and MacNaugh-
ton 2016). 
Although the recent recognition of decent work as an SDG in 2016 implies a global consesus 
about the need for urgent action to impove quality of work, a common ground does not exist 
regarding policy action. Ruggiero et al. (2015, p.126) argue that international organisations, 
such as the ILO and the World Bank, have different policy conceptualisations of decent work 
that lead to conflicting types of action. For Ruggiero et al. the World Bank promotes (many 
times neoliberal) pro-market actions, while the ILO promotes actions that are based on human 
rights. In this way, these two institutions enphasise conflicting actions that target health condi-
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tions versus health equity, pro-market interests versus the social dimension of work, or individ-
ual versus collective responsibility to achieve decent work (ibid., p.120). Frey and MacNaugh-
ton (2016, p.1), further argue the dominance of the World Bank’s perspective in the recently 
launched SDG- 8, as the link between economic growth and decent work establishes growth as a 
necessary condition for the achievement of decent work, despite the lack of evidence showing 
such a causal relationship, downgrading the ILO’s conception of decent work as a “fundamental 
right necessary for human dignity” (ibid, p.8). 
Measuring decent work 
Decent work as a multidimensional concept of quality of work, has been extremely difficult to 
operationalise in standarised and internationally comparable indicators, restricting its impact on 
both academic and policymaking contexts. Burchell et al. (2014), explains that in academic and 
policy grounds, there is no agreement about how to measure quality of work, regarding which 
indicators to include, and thus how to act and monitor progress. While in academic contexts, 
since the early 1960s agreement has existed to measure work quality beyond the solely econom-
ic dimension of pecuniary rewards, relevant disagreement exists regarding measuring subjective 
job satisfaction, ‘objective’ and observable characteristics of employment (some scholars advo-
cating for the establishment of minimum common characteristics) or mixed subjective and ob-
jective evaluations (Jecks et al. 1998, Kallebeg & Vaisey 2005, Tangian 2009). This has lead to 
even the most widely-used models disagreeing on their included indicators and how they should 
be included (Green & Mostaf 2012; Körner et al. 2009).  
In the context of international organisations, a set of common indicators is key to monitor pro-
gress, decide on policy actions and communicate results (Burchell et al. 2014). According to 
Burchell et al. (2014), three problems can explain the slow progress in agreeing on common 
indicators. First, the difficulties of obtaining reliable and internationally comparable data for 
many indicators simultaneouly. Second, deciding what type of information should measure a 
multidimensional concept (with the constraint that more indicators makes data less internation-
ally comparable). Finally, the aforementioned political tension of agreeing on a universal con-
cept among organisations and actors with different views about what constitutes a good job. De-
spite the discouraging panorama, international measurements have slowly evolved, adding more 
indicators and adjusting others that already exist (see ILO 2001, ILO 2002b, ILO 2008b), and in 
2013 the ILO came out with a guideline for producing internationally comparable statistics to 
monitor the progression of decent work. This guideline contains in ten substantive elements as-
sociated with 18 main indicators (see Table A.2.1), 31 additional indicators, and 10 indicators to 
be incorporated in the future, reflecting an ongoing debate to arrive to a final set of indicators. 
As Burchell (2014, pp.471-472) convincingly argues, this complexity, lack of agreement and 
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ongoing lack of standardised measurements have made the concept of ‘decent work’ of relative-
ly low use in academic discussion and impact on policy making. 
Table A.2. 1: Ten Substantive Elements and Statistical Indicators of the Decent Work Agenda 
Substantive element of the Decent Work 
Agenda 
  Statistical Indicators 
I. Employment opportunties 
1 Employment-to-population ratio 
2 Unemployment rate 
3 
Youth not in employment, education or 
trainning, 15-24 years 
4 Informal employment rate 
II. 
Adequate earnings and productive 
work 
5 Working poverty rate 
6 
Employees with low pay rate (below 2/3 of 
median hourly earnings) 
III. Decent work time 7 
Employment in excessive working time 
(more than 48 hours per week) 
IV. 
Combining work, family and personal 
life 
  No indicator 
V Work that should be abolished 8 Child labour rate 
VI. Stability and security of work 9 Precarious employment rate 
VII. 
Equal opportunity and treatment in 
employment 
10 Ocupational segregation by sex 
11 
Female share of employment in senior and 
middle management 
12 Gender wage gap 
VIII. Safe work environment 13 Ocupational injury frequency rate 
IX Social security 
14 
Share of population above statutory pen-
sionable age (or aged 65 or above) benefit-
ing from an old-age pension 
15 
Public social security expenditure (percent-
age of GDP) 
X 
Social dialogue, workers' and em-
ployers' representations 
16 Trade union density rate 
17 Employers' organisation density rate 
18 Collective barganing coverage rate 
Source: adapted from ILO 2013b. 
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ANNEX 3: DEBATES ON WASTE-PICKERS 
 
Thirty-five years have passed since the implementation in New Jersey (USA) of the first 
city recycling system (Miller 2002), and yet the majority of cities in developing countries have 
still not incorporated recycling as part of their Solid Waste Management (SWM) systems. In the 
best case scenarios, developing world cities collect and dispose of waste, but in the worst waste 
is not collected at all – as is the case for three billion people worldwide (UNEP 2015). Global 
urbanisation will bring 2.2 billion more people into cities in the Global South by 2050, 
increasing environmental and sanitisation problems that derive from inadequate SWM systems 
(Beall 1997, p.1). The main reason behind the absence of integral SWM systems (reduction, 
reuse, recycling and disposal) is the expensive capital cost of collection systems for countries 
that are income-poor and labour-rich (Ackerman 2005; Dias 2016). In response, waste-picking 
has been considered a spontaneous labour-intensive alternative for achieving integral SWM, and 
indeed, is sometimes regarded as an ‘example of sustainable development’ in developing 
countries, with ‘sustainable consumption and production’ accomplishing the triple objective of 
economic growth, social equality and environmental protection (Medina 2007, p.xi; Wilson et 
al. 2006). 
 
Medina (2007, p.ix) emphasises that waste-picking activities enhance environmental 
protection by increasing the amount of waste collected, reused, and recycled, resulting in high 
energy savings, pollution prevention and reductions in pollution indicators, as well as extending 
the life of landfills (see also Chen et al. 2016; Dias 2016; Geng & Cote 2002; Troschinetz & 
Mihelcic 2009). At the same time, waste-picking has significant economic impacts, both by 
providing cheap raw material to local enterprises, which increases their competitiveness 
(Medina 2007) and saves municipal waste management costs (Dias 2016, p.377) and by creating 
significant earnings for workers (Ahmed & Ali 2004; Chaturvedi 1998). Moreover, informal 
waste-picking has a strong impact on social equity insofar as it creates more than 15 million 
jobs worldwide for the most vulnerable members of society (Medina 2007, p.viii). In spite of 
these benefits, waste-picking largely remains an illegal activity. 
 
 The following section will analyse the arguments and policy approaches towards waste-
pickers from the three schools of thought presented above (treating voluntarist and dualist as 
one perspective), and finally examine the more recent wave of supportive policies that have 
been implemented. 
 
 
 
303 
 
Dualist policies towards waste-pickers 
 
The dualist school contends that there are few direct economic links between informal 
waste-picking activities and formal economic sectors (Santos 1979). From this perspective, 
waste-picking emerges as a result of a lack of growth and modern employment in developing 
countries, being a ‘last resort’ or marginal survival activity with low productivity potential 
(Geertz 1963; Huysman 1994). 
 
The dualist conception of waste-picking is widespread among academics and 
policymakers (Lomnitz 1977; Souza 1980). As is the case with the UIE in general, waste-
picking is considered counter-cyclical to economic impacts from a dualist perspective. Such 
counter-cyclical predictions have been observed in analyses of waste-picking in the 1994 
Mexican and 2001 Argentinian economic crises, as economic downturn was followed by a 
dramatic increase in waste-picking activities (Schamber & Suarez 2007). 
 
All dualist visions of waste-picking advocate for the expansion of the formal economy 
and the repression of waste-picking activities. To expand the formal economy in the context of 
waste-pickers, organisations such as the World Bank promoted the privatisation of municipal 
SWM systems (Beall 1997, p.6). Salah-Fahmi (2005), in Egypt, and Beall (1997, p.6), in 
Pakistan, report how waste-pickers have been displaced and excluded from the formal 
municipal SWM system following this privatisation. Repressive policies have been put in place 
to reduce persistent informal waste-picking, and these policies, such as displacement, policing, 
confiscation of materials and clampdowns on work, have for a long time been the mainstream 
approach used to address the issue. Schamber and Suárez (2002) show that in Argentina in 
2002, after a growth in waste-picking activities following the economic crisis, repressive 
policies were extensively implemented by the local government of Buenos Aires. My analysis of 
Santiago de Chile (Navarrete 2010) furthermore underlines how waste-pickers are subject to 
police harassment, being permitted to work only during the night-time. 
 
Structuralist policies towards waste-pickers 
 
 For structuralists, waste-picking is an integral part of the capitalist system. Waste-
pickers’ activities provide the link to satisfy formal enterprises’ demand for recycled materials 
(Birkbeck 1979, p.164), allowing for the reduction of labour costs and overhead expenses. 
Structuralists perceive this relationship as exploitative and one that reinforces the cycle of 
poverty. For Birkbeck (1978; 1979), waste-pickers are able to reduce production costs for 
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formal enterprises in two ways: by providing input materials at a lower price than raw materials, 
and reducing the costs of labour contracting for the provision of these products. Regarding the 
first point, large industries are able to command dramatically reduced prices for these materials 
due to their monopsony and oligopsony power (Birkbeck 1979, p.176). Regarding the second, 
these enterprises are able to avoid standard contractual relationships and labour benefit 
payments when dealing with waste-pickers. Furthermore, by their nature as an unorganised 
mass of labour, waste-pickers face reduced bargaining power over their wages, and piecework 
payments allow for complete labour flexibility and the avoidance of firing costs when deemed 
necessary (Birkbeck 1979, pp.175-177). Structuralists hence argue that waste-pickers form an 
‘integral part’ of the capitalist system of production, reducing production costs and fostering 
competitiveness for large businesses. As with the UIE in general, waste-picking is pro-cyclical 
to economic impacts: in times of economic expansion, demand for recyclable materials from 
local industries will increase, in turn creating a growth in the activity. The strong link between 
formal enterprise demand and waste-pickers’ supply has been similarly demonstrated in 
Colombia (Birkbeck 1979), Pakistan (Beall 1997, p.127), India (Chaturvedi 1998), and 
Argentina and Mexico (Medina 2007). 
 
Structuralists’ main policy recommendation is to foster waste-picker unions, in order to 
reinforce their power to negotiate better prices and working conditions (Birkbeck 1979; Scham-
ber & Suárez 2007). With stronger unions, waste-pickers can potentially increase their power to 
negotiate better selling conditions and secure access to a larger amount of recyclable materials 
(Birkbeck 1979, p.180; see also WIEGO 2015). Similarly, strong waste-picker unions will be 
able to negotiate better prices paid from enterprises and middlemen. Dias (2016) further under-
lines that organisation can be key for negotiating a favourable regulatory framework with local 
government in which they can operate freely. Indeed, NGOs and some neo-Marxian local gov-
ernments in cities such as Buenos Aires (Argentina), São Paulo (Brazil), Bogotá (Colombia), 
and Temuco (Chile) have fostered the creation of these cooperatives to fight against repressive 
central state policies and to negotiate better prices for recyclable materials (UN Habitat 2016; 
MMA 2013, p.39; Schamber & Suarez 2007).  
 
Neoliberal policies towards waste-pickers 
 
 Medina (2007) analyses neoliberal logic as applied to waste-picking, considering 
workers to be micro-entrepreneurs or ‘industrial scavengers’. Their activity is strongly 
connected with the formal industry in two main ways. First, as observed by structuralists, waste-
picking provides local industry with cheap substitutes for raw materials, thereby reducing 
production costs. Second, the formal market of raw materials determines the types of substitute 
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materials that are in demand, and in turn the prices paid to waste-pickers. Consequently, waste-
picking inherently affects the competitiveness of local industry. Unlike the traditional neoliberal 
model regarding the UIE, for Medina (2007) all types of waste-picking are counter-cyclical to 
economic growth: subsistence waste-picking rises during economic downturns, as 
unemployment increases. Similarly in periods of crisis, local currencies tend to devalue, raising 
the prices of imported raw material, thus increasing the demand for cheap substitutes provided 
by waste-pickers. From this perspective, waste-picking is highly efficient, but for reasons of 
legalisation and government regulation, waste-pickers cannot realise their full economic 
potential. 
 
 Government intervention, in the form of harassment or restriction to the activity, does 
not allow waste-pickers to reach their maximum efficiency as it prevents enterprises' 
capitalisation and growth. Consequently, these legal restrictions must disappear for the waste-
picking sector to flourish. Neoliberal policies towards waste-pickers have been strongly fostered 
in the early 2000s in Latin America – particularly in Brazil, Peru, and Argentina, where waste-
picking was legally recognised and the market of recyclable materials opened to waste-pickers 
(LCABA 2002; Medeiros & Macêdo 2006; Medina 2005a; 2005b; Piovano 2008).  
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ANNEX 4: DEBATES ON INFORMAL STREET VENDING 
 
 Street vending is understood as ‘retail or wholesale trading of goods and services in the 
public axis such as alleyways, avenues and boulevards’, with sales made from mobile (person, 
tricycle or motor vehicle) or fixed stores (isolated or concentrated in a ‘street market’) (Bromley 
2000, pp.1-4; see also de Soto 1989, p.61). It is one of the oldest, most visible and most 
persistent informal activities (Neuwirth 2011; WIEGO 2014d). Although the modern retail 
industry has extended into major cities, street vending remains a retail alternative in almost 
every large city in the world, including the Global North (Bromley 2000; Skinner 2008; WIEGO 
2014d). No matter how aggressive public policies or formal retail strategies towards street 
vending have been, this activity has found a way to rebuild itself throughout the centuries and 
stands as a main characteristic of the process of urbanisation (for detailed studies in Lima and 
Nairobi, see de Soto 1989, pp.59-92 and Kinyanjui 2014, pp.1-63).  
 
 Despite being a seemingly unshakeable feature of cities, street vending has created 
intense debate around its benefits and drawbacks. Regarding its benefits, street vending can 
contribute to enhancing urban cultural life, transforming parts of cities into major tourist 
attractions, and bringing identity and meaning to otherwise empty and homogenous public 
spaces (Bromley 2000, p.1). Moreover, street vending can perform a major socio-economic role 
by creating job opportunities (de Soto 1989; Roever & Skinner 2016; Williams & Gurtoo 2012), 
raising product competition, controlling inflation (as it lowers the costs of products/services), 
and increasing the sales outputs of formal enterprises (Bromley 2000, p.5; for a more detailed 
discussion of expanding formal markets, see London 2010; Prahalad 2004). Furthermore, street 
vending has a significant role in the provision of goods and services in urban areas, as it 
provides affordable products in small quantities, improves production and distribution networks, 
and increases retail coverage, particularly in peripheral and/or isolated low income urban areas 
(Roever & Skinner 2016, p. 361).    
 
 However, more conventional views caution about the pervasive effects of street vending 
for urban, social and economic life. Urban life is arguably worsened as a result of street vending 
through increased congestion, pollution (e.g. uncollected rubbish, traffic pollution and untreated 
water) and by deteriorating the commercial and aesthetic appeal and overall image of a public 
space (Bromley 1979, pp.6-9; de Soto 1989; Harrison & McVey 1997, p.318; Kinyanjui 2014, 
p.34; Oz & Eder 2012). Economic growth is also damaged as a consequence of limited or non-
existent tax payments (on profits and added value) and ‘unfair competition’ against formal 
shops, which can reduce economic strength and the availability of employment within the 
formal sector (Harrison & McVey 1997; pp.318-319; Kinyanjui 2014, p.38). Social issues that 
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arise from street vending concern the potential threats to health from poor management or 
production of street food, the impacts on street safety and security (by leading to an increase in 
traffic accidents and the possibility of theft) (Bromley 2000, p.1; Harrison & McVey 1997, 
pp.318-319; Whitehouse et al. 2008) and the perpetuation of poverty (through low incomes, low 
productivity potential and the absence of social protection). Policymakers have traditionally 
perceived street vending as a ‘non-modern’ activity, and a sign of a lack of urban development. 
This has led urban authorities to address ‘ambivalent or repressive, but seldom supportive 
(policies)’ (Skinner 2008, p.227). 
 
Dualist policies towards street vending 
 
Dualists conceive of street vending as a sign of poverty and a lack of formal 
employment, and its disappearance is seen as a positive evolution (Geertz 1963; Gilbert 1998). 
Workers sell goods produced in and distributed entirely through informal networks. These 
informal products are considered to be lower quality than formal products (Peattie 1980) and 
can only be competitive in the presence of low-income consumers who have insufficient 
resources to buy formal, higher quality products. This point is particularly relevant in the food 
sector, where the quality of street vendors’ products can threaten public health (Ekanem 1998; 
Harrison & McVey 1997, p.318; Lues et al. 2006)
1
. Their operations have a low-productivity 
future, and hence are not a viable development possibility. Street vendor operations involve low 
capital, operate on a small scale and utilise only basic technology, so neither a notable increase 
in productivity nor the integration of street vending into the retail distribution systems of 
modern cities is possible. Furthermore, street vending tends to be associated with an 
underdeveloped accounting system, an unclearly defined pricing system, child labour (Peattie 
1980) and long working days (Núñez 1993). 
 
Drawing on these observations, dualist policymakers consider street vending to be 
reminiscent of a traditional market system, or as a primitive approach to retail, and thus aim to 
attract and develop a ‘modern’ formal retail system that would make formal products available 
in areas where street vending flourishes. In addition, policymakers see street vendors as a 
‘nuisance’ associated with the aforementioned urban problems (Cross 1998, p.7), and accuse 
vendors of unfair competition with the formal sector as they do not pay, or pay only limited 
space rental costs and/or taxes to the public sector.  
 
                                                        
1 It is worth noting, however, that similar concerns do exist in the formal food sector regarding the use 
of potentially harmful ingredients and unhealthy doses of additives. 
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Policymakers have been led to implement repressive policies of evictions, relocation 
and harassment, using police and inspectors (Cross 1998, p.9; Roever & Skinner 2016, pp.362-
364) that have ‘threatened, chased, arrested and occasionally beaten street vendors, and (often 
confiscated) their goods’ in several cities of the world (Bromley 2000, p.11; see also Harrison & 
McVey 1997, p.320; Kinyanjui 2014, p.26). Moreover, Kinyanjui (2014, pp.37-41) reports on 
the restrictions on stall size, destruction of stalls, provision of unsecure permits, lack of 
flexibility regarding opening times and the disarticulation of street vendor organisations as 
additional repressive policies that can harm street vendors (see Roever & Skinner 2016 for a 
detailed discussion of the impacts of repressive policies). The main players that influence 
policies of repression tend to be the local chamber of commerce, property developers and 
neighbourhood associations (Bromley 2000, p.13; Harrison & McVey 1997, p.323; Neuwirth 
2011, p.11; Roever & Skinner 2016). Repressive policies are common in the Global South, as 
Roever and Skinner (2016, pp.362-363) report that over a period of three years more that fifty 
evictions and forced relocations of street vendors were reported in cities including Bogotá, 
Kathmandu, Kingston, Lagos, Luanda, Manilla, Medellín, Mexico City, Mumbai, San Pedro 
Sula, San Salvador and Tegucigalpa. In the African context, repressive policies are currently 
being expanded to the point where purchasing from street vendors constitutes a criminal 
offence. Dualist policies towards street vending thus aim to attract modern retail and repress 
informal activity to the point where street vending will ultimately be rendered obsolete.  by 
modern retail. 
 
Structuralist policies towards street vending 
 
For structuralists, street vendors are an integral part of the formal production-
distribution chain, being vertically integrated in exploitative conditions with the formal 
economy, as distributional channels of formal products (Cross 1998, p.229; Kinyanjui 2014, 
p.9) or as purchasers of raw materials used to fabricate their own products (Peattie 1980, pp.25-
27). For instance, it is estimated that a wide range of products, from vegetables to toys or 
telephones, owe a great deal of their sales to street vendor distribution channels (Neuwirth 2011; 
Peattie 1980; see also Dolan & Scott 2009; Payaud 2013). At the same time, street vending is 
perceived as a ‘necessity-driven’ and ‘last resort’ activity (Cross 1998, p.228; Williams & 
Gurtoo 2012, p.2), that forces people to work in poor conditions. The concept of street vending 
as a survival activity has been supported by studies in several countries such as Ghana (Lyon 
2007), Somalia (Little 2003) and the Dominican Republic (Itzigsohn 2000). Authors have also 
described street vending as a highly insecure and unstable form of employment characterised by 
prolonged working hours, little legal or social protection and low wages (Kapoor 2007; 
Williams & Gurtoo 2012, p.5). It is also important to note that formal industries gain a two-fold 
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benefit from street vending: first, by having a reserve of workers available that keep wages low; 
and second, by increasing their sales without bearing the costs of social payments and labour 
contracts. 
 
As per their recommendation with regard to waste-pickers, structuralist policies seek to 
strengthen street vendors’ union power to oppose repression and/or influence policymaking. 
According to structuralists, street vendors are not included in the ‘regulatory (creation) process’ 
devised by elites of professionals and politicians, resulting in policies that hardly represent their 
interests (Cross 1998, p.248; Kinyanjui 2014, p.14). Stronger organisations are needed to 
acquire the critical power to negotiate with authorities and resist repression by the state or other 
interest groups (Cross 1998, p.245). Particularly, powerful street vendor unions would be able to 
negotiate for locations where sales are high, secure the use of public streets, access financial 
benefits – notably a reduction of fees and taxes – and expand the availability of work spaces 
(Cross 1998; Harrison & McVey 1997; Roever & Skinner 2016). Furthermore, they would be in 
a better position to resist repression through their political influence, increasing their capacity to 
set up work in new locations and giving them a stronger voice to obtain favourable local 
regulations (Bromley 2000, p.14; Cross 1998, p.232). As a result, benefits from the activity 
would be optimised and workers would have a better guaranteed survival (Cross 1998, p.250). 
Cross (1998, p.248) stresses that unions should preferably be medium-sized and locally based, 
achieving a critical mass that avoids co-optation by public authorities and/or their political 
leaders. More recent studies propose that larger unions can be effective not only in resisting 
eviction, but also when lobbying for favourable changes in national law (Roever & Skinner 
2016, pp.370-371; Lindell 2010). 
 
Neoliberal policies towards street vending 
 
For neoliberals, street vending is an entrepreneurial activity that follows a particular 
evolutionary path in which vendors acquire valuable experience and increase their profitability 
and capital (de Soto 1989). This evolution moves from people being mobile ambulant vendors, 
to becoming fixed street vendors, and then becoming part of an informal street market and 
establishing an informal ‘right of ownership’ over public urban space (Bromley 2000, p.4; de 
Soto 1989, p.83; Núñez 1993). Finally, street vendors establish formal markets in private spaces, 
securing formal property rights (de Soto 1989, p.62). In street markets, this informal ‘right of 
ownership’ represents the recognition of and respect for the power of associations to allocate 
business space, along with the payment of municipal taxes for the use of public space. From this 
perspective, street vending follows the path of a start-up enterprise, with legislation and public 
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harassment being the main constraints to their development. 
 
Neoliberals promote street vendors’ access to free-market opportunities and the 
legalisation of the activity. For neoliberals, the state imposes significant monetary and time 
constraints on street vendors’ ability to set up formal shops and construct formal markets. These 
constraints largely outstrip the capacity of the most vulnerable workers and entrepreneurs, 
forcing them into informality (de Soto 1989). At the same time, harassment policies lead 
informal entrepreneurs towards devoting significant time and resources to non-productive tasks, 
thus ‘limit(ing) the profitability of street vending’ (Bromley 2000, p.23). Furthermore, when 
street vendors must contend with the confiscation of their products or the destruction of their 
stalls, they are regularly forced to restart the process of building their capital, both working (the 
cycle of buying a product, selling at a profit and using the profit to re-invest in a greater number 
of products) and fixed. Being in favour of free-market access, neoliberals recommend allowing 
street vendors to develop naturally by themselves, following their postulated evolutionary path. 
Additionally, the legalisation of street vendors would be key to guaranteeing access to property 
rights over their assets from the outset. Through legalisation, street vendors would be able to 
access the full opportunities of the private modern economy, having access to credit, increasing 
their investments and seeing their micro-enterprise continue to evolve (de Soto 1989; Kinyanjui 
2014, p.33). Kinyanjui (2014, pp.23-24) provides an example of this type of legalisation in 
Nairobi, where policies were introduced that provided vendors licensing and allocation of a 
trading space in exchange for a reasonable fee. 
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ANNEX 5: DEBATES ON HOME-BASED ENTERPRISES 
 
 Home-based enterprises (HBEs) are a major and growing component of the informal 
sector, present in both developed and developing countries (Chen et al. 1999; Tipple 2005; 
WIEGO 2014b). Strassman (1987) defines HBEs as businesses that are located at home or in 
very close proximity to it, in both low- and high-income neighbourhoods (see also Ezeadichie 
2012, p.49; Tipple 2005, p.613), rather than in areas of commercial or industrial land use (see 
also Chen & Sinha 2016; Ezeadichie 2012, p.49; Tipple 2005, p.613). According to WIEGO 
(2014b) there are over 100 million home-based workers around the world, the vast majority of 
whom are women. There are two types of informal home-based workers in HBEs: those 
subcontracted by firms or intermediaries (‘own account home-based workers’); and the self-
employed, who produce or sell goods and services from home (‘homeworkers’) (Chen & Sinha 
2016; Rogerson 1996; WIEGO 2014b). 
 
 Home-based informal businesses are traditionally easy-entry, small, family-based 
enterprises, often using unpaid family workers, and with limited expansion capacity (ILO 1972; 
Ligthelm 2005, p.207; Tipple 2005, p.618). The majority of HBEs are concentrated in few 
sectors: primarily retail, mainly ‘daily household necessity’ goods, and manufacturing (Gough 
1993, p.98; Gough & Kellett 2001, p.240; Tipple 2005, p.614). However, the remainder of 
HBEs represents a large diversity of businesses including artisanal production, personal services 
and clerical work (Gough et al. 2003, p.260; Tipple 2004, p.374; 2005, p.614; WIEGO 2014b). 
Although in theory HBEs ought to have disappeared with the advance of modern industrial and 
retail production, various scholars have shown that these informal activities have proven to be 
highly persistent and permanent (Biles 2008; 2009; Gough & Kellet 2001). Ligthelm (2005, 
p.205) underlines that a large proportion of these businesses have long survival rates, and 
Gough (2010, p.67; see also Gough & Kellet 2001) maintains that a large percentage of 
‘business death’ in the sector can be explained by adaptive behaviours that turn HBEs into more 
profitable endeavours. 
 
 There is intense debate regarding the desirability of HBEs as a feature of modern urban 
development. Several authors argue that HBEs contribute significantly to income generation for 
the urban poor, as well as poverty alleviation (Ezeadichie 2012, p.47; Gough 1993; 2010; 
Gough et al. 2003, p.64) and social inclusion (WIEGO 2014b). Regarding income generation, 
Gough et al. (2003, p.258) argue that these businesses are important and attainable means of 
complementing household income, as they require low skills, low starting capital and are based 
on local demand, creating an easy-entry income alternative – particularly in times of macro-
economic crisis (see also Gough 1993; Roy 2005). Furthermore, the home-based nature of 
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employment allows workers to save on the costs of commuting to a workplace, resulting in a 
higher share of household budget available for other expenses (Ezeadichie 2012, p.48; Gough 
1993). At the same time, HBEs contribute to poverty alleviation, by enhancing affordability, 
coverage and availability for consumers (Ezeadichie 2012, Chen 2014). Increased affordability 
comes from offering products in small quantities, adjusted in quality and offering informal 
credit access to low-income households (Gough 1993; Gough et al. 2003, p.261); retail coverage 
from injecting undersupplied neighbourhoods with a large diversity of goods and services (Chen 
& Sinha 2016, 343; Ezeadichie 2012, p.52; Gough et al. 2003, p.261; Tipple 2004, p.374); and 
availability of products by operating six or seven days per week, with extended opening hours 
(Gough et al. 2003, p.262; Ligthelm 2005, p.210). Finally, they play a significant role in social 
inclusion through increased employment opportunities, particularly by allowing women to 
combine reproductive and productive tasks (Carr et al. 2000; Chant 2014, p.298; Chant & 
McIIwaine 2009; 2016; ILO 2002a; Tipple 2004, p.374; WIEGO 2014b), by allowing the 
elderly to complement their pension income (Gough et al. 2003, p.266), and by generating extra 
income that helps to consolidate houses in low-income neighbourhoods (Gough 1993, p.101, 
Gough & Kellett. 2001; Gough & Tan 2009). 
 
In spite of these benefits, HBEs remain a contested point in academic work, as they are 
associated with urban decay and a variety of social problems. HBEs are perceived as having a 
negative effect on the urban environment for several reasons. First, their existence can lead to 
the deterioration of a local environment by incorporating polluting activities into residential 
areas, through work with toxic inputs (Frijns & Van Vliet 1999; Gough 1993) and by increasing 
the output of waste in areas that have no system of SWM (Tipple 2004, p.373). Second, HBEs 
may illegally occupy and build into public space to expand their business, depriving the 
community of these areas (Gough et al. 2003). Third, HBEs are blamed for decreasing land 
value, as they influence the liveability and aesthetic image of residential areas (Okeke 2000). 
Inside the home workspace, a major criticism lies in the impact of increased overcrowding due 
to occupying the ‘scarce space that is needed for domestic functions’ (Tipple 2004, p.261; see 
also Chant & McIIwaine 2009; Gove et al. 1983). Regarding social impacts, authors underline 
that the nature of family home-based business allows for a higher presence of child work than in 
other informal sectors (Benería & Floro 2005; Gough et al. 2003). Moreover, Benería and Floro 
(2005) point out that HBEs create a reproductive cycle of poverty: by exploiting child labour 
and diverting children from school studies, the cycle of low education and sustained low income 
for poor households is perpetuated. Another common criticism is the resulting drain on 
contributions to local public services, as HBE’s tend to ‘free-ride’ by not paying local and/or 
national taxes (Ezeadichie 2012, p.51). In light of contested views on the desirability of HBEs, 
it is no surprise that policy recommendations differ markedly. 
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Dualist policies towards HBEs 
 
 For dualists, there is no place for HBEs in a modern economy. From a dualist vantage 
point, HBEs are part of the process of urban development that encourages rural-urban migration 
(Ezeadichie 2012, p.44). In developing countries, the large majority of poor people migrating to 
the city end up in poorly serviced areas or informal settlements, where there is little or no 
provision of goods or infrastructure. As a result of unemployment and lack of neighbourhood 
services, HBEs emerge as a low-profit employment option, and the sector is condemned to low 
productivity since the majority of its workers have limited skills and capital. Dualists argue that 
modern urbanisation will force HBEs to contend with modern industries of goods and services, 
and will ultimately face their demise when they no longer provide a competitive alternative. 
HBEs are regarded as being only marginally connected with the formal market, as they are 
limited in size and supply potential, offering mainly daily necessities on a very localised scale 
(Gough et al. 2003, p.274).  
 
 As with waste-pickers and street vendors, dualists argue that HBEs will face a counter-
cyclical impact to economic turndown, as they provide ‘easy-entry’ work alternatives in times of 
crisis. Nevertheless, they criticise the limited capacity of HBEs to absorb workers. As 
unemployment increases, more HBEs will be established in an urban area, increasing local 
competition, and thus reducing profit until many businesses become unprofitable (May & 
Stavrou 1990; Snyman 1990). Empirical evidence from Gough et al. (2003, pp.266-268; 2010) 
does indeed show that many HBEs have limited capability for expansion and a very short 
lifespan for these reasons. 
 
 Once again, dualists advocate here for policies of expansion of the formal economy and 
repression of HBEs. The industrial and retail attraction of formal enterprises with a stronger 
presence in poor neighbourhoods is seen as a relatively straightforward means of decreasing 
self-employment in HBEs. This may require supplying economic incentives to the formal sector, 
such as infrastructure or tax abatements, or lobbying supermarkets or industries to establish 
businesses in poor districts. This attraction of formal enterprises to poor areas has been 
described as common employment policy practice for local councils, and modern retail has led 
to the disappearance of informal activities, or their displacement to less profitable areas (see 
Aliaga 2011; 2012; Dyer et al. 2005; FNE 2007; Kalhan 2007). Beyond this, dualist 
policymakers apply censure and repressive interventions, drawn from HBEs’ non-compliance 
with one or several regulations (Watson 2011). These policies can include refusing local permits 
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to HBEs, constant controls from public officers and fines for not complying with land or 
sanitary regulations. Gough and Tran (2009), for instance, report the closure of HBEs and 
intense fiscalisation during the period of communist rule in Vietnam, as most private activities 
were banned. However, as Gough et al. (2003, p.274) emphasise, although HBEs clearly break 
laws and regulations, enforcement is actually quite rare, and, unlike the other two sectors 
studied here, dualist repressive policies are not particularly common.  
 
Structuralist policies towards HBEs 
 
 From a structuralist perspective, HBEs serve as a means for labour exploitation, 
particularly through women (Chant 2014; Chant & Pedwell 2008; Ghvamshahidi 1995). For 
structuralists, the increased unemployment resulting from trade liberalisation has led to 
increased competition between HBEs, downgrading their profits and decreasing wages (Gough 
et al. 2003, p.254; Siggel 2010). At the same time, globalisation has seen multinationals 
subcontract enterprises or intermediaries to lower the costs of production ‘incorporating them 
into national or international value chains on unfair terms’ (Chen & Sinha 2016, pp.345-346). 
Several of these products are made by HBEs, particularly in the manufacturing sector. As a 
result, multinationals are able to exploit labour by transferring the production costs of social 
security, benefit payment and extensive workday length to workers (Tipple 2005, p.620; see also 
Chen & Sinha 2016; Chant & McIIwaine 2009; Ruthven 2010). Similarly, multinationals use 
subcontracting to exploit vulnerable workers (typically women, migrants and children) and 
employ unpaid family members to reduce their costs of production (Nadvi 2004; Ruthven 
2010). Chant (2014, p.298) also points out that, by incorporating women who tend to be the 
primary family caregivers into productive activities, their burdens of responsibility and 
obligation grow, reinforcing their situations of poverty
2
. Structuralists see these industries as 
pro-cyclical, as they expand along with the economy as the need for subcontracting from HBEs 
increases. 
   
 Although structuralists generally associate HBEs with labour exploitation that should be 
replaced by ‘decent’ formal work, as a preliminary policy they advocate organisations that can 
raise workers’ bargaining power against large formal enterprises and public officials (WIEGO 
2014b). These organisations are not commonplace amongst HBEs, as the isolation of workers 
has created difficulties in building strong HBE organisations (Chen & Sinha 2016, p.352). This 
                                                        
2
 Chant proposes that not addressing the roots of the exclusion of women – based in household and 
family norms and expectations – in favour of a purely income-based analysis, could lead to an 
increase in women’s overall contribution to productive activities without significantly reducing 
their family responsibilities and obligations. 
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has resulted in a group of informal workers that are far less organised than other informal 
sectors, leaving them little negotiating power (WIEGO 2014b) and thus particularly vulnerable 
to exploitation. This grants the leading formal enterprises uncontested power to fix standards, 
deadlines, and prices of products, as well as to impose irregular work orders and delay 
payments, which forces those in HBEs to work for low wages, without social benefits and to 
cover their own costs of capital investments (Chen & Sinha 2016, p.346). For structuralists, the 
fostering of their organisational power would increase HBEs’ capacity to negotiate regular work 
orders, higher prices and reduce the payment waiting time (Chen & Sinha 2016; WIEGO 
2014b). In practise, when HBE organisation does occur, it either happens at a local level, with 
power remaining limited, or it is connected to more general organisations at the national level 
(WIEGO 2014b), which reduces the capacity to address sector-specific concerns. International 
organisations and NGOs, such as UN Women (through the United Nations Development Fund 
for Women), SEWA (Self-Employed Women’s Association) and particularly ‘HomeNet’ have 
actively fostered the creation of organisations. Chen and Sinha (2016, pp.354-355) report how 
city- and national-level HBE organisations in Thailand and the Philippines have been able to 
secure increased bus services, electrification of slums, access to water, occupational health 
access and other labour rights.  
 
Neoliberal policies towards HBEs 
 
 Neoliberals consider HBEs to be start-up enterprises that are conducive to economic and 
social gains, especially among the poor. By using their own home for productive tasks, low-
income households reduce capital entry barriers and avoid high maintenance costs (Tipple 1993, 
p.529; Whitson 2007). As several enterprises are established, the more successful ones survive 
and become highly competitive, contributing to economic growth. For example, Ligthelm’s 
(2005, p.215) study shows that, in South Africa, when compared on a store-by-store basis, some 
HBEs working in retail can have a higher turnover than several well-known national South 
African small supermarkets operating in the formal sector (such as ‘8 Till Late’, ‘Seven Eleven’ 
or ‘OK Foods’), and their combined turnover represents more than 20% of all combined 
hypermarket and supermarket revenue. Those enterprises that have no expansion capacity can 
still make a significant contribution to household livelihoods of the urban poor – Tipple (2004, 
p.374) points out that households operating HBEs tend to earn more than households which do 
not run HBEs. These informal businesses are connected to the formal economy in two main 
ways: first, through their demand for raw and processed formal products; and second, by selling 
their products, as competitive inputs, to industries. As a result of these connections, HBEs are 
pro-cyclical – in times of economic expansion, demand for their products increases from local 
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markets and formal industries. 
 
Neoliberal policy recommendations are based on legalisation, property rights and access 
to credit. For neoliberals, HBEs’ dependency on small quantities of money coming from their 
own savings, and on credit from family or relatives, to start or expand their business (Ligthelm 
2003, p.36; Ligthelm 2005, p.206) poses a major constraint to achieving their full productive 
capacity. For Watson (2011, p.1), laws, regulations and professional practices – especially in 
planning – exact costs and restrictions upon HBEs which are difficult to meet by poor 
households, thus obliging them to remain illegal. For instance, Onyebueke and Ndubueze’s 
(2010) study of housing in Nigeria highlights how land regulation imposes artificial restrictions 
of mono-functional land usage that prevents multifunctional units – such as HBEs – from 
operating legally. This resulting illegality causes two problems for the development of HBEs. 
First, because of insecure tenure, HBEs tend to underinvest in their businesses (Hoek-Smit 
1981). Second, because of their illegal status, HBEs cannot access crucial credits to expand their 
business. Indeed, in Accra and Pretoria, where HBEs have expressed a desire to expand their 
businesses, Gough et al (2003, p.266) argue that the lack of access to capital is their primary 
constraint. If, for example, a successful HBE runs out of useable surplus surface area in its 
home-work property space, the proprietor would not be able to access credit to rent or purchase 
a new site into which they could expand their enterprise (Gough et al. 2003, p.268). For 
neoliberals, legalisation and secure property rights over their business would eliminate the 
occurrence of situations like this that prevent the expansion of HBEs, allowing them to fully 
reach their growth potential (Ezeadichie 2012, p.48). 
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ANNEX 6: INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR WASTE-
PICKERS 
 
In Chapter 4, section three, I evaluate the impact of support policies on five indicators. This 
annex complements this discussion providing detail on evaluated policies, running variables and 
extending the discussion on additional performance indicators discussed in the literature. For 
this, I run Equation 1 where the outcome of interest is one of six additional sustainable 
performance indicators. As explanatory variables in this set of regressions remains the twelve 
supportive policies implemented by municipalities as for models in Chapter 4, with the same 
model specifications and significance levels applying. Tables A.6.4 through A.6.6 report  all 
coefficients in the regression, and the way that the coefficients change as more controls are 
added. As before, qualitative analysis is used to report explanations for mechanisms driving 
policy impact.  
 
The results of regression models are summarised in Table A.6.3 Model 1.b reports the impact of 
policies on an additional economic outcomes; Model 2.b reports the impact of policies on an 
additional social outcomes; Model 3.b assess the impact of policies on an additional working 
conditions outcome; Model 1.b-5.c  analyse the impact of policies on the reduction of negative 
externalities for HBEs. For intellectual transparency, full models are presented in Tables A.6.4 
through A.6.6.  
 
Table A.6. 1: Sustainable Performance Indicators for Waste-Pickers (Dependent Variables) 
  Response Variables Authors  n. Indicators 
1. Economic efficiency       
  Individual productivity Medina (2007) 1.a Earnings per hour worked                     
  Impact on productivity of local industry Medina (2007) 1.b Kilograms recycled per hour 
2. Social equity       
  Poverty reduction 
Medina (2007); 
2.a 
Income as multiple above/below mini-
mum salary  Chaturvedi (1998) 
  Internal income equality Chaturvedi (1998) 2.b 
Income dispersion within the coopera-
tive 
3. Quality of Work       
  Working conditions Medeiros and Macêdo (2006) 3.a Length of working week 
  Physical health 
Begun (1999); Nguyen et al 
(2003) 
3.b 
Number of work-related accidents suf-
fered within the past six months 
  
4. Negative externalities       
  Child labour Chaturvedi (1998) 4.a 
Frequency of waste-pickers ac-
companied by a child (a) 
  Waste dispersion Chaturvedi (1998) 4.b 
Frequency of cleaning up after 
waste collection (b) 
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5. Environmental protection       
  
Energy saving and prevention of waste 
entering landfill 
Medina (2007) 5.a 
Kilograms recycled per worker per 
hour 
  
Prevention of toxic material from enter-
ing landfill 
Medina (2007) 5.b 
Kilograms of toxic materials recy-
cled per month 
  Diversity of material recycled Medina (2007) 5.c 
Number of different materials col-
lected per worker 
  
a) On a perceptual scale from 1 to 6, where 1 represents ‘I never go to collect waste with with my child/chidren’ and 6 represents 
‘I always go to collect waste with my child/children’. 
b) On a perceptual scale from 1 to 6, where 1 represents ‘I always clean up after collecting/sorting waste’ and 6 represents ‘I 
never clean up after collecting/sorting waste’. 
  
 
 
Table A.6. 2:  Types of Local Policies Implemented by Borough (Independent Variables)   
 
4 Explanatory Variables 
La Reina 
(Co-Production) 
Cerrillos 
(Structuralist) 
Maipú 
(Neoliberal) 
Santiago  
(Dualist) 
A. Individual Socio-Economic Conditions (control variables)  
1 Income Monthly waste-picker income per month in Chilean pesos   
2 Work-week Number of hours worked per week    
3 Age In years     
4 Gender Male / female    
5 Experience Number of years spent in the activity    
B. Municipal Socio-Economic Conditions (control variables) 
6 Poverty Municipal poverty rate   
7 Inhabitant income Average inhabitant income in the municipal area    
8 Waste production Average kilograms of waste produced by a household in a municipal area 
C. Supportive Local Policies (explanatory variables)       
1 Access to credits yes no  no  no 
2 Donation of tools and machinery yes no  no  no 
3 Donation of vehicles yes no no  no 
4 Provision of a recycling centre yes no no  no 
5 Institutionalisation of waste-pickers yes no no  no 
6 Coordination with waste lorry yes yes no  no 
7 Waste-picker monopoly yes no no  no 
8 Regularisation of schedules yes no no  no 
9 Promoting waste separation yes no no  no 
10 Restrictions on work in landfills yes no no  no 
11 Place to leave children  yes No no  no 
 Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table A.6. 3: Summary of the Impacts of Municipal Policies on the Sustainable Performance of Waste-Pickers 
Response Variable Positively Impacting Policy Negatively Impacting Policy Magnitude Type of policy Overall Impact (a) 
1. Economic Efficiency 
Indicator 1.b: Access to credits 
 
6.481** Capital A 
Quantity collected per hour 
(recyclable material only) 
Donation of tools and machinery   2.380** Capital A 
Institutionalisation of waste-pickers   15.960*** Organisation A 
Coordination with waste lorry    3.056*** Organisation A 
Place to leave children (social network) 6.885** Neg. Externality A 
2. Social Equity 
Indicator 2.b: Access to recycling centre   -0.0441*** Capital A 
Gini coefficient within coop-
eratives 
Institutionalisation of waste-pickers   -0.127*** Organisation A 
Coordination with waste lorry   0.00267* Organisation A 
Promoting waste separation   -0.00403*** Organisation A 
3. Quality of work 
Indicator 3.b: Regularisation of schedules   -0.340** Organisation A 
Frequency of workplace 
accidents 
  Storage in an informal plot 2.102** Capital C 
4. Negative Externalities 
Indicator 4.b: 
- - - 
  
- 
Waste Dispersion (c)   
5. Environmental Protection 
Indicator 5.b: Access to credits   83.55** Capital A 
Kilograms of toxic material 
collected per month 
Institutionalisation of waste-pickers   167.2** Organisation A 
Indicator 5.c: 
Institutionalisation of waste-pickers 
  
3.912*** Organisation A Diversity of materials col-
lected 
  
Notes: 
a) Overall Impact A denotes municipal policies that have only a positive impact across indicators; B refers to municipal policies that have both positive and negative impacts 
across indicators; C denotes policies that have only negative impacts across indicators. 
  b) Where 1 signifies 'I never go with my child/children to collect waste' and 6 signifies 'I always go with my child/children to collect waste' 
  c) Where 1 signifies 'I always clean up after collecting/sorting waste' and 6 signifies 'I never clean up after collecting/sorting waste' 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses       
320 
 
 
 
Local industry productivity: quantity of recyclable material collected per hour (indica-
tor 1.b) 
 
The quantity that each waste-picker collects in recyclable materials (the use by industries) in an 
hour faces a significant rise with supportive policies. The provision of tools and/or machinery 
increases waste-pickers’ recycling rates by 2.380 kilograms per hour of work, coordination with 
the waste lorry by 3.056 kilograms per hour, granting access to credits increases collection by 
6.481 kilograms per hour worked, the institutionalisation of waste-pickers by 15.960 kilograms 
per hour, and access to childcare facilities by 6.885 kilograms per hour. The similarity in the 
magnitudes of impact with indicator 5.a regarding the donation of tools and machinery, and the 
coordination with the waste lorry and, confirms that these policies increase collection rates of 
predominantly recyclable material, with little impact on the collection of reusable products. 
 
Access to credits allows waste-pickers to upgrade and repair vehicles, increasing their 
collection capacity. Victor (60), a waste-picker from La Reina, argues:  
V: Here, since micro-entrepreneurs are accepted by the Banco de Estado [State Bank], we can 
obtain credits… You have to take advantage of these opportunities… The majority (of us) are 
trying to repair our (existing) vehicles or adding bigger containers onto them so we can carry 
more material  
 
The institutionalisation of waste-pickers allows them to collect more recyclable materials, 
As explained in Chapter 4, this is due to the trust from municipal recognition, allowing waste-
pickers to enter locals’ houses to collect large reusable items. 
 
Waste-pickers’ access to childcare services increases indicator 1.b, particularly for wom-
en. This is because female waste-pickers face a higher burden of family tasks, forcing them to 
combine waste-picking with childcare responsibilities. This means that female waste-pickers 
can sometimes only collect intermittently, or must bring their children with them, slowing down 
their work. Access to care services (particularly through their personal network) allows them to 
fully concentrate on recycling, increasing their efficiency. As stated by Carolina (31), a waste-
picker in Cerrillos:   
C: Today, I had to sell my material for recycling…but I couldn’t, because I had a (school) meeting 
at 9:00 am. It finished at 11:00 am, and then I had to prepare lunch…then I had the (school) en-
rolment… I have to collect between my home and the school, I can’t go very far… I have to bring 
(my daughter) sometimes, I have nobody to leave her with, so collecting is harder. 
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Income equality: Gini coefficient within cooperatives (indicator 2.b) 
 
A large number of policies are effective for reducing income differences within coopera-
tives (indicator 4): the provision of recycling centres reduces inequality by 0.041 Gini points, 
the institutionalisation of waste-pickers by 0.127 Gini points, coordination with the waste lorry 
by a very small 0.003 points, and the promotion of waste separation by a similar 0.004 points.  
 
Recycling centres homogenise the prices paid per kilogram to waste-pickers. This is be-
cause all waste-pickers contribute their collected material to one single load which is sold in 
large quantities. Unlike when they sell as individuals to a middleman, they do not face the pe-
nalisation of lower prices for selling in small quantities. Moreover, waste-pickers associated 
with the recycling centre share equally in the profits made from the centre. Esteban (52): 
E: The recycling centre creates a change… (Waste-pickers) benefit because they are paid a higher 
price (per kilogram), but also later on…(because the cooperative) has to invest in the improve-
ment (of the recycling centre) or distribute the profits, and it is the members who decide what to 
do. 
 
Since the institutionalisation of waste-pickers affects an entire cooperative and includes 
waste-pickers being introduced to neighbours, this helps those who are less naturally sociable to 
gain the trust and support of locals, which in turn increases their productivity and incomes, clos-
ing the gap between them and other waste-pickers. Antonio (52), a waste-picker from La Reina, 
explains: 
A: When we started, we were all accompanied by a municipal officer as well as a monitor from 
Casa La Paz… I worked with (an officer), teaching people what they should and should not give 
(for recycling and reuse), door-to-door. It was hard work. We were given our uniforms and the 
houses to visit. 
 
Through similar mechanisms, the promotion of waste separation and the coordination of 
waste-pickers with the lorry reduce inequality by a smaller proportion, as again they help less 
outgoing individuals to increase their collection rates. 
 
Physical health: frequency of workplace accidents (indicator 3.b)  
 
As well as increasing sustainable performance, supportive policies also have a positive 
impact on reducing the negative externalities of waste-picking. Work-related accidents can be 
reduced by 0.340 accidents every six months by simply regularising the schedules of collection 
for waste-pickers.  
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This regularisation makes neighbours more willing to provide pre-organised material and 
means that waste-pickers do not have to rush to open bags, thus preventing the risks that arise 
from waste manipulation. As expressed by Natalia (50), a waste-picker in La Reina: 
N: My neighbours know when I come, and have everything ready… I don’t put my hands into the 
waste, I have taught them… They give everything to me clean, crystal clean… They give one plas-
tic bag with the ‘cachureos’, another with the cardboard, another with newspaper, everything 
separated. 
 
Contrasting this, the access to storage in an informal plot increases workplace accidents 
by 2.102 occurrences every six months. This is due to an increased possibility of accidents in a 
storage place with poor working conditions and regular unprotected waste manipulation. As 
Esteban (52) explains: 
E: The problem with the accumulation of waste in (illegal) plots is the risk of fire and sanitary 
problems. You do not have the right conditions to store goods. Moreover, sometimes you have 
(other types of) accidents – cuts from broken bottles or sharp pieces of steel, as waste is dispersed 
all around. 
 
 
Waste dispersion: frequency of cleaning up after collecting (indicator 4.b)  
 
 For waste dispersion (indicator 10), my regressions did not show statistically significant 
results. I suspect that this is either due to running out of statistical power (given the small num-
ber of observations), or due to a behavioural pattern that I am not able to capture in my data. 
 
Prevention of waste entering landfills: quantity of toxic material (indicator 5.b) collect-
ed  
 
Regarding the collection of toxic materials, facilitating access to credit allows each waste-
picker to collect an extra 63 kilograms per month of toxic materials, while the institutionalisa-
tion of waste-pickers sees an increase of 167.2 kilograms. Through access to credit, waste-
pickers are able to obtain the necessary capital to manage this type of waste – waste-pickers 
without access to appropriate tools or storage tend to avoid the collection of toxic materials for 
fear of sustaining injuries. Belen (59), a waste-picker leader from Santiago Centro, gives one 
example: 
B: I received a credit from the Banco Estado… I want to (use my credit to) build a small storage 
space in my house…which would allow me to collect products like batteries. This is fundamental 
(for my business). 
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Furthermore, since institutionalising waste-pickers encourages neighbours to open their 
doors to them, waste-pickers are able to collect toxic materials – such as broken electronics – 
directly from the source, in a clean and safe manner. 
 
Diversity of material recycled: number of different materials recycled (indicator 5.c)  
 
In relation to the diversity of materials collected (indicator 7), the institutionalisation of 
waste-pickers leads to 3.9 new types of material being added to the local recycling and reuse 
waste management system. Some materials require cleaning prior to recycling (such as card-
board or detergent bottles), and so are normally not collected by waste-pickers. Since the insti-
tutionalisation of waste-pickers increases neighbourhood collaboration, materials tend to be 
cleaned before being handed in for waste collection, thus expanding the number of types of ma-
terial that are recycled. As Sofia (46), a waste-picker leader from La Reina, noted: 
S: The neighbours already know what we collect and how the material needs to be… For example, 
detergent bottles need to be clean, because the detergent pollutes. The same goes for oil bottles… 
Cardboard must be clean, because if it comes with traces of food you can’t sell it. My neighbours 
already know this and provide everything already cleaned. 
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Table A.6. 4: Waste-Pickers OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Economic Efficiency
INDICATORS
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Access to credits -5.034 -7.859 -36.64 6.098** 5.635* 6.481** 0.0874 0.107 0.102
(268.8) (248.2) (244.1) (2.963) (2.972) (3.046) (0.148) (0.146) (0.150)
Donation of tools and machinery -90.78 -75.76 -111.8 1.056 1.450 2.380** 0.0265 0.00112 0.000459
(107.7) (95.78) (96.61) (1.225) (1.310) (1.140) (0.0549) (0.0503) (0.0582)
Provision of tricycle -283.3 -269.9 -101.6 -5.155* -2.989 -4.340 0.178 0.0906 0.0669
(221.2) (252.0) (250.3) (3.069) (3.549) (3.394) (0.152) (0.163) (0.169)
Provision of motorised vehicles 422.9 512.7 654.2* 5.903 6.278 5.879 0.573*** 0.476** 0.440**
(331.4) (382.0) (390.3) (5.994) (6.794) (6.142) (0.195) (0.193) (0.195)
Recycle center 180.7 241.3 209.8 7.148* 4.678 -0.107 -0.138 -0.106 -0.0163
(246.5) (250.1) (318.9) (3.905) (4.518) (4.925) (0.142) (0.155) (0.202)
Informal plot 473.8 443.6 328.3 8.878* 6.943 9.151* -0.168 -0.0661 -0.0778
(352.1) (378.7) (383.4) (4.995) (5.303) (5.105) (0.263) (0.296) (0.301)
Institutionalisation of waste-pickers 1,550*** 1,530*** 1,260*** 13.24*** 12.12** 15.96*** 0.864*** 0.906*** 0.929***
(419.7) (392.6) (344.5) (4.115) (5.402) (5.056) (0.216) (0.191) (0.211)
Coordination with waste lorry -100.8 -105.0 -103.0 2.700*** 2.803*** 3.056*** -0.0383 -0.0451 -0.0504
(69.83) (67.66) (69.33) (0.825) (0.865) (0.760) (0.0352) (0.0357) (0.0333)
Waste-picker monopoly 618.8*** 708.7*** 833.8*** 3.877 2.590 1.259 0.222* 0.196 0.170
(189.7) (207.5) (225.4) (2.771) (2.850) (3.101) (0.120) (0.132) (0.140)
Regularisation of schedules 96.44* 88.18 152.3** 1.401* 1.390* 0.225 0.0575* 0.0633* 0.0604
(54.41) (61.91) (67.75) (0.723) (0.719) (0.674) (0.0343) (0.0360) (0.0447)
Promoting waste segregation -41.37 -39.42 -81.75 0.782 0.291 0.429 -0.0757* -0.0615 -0.0508
(57.65) (58.47) (62.28) (0.856) (0.862) (0.848) (0.0414) (0.0414) (0.0435)
Restrictions on work in landfills -28.50 -15.09 -73.55 -0.153 -0.191 0.686 0.0368 0.0281 0.0344
(125.5) (127.6) (142.9) (0.859) (0.821) (1.054) (0.0789) (0.0771) (0.0852)
Place to leave children (social network) 96.42 139.5 17.70 7.240** 5.707 6.885** 0.0477 0.0697 0.0915
(291.3) (259.7) (252.6) (3.144) (3.482) (3.052) (0.182) (0.199) (0.215)
Place to leave children (school/nursery) -21.02 52.92 -100.4 2.361 0.960 3.107 0.0702 0.0727 0.0896
(376.6) (342.3) (344.3) (3.669) (4.117) (4.005) (0.218) (0.229) (0.244)
No children -190.5 -122.2 -246.5 3.590 2.976 5.290 -0.00884 -0.0364 -0.0321
(284.5) (248.1) (248.7) (3.338) (3.799) (3.781) (0.182) (0.202) (0.214)
Socio-economic controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Socio-spatial controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Constant 1,038* 946.0 -438.0 -21.90*** -15.69 -3.082 0.533 0.427 0.741
(549.5) (610.8) (889.9) (7.838) (10.38) (14.58) (0.347) (0.422) (0.566)
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 94 94 94
R-squared 0.455 0.478 0.501 0.507 0.536 0.573 0.519 0.549 0.551
1: Earnings Hour Worked
 2: Kilos Hour Worked (only 
recyclables)
3: Times Minimum Salary
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.6. 5: Waste-Pickers OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Social Equity and Environmental Protection 
 
INDICATORS
VARIABLES 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Access to credits 0.00241 0.00321 0 6.522 4.952 5.783 59.82* 79.13** 83.55** 0.0340 0.188 0.260
(0.00384) (0.00403) (0) (4.233) (4.201) (4.209) (35.69) (34.61) (32.80) (0.624) (0.683) (0.667)
Donation of tools and machinery 0.00249 0.00180 0*** 0.688 1.704 2.550* 8.832 2.714 5.266 -0.0971 -0.122 0.00376
(0.00233) (0.00224) (0) (1.324) (1.509) (1.412) (14.78) (14.90) (15.49) (0.230) (0.227) (0.197)
Provision of tricycle 0.0113 0.00723 -0*** -4.171 -0.236 -3.946 13.66 -9.768 -13.44 0.900 0.637 0.626
(0.00740) (0.00723) (0) (3.372) (4.418) (4.170) (38.97) (33.55) (36.33) (0.938) (0.939) (1.024)
Provision of motorised vehicles 0.0149 0.0137 -0** 14.03* 13.84 12.37 -95.07 -104.0 -106.5 0.649 0.784 0.775
(0.00926) (0.00836) (0) (8.158) (9.581) (8.114) (64.62) (70.03) (71.35) (1.029) (1.069) (1.104)
Recycle center -0.0492*** -0.0441*** -0 1.345 -1.907 0.771 34.83 65.06 37.17 1.443** 1.525** 0.311
(0.00473) (0.00563) (0) (4.715) (5.063) (5.786) (33.78) (46.42) (52.41) (0.622) (0.657) (0.858)
Informal plot 0.00640 0.00868 0* 13.61 10.20 11.23 -22.83 -4.343 5.079 -1.379 -1.094 -0.783
(0.00623) (0.00532) (0) (11.09) (10.35) (9.729) (33.03) (28.54) (35.13) (1.014) (0.909) (0.959)
Institutionalisation of waste-pickers -0.129*** -0.127*** -0.124*** 9.524** 5.256 12.36** 157.7** 154.9** 167.2** 2.809*** 3.715*** 3.912***
(0.00566) (0.00571) (0) (4.569) (6.055) (5.376) (67.07) (69.22) (71.21) (0.776) (0.977) (1.060)
Coordination with waste lorry 0.00248 0.00267* -0 2.825*** 3.645*** 3.402*** 15.30 7.748 10.29 -0.291* -0.368** -0.268
(0.00167) (0.00160) (0) (0.900) (1.116) (0.971) (12.35) (11.38) (11.76) (0.158) (0.171) (0.176)
Waste-picker monopoly 0.00678 0.00799 -0*** 5.275* 2.947 -0.614 -26.51 -17.26 -19.14 -0.682 -0.415 -0.205
(0.00581) (0.00636) (0) (3.016) (3.135) (3.978) (55.72) (56.98) (64.35) (0.815) (0.829) (0.747)
Regularisation of schedules -0.00113 -0.000831 -0 2.577** 2.069** 0.455 2.421 4.814 2.744 0.253 0.355** 0.304
(0.00117) (0.00107) (0) (0.993) (1.019) (0.892) (6.407) (7.093) (7.907) (0.162) (0.177) (0.199)
Promoting waste segregation -0.00490*** -0.00403*** -0** 0.436 -0.263 1.122 0.200 2.093 0.0967 -0.0674 -0.0797 -0.213
(0.00133) (0.00138) (0) (1.112) (1.150) (1.063) (10.22) (10.06) (12.30) (0.161) (0.171) (0.203)
Restrictions on work in landfills -0.00101 -0.00106 0 -0.741 -0.544 1.270 1.766 -0.252 3.122 0.213 0.252 0.283
(0.00204) (0.00182) (0) (1.171) (1.124) (1.238) (11.58) (11.87) (14.00) (0.216) (0.214) (0.225)
Place to leave children (social network) -0.0107* -0.00723 -0** 7.460 5.314 8.703** -12.97 9.350 7.897 -1.068 -0.872 -0.997
(0.00619) (0.00549) (0) (4.748) (5.245) (3.966) (50.60) (42.94) (42.22) (1.009) (1.125) (1.061)
Place to leave children (school/nursery) -0.00500 -0.00340 -0 4.698 3.372 7.532* -12.39 -9.328 -7.602 -1.405 -1.257 -1.321
(0.00652) (0.00618) (0) (5.005) (5.629) (4.474) (65.05) (68.95) (70.47) (1.058) (1.211) (1.145)
No children -0.000709 0.00168 -0 4.166 3.311 7.457 -52.05 -21.39 -17.25 -0.614 -0.595 -0.544
(0.00714) (0.00635) (0) (5.072) (5.582) (4.554) (54.99) (47.68) (48.39) (1.093) (1.236) (1.213)
Socio-economic controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Socio-spatial controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Constant 0.297*** 0.291*** 0.397*** -21.57** -19.28 26.50 3.451 74.93 59.44 8.924*** 8.490*** 6.290
(0.0128) (0.0147) (0) (8.833) (14.32) (17.46) (90.55) (92.67) (171.5) (1.845) (2.396) (3.919)
Observations 96 96 96 87 87 87 71 69 69 86 84 84
R-squared 0.924 0.931 1.000 0.467 0.524 0.577 0.528 0.586 0.591 0.428 0.473 0.501
5: Kilos per Hour Worked 
(recyclable and reuse)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4: Income Inequality by Cooperative 6: Kilos of Toxic Material per Month 7: Types of Materials Collected
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Table A.6. 6: Waste-Pickers OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Negative Externalities 
 
INDICATORS
VARIABLES 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Access to credits 0.621 0.660 0.624 -0.0145 -0.216 -0.150 0.201 0.176 0.180 -0.0867 -0.0971 -0.0928
(0.437) (0.446) (0.465) (0.382) (0.324) (0.330) (0.178) (0.153) (0.168) (0.125) (0.104) (0.107)
Donation of tools and machinery 0.378 0.331 0.340 -0.0191 0.0829 0.0743 -0.161 -0.0811 -0.0764 0.0987 0.0884 0.0931*
(0.234) (0.279) (0.277) (0.164) (0.151) (0.151) (0.127) (0.0909) (0.0809) (0.0748) (0.0642) (0.0550)
Provision of tricycle 0.501 0.343 0.0588 0.429 0.503 0.618 0.230 0.320 0.196 0.422*** 0.361** 0.225
(0.609) (0.613) (0.574) (0.411) (0.435) (0.411) (0.422) (0.413) (0.433) (0.145) (0.152) (0.146)
Provision of motorised vehicles 0.388 0.223 -0.147 0.706* 0.781* 0.879* 0.148 0.349 0.228 0.302 0.137 0.00359
(0.729) (0.822) (0.819) (0.401) (0.460) (0.446) (0.485) (0.495) (0.523) (0.219) (0.234) (0.202)
Recycle center -1.733*** -1.802*** -0.898 0.0526 0.000525 -0.391 -0.568 -0.734* -0.499 -0.303** -0.321** -0.0604
(0.470) (0.480) (0.645) (0.234) (0.309) (0.545) (0.434) (0.438) (0.463) (0.147) (0.152) (0.208)
Informal plot 1.889** 2.196** 2.102** 0.0979 -0.0652 -0.0760 -0.145 -0.171 -0.142 -0.458 -0.411 -0.380
(0.941) (0.915) (0.936) (0.301) (0.300) (0.267) (0.463) (0.545) (0.537) (0.337) (0.336) (0.310)
Institutionalisation of waste-pickers -0.514 -0.425 -0.0313 0.173 -0.153 -0.488 0.120 -0.0305 0.145 -0.179 -0.337 -0.145
(0.666) (0.899) (0.997) (0.508) (0.489) (0.595) (0.370) (0.333) (0.404) (0.246) (0.221) (0.236)
Coordination with waste lorry 0.273** 0.257* 0.201 -0.153 -0.151 -0.103 0.0770 0.0414 0.0254 0.0254 0.0390 0.0212
(0.130) (0.134) (0.139) (0.126) (0.103) (0.115) (0.0575) (0.0639) (0.0634) (0.0398) (0.0353) (0.0373)
Waste-picker monopoly 1.230*** 1.129** 0.826 0.231 0.0565 0.222 -0.0649 0.0161 -0.0737 -0.0184 -0.125 -0.224
(0.390) (0.456) (0.548) (0.365) (0.442) (0.401) (0.403) (0.421) (0.366) (0.141) (0.128) (0.137)
Regularisation of schedules -0.290** -0.292** -0.340** 0.0314 -0.0141 0.0231 0.150** 0.103 0.0801 -0.0156 -0.0176 -0.0424
(0.127) (0.138) (0.153) (0.0722) (0.0828) (0.123) (0.0712) (0.0667) (0.0874) (0.0328) (0.0382) (0.0426)
Promoting waste segregation -0.119 -0.0785 0.0385 0.105 0.0830 0.0421 0.0198 0.000248 0.0404 -0.0855** -0.0685* -0.0243
(0.128) (0.143) (0.135) (0.0917) (0.0966) (0.0932) (0.0792) (0.0920) (0.111) (0.0396) (0.0380) (0.0414)
Restrictions on work in landfills -0.290 -0.289 -0.200 -0.0682 -0.0987 -0.137 -0.123 -0.0659 -0.0323 0.0139 0.00447 0.0411
(0.251) (0.250) (0.287) (0.130) (0.116) (0.113) (0.0977) (0.0879) (0.0937) (0.0601) (0.0563) (0.0577)
Place to leave children (social network) -0.876 -0.898 -0.635 -1.628*** -1.696*** -1.813*** -0.294 -0.229 -0.125 -0.222 -0.263 -0.149
(0.791) (0.720) (0.697) (0.436) (0.412) (0.399) (0.373) (0.393) (0.391) (0.218) (0.195) (0.174)
Place to leave children (school/nursery) 0.0574 0.131 0.359 -1.051** -1.022** -1.117** -0.561 -0.122 -0.0219 -0.164 -0.219 -0.109
(0.840) (0.798) (0.782) (0.463) (0.460) (0.437) (0.464) (0.384) (0.401) (0.245) (0.221) (0.203)
No children -0.205 -0.443 -0.360 -1.138* -0.749 -0.640 -0.283 -0.227 -0.176 -0.0170 -0.0896 -0.0347
(0.787) (0.760) (0.748) (0.677) (0.680) (0.738) (0.413) (0.436) (0.459) (0.235) (0.214) (0.193)
Socio-economic controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Socio-spatial controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Constant 1.946 0.911 4.663 1.031 1.602 -0.455 -0.436 -0.802 0.321 0.879** 0.720* 1.953***
(1.244) (1.424) (2.993) (1.029) (1.115) (2.328) (0.737) (1.017) (0.769) (0.362) (0.398) (0.646)
Observations 96 94 94 75 73 73 96 94 94 96 94 94
R-squared 0.403 0.431 0.466 0.347 0.449 0.472 0.182 0.253 0.270 0.220 0.325 0.386
Robust standard errors in parentheses
11: Workday8: Quantity of Accidents 9: Frequency of Childwork 10: Waste Dispersion
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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ANNEX 7: INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR STREET 
VENDORS 
 
 
In Chapter 5, section three I have evaluated the impacts of supportive policies on four 
street-vendors performance indicators associated with their objectives of improved economic, 
social and working condition outcomes and in reducing the negative externalities. This annex 
complements this discussion by providing a description of indicators, evaluated policies, run-
ning variables, as well as by analysing the impact of supportive policies on additional perfor-
mance indicators commonly discussed in the literature (see Table A.7.1).  As for Chapter 5,  
OLS models are employed to disentangle the impact of supporting policies on  street vendors’ 
performance indicators, using the same specifications and significance levels. For intellectual 
transparency, Tables A.7.5 through A.7.7 also report all coefficients in the regression, and the 
way that the coefficients change as more controls are added. As before, qualitative analysis is 
used to report explanations for mechanisms driving policy impact. 
 
Table A.7.4 reports the significant results of OLS regressions for eight additional indi-
cators with all controls. Model 1.b shows the impact of supportive policies on economic indica-
tors; Models 2.b and 2.c assess the impact of policies on social indicators; Models 3.b, 3.c, 3.d 
report the results of supportive policies on working condition indicators; and Models 4.b and 4.c 
analyse the impact of municipal policies on reducing negative externalities. Qualitative analysis 
supports these results through quotes from interviews and group discussions, commenting on 
the mechanisms at play. 
 
Table A.7. 1: Sustainable Performance Indicators for ‘Feriantes’ (Dependent Variables) 
  Response Variables Authors  n Indicator Model 
1. Economic efficiency         
  Feriante productivity 
Cross 1998, de Soto 1989; 
Williams & Gurtoo 2012 
1.a Earnings per hour worked MLR 
  Feriante monthly income 
Cross 1998, de Soto 1989; 
Williams & Gurtoo 2012 
1.b Feriante earnings per month MLR 
2. Social equity         
  Poverty reduction Peattie 1980 2.a 
Feriante's total income relative to 
the poverty line 
MLR 
  Gender inequality Kinyanjui 2014, 2.b 
Female feriante income relative to 
average men’s feriante income 
MLR 
  Employment generation 
de Soto 1989, Willliams and 
Gurtoo 2012 
2.c Number of jobs generated per stall MLR 
3. Quality of work         
  Working week Núñez 1993 3.a Number of hours worked per week MLR 
  Accidents at the workplace 
Kapoor 2007; Williams & 
Gurtoo 2012; Alfers et al. 
2016 
3.b 
Accident at the workplace in the last 
six months (yes/no) 
BLR 
  Pension access 
Kapoor 2007; Williams & 
Gurtoo 2012 
3.c Access to pension (yes/no) BLR 
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  Health contribution 
Kapoor 2007; Williams & 
Gurtoo 2012 
3.d Health contribution (yes/no) BLR 
4. Negative externalities         
  Child labour (a) Peattie 1980 4.a Perception scale of child work (a) MLR 
  Neighbourhood life disturbance (b) 
Bromley 1979, Cross 1998,  
Harrison and McVey 1997, 
Kinyanjui 2014, p.34, de 
Soto 1989 
4.b 
Perception scale of neighbourhood 
life  disturbance 
MLR 
  Food security (c) Bromley 2000 4.c 
Prices of  feriantes’ products rela-
tive to large retail  
BLR 
  
a) On a perceptual continuous scale, where 1 represents’I never take my children to work’ and 7 represents ‘I always take my 
children to work’ 
b) On a perceptual continuous scale where 1 represents ‘Neighbours living on the street of the market are unhappy with my busi-
ness’ and 7 represents ‘Neighbours living on the street of the market are happy with my business’. 
c) Declared price of products compared with large retail prices, where O represents cheaper and 1 represents equal price or more 
expensive 
MLR: Multiple Linear Regressions 
BLR: Binary Logistic Regressions 
 
Table A.7. 2: Control Variables 
Explanatory Variables Description 
A. Individuals socio-economic conditions (control variables) 
1 Gender Gender of the respondent (male/female) 
2 Nationality Chilean / foreigner 
3 Household size Number of children per household 
4 Age Age of the street vendor in years 
5 Experience Age of the business in years 
6 Education None, primary, secondary or tertiary education 
7 Feriante income Monthly feriante net income 
8 Working week Number of hours worked per week 
B. Enterprise characteristics (control variables) 
9 Enterprise size Number of workers employed by the enterprise 
10 Enterprise sector Fruit and vegetables, fish and seafood, dry fruits,  
chicken and eggs, groceries, clothing, cleaning products, 
 seasoning and cereals, others. 
11 Type of products Elaborated, primary, mixed 
12 Formalisation Number of national and local regulations satisfied  
B. Spatial or 'entourage' conditions (control variables) 
13 Distance to large retail Number of blocks to the closest large retail shop 
14 Distance to high street Number of blocks to the closest high street 
15 Distance to underground station Number of blocks to the closest underground station 
C. Municipal conditions (control variables)   
16 Municipal inhabitant income Average inhabitant income in municipality  
17 Municipal budget per person Average municipal budget per inhabitant 
18 Municipal poverty rate Percentage of people in poverty per municipality 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table A.7. 3: Types of Local Policies Implemented  
Explanatory Variables Description 
D. Supportive local policies (explanatory variables)              
D.1 Human capital  
19 Training Have received a public training (yes/no) 
D.2 Individual capital   
20 Electronic scale Analogue, digital, none 
21 Working uniform Using special clothing for production or selling (yes/no) 
22 Freezer Freezer used in the stall (yes/no) 
23 Electric generator Electric generator used in the stall (yes/no) 
24 Other machines Another type of machine used in the stall (yes/no) 
25 Type of stall Precarious, standard, permanent 
26 Storage space None, on a plot, in a house, in a warehouse, in refrigerated storage, other 
27 Type of vehicle Hand cart, rental car, relatives’ car, shared transport, car, van, pick-up, truck 
D.3 Collective capital   
28 Electricity access Having access to electricity in the street market (yes/no) 
29 Potable water Having access to potable water in the street market (yes/no) 
30 Common roof Street market equipped with a shared permanent roof (yes/no) 
31 Children’s playground Street market equipped with a shared children’s playground (yes/no) 
32 Green space Street market equipped with green spaces (yes/no) 
33 Parking facilities In the street, on a street island, in designated market parking space, other type 
34 Toilet facilities None, request from neighbours, chemical toilet, permanent toilet 
D.4 Financial Access   
35 Local fund Having received a national grant (yes/no) 
36 National financial fund (individual) Having received a national individual grant (yes/no) 
37 National financial fund (collective) Having received a national collective grant (yes/no) 
38 Access to credit Having access to credit (yes/no) 
D.5 Market access and regulation   
39 Stall size Street vendor’s stall size in square metres 
40 Number of stalls  Number of stalls per street vendor 
41 Number of  feriantes  Number of street vendors per market 
42 Hours per permit Number of hours of work per week permitted by municipal permit 
43 Cost of local permit Cost of the local permit in Chilean pesos 
44 Diversity of selling methods Number of different strategies used to sell products 
45 Debit card payment Accepting debit card payments (yes/no) 
D.6 Organisation   
46 Unionisation Belonging to an organisation (yes/no) 
D.7 Other   
47 Child care No access, access through personal network or public nursery 
  Police support Perception level of police support for the activity 
48 Municipal support Perception level of local government support for the activity 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table A.7. 4: Summary of the Impacts of Municipal Policies on the Performance of Feriante 
Respose Variable Positively Impacting Policy Negatively Impacting Policy Magnitude SE Type of policy 
Overall Im-
pact (a) 
1. Economic Efficiency 
Indicator 1.b: Truck   534,106*** -195,002 Physical Capital A 
Feriantes'sEarnings per 
month 
Warehouse storage   400,967** -162,669 Physical Capital A 
Fridge at the stall   717,810** -328,139 Physical Capital A 
Electric generator   1.908e+06* -1,016,000 Physical Capital A 
National Small Fund   364,678** -184,592 Financial Capital A 
Municipal support   44,869** -18,453 Other support A 
2. Social Equity 
Indicator 2.b: Plot storage   1.241** -0.474 Physical Capital A 
Feriantess women income 
relative to average Feriantess 
men income 
Warehouse storage   1.380*** -0.352 Physical Capital A 
Fridge at the stall   1.653** -0.665 Physical Capital A 
Potable Water at the street market   0.669** -0.332 Physical Capital A 
  State Large Fund -1.102* -0.554 Financial Capital C 
  Permit Cost -2.35e-06* -2.35e-06* Regulation C 
  
     
Indicator 2.c: Standard stall   0.602*** -0.188 Physical Capital A 
Employment generated per 
HBE 
Permanet stall 
 
0.737*** -0.227 Physical Capital A 
3. Quality of work 
Indicator 3.b: Square meters stall   0.0985* -0.0535 Regulation B 
Access to Pension (yes/no)   Chemical toilet in the street market -2.444*** -0.888 Colletive Capital B  
Indicator 3.c: House storage   0.976** -0.486 Physical Capital A 
Healht Contribution (yes/no) 
Uniform   1.247** -0.494 Physical Capital A 
Potable Water at the street market   2.000** -7.89E-01 Colletive Capital A 
  Built toilet in the street market -21.21*** -2.70E+00 Colletive Capital B 
Indicator 3.d: Uniform   -3.830*** -1.12E+00 Physical Capital A 
Frequency of workplace 
accidents 
Permanent  Roof    -2.872* -1.58E+00 Colletive Capital A 
Childcare access (other)   -3.796*** -1.423 Neg. Externalities A 
Police support 
 
-0.426*** -0.161 Regulation A 
  Square meters stall 0.157*** -6.07E-02 Regulation B 
  Diversity of payment 2.187*** -7.69E-01 Access to markets C 
4. Negative Externalities 
Indicator 4.b:             Provision of green space    -0.770** -3.79E-01 Neg. Externalities A 
Neighbourhood life distu-
bance (c) 
Parking in a street island   -4.442*** -1.03E+00 Neg. Externalities A 
  Diversity of payment 0.694** -0.277 Access to markets C 
Indicator 4.c:                  Number of street vendors   -0.0141*** -0.00546 Regulation B 
Food security and Affordabil-
ity (d) 
Street market parking provision   -3.967* -2.32 Colletive Capital A 
  Pick up van 6.489*** -2.303 Physical Capital B 
Notes: 
a) Overall Impact A denotes municipal policies that have only a positive impact across indicators; B refers to municipal policies that have both positive and negative 
impacts across indicators; C denotes policies that have only negative impacts across indicators. 
  b) In a perceptual continous scale where 1 meas never go with my child/chidren to collect and 7 means always go to collect with my child/children 
  
c) In a perceptual continous scale where 1means neighbours living in my same street are unhappy with my business  and 7 means hneighbours living in my same street 
are happy with my business. 
  d) Declare price of products compared with large retail prices where O means is cheaper and 1means equal or more expensive 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses         
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Feriante Profitability: Earnings Per Month (indicator 1.b) 
 The monthly income of feriantes is increased by 534,106 pesos (USD 864.46) with ac-
cess to a large motorised vehicle, 400,967 pesos (USD 646.72) with access to a warehouse stor-
age space, 1,908,000 pesos (USD 3,077.42) by having an electric generator, 717,810 pesos 
(USD 1,157.76) by having a freezer in their stall and 364,678 pesos (USD 588.19) by the provi-
sion of small national funds. Since large motorised vehicles and storing in a warehouse increase 
productivity per hour (indicator 1.a, see chapter 5), this naturally translates into higher monthly 
incomes. Similarly, for the same reasons explained for indicator 2.a (in Chapter 5) an electric 
generator and a freezer increases monthly feriantes incomes.  
 
 Small national funds allow feriantes to acquire the equipment necessary to produce or 
preserve larger quantities and add value to products. Sara (45), a food and salad vendor in Con-
chalí: 
S: I received a grant from (the government fund) SERCOTEC… I bought a semi-industrial cooker 
and large stock pots to cook in large quantities… I used to sell 100 salads at 400 pesos, making 
40,000 per day, and now I sell 150 salads at 1000 pesos and I make 150,000. 
  
Feriante Gender Equality: Average Female Income Relative to Average Male Income 
(indicator 2.b) 
 This subsector is unique regarding gender income inequality (indicator 2.b), as women 
in feriante work earn more than men on average (see Table 6.2). Their incomes can be further 
increased by having access to a freezer or refrigerator at their stall, increasing women’s incomes 
by 165% and 250% over average male incomes respectively, by having access to potable water, 
leading to a 70% increase, and by accessing storage facilities, increasing by 124%. Given the 
disproportionate representation of women in stalls selling prepared food, the positive impact of 
freezers and refrigerators renders a larger effect on women. Sara (45), a food and salad seller in 
Conchalí: 
S: I prepare ‘chapsui’, ‘cazuela’ and ‘pastelera’. All of them are pre-prepared… For this, I have 
the freezer to preserve them… Of course, I earn much more (than when I only sold salads). 
 The provision of potable water has a double impact: it improves the hygiene of prepared 
food, particularly for raw salads, raising client trust, while also allowing female feriantes to 
produce at their stall rather than only at home. As Carolina (46) a salad seller in Macul, notes:   
C: In containers, water can (stagnate) for two or three days… When there is potable water, things 
are cleaner, and people are more confident to buy… If you run out of something you can make it 
on the spot. 
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 Women sell manufactured or elaborate products such as accessories, clothing and gro-
ceries in a higher proportions than men, and so benefit more significantly from access to storage 
facilities, – allowing them to buy in large quantities when prices are cheaper. Roberta (41), a 
seller of accessories in Maipú, explains: 
R: In winter we prepare for September or Christmas because prices are lower. It doesn’t matter 
that you buy a lot, you will sell it later. Some colleagues start buying two days before Christmas 
because they don’t have anywhere for storage. Things are already expensive by that time. 
 Women’s incomes are however reduced by expensive municipal permits and the provi-
sion of large funds. As municipal permits are on average 10% more expensive for elaborate 
products than for primary products, the high concentration of women in the trade of these prod-
ucts (58% versus 42% for men) translates into a disproportional impact on their incomes.  
 My qualitative data did not contain information helping to establish a mechanism be-
hind the negative impact of large national fund investment on gender equality outcomes. One 
possible explanaition could be that these resources are allocated in a larger proportion to the 
more traditional stalls selling fish, seafood, fruit and vegetables, in which men are over-
represented. 
Employment Generation: Number of Jobs Generated per Street Vending Enterprise (in-
dicator 2.c) 
 The results show that more successful and established stalls tend to create higher 
amounts of employment. Street markets generate three main types of associated informal em-
ployment: sales, unloading and assembly, and delivery. When compared with less-established 
stalls, a more elaborate stall (with digital scales, a strong structure, a tent and large tables for 
display) sees an increase of 0.6 jobs per stall. The visual and hygienic appeal of these stalls in-
crease thereof demand, which leads to the need for additional workers to help with the extra 
workload. As Sebastian (50), a potato vendor in Conchalí, explains: 
S: Some of us used to have stalls, and others only had a tent or a piece of fabric on the pavement. 
Now, instead, all of our stalls match in colour and size… Our sales have improved a lot…so, two 
people come now to help me at the counter on weekends to cope with clients. 
 Creating a permanent feria –such as the ferias modelos – creates 0.7 more jobs. As with 
the previous example, more clients are attracted because of the higher standard of the market, 
once again necessitating additional casual employment.  
Workplace Accidents: Accidents Occurring at the Workplace in the Last Six Months 
(indicator 3.b) 
 The data suggest that the occurrence of accidents or illnesses related to street market 
activity (indicator 3.b) can be significantly reduced through several methods. The provision of 
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work-specific clothing is essential to reduce workplace hazards, such as steel gloves for fish-
mongers to reduce knife cuts, heat-resistant gloves to reduce burns when cooking food, lifting 
belts to avoid lumbago when loading trucks or setting up stalls, reflective jackets to decrease the 
potential for feriantes to be hit by vehicles in the early morning, or simply hats in summertime 
to reduce sunburn for those working in exposed stalls. Sara (45), a feriante leader in Conchalí, 
explains:  
S: We all received uniforms… We bought specialised gloves… We even bought weightlifting 
belts… Everyone (in food sales) has to wear an apron, because they used to serve clients without a 
shirt on during summer. 
 In a similar manner, a permanent roof reduces weather exposure, reducing cold-induced 
illnesses and sunburn in summer, while also meaning that feriantes do not have reinstall heavy 
stalls repeatedly or set up reducing the risk of strains. As Francisco (50), a feriante leader in 
Macul, explains: 
F: The most common ailment in street markets is back pain, aching joints, mostly related to body 
pain… (The permanent roof) has improved quality of life, because you don’t get wet in winter or 
burnt in summer, you don’t need to be carrying metal (from the stall) to the ‘feria’… Now, you just 
arrive with your merchandise and set up your products. 
 
 
 The provision of toilets at street markets also reduces workplace risks. Having nearby 
access to a toilet decreases the risk of stallholder, particularly women, from developing urinary 
tract infections, and also reduces the presence of stagnant urine around street markets. Guiller-
mo (67), a feriante leader: 
G: There are many hidden illnesses… (For example) prostate or urinary infections because many 
people ‘hold it in’, either because they don’t want to leave their stall alone or because the toilets 
are too dirty – or there may be no toilets at all. 
 Collaborative policing efforts that work with street vendors to maintain security in street 
markets seem to reduce accidents resulting from defending against thieves and feriantes being 
hit by cars in the darkness. Paulo (54), a seller of plastic bags in Macul: 
P: Clients feel safe coming to our ‘feria’… The police frequently visit the market, and we can call 
the police if something happens, for example theft, or somebody looking at the vehicles suspicious-
ly. There is someone that comes in the morning when we are setting up to provide more traffic-
pedestrian security. 
  
 A larger diversity of payments accepted, particularly the acceptance of credit based on 
trust alone, is associated with a higher risk of feriantes being injured in fights with clients or 
other feriantes due to disputes over unpaid debts. Roberto (48), an egg vendor in Maipú, com-
ments: 
R: There are very few ‘feriantes’ that still offer credit, because in the end it just causes problems… 
There are people that don’t pay, and sometimes there are even punch-ups… The other day, two 
people got into a fight in my ‘feria’. 
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 A larger stall size increases the need to carry heavier weight for both stalls and products, 
increasing the probability of injuries, cuts, back pain and other bodily pain. As Diego (60) a 
hardware seller in Maipú, comments: 
D: That is the main (work-related) injury – back pain… Many people have had cuts or bruises be-
cause a piece of steel fell on their head or feet. 
 
Pension Access: Having Access to the Pension System (indicator 3.c) 
  
 Having a larger stall size leads to an increase in pension membership by 9.9%, while it 
is reduced by the provision of chemical toilets. Unfortunately, my qualitative data do not help to 
provide any mechanisms driving this impact. 
Access to Health: Having Any Type of Health Coverage (indicator 3.d) 
 
 Higher levels of access to health care seem to be associated with access to potable wa-
ter, having a storage space and wearing work-specific clothing, and are reduced for those who 
have access to a permanent toilet. As with indicator 6, the qualitative data do not provide further 
explanation for possibile mechanisms that could be driving these results. 
Neighbourhood Life Disturbance: Perception of Street Market Disturbance in a Neigh-
bourhood (indicator 4.b) 
 
 Neighbourhood disturbance (indicator 4.b) appears to be reduced by the provision of 
street island parking spaces for feriantes and clients, and the provision of green spaces associat-
ed with the street market. One of the main sources of conflict between feriantes and their neigh-
bours is through blocking the street, increasing congestion and creating noise when setting up 
stalls. Parking facilities on a street island frees up these streets, minimising traffic disruptions 
and distancing markets from places of residence. Mario (55), a mucipal officer in Macul: 
M: The main benefit of ‘ferias modelos’ is first that they are not in the street, they are on a traffic 
island… Other ‘ferias’ block the street completely, cars cannot move, and also have the problem 
of noise with neighbours. 
 Moreover, investment in green and public space as an integral part of a street market 
infrastructure can transform neighbourhood perception, as these spaces can be used even on 
days when the market is not open. As Francisco (50) comments: 
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F: This street market has become the only public space for the community, there are practically no 
other public squares…(When we are not working), the community uses it as pedestrian walkway, 
or kids go to play on bikes or skate, because there is a green, covered space. 
 
Food Security and Affordability: Prices of Feriante Products Relative to Large Retail 
(indicator 4.c)   
 
The prices of street market food is reduced by having a higher number of street vendors 
in operation and the provision of feria parking space. A higher number of street vendors creates 
higher competition in each street market for each type of product, thus motivating feriantes to 
set lower prices. Tomas (44), a greengrocer in Macul: 
T: Say I offer something and one day there are…fewer stalls (than normal) offering that product. 
You say: ‘ (Today) I am going to sell it for (a higher price), because there is so little (competi-
tion)’. On a bad day when the street market is full, you can’t do that.  
 
Having safe feria parking, such as that in ferias modelos, most likely reduces food costs 
as it reduces the chance of vehicle theft, a cost that would then be transferred onto product pric-
es. Sara (45), a feriante leader in Conchalí: 
S: (When you leave your car in the street) you risk having it stolen, in which case you would lose a 
working tool, and that increases your costs… It creates another expenditure that you have to 
make. It damages not only us, but also our clients… (and if your vehicle is stolen) you will have to 
increase the prices. 
 
The apparent impact of pick-up vehicles creating higher product prices is driven by the 
fact that these traditional feriante vehicles – generally older, larger trucks – have high mainte-
nance costs that are then similarly transferred into shop prices. Therefore, this result should be 
taken as a proxy for age of the vehicle, showing the need to incorporate new vehicles into ferias. 
Paulina (44), a clothing seller from La Granja: 
P: We set prices with percentages. I work at twenty to twenty-five percent… The transport costs 
for purchasing, delivery costs for those without a vehicle, all of that becomes cost… If you have a 
vehicle in bad condition, that always breaks down…it becomes a cost (that is transferred on to 
prices). 
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Table A.7. 5: Street vendors OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Economic Efficiency and 
Social Equity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Access to credit -331.2 -128.9 -359.9 95.87 -57,189 -33,382 -83,300 -53,087 -0.19 -0.0987 -0.279 -0.185 -0.0713 -0.075 -0.156 -0.19
(-669.4) (-653.1) (-677.9) (-683.6) (-84155) (-85497) (-85446) (-88698) (-0.328) (-0.333) (-0.333) (-0.345) (-0.149) (-0.162) (-0.161) (-0.17)
Local fund -1,357 -1,678 -1,434 -1,678 -128,392 -144,509 -147,707 -179,494 -0.435 -0.417 -0.405 -0.489 -0.463 -0.457 -0.36 -0.415
(-1285) (-1387) (-1350) (-1401) (-165002) (-173701) (-189233) (-190537) (-0.665) (-0.708) (-0.764) (-0.764) (-0.382) (-0.4) (-0.417) (-0.445)
National Small Fund 2,507 2,562 2,605 2,525 332,086* 325,099* 369,442** 364,678** 1.129 1.061 1.242* 1.197* 0.621 0.61 0.938** 0.974**
(-1893) (-1931) (-1883) (-1874) (-182415) (-186447) (-184017) (-184592) (-0.711) (-0.731) (-0.722) (-0.721) (-0.403) (-0.41) (-0.433) (-0.444)
State Large Fund 1,362 1,501 1,571 1,442 -77,556 -64,776 -74,335 -86,637 -0.258 -0.243 -0.271 -0.251 -1.039** -1.024** -1.124** -1.102*
Training 263.6 226.4 214.4 376.5 31,486 28,263 48,097 72,667 0.165 0.161 0.22 0.291 0.501* 0.487 0.43 0.448
(-1007) (-1008) (-997.2) (-1014) (-114286) (-115349) (-115855) (-117124) (-0.454) (-0.455) (-0.457) (-0.46) (-0.288) (-0.296) (-0.31) (-0.349)
Tools and machinery
Uniform -378 -368.7 -332.9 -19.62 -5,419 -8,162 13,451 38,643 -0.037 -0.0618 0.0382 0.124 -0.166 -0.175 -0.166 -0.148
(-652.7) (-654.2) (-699.9) (-720.1) (-78035) (-79421) (-78610) (-82048) (-0.298) (-0.302) (-0.301) (-0.318) (-0.158) (-0.162) (-0.152) (-0.196)
Electronic sacle -354.7 -338.9 -413.4 -693.4 -31,581 -16,043 18,247 3,671 -0.288 -0.184 -0.0681 -0.131 -0.139 -0.105 -0.000645 0.0049
(-840.9) (-843.8) (-828.5) (-851.5) (-111711) (-109883) (-108527) (-115864) (-0.43) (-0.421) (-0.415) (-0.444) (-0.317) (-0.325) (-0.314) (-0.325)
No using scale 762.9 728 652.8 656.9 76,067 80,752 116,675 128,940 0.033 0.0751 0.215 0.243 -0.0517 -0.0333 0.0412 0.0207
-976.3 -956.7 -921.6 -924.8 -145,864 -145,497 -147,357 -151,255 -0.563 -0.563 -0.571 -0.59 -0.324 -0.324 -0.323 -0.342
Fridge at the stall 3,197* 2,871 2,902 3,529 628,687** 613,511** 630,103** 717,810** 2.103* 2.127* 2.186* 2.522* 1.607** 1.627** 1.629** 1.653**
(-1838) (-1832) (-1954) (-2177) (-305337) (-307606) (-304177) (-328139) (-1.21) (-1.214) (-1.207) (-1.284) (-0.66) (-0.675) (-0.644) (-0.665)
Electric generator 6,822 7,570 7,504 7,166 2.124e+06** 2.127e+06** 2.036e+06** 1.908e+06* 8.710** 8.447** 8.177** 7.663* 0.472 0.473 0.26 0.0132
(-4598) (-4780) (-4823) (-5077) (-944996) (-958173) (-958133) (-1016000) (-3.77) (-3.782) (-3.79) (-3.997) (-1.239) (-1.303) (-1.332) (-1.451)
Other types of machines -2,382** -2,045* -2,073* -2,614** -220,716 -195,201 -245,578 -279,588 -0.746 -0.693 -0.915 -1.113 0.117 0.138 -0.0437 -0.116
(-1075) (-1109) (-1136) (-1305) (-164060) (-173776) (-170529) (-188407) (-0.647) (-0.685) (-0.674) (-0.731) (-0.258) (-0.274) (-0.317) (-0.405)
Stall type  (precarious)
Standard stall 785.2 925.2 857.5 438.2 27,552 46,569 48,622 55,675 0.126 0.194 0.187 0.191 0.0324 0.0186 0.283 0.411
(-725.2) (-716.3) (-752.5) (-829.9) (-107876) (-107039) (-119636) (-138483) (-0.424) (-0.421) (-0.474) (-0.549) (-0.249) (-0.274) (-0.332) (-0.36)
Permanet stall 1,323 1,435 1,321 805.5 -35,093 -8,325 -7,816 16,142 -0.302 -0.176 -0.186 -0.151 -0.0696 -0.0626 0.262 0.47
(-997.7) (-996.1) (-1030) (-1143) (-132399) (-134494) (-144896) (-164790) (-0.514) (-0.52) (-0.562) (-0.642) (-0.359) (-0.396) (-0.432) (-0.437)
Other 94.43 184.8 129.5 155 73,950 90,501 115,296 140,354 0.246 0.308 0.421 0.51 0.0916 0.103 0.61 0.898*
(-1387) (-1363) (-1455) (-1491) (-141200) (-141433) (-163577) (-177236) (-0.561) (-0.572) (-0.666) (-0.717) (-0.303) (-0.336) (-0.429) (-0.494)
Number of Stalls -876.7 -894 -1,123 -1,418* -57,583 -57,282 -72,543 -77,823 -0.282 -0.279 -0.339 -0.36 -0.0953 -0.112 -0.162 -0.139
(-703.5) (-709.1) (-799.1) (-780.2) (-75894) (-77691) (-80278) (-82036) (-0.294) (-0.305) (-0.311) (-0.321) (-0.218) (-0.239) (-0.269) (-0.286)
Square meters stall 22.48 22.37 36.24 65.8 -3,797 -3,936 -2,458 -1,646 -0.0114 -0.0119 -0.007 -0.00327 0.00627 0.00675 0.0109 0.0122
(-21.15) (-21.81) (-24.08) (-29.46) (-2909) (-2967) (-3223) (-3769) (-0.0112) (-0.0113) (-0.0123) (-0.0144) (-0.00694) (-0.00695) (-0.00717) (-0.0105)
Transport type (none)
Rented car/ Delivery 1,747 1,589 1,754 2,351 46,110 35,704 7,088 52,765 0.0596 0.0466 -0.0191 0.139 0.141 0.142 -0.088 0.0812
(-1750) (-1744) (-1792) (-1863) (-155364) (-159300) (-169052) (-173212) (-0.593) (-0.609) (-0.649) (-0.661) (-0.391) (-0.399) (-0.412) (-0.444)
Friends/ Relatives Transport 1,666 1,559 1,834 2,133* 54,252 57,325 45,104 97,844 0.184 0.242 0.255 0.415 0.0288 0.0411 -0.199 0.0864
(-1015) (-1007) (-1127) (-1261) (-141808) (-143480) (-160345) (-170901) (-0.553) (-0.555) (-0.615) (-0.661) (-0.325) (-0.323) (-0.359) (-0.399)
Collective transport 1,412 1,194 1,572 2,547* 188,075 144,961 107,308 213,944 1.059 0.841 0.732 1.08 0.467 0.442 0.0837 0.217
(-1268) (-1287) (-1385) (-1454) (-214778) (-222175) (-223862) (-235903) (-0.795) (-0.834) (-0.839) (-0.873) (-0.556) (-0.571) (-0.551) (-0.594)
Car 1,732 1,583 2,008 2,469* 261,885 250,257 245,275 278,637 1.043 1.017 1.036 1.195 0.826 0.839 0.601 0.809
(-1159) (-1166) (-1270) (-1365) (-194504) (-196453) (-210949) (-225144) (-0.77) (-0.77) (-0.821) (-0.873) (-0.685) (-0.685) (-0.688) (-0.734)
Van 1,349 1,170 1,594 2,243* 101,229 108,819 81,983 159,366 0.302 0.42 0.361 0.636 0.0136 0.0319 -0.198 -0.00309
(-1027) (-1022) (-1148) (-1278) (-138174) (-142642) (-154933) (-161011) (-0.536) (-0.551) (-0.594) (-0.617) (-0.373) (-0.382) (-0.389) (-0.433)
Pick up 2,176** 2,102** 2,436** 2,823** 196,102 204,506 200,473 260,440* 0.745 0.828* 0.867* 1.093** 0.373 0.382 0.193 0.41
(-1057) (-1045) (-1157) (-1249) (-121785) (-124530) (-133542) (-139576) (-0.473) (-0.48) (-0.512) (-0.532) (-0.267) (-0.27) (-0.292) (-0.32)
Truck 2,921** 2,787** 3,220** 3,785** 447,615*** 444,899** 465,217** 534,106*** 1.720*** 1.747*** 1.848*** 2.091*** 1.070** 1.081** 0.725 0.901
(-1199) (-1180) (-1308) (-1485) (-172068) (-173559) (-184904) (-195002) (-0.658) (-0.663) (-0.7) (-0.736) (-0.483) (-0.49) (-0.507) (-0.552)
Strorage space (none)
Plot storage 2,650 2,657* 2,823* 2,638* 582,903* 581,268* 524,896 512,748 2.028 2.014* 1.802 1.761 1.305*** 1.295** 1.062** 1.241**
(-1656) (-1563) (-1637) (-1585) (-326763) (-317583) (-333084) (-335571) (-1.24) (-1.213) (-1.272) (-1.295) (-0.48) (-0.496) (-0.45) (-0.474)
House storage 400.8 342 263.6 320.2 -18,987 -17,261 -52,346 -43,833 -0.138 -0.109 -0.213 -0.168 0.148 0.15 0.0979 0.198
(-772.7) (-761) (-861.3) (-860.4) (-96187) (-97507) (-103271) (-111606) (-0.375) (-0.377) (-0.398) (-0.434) (-0.221) (-0.224) (-0.241) (-0.285)
Warehouse storage 2,572** 2,609** 2,723** 3,038** 381,969** 383,499** 368,314** 400,967** 1.289** 1.283** 1.234** 1.358** 1.286*** 1.297*** 1.226*** 1.380***
(-1110) (-1109) (-1218) (-1217) (-148870) (-148739) (-152228) (-162669) (-0.58) (-0.579) (-0.587) (-0.625) (-0.305) (-0.311) (-0.312) (-0.352)
Refrigerated storage -226.9 -637 -661.9 -525.1 -109,006 -128,919 -139,392 -95,381 -0.73 -0.704 -0.756 -0.588 -0.662 -0.658 -0.427 -0.442
(-1845) (-1971) (-1929) (-2052) (-207320) (-212397) (-216684) (-237858) (-0.801) (-0.815) (-0.84) (-0.921) (-0.531) (-0.533) (-0.591) (-0.621)
Other type of storage -262.8 -58.33 -126.1 130.5 -38,236 -24,888 -61,879 -59,801 -0.37 -0.352 -0.465 -0.403 -0.539 -0.552 -0.238 -0.000797
(-1283) (-1329) (-1381) (-1333) (-198855) (-201896) (-205302) (-205133) (-0.754) (-0.763) (-0.772) (-0.778) (-0.628) (-0.652) (-0.624) (-0.673)
Common infrastructure
Permanent  Roof -201.2 -432.6 -504.9 -1,047 78,962 49,811 28,055 -4,337 0.282 0.181 0.0869 -0.0478 0.269 0.269 0.158 0.0641
(-728.6) (-754.8) (-768.1) (-836.8) (-112868) (-116957) (-118013) (-124829) (-0.433) (-0.447) (-0.452) (-0.478) (-0.214) (-0.216) (-0.247) (-0.307)
Electricity in the street market 1,130 1,206 1,571 1,418 265,917 203,284 301,551 351,419 0.926 0.437 0.809 0.983 -1.847 -2.25 -1.145 -1.198
(-2518) (-2268) (-2358) (-2341) (-227668) (-227548) (-243391) (-256535) (-0.859) (-0.902) (-0.945) (-1.001) (-1.204) (-1.57) (-1.647) (-1.79)
Potable Water at the street market 1,756 1,734 1,297 971.7 75,365 78,263 74,633 56,953 0.454 0.497 0.521 0.462 0.622*** 0.652** 0.525* 0.669**
(-1124) (-1107) (-970.9) (-1050) (-112882) (-113609) (-120605) (-129480) (-0.435) (-0.442) (-0.47) (-0.51) (-0.235) (-0.249) (-0.292) (-0.332)
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses
VARIABLES
1: Earnings per hour worked  2: Feriantes's Earnings per month 3: Income relative to poverty line
 4: Feriantess women income relative to 
average Feriantess men income
Financial Capital
Human Capital
Physical Capital
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Table A.7.5: Street vendors OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Economic Efficiency and 
Social Equity (Continuation) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Number of street vendors 0.593 0.543 0.614 0.591 101 100.9 73.01 81.2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.0007 0.0007 0.0004 0.0006
(-0.429) (-0.461) (-0.489) (-0.46) (-62.53) (-64.92) (-67.88) (-68.75) (-0.0004) (-0.0004) (-0.0004) (-0.0004) (-0.0005) (-0.0004) (-0.0006) (-0.0006)
Number hours permit -88.93*** -95.26*** -98.67*** -69.87** 3,624 3,350 2,581 5,052 0.0125 0.013 0.00977 0.0186 0.0062 0.00627 0.00608 0.0111
(-1660) (-1696) (-1734) (-1647) (-135926) (-135380) (-140346) (-143956) (-0.528) (-0.525) (-0.545) (-0.563) (-0.439) (-0.464) (-0.488) (-0.554)
Diversity of payment -370.3 -201.2 -301.8 -493.9 -32,827 -28,811 -10,752 -23,830 -0.0786 -0.11 -0.0427 -0.122 -0.112 -0.112 -0.147 -0.139
(-614.2) (-660.5) (-655.1) (-654.3) (-84826) (-89505) (-87444) (-95103) (-0.348) (-0.363) (-0.353) (-0.385) (-0.172) (-0.174) (-0.174) (-0.216)
Unionisation -912.6 -960.9 -938.1 -820.5 308.6 -13,526 -39,592 -23,050 -0.0831 -0.146 -0.224 -0.176 -0.231 -0.225 -0.355 -0.356
(-841.5) (-840.9) (-801.6) (-800.8) (-90742) (-91784) (-90639) (-94199) (-0.347) (-0.352) (-0.349) (-0.363) (-0.24) (-0.259) (-0.252) (-0.259)
Children Playground -2,012 -2,309 -2,835* -3,842** -102,358 -155,047 -197,391 -287,245 -0.39 -0.627 -0.835 -1.143 -0.162 -0.2 -0.233 -0.555
(-1420) (-1486) (-1588) (-1651) (-163470) (-168353) (-176297) (-185219) (-0.627) (-0.64) (-0.669) (-0.719) (-0.286) (-0.317) (-0.34) (-0.437)
Provision of green space -331.6 -7.309 78.47 977.4 -104,284 -68,326 -50,138 -11,529 -0.519 -0.39 -0.317 -0.182 0.0235 0.0593 0.0268 0.168
(-1059) (-1105) (-1150) (-1237) (-139909) (-143340) (-150486) (-154554) (-0.538) (-0.55) (-0.571) (-0.597) (-0.205) (-0.227) (-0.25) (-0.314)
Parking space (in the street)
Parking in a street island -764.9 -3,583 -3,625 -5,060 -281,650 -584,189 -747,542 -829,841* -1.453 -2.482 -3.168* -3.421**
(-1962) (-2950) (-3585) (-3140) (-487473) (-516989) (-528046) (-444322) (-1.773) (-1.861) (-1.806) (-1.603)
Street market parking provision 864.5 -1,888 -1,786 -3,211 -82,513 -388,347 -516,157 -594,901 -0.591 -1.673 -2.222 -2.48 0.159 0.125 0.204 0.214
(-1759) (-2677) (-3356) (-2881) (-486978) (-519327) (-528661) (-441684) (-1.775) (-1.87) (-1.808) (-1.591) (-0.213) (-0.218) (-0.251) (-0.273)
Other type of parking 1,311 -1,784 -1,676 -3,612 -75,048 -443,403 -652,558 -750,799 -0.661 -2.021 -2.898 -3.278* -0.12 -0.177 -0.272 -0.358
(-2588) (-3516) (-4111) (-3893) (-541007) (-577564) (-596738) (-538124) (-1.989) (-2.102) (-2.088) (-1.984) (-0.304) (-0.328) (-0.344) (-0.373)
Toilet facilities (none)
2.Toilet_StreetMarket 1,683** 1,751** 2,044** 2,054** 117,610 122,563 146,195 166,926 0.383 0.4 0.502 0.55 0.0415 0.0274 0.0442 0.188
(-823.4) (-839.6) (-928.2) (-964.3) (-94855) (-95593) (-106614) (-114313) (-0.371) (-0.377) (-0.415) (-0.444) (-0.203) (-0.207) (-0.208) (-0.261)
3.Toilet_StreetMarket 1,441 3,428 4,064 3,459 -178,725 49,975 9,524 48,549 -0.109 0.714 0.61 0.773 -0.596 -0.553 -0.437 -0.414
(-2474) (-3388) (-3657) (-2992) (-255081) (-317122) (-321592) (-287135) (-0.958) (-1.066) (-1.104) (-1.066) (-0.495) (-0.524) (-0.531) (-0.573)
4.Toilet_StreetMarket -767.4 -902.1 -472.7 -251.9 -132,271 -130,263 38,308 20,244 -0.482 -0.431 0.212 0.0682 -0.65 -0.608 -0.519 -0.641
(-1254) (-1245) (-1249) (-1482) (-185790) (-184089) (-174808) (-234801) (-0.764) (-0.747) (-0.689) (-0.941) (-0.72) (-0.739) (-0.597) (-0.595)
5.Toilet_StreetMarket -1,381 -1,504 -1,629 -1,288 -434,109 -453,282 -445,253 -388,570 -1.725 -1.791 -1.751 -1.597 0.074 0.0592 -0.184 0.0506
(-1398) (-1470) (-1490) (-1663) (-295042) (-296838) (-303355) (-315420) (-1.152) (-1.157) (-1.19) (-1.248) (-0.386) (-0.386) (-0.426) (-0.504)
Childcare facilities (none)
2.Childcare access (network) -1,567 -1,546 -1,806 -1,728 -147,614 -157,870 -145,749 -132,509 -0.76 -0.85 -0.796 -0.753 0.0295 0.042 -0.0693 -0.00966
(-2254) (-2300) (-2306) (-2200) (-164556) (-164797) (-172995) (-175144) (-0.646) (-0.644) (-0.669) (-0.673) (-0.401) (-0.412) (-0.434) (-0.445)
3.Childcare access (public 
provision)
-1,723 -1,715 -1,965 -1,621 -76,253 -86,143 -34,535 -9,845 -0.505 -0.592 -0.414 -0.344 -0.0808 -0.0867 -0.0681 -0.0153
(-2158) (-2216) (-2268) (-2173) (-162236) (-164682) (-168332) (-169319) (-0.638) (-0.64) (-0.645) (-0.646) (-0.401) (-0.406) (-0.436) (-0.467)
4.Childcare access (other) -1,513 -1,500 -1,823 -1,947 -113,807 -126,025 -94,828 -99,924 -0.523 -0.626 -0.535 -0.552 -0.242 -0.254 -0.205 -0.229
(-2244) (-2297) (-2354) (-2233) (-151934) (-151252) (-160062) (-161856) (-0.598) (-0.587) (-0.611) (-0.615) (-0.343) (-0.349) (-0.382) (-0.408)
Police support -158.1 -155.3 -153.4 -161.7 -23,934 -25,491 -22,261 -25,824 -0.0735 -0.0844 -0.0726 -0.0847 -0.0662 -0.0671 -0.0646 -0.0936
(-113.8) (-118.6) (-120.2) (-117) (-15386) (-15531) (-16046) (-17098) (-0.0597) (-0.0599) (-0.0623) (-0.0671) (-0.0555) (-0.0559) (-0.0564) (-0.0709)
Other Municipal support 160.2 158.8 160.2 180.5 47,096*** 46,148** 41,412** 44,869** 0.192*** 0.186*** 0.166** 0.177** 0.0586 0.054 0.0574 0.0592
(-108.5) (-108.1) (-113.5) (-117.3) (-18113) (-18037) (-17963) (-18453) (-0.0691) (-0.0683) (-0.0678) (-0.0705) (-0.0449) (-0.0463) (-0.0483) (-0.0528)
Socio-Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Enterprise controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Spatial Controls no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
Municipal Controls no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes
Constant 4,765 7,693** 7,181* 9,396** 433,278 611,490 1.125e+06* 1.264e+06** 2.401 2.39 4.402* 4.842** 0.476 0.0655 1.648 0.898
(-3327) (-3793) (-4315) (-4246) (-590003) (-612925) (-623718) (-581820) (-2.216) (-2.317) (-2.285) (-2.233) (-0.835) (-1.002) (-1.048) (-1.249)
Observations 343 343 335 333 345 345 337 333 345 345 337 333 154 154 151 149
R-squared 0.343 0.351 0.363 0.407 0.41 0.416 0.441 0.457 0.408 0.415 0.438 0.451 0.598 0.6 0.628 0.642
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses
VARIABLES
Market Access
Organisation
Negative Externalities
1: Earnings per hour worked  2: Feriantes's Earnings per month 3: Income relative to poverty line
 4: Feriantess women income relative to 
average Feriantess men income
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Table A.7. 6: Street vendors OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Work Quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Access to credit 0.181 0.233 0.238 0.187 0.937* 0.994* 0.992* 0.74 0.598* 0.533 0.722** 0.696 -0.596 -0.677 -0.795 -1.397**
(-0.152) (-0.151) (-0.153) (-0.159) (-0.49) (-0.531) (-0.54) (-0.651) (-0.342) (-0.35) (-0.367) (-0.439) (-0.436) (-0.453) (-0.489) (-0.692)
Local fund -0.00687 -0.098 -0.107 -0.15 - - - - 0.18 0.106 -0.0213 0.431 -0.623 -0.626 -0.913 -0.414
(-0.334) (-0.341) (-0.346) (-0.305) () () () () (-0.874) (-0.835) (-0.802) (-0.92) (-0.931) (-1.032) (-1.124) (-1.178)
National Small Fund 0.0396 0.0549 -0.00661 -0.0207 -2.35 -2.805 -1.845 -1.983 -0.336 -0.246 -0.21 -0.861 1.552 1.594 1.333 2.033*
(-0.258) (-0.251) (-0.27) (-0.274) (-1.471) (-1.922) (-1.851) (-2.651) (-0.713) (-0.754) (-0.744) (-0.926) (-0.965) (-1.005) (-1.067) (-1.15)
State Large Fund -0.255 -0.181 -0.146 -0.0356 0.9 1.187 0.664 0.808 0.508 0.806 0.892 1.272* 0.755 0.753 0.932 1.075
Training -0.211 -0.212 -0.212 -0.209 1.076 1.148 1.296 1.314 -0.624 -0.691 -0.802* -1.350** -1.197* -1.210* -0.968 -1.217
(-0.23) (-0.227) (-0.238) (-0.219) (-0.717) (-0.766) (-0.809) (-0.934) (-0.451) (-0.462) (-0.475) (-0.525) (-0.663) (-0.66) (-0.738) (-1.068)
Tools and machinery
Uniform 0.0305 0.0337 0.0302 0.0247 0.0122 0.0406 0.602 1.028 0.854** 0.931** 0.969** 1.247** -1.765*** -1.772*** -2.237*** -3.830***
(-0.134) (-0.132) (-0.132) (-0.133) (-0.51) (-0.606) (-0.617) (-0.704) (-0.358) (-0.38) (-0.394) (-0.494) (-0.666) (-0.674) (-0.772) (-1.122)
Electronic sacle 0.151 0.155 0.128 0.197 -1.223** -0.861 -0.845 -0.85 -0.318 -0.503 -0.562 -0.82 0.775 0.73 1.043 2.140***
(-0.177) (-0.179) (-0.179) (-0.169) (-0.621) (-0.681) (-0.74) (-0.856) (-0.423) (-0.43) (-0.447) (-0.529) (-0.646) (-0.633) (-0.639) (-0.668)
No using scale -0.248 -0.236 -0.26 -0.328 -0.811 -0.3 -0.37 -0.162 0.011 -0.0163 0.0167 0.53 -0.0258 -0.0341 -0.218 0.65
-0.214 -0.214 -0.211 -0.217 -0.922 -0.917 -1.079 -1.276 -0.468 -0.482 -0.49 -0.587 -0.928 -0.927 -1.111 -1.696
Fridge at the stall -0.177 -0.267 -0.226 -0.655** - - - - -0.107 -0.107 -0.196 1.983 2.563 2.614 3.234 2.181
(-0.342) (-0.337) (-0.345) (-0.318) (-0.998) (-0.934) (-0.952) (-1.209) (-2.168) (-2.319) (-2.355) (-2.005)
Electric generator 1.645 1.811 1.69 0.786 - - - - - - - - -3.507 -3.627 -5.096* -1.297
(-1.093) (-1.12) (-1.111) (-0.806) (-2.44) (-2.408) (-2.72) (-4.312)
Other types of machines 0.286 0.361 0.441 0.676** - - - - 0.3 0.259 0.336 0.328 -0.44 -0.507 -0.339 -2.707
(-0.32) (-0.327) (-0.325) (-0.33) () (-0.867) (-0.807) (-0.815) (-1.362) (-1.209) (-1.23) (-1.36) (-2.158)
Stall type  (precarious)
Standard stall 0.384* 0.432** 0.432** 0.602*** -1.006 -0.985 -1.067 -0.257 -1.04 -0.977 -0.855 -1.21 1.005 0.89 1.298 0.614
(-0.203) (-0.194) (-0.195) (-0.188) (-0.937) (-0.86) (-0.915) (-1.093) (-0.648) (-0.672) (-0.708) (-0.983) (-0.76) (-0.784) (-0.815) (-0.974)
Permanet stall 0.453* 0.504** 0.445** 0.737*** -1.509 -1.515 -1.603 -1.416 -1.594** -1.502* -1.329 -1.854 0.379 0.248 0.622 -0.637
(-0.234) (-0.223) (-0.225) (-0.227) (-1.096) (-1.078) (-1.044) (-1.411) (-0.741) (-0.79) (-0.828) (-1.169) (-0.765) (-0.812) (-0.87) (-1.156)
Other 0.0958 0.139 0.0407 0.0488 -0.721 -0.909 -0.854 -0.67 1.34 1.575 1.947 1.979 0.722 0.554 0.653 -0.147
(-0.356) (-0.356) (-0.361) (-0.352) (-1.649) (-1.613) (-2.065) (-2.512) (-1.266) (-1.391) (-1.527) (-1.493) (-1.02) (-1.137) (-1.289) (-1.68)
Number of Stalls 0.155 0.158 0.171 0.325* -0.305 -0.484 -0.0772 -0.202 0.132 0.232 0.118 0.139 -0.535 -0.595 -1.105* -2.491***
(-0.184) (-0.178) (-0.192) (-0.169) (-0.662) (-0.754) (-0.798) (-0.902) (-0.401) (-0.406) (-0.423) (-0.495) (-0.539) (-0.585) (-0.657) (-0.887)
Square meters stall 0.0221* 0.0208* 0.0207* 0.00956 0.0826** 0.0965** 0.0923* 0.0985* -0.00587 -0.0118 -0.0121 -0.0117 0.0635* 0.0673* 0.0988** 0.157***
(-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.006) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.05) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.03) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.03)
Transport type (none)
Rented car/ Delivery -0.563* -0.596* -0.570* -0.421 -0.435 -0.373 -0.241 -0.251 -0.284 -0.353 -0.503 -0.314 0.716 0.687 0.654 0.0423
(-0.326) (-0.326) (-0.342) (-0.356) (-0.679) (-0.716) (-0.786) (-1.088) (-0.507) (-0.493) (-0.515) (-0.598) (-0.633) (-0.625) (-0.656) (-0.961)
Friends/ Relatives Transport -0.000771 -0.0193 -0.0139 0.164 -1.065 -1.17 -1.238 -1.432 -0.478 -0.649 -0.719 -1.001 0.718 0.666 0.571 -0.0331
(-0.286) (-0.285) (-0.293) (-0.301) (-1.229) (-1.243) (-1.361) (-1.435) (-0.617) (-0.604) (-0.616) (-0.691) (-0.943) (-0.961) (-1.109) (-1.394)
Collective transport 0.222 0.133 0.17 0.117 -0.262 -0.547 -0.279 -0.345 0.144 0.0943 0.101 0.227 - - - -
(-0.373) (-0.365) (-0.382) (-0.338) (-1.322) (-1.294) (-1.298) (-1.5) (-0.701) (-0.669) (-0.724) (-0.826)
Car -0.0228 -0.0717 0.0887 0.0734 -0.74 -0.813 -1.008 -1.516 -0.62 -0.673 -0.915 -0.595 0.198 0.146 0.323 -0.943
(-0.293) (-0.297) (-0.311) (-0.323) (-1.282) (-1.391) (-1.607) (-2.919) (-0.752) (-0.791) (-0.826) (-0.893) (-0.903) (-0.881) (-0.828) (-1.193)
Van 0.141 0.0974 0.183 0.203 -2.008* -1.967 -1.946 -1.931 -1.430* -1.416* -1.474* -0.982 0.27 0.315 0.45 -1.996
(-0.283) (-0.291) (-0.307) (-0.312) (-1.138) (-1.3) (-1.627) (-1.738) (-0.86) (-0.842) (-0.877) (-1.018) (-1.245) (-1.262) (-1.464) (-2.642)
Pick up 0.426* 0.408* 0.428* 0.315 -1.838 -2.291* -1.905 -2.383 -0.168 -0.229 -0.253 -0.319 -0.172 -0.177 -0.651 -1.692
(-0.236) (-0.24) (-0.25) (-0.26) (-1.225) (-1.258) (-1.308) (-1.531) (-0.734) (-0.727) (-0.735) (-0.827) (-0.906) (-0.894) (-0.973) (-1.681)
Truck 0.487* 0.452 0.500* 0.22 0.64 -0.428 -0.0174 0.4 -0.398 -0.319 -0.242 -0.224 -1.856 -1.746 -2.728** -4.116**
(-0.276) (-0.281) (-0.294) (-0.298) (-1.32) (-1.42) (-1.495) (-1.675) (-1.021) (-1.002) (-1.052) (-1.098) (-1.154) (-1.173) (-1.349) (-2.07)
Strorage space (none)
Plot storage 0.0794 0.0802 0.153 0.073 2.469* 2.256* 1.902 3.241 -0.318 -0.225 -0.535 -0.127 1.421 1.357 1.532 0.837
(-0.253) (-0.239) (-0.232) (-0.29) (-1.311) (-1.365) (-1.702) (-2.155) (-0.798) (-0.782) (-0.845) (-0.994) (-1.248) (-1.37) (-1.458) (-3.412)
House storage -0.0141 -0.0145 -0.0496 -0.00682 1.354** 1.617* 1.873* 1.626 0.735* 0.792** 0.743* 0.976** 1.134* 1.142* 0.907 1.645**
(-0.164) (-0.161) (-0.163) (-0.167) (-0.682) (-0.843) (-0.968) (-1.193) (-0.397) (-0.395) (-0.42) (-0.486) (-0.597) (-0.608) (-0.66) (-0.807)
Warehouse storage 0.159 0.168 0.134 0.0882 1.295 1.254 1.233 2.048 0.969* 1.018* 0.951 1.044 1.126 1.134 1.152 2.162*
(-0.203) (-0.201) (-0.206) (-0.217) (-0.915) (-1.076) (-1.283) (-1.603) (-0.583) (-0.587) (-0.597) (-0.666) (-0.822) (-0.831) (-0.864) (-1.161)
Refrigerated storage -0.39 -0.508 -0.476 -0.289 3.034 2.639 2.9 1.306 0.696 0.507 0.324 -0.172 0.283 0.347 0.376 2.227
(-0.531) (-0.522) (-0.53) (-0.465) (-1.858) (-2.192) (-2.493) (-2.951) (-0.971) (-1.014) (-1.002) (-1.192) (-2.34) (-2.334) (-2.6) (-2.294)
Other type of storage -0.238 -0.174 -0.287 -0.334 -0.289 0.613 0.316 0.99 0.869 0.832 0.752 0.903 2.532** 2.544** 2.653** 4.470***
(-0.411) (-0.406) (-0.412) (-0.377) (-1.301) (-1.36) (-1.63) (-1.797) (-0.806) (-0.808) (-0.801) (-0.828) (-0.992) (-0.999) (-1.038) (-1.577)
Common infrastructure
Permanent  Roof -0.0335 -0.114 -0.144 -0.0861 -0.308 -0.447 -0.476 -1.833** 0.114 -0.0199 -0.00528 0.0959 -1.690** -1.611** -1.596** -2.872*
(-0.203) (-0.203) (-0.209) (-0.216) (-0.743) (-0.674) (-0.734) (-0.846) (-0.487) (-0.486) (-0.466) (-0.565) (-0.706) (-0.693) (-0.734) (-1.576)
Electricity in the street market -0.557 -0.499 -0.552 -0.513 2.064 2.135 1.184 1.356 -1.309 -0.536 -1.114 -1.264 1.612 1.958 2.648 6.519**
(-0.599) (-0.617) (-0.596) (-0.522) (-2.276) (-2.404) (-2.685) (-3.18) (-1.267) (-1.404) (-1.363) (-1.445) (-1.833) (-2.31) (-2.277) (-3.059)
Potable Water at the street market 0.152 0.149 0.0166 0.0956 -1.526* -1.991* -2.224 -4.262** 1.698*** 1.438** 1.862*** 2.000** 0.341 0.316 0.503 1.144
(-0.202) (-0.198) (-0.214) (-0.207) (-0.837) (-1.04) (-1.358) (-1.964) (-0.639) (-0.657) (-0.692) (-0.789) (-0.591) (-0.608) (-0.621) (-0.936)
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses
5: Employment generated per HBE 6: Access to Pension (yes/no) 7: Health Contribution (yes/no) 8: Frequency of workplace accidents
Financial Capital
Human Capital
Physical Capital
VARIABLES
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Table A.7.6: Street vendors OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Work Quality (Continuation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Number of street vendors 0.000133 0.000121 0.000145 0.00011 0.00102 0.00106 0.00287*** 0.00365*** -0.000372 -0.000432 -0.000478 -0.000601 0.000968 0.00104 0.000251 0.000347
(-0.0002) (-0.0002) (-0.0002) (-0.0002) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.0003) (-0.0003) (-0.0003) (-0.0004) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.0003) (-0.0004)
Number hours permit -0.00335 -0.005 -0.00214 -0.00659 -0.0144 -0.00458 0.00591 0.0353 0.00564 0.00468 0.00146 -0.0645*** -0.023 -0.0222 -0.0175 -0.0162
(-0.296) (-0.283) (-0.3) (-0.295) (-1.043) (-1.176) (-1.144) (-1.28) (-0.658) (-0.648) (-0.681) (-0.725) (-0.739) (-0.755) (-0.742) (-1.187)
Diversity of payment 0.276* 0.315* 0.297* 0.26 -0.556 -0.448 -0.725 -0.352 0.153 0.147 0.291 0.141 1.018** 1.000* 1.174** 2.187***
(-0.16) (-0.162) (-0.163) (-0.169) (-0.618) (-0.614) (-0.714) (-0.769) (-0.409) (-0.432) (-0.453) (-0.503) (-0.487) (-0.527) (-0.538) (-0.769)
Unionisation -0.138 -0.172 -0.142 -0.194 -0.495 -0.598 -0.46 -0.0557 0.568 0.479 0.478 0.858 0.567 0.624 0.483 0.697
(-0.136) (-0.142) (-0.145) (-0.147) (-0.539) (-0.555) (-0.57) (-0.76) (-0.347) (-0.369) (-0.389) (-0.535) (-0.492) (-0.479) (-0.49) (-0.705)
Children Playground -0.198 -0.333 -0.416 -0.199 -1.742 -2.339* -2.417* -3.150** -0.941 -0.908 -0.867 -0.986 0.353 0.505 0.824 0.0619
(-0.324) (-0.326) (-0.342) (-0.365) (-1.448) (-1.358) (-1.233) (-1.529) (-0.737) (-0.73) (-0.776) (-0.865) (-0.82) (-0.847) (-0.84) (-1.179)
Provision of green space 0.333 0.427* 0.460* 0.343 1.081 1.243 1.393 2.139 0.988* 0.869 1.154** 1.409** 0.106 0.0235 0.281 0.939
(-0.257) (-0.258) (-0.262) (-0.274) (-0.891) (-0.865) (-0.987) (-1.328) (-0.56) (-0.559) (-0.561) (-0.644) (-0.679) (-0.709) (-0.717) (-1.226)
Parking space (in the street)
Parking in a street island 0.534 -0.345 -0.863 -0.325 1.474 2.174* 2.735* 3.360** 1.086 1.828 1.419** 1.554* -2.654* -1.839 -2.317 -6.126**
(-0.539) (-0.67) (-0.635) (-0.508) (-1.323) (-1.304) (-1.531) (-1.669) (-2.006) (-2.353) (-0.707) (-0.856) (-1.537) (-1.667) (-1.97) (-2.772)
Street market parking provision 0.356 -0.492 -1.056* -0.544 1.208 1.724 1.918 3.048* 0.17 1.014 0.451 0.576 -1.728 -0.908 -1.248 -3.724
(-0.537) (-0.664) (-0.635) (-0.5) (-1.354) (-1.32) (-1.514) (-1.582) (-2.001) (-2.356) (-0.706) (-0.825) (-1.491) (-1.667) (-1.992) (-2.615)
Other type of parking 0.914 -0.0925 -0.595 -0.0653 - - - - - - -4.527** -3.516* -3.822* -7.985**
(-0.616) (-0.752) (-0.736) (-0.646) (-1.967) (-2.126) (-2.298) (-3.24)
Toilet facilities (none)
2.Toilet_StreetMarket 0.141 0.154 0.185 0.212 -1.658*** -1.776*** -2.195*** -2.444*** -0.52 -0.561 -0.76 -1.083* -0.74 -0.761 -1.141** -1.385**
(-0.166) (-0.164) (-0.166) (-0.168) (-0.64) (-0.648) (-0.715) (-0.888) (-0.434) (-0.438) (-0.493) (-0.61) (-0.462) (-0.476) (-0.534) (-0.699)
3.Toilet_StreetMarket 0.591 1.220** 1.338*** 1.225*** - - - - -4.680*** -4.856*** -5.235*** -21.21*** 1.295 0.759 0.0143 2.644
(-0.57) (-0.498) (-0.485) (-0.447) (-1.407) (-1.433) (-1.479) (-2.696) (-1.644) (-1.606) (-1.688) (-2.878)
4.Toilet_StreetMarket -0.139 -0.14 -0.216 -0.531 - - - - -1.062 -0.95 -1.386 -1.299 - - - -
(-0.359) (-0.378) (-0.37) (-0.438) (-1.377) (-1.559) (-1.516) (-1.837)
5.Toilet_StreetMarket -0.278 -0.329 -0.343 -0.0275 1.521 1.08 1.719 2.209 - - - - 2.306* 2.391* 2.772** 2.366*
(-0.589) (-0.63) (-0.638) (-0.549) (-1.467) (-1.437) (-1.859) (-1.917) (-1.237) (-1.257) (-1.233) (-1.395)
Childcare facilities (none)
2.Childcare access (network) 0.0316 0.0368 0.0552 0.145 0.49 -0.162 0.512 -0.318 -0.232 0.0393 0.353 0.738 -1.651 -1.634 -1.656 -3.267**
(-0.457) (-0.457) (-0.453) (-0.41) (-1.065) (-1.047) (-1.339) (-1.372) (-0.778) (-0.763) (-0.819) (-0.903) (-1.162) (-1.137) (-1.108) (-1.378)
3.Childcare access (public 
provision)
0.282 0.285 0.189 0.141 -0.23 -0.81 -0.347 -0.646 -0.559 -0.291 -0.131 -0.165 -1.693 -1.671 -1.738 -2.913**
(-0.436) (-0.441) (-0.44) (-0.401) (-1.13) (-1.074) (-1.396) (-1.382) (-0.742) (-0.705) (-0.754) (-0.804) (-1.053) (-1.041) (-1.079) (-1.356)
4.Childcare access (other) 0.082 0.0859 0.0438 0.0738 0.522 -0.112 0.469 0.193 0.245 0.539 0.648 1.151 -1.646* -1.632* -1.609* -3.796***
(-0.432) (-0.44) (-0.441) (-0.396) (-0.967) (-0.995) (-1.273) (-1.392) (-0.703) (-0.669) (-0.731) (-0.83) (-0.994) (-0.965) (-0.96) (-1.423)
Police support -0.0112 -0.0125 -0.0113 -0.00447 -0.0201 -0.0185 -0.0838 -0.101 0.0775 0.0725 0.0834 0.0944 -0.236** -0.236** -0.275** -0.426***
(-0.0295) (-0.0298) (-0.0271) (-0.0241) (-0.132) (-0.136) (-0.146) (-0.2) (-0.0628) (-0.062) (-0.0721) (-0.0931) (-0.111) (-0.11) (-0.123) (-0.161)
Other Municipal support 0.0225 0.0211 0.0232 -0.00472 -0.0566 -0.0633 -0.149 -0.0705 -0.0609 -0.0516 -0.0514 -0.0819 0.0258 0.0262 0.0327 0.136
(-0.0274) (-0.0276) (-0.0281) (-0.029) (-0.114) (-0.125) (-0.145) (-0.175) (-0.0765) (-0.0835) (-0.0892) (-0.106) (-0.0929) (-0.0915) (-0.0957) (-0.129)
Socio-Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Enterprise controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Spatial Controls no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
Municipal Controls no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes
Constant -0.282 0.629 0.334 -1.001 -0.494 -4.466 -3.221 -1.811 0.119 2.408 3.045 1.43 -0.908 -1.287 -1.016 6.386
(-0.897) (-1.059) (-1.089) (-0.956) (-2.439) (-3.702) (-3.965) (-5.791) (-2.453) (-2.81) (-2.158) (-2.589) (-2.384) (-3.129) (-3.28) (-4.789)
Observations 351 351 343 326 245 245 243 233 345 345 335 319 308 308 302 291
R-squared 0.409 0.422 0.441 0.532 0.293 0.307 0.32 0.431 0.17 0.186 0.201 0.278 0.300 0.302 0.335 0.474
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses
5: Employment generated per HBE 6: Access to Pension (yes/no) 7: Health Contribution (yes/no) 8: Frequency of workplace accidents
Market Access
Organisation
Negative Externalities
VARIABLES
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Table A.7. 7: Street vendors OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Negative Externalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
Access to credit -1.526 -1.09 -1.073 -0.968 0.337 0.495 0.509 0.537 0.0275 0.116 0.165 0.118 -0.307 -0.294 0.0627 0.946
(-3.224) (-2.917) (-3.032) (-3.128) (-0.401) (-0.416) (-0.433) (-0.454) (-0.203) (-0.208) (-0.214) (-0.233) (-0.638) (-0.715) (-0.735) (-1.012)
Local fund -3.801 -4.335 -3.463 -4.626 1.137 0.947 1.056 0.715 -0.328 -0.312 -0.318 -0.0903 0.775 0.627 0.605 -2.157
(-3.873) (-3.868) (-4.073) (-4.429) (-1.039) (-1.068) (-1.051) (-1.15) (-0.413) (-0.395) (-0.417) (-0.442) (-1.571) (-1.634) (-1.497) (-1.959)
National Small Fund 2.197 2.061 3.186 3.263 0.28 0.381 0.28 0.569 0.333 0.32 0.211 0.0909 -0.495 -0.448 -0.742 1.292
(-3.463) (-3.627) (-3.531) (-4.359) (-0.771) (-0.757) (-0.72) (-0.751) (-0.362) (-0.345) (-0.346) (-0.394) (-1.112) (-1.154) (-1.145) (-2.709)
State Large Fund -2.183 -1.254 -1.537 -0.615 0.828 0.929 1.046 1.169 -0.309 -0.434 -0.377 -0.348 -0.485 -0.387 -0.68 -3.562*
Training 3.929 3.719 3.018 3.87 -0.201 -0.229 -0.157 -0.321 0.0265 0.0557 0.0663 -0.0838 1.377 1.336 1.583* 6.534***
(-3.073) (-3.159) (-3.408) (-3.253) (-0.647) (-0.666) (-0.662) (-0.612) (-0.35) (-0.354) (-0.364) (-0.386) (-0.901) (-0.896) (-0.877) (-2.341)
Tools and machinery
Uniform 3.376 3.433 3.613 5.312 0.14 0.203 0.243 0.00464 -0.136 -0.158 -0.201 -0.298 -0.355 -0.306 -0.305 -0.837
(-4.912) (-4.842) (-5.15) (-6.05) (-0.376) (-0.38) (-0.397) (-0.438) (-0.188) (-0.186) (-0.184) (-0.21) (-0.664) (-0.663) (-0.637) (-1.441)
Electronic sacle -1.343 -1.151 -1.063 -0.409 0.00636 -0.0397 -0.0336 0.184 0.155 0.236 0.215 0.341 -0.593 -0.644 -0.648 0.159
(-4.27) (-3.858) (-3.822) (-4.363) (-0.53) (-0.537) (-0.556) (-0.643) (-0.268) (-0.274) (-0.268) (-0.287) (-0.675) (-0.682) (-0.728) (-1.551)
No using scale -1.438 -1.261 -1.046 -1.083 0.551 0.499 0.589 0.515 -0.0374 -0.0247 -0.0799 0.0546 -1.294 -1.246 -1.056 -2.617
-2.737 -2.901 -3.134 -3.285 -0.616 -0.629 -0.632 -0.693 -0.285 -0.284 -0.285 -0.299 -1.017 -0.989 -1.058 -2.451
Fridge at the stall -1.705 -2.337 -1.753 -0.0222 -0.319 -0.653 -0.919 -1.074 -0.411 -0.431 -0.447 -1.027* - - - -
(-4.269) (-4.522) (-4.574) (-5.557) (-1.032) (-1.018) (-1.01) (-1.117) (-0.688) (-0.688) (-0.682) (-0.596)
Electric generator 0.703 1.161 0.238 0.592 0.507 1.241 2.086 2.335 2.157 2.118 2.279 2.01 - - - -
(-11.12) (-11.36) (-11.71) (-15.78) (-1.905) (-2.099) (-2.205) (-2.382) (-2.433) (-2.553) (-2.708) (-2.333)
Other types of machines -5.299 -4.864 -5.644 -10.53 -0.352 -0.129 -0.0273 0.843 -0.531 -0.506 -0.375 -0.486 -0.168 -0.0619 -0.275 -2.31
(-6.931) (-7.043) (-7.659) (-11.21) (-0.998) (-1.048) (-1.119) (-1.364) (-0.418) (-0.445) (-0.446) (-0.43) (-0.911) (-0.945) (-0.964) (-2.549)
Stall type  (precarious)
Standard stall -1.592 -0.843 -0.977 -0.287 0.774 0.774 0.431 0.715 0.0605 0.0333 -0.0117 -0.00432 -1.4 -1.333 -1.391 -7.209**
(-2.848) (-2.915) (-3.02) (-3.495) (-0.657) (-0.663) (-0.676) (-0.754) (-0.336) (-0.331) (-0.343) (-0.417) (-0.895) (-0.872) (-0.932) (-2.943)
Permanet stall -0.131 1.008 1.415 0.981 0.445 0.303 -0.0506 0.567 0.331 0.274 0.204 0.222 -1.497* -1.44 -1.35 -5.739**
(-3.699) (-4.34) (-4.584) (-4.107) (-0.746) (-0.757) (-0.77) (-0.874) (-0.391) (-0.391) (-0.398) (-0.485) (-0.898) (-0.929) (-0.961) (-2.363)
Other 1.368 2.363 3.2 3.577 0.919 0.921 0.658 1.168 0.376 0.279 0.0924 0.137 0.928 1.032 1.335 -3.022
(-4.495) (-4.428) (-4.782) (-4.818) (-0.987) (-0.97) (-1.058) (-1.09) (-0.508) (-0.49) (-0.493) (-0.518) (-1.135) (-1.164) (-1.364) (-3.324)
Number of Stalls -2.686 -2.377 -2.512 -2.758 -0.859* -0.883** -1.008** -0.993** -0.162 -0.223 -0.298 -0.363* -0.333 -0.276 -0.14 -1.362
(-2.635) (-2.52) (-2.536) (-2.717) (-0.442) (-0.446) (-0.438) (-0.463) (-0.211) (-0.204) (-0.211) (-0.219) (-0.744) (-0.757) (-0.822) (-1.097)
Square meters stall 0.0715 0.0503 0.0632 0.0601 0.00701 0.0106 0.012 0.0198 0.0175 0.0208 0.0225 0.0274* -0.0708 -0.0748 -0.0937 -0.153
(-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.119) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.08)
Transport type (none)
Rented car/ Delivery 6.218 5.944 6.638 5.864 -0.574 -0.526 0.0155 0.765 -0.893* -0.941* -0.804 -1.061** 0.662 0.651 0.62 3.117
(-5.903) (-5.846) (-6.231) (-6.33) (-1.125) (-1.146) (-1.146) (-1.093) (-0.498) (-0.494) (-0.5) (-0.52) (-0.909) (-0.915) (-0.931) (-1.916)
Friends/ Relatives Transport 6.501 6.639 7.969 8.953 -0.378 -0.428 0.097 0.563 -0.69 -0.698 -0.563 -0.632 2.185 2.204 2.347* 6.787***
(-7.014) (-7.353) (-8.168) (-8.105) (-1.023) (-1.027) (-1.038) (-1.045) (-0.445) (-0.455) (-0.479) (-0.537) (-1.34) (-1.356) (-1.381) (-2.107)
Collective transport 6.687 5.759 6.426 7.325 -0.629 -0.609 -0.0989 0.413 -0.452 -0.601 -0.4 -0.671 - - - -
(-7.941) (-7.154) (-7.426) (-8.063) (-1.559) (-1.55) (-1.552) (-1.595) (-0.709) (-0.692) (-0.715) (-0.777)
Car 0.345 -0.0287 -0.522 2.807 0.557 0.554 1.054 1.555 -0.672 -0.695 -0.412 -0.725 1.16 1.188 1.282 4.277
(-4.73) (-4.67) (-4.857) (-5.559) (-1.039) (-1.043) (-1.051) (-1.048) (-0.494) (-0.5) (-0.53) (-0.613) (-1.326) (-1.375) (-1.389) (-3.282)
Van 10.99* 11.14* 12.26* 13.95* -0.322 -0.426 0.0781 0.87 -0.832* -0.806* -0.566 -0.728 0.564 0.577 0.575 3.935
(-5.979) (-6.631) (-7.056) (-7.509) (-1.027) (-1.06) (-1.044) (-1.057) (-0.463) (-0.471) (-0.499) (-0.55) (-1.561) (-1.57) (-1.841) (-5.024)
Pick up 7.894 8.121 8.598 10.65 0.0183 -0.01 0.647 1.124 -0.612 -0.603 -0.451 -0.585 1.788* 1.819* 2.056* 6.489***
(-5.02) (-5.422) (-5.89) (-7.331) (-0.931) (-0.947) (-0.955) (-0.929) (-0.41) (-0.421) (-0.444) (-0.505) (-1.076) (-1.051) (-1.155) (-2.303)
Truck 9.652** 9.662** 11.06** 13.54** 0.614 0.524 0.996 1.465 -0.810* -0.840* -0.622 -0.847 - - - -
(-4.284) (-4.437) (-4.9) (-5.998) (-0.99) (-0.999) (-1.009) (-1.02) (-0.449) (-0.455) (-0.471) (-0.537)
Strorage space (none)
Plot storage -3.305 -3.366 -3.056 -1.852 -1.623 -1.538 -1.392 -0.807 0.0994 0.0835 0.131 0.19 2.35 2.362 2.121 0.84
(-4.713) (-4.863) (-5.132) (-4.763) (-1.009) (-1.018) (-1.033) (-1.08) (-0.313) (-0.326) (-0.326) (-0.376) (-1.519) (-1.5) (-1.398) (-2.193)
House storage 1.869 2.008 3.228 3.653 -0.764 -0.808* -0.753 -0.731 0.103 0.0778 0.0316 0.0364 0.547 0.578 0.549 -3.577**
(-5.022) (-5.171) (-5.775) (-5.973) (-0.48) (-0.482) (-0.499) (-0.564) (-0.218) (-0.216) (-0.217) (-0.242) (-0.691) (-0.734) (-0.7) (-1.632)
Warehouse storage 0.538 0.644 1.687 5.161 -0.863 -0.844 -0.822 -0.81 -0.0981 -0.12 -0.149 -0.316 1.448 1.501 1.343 -3.157*
(-4.257) (-4.248) (-4.536) (-5.765) (-0.716) (-0.725) (-0.748) (-0.828) (-0.326) (-0.325) (-0.318) (-0.357) (-1.229) (-1.248) (-1.317) (-1.842)
Refrigerated storage -11.09* -11.95* -11.61* -10.29 -2.206** -2.405** -2.572** -2.731*** 0.573 0.621 0.519 0.833 3.339 3.263 3.149 2.224
(-6.695) (-6.834) (-6.814) (-7.097) (-1.001) (-1.007) (-1.044) (-0.896) (-0.555) (-0.562) (-0.556) (-0.558) (-2.053) (-2.033) (-2.166) (-4.505)
Other type of storage 9.227 9.444 9.593 11.21 -0.921 -0.742 -0.694 -0.859 0.778 0.838 0.626 0.518 0.793 0.763 0.803 -5.576
(-6.777) (-6.868) (-7.169) (-7.98) (-0.915) (-0.934) (-0.963) (-1.006) (-0.591) (-0.602) (-0.624) (-0.639) (-1.441) (-1.492) (-2.028) (-3.825)
Common infrastructure
Permanent  Roof -11.41 -12.41 -13.27 -15.04 -0.509 -0.602 -0.538 -0.372 0.339 0.344 0.329 0.413 0.0375 0.00924 -0.0124 2.494
(-8.978) (-9.671) (-10.12) (-12.17) (-0.509) (-0.518) (-0.512) (-0.619) (-0.277) (-0.282) (-0.283) (-0.307) (-0.9) (-0.897) (-0.954) (-1.689)
Electricity in the street market 1.236 1.059 0.0711 -1.373 0.773 0.547 0.673 0.474 -0.288 -0.739 -0.956 -0.795 -
(-7.156) (-7.157) (-7.655) (-9.567) (-1.195) (-1.382) (-1.363) (-1.783) (-0.645) (-0.658) (-0.609) (-0.665)
Potable Water at the street market 0.232 -0.0843 0.662 0.891 -0.86 -0.794 -0.889 -0.538 -0.0932 0.0384 -0.0354 -0.0746 1.464 1.403 2.185** 2.604*
(-2.668) (-2.695) (-2.667) (-3.346) (-0.754) (-0.759) (-0.763) (-0.777) (-0.298) (-0.298) (-0.332) (-0.343) (-0.928) (-0.967) (-1.115) (-1.346)
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses
VARIABLES
9: Work week 10: Child work 11: Neighbourhood life distubance (reverse) 12: Food security and Affordability 
Financial Capital
Human Capital
Physical Capital
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Table A.7.7: Street vendors OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Negative 
Externalities(Continuation)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
Number of street vendors -0.000237 -0.000246 -0.00018 5.98E-05 0.00111 0.000948 0.00170** 0.00257*** -0.000109 -9.47E-05 -9.15E-05 -0.000136 -0.00416** -0.00433* -0.00483** -0.0141***
(-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.0001) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.005)
Number hours permit 1.097*** 1.089*** 1.069*** 1.129*** -0.0155 -0.0185 -0.0152 -0.0154 -0.00987 -0.0102 -0.00979 -0.0129 0.0241 0.0222 0.0256 0.179**
(-2.989) (-3.28) (-3.312) (-4.298) (-0.994) (-1.01) (-0.963) (-0.949) (-0.427) (-0.438) (-0.434) (-0.459) (-1.11) (-1.169) (-1.153) (-2.121)
Diversity of payment -1.153 -1.127 -0.72 -2.089 0.143 0.425 0.375 0.235 0.488* 0.522** 0.527** 0.694** 1.17 1.196 1.480* 2.514**
(-2.692) (-2.913) (-2.762) (-3.012) (-0.404) (-0.458) (-0.461) (-0.562) (-0.25) (-0.246) (-0.248) (-0.277) (-0.738) (-0.785) (-0.8) (-1.139)
Unionisation 1.171 0.456 0.396 -0.155 -0.990** -0.874* -0.594 -0.831 -0.209 -0.151 -0.121 0.0148 0.569 0.488 0.621 2.704**
(-2.795) (-2.373) (-2.499) (-3.009) (-0.464) (-0.485) (-0.508) (-0.509) (-0.23) (-0.229) (-0.235) (-0.257) (-0.718) (-0.686) (-0.646) (-1.087)
Children Playground -19.75 -21.45 -22.72 -24.35 -0.0323 -0.126 -0.485 -0.639 0.177 0.111 -0.0185 -0.141 0.146 0.107 0.51 4.14
(-15.76) (-17.26) (-17.95) (-20.86) (-0.734) (-0.769) (-0.806) (-0.944) (-0.453) (-0.439) (-0.449) (-0.528) (-1.031) (-1.151) (-1.15) (-3.184)
Provision of green space 17.6 18.36 19.85 22 0.464 0.668 0.486 0.14 -0.920*** -0.784** -0.669** -0.770** 0.952 0.972 1.276 2.777
(-15.88) (-16.55) (-16.94) (-18.53) (-0.6) (-0.634) (-0.676) (-0.749) (-0.341) (-0.326) (-0.318) (-0.379) (-0.871) (-0.997) (-1.03) (-2.404)
Parking space (in the street)
Parking in a street island 2.316 -4.459 -19.74** -23.06** -2.218* -4.037*** -3.456** -4.261** -2.344* -3.227* -4.974*** -4.442*** -1.767 -2.115 -3.716 0.702
(-15.72) (-14.76) (-9.447) (-9.181) (-1.138) (-1.399) (-1.59) (-1.881) (-1.38) (-1.671) (-0.96) (-1.03) (-1.776) (-1.946) (-2.434) (-1.897)
Street market parking provision 2.91 -3.683 -18.53* -21.33** -1.385 -3.153** -2.491 -3.425* -1.946 -2.886* -4.671*** -4.152*** -3.118* -3.446* -5.233** -3.967*
(-16.55) (-15.24) (-9.775) (-9.77) (-1.096) (-1.415) (-1.644) (-1.795) (-1.37) (-1.65) (-0.906) (-0.987) (-1.622) (-1.9) (-2.464) (-2.32)
Other type of parking -6.455 -15.18 -30.74*** -37.55*** -3.148** -4.875*** -4.162** -4.644** -2.122 -3.077* -4.736*** -4.197*** - - - -
(-14.44) (-14.69) (-11.57) (-12.85) (-1.365) (-1.725) (-1.845) (-2.065) (-1.513) (-1.792) (-1.153) (-1.22)
Toilet facilities (none)
2.Toilet_StreetMarket 0.978 0.81 1.882 3.163 -0.619 -0.542 -0.665 -0.578 0.278 0.361 0.359 0.392 0.193 0.112 -0.0514 -0.125
(-2.776) (-2.764) (-3.21) (-3.84) (-0.599) (-0.604) (-0.622) (-0.63) (-0.239) (-0.237) (-0.261) (-0.286) (-0.665) (-0.679) (-0.653) (-2.014)
3.Toilet_StreetMarket -12.62 -7.307 -5.599 -4.152 0.0696 0.667 0.938 0.77 -0.5 0.134 0.312 0.401 1.353 1.403 1.15 5.712
(-18.45) (-15.57) (-15.99) (-14.69) (-2.168) (-1.521) (-1.395) (-1.49) (-0.64) (-1.019) (-1.089) (-1.2) (-1.673) (-1.758) (-1.913) (-4.232)
4.Toilet_StreetMarket 0.881 1.367 0.94 -1.013 0.226 0.191 0.233 -0.786 -0.377 -0.456 -0.689 -0.527 - - - -
(-6.5) (-6.712) (-7.027) (-8.091) (-1.355) (-1.371) (-1.445) (-1.604) (-0.485) (-0.523) (-0.614) (-0.699)
5.Toilet_StreetMarket 3.778 2.798 2.689 0.562 -2.886*** -2.826*** -2.611** -2.678** -0.479 -0.389 -0.26 -0.0907 - - - -
(-7.407) (-7.055) (-7.035) (-7.127) (-0.936) (-1.03) (-1.077) (-1.167) (-1.027) (-1.028) (-1.093) (-1.008)
Childcare facilities (none)
2.Childcare access (network) -1.449 -1.348 -2.566 -1.658 -1.45 -1.523 -1.631 -1.826 -0.317 -0.435 -0.352 -0.515 -2.870* -2.836* -2.734* -1.639
(-5.932) (-5.856) (-5.788) (-6.145) (-1.156) (-1.133) (-1.097) (-1.13) (-0.694) (-0.664) (-0.667) (-0.7) (-1.555) (-1.541) (-1.489) (-2.033)
3.Childcare access (public provision) 6.749 6.971 6.181 6.667 -1.118 -1.217 -1.317 -1.462 -0.666 -0.808 -0.885 -1.066* -2.766** -2.618** -2.649** -1.905
(-9.478) (-9.293) (-9.312) (-9.237) (-1.075) (-1.061) (-1.017) (-1.025) (-0.651) (-0.622) (-0.619) (-0.631) (-1.345) (-1.287) (-1.29) (-1.951)
4.Childcare access (other) -2.527 -2.396 -3.703 -3.025 -0.637 -0.743 -0.944 -1.421 -0.755 -0.899 -0.967 -1.105* -1.514 -1.38 -1.423 2.555
(-5.2) (-5.165) (-5.22) (-5.989) (-1.103) (-1.079) (-1.029) (-1.073) (-0.635) (-0.608) (-0.601) (-0.628) (-1.095) (-1.015) (-0.914) (-1.649)
Police support -0.0689 -0.139 -0.0752 -0.136 0.0955 0.0949 0.101 0.0691 -0.0136 -0.0113 -0.00899 -0.00889 -0.0331 -0.0392 -0.0394 0.489*
(-0.556) (-0.636) (-0.611) (-0.726) (-0.0821) (-0.0829) (-0.083) (-0.0884) (-0.0407) (-0.0413) (-0.0361) (-0.0351) (-0.0886) (-0.0968) (-0.0924) (-0.267)
Other Municipal support 0.494 0.48 0.434 0.701 -0.125 -0.122 -0.127 -0.122 -0.0324 -0.0369 -0.0277 -0.0489 0.188 0.188 0.2 0.534**
(-0.449) (-0.441) (-0.425) (-0.568) (-0.0905) (-0.0919) (-0.0965) (-0.101) (-0.0422) (-0.0432) (-0.043) (-0.0464) (-0.15) (-0.14) (-0.145) (-0.253)
Socio-Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Enterprise controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Spatial Controls no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
Municipal Controls no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes
Constant -5.481 2.608 15.97 18.32 6.823*** 8.189*** 6.963** 6.690** 5.305*** 4.744** 5.739*** 4.801*** 0.7 2.043 4.245 16.28
(-28.75) (-28.48) (-22.03) (-23.68) (-2.392) (-2.822) (-2.915) (-3.225) (-1.721) (-1.964) (-1.482) (-1.574) (-2.81) (-3.629) (-4.352) (-10.6)
Observations 356 356 348 333 249 249 243 230 358 358 350 333 290 290 284 251
R-squared 0.5 0.503 0.509 0.53 0.311 0.321 0.338 0.378 0.194 0.211 0.248 0.288 0.292 0.294 0.314 0.485
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses
VARIABLES
12: Food security and Affordability 
Market Access
Organisation
Negative Externalities
9: Work week 10: Child work 11: Neighbourhood life distubance (reverse)
342 
 
ANNEX 8: INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR HOME-
BASED ENTEPRISES 
  
This annex complements the discussion of Chapter 6, section three, by describing in de-
tail evaluated policies, running variables. This section also complements this discussion by 
evaluating the impact of supportive policies on additional HBEs’ performance commonly dis-
cuss in the literature. As previously, OLS models were built to disentangle the impacts of exist-
ing policies on additional seven HBE performance indicators (Table A.8.3). Explanatory, con-
trol variables and significance levels are the same used for models on chapter 6 (see Table 
A.8.2).  
 
 The results of these complementary regression models are summarised in Tables A.8.3. 
Model 1.b reports the impact of policies on economic outcomes; Models 2.b and 2.c report the 
impact of policies on social outcomes; Models 3.b, 3.c and 3.d assess the impact of policies on 
outcomes for working conditions; and Model 4.b analyses the impact of policies on the reduc-
tion of negative externalities for HBEs. Full models are presented in Tables A.8.4 through 
A.8.6. As for Chapter 6, qualitative analysis is used to report explanations for mechanisms driv-
ing policy impact. Qualitative analyses is also used to complement the quantitative analysis 
through quotes taken from group discussions and interviews. 
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Table A.8. 1: Performance Indicators for Home-Based Enterprises (dependent variables) 
 
  Response Variable Authors  n Indicators Model 
1. Economic efficiency         
  HBE productivity Ezeadichie 2012, Gough 2003 1.a Earnings per hour worked MLR 
  HBE monthly income 
Ezeadichie 2012, Ligthlm 2005, 
Gough 2003 
1.b HBE earnings per month MLR 
2. Social equity         
  Poverty reduction 
Ezeadichie 2012, Gough et al. 
2003 
2.a 
HBE household income rela-
tive to the poverty line 
MLR 
  Gender inequality 
Carr et al. 2000, Chant 2014, 
Chant and McIlwaine 2009 
2.b 
  
MLR Average female HBE income 
relative to average male HBE 
income 
  Employment generation 
Carr et al. 2000, May & Stra-
vrou 1990, Snyman 1990, Tip-
ple 2004, WIEGO 2014b. 
2.c 
Number of jobs generated per 
HBE 
MLR 
3. Quality of work         
  Working week Tipple 2005 3.a 
Number of hours worked per 
week 
MLR 
  Workplace accidents 
Tipple 2006, Tipple and Kellet 
2003, Chen and Sinha 2016. 
3.b 
Accident at the workplace in 
the last six months(yes/no) 
BLR 
  Pension access Tipple 2005 3.c 
  
BLR 
Access to pension (yes/no) 
  Health contribution Tipple 2005 3.d 
Health contribution scheme 
(yes/no) 
BLR 
4. Negative externalities         
  Child labour 
Beneria and Floro 2005, Gough 
et al. 2003 
4.a 
Perception scale of child work 
(a) 
MLR 
  Family life disturbance 
Tipple 2004, Chant and McIl-
waine 2009, Gove et al 1983 
4.b 
Perception scale of family life 
disturbance (b) 
MLR 
  
a) On a perceptual continuous scale, where 1 represents ‘I never work with my child/children’ and 7 
represents ‘I always work with my child/children’.   
b) On a perceptual continuous scale, where 1 represents ‘Having my business at home does not 
affect my family life’ and 7 represents ‘Having my business at home does affect my family life’.   
c) On a perceptual continuous scale, where 1 represents ‘Neighbours living on my street are unhap-
py with my business’ and 7 represents ‘Neighbours living on my street are happy with my business’.   
MLR: Multiple Linear Regression   
BLR: Binary Logistic Regression 
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Table A.8. 2: Types of Local Policies Implemented and Control Variables 
Explanatory Variables Description 
A. Individual socio-economic conditions (control variables) 
1 Gender Gender of the respondent (male/female) 
2 Nationality Chilean / non-Chilean 
3 Household size Number of people living in the house 
4 Age Age in years of HBE owner 
5 Experience Age in years of HBE enterprise 
6 Education Primary, secondary or tertiary education 
7 Working week Number of hours of work per week 
B. Enterprise characteristics (control variables) 
7 HBE income Monthly net income of HBE 
8 Enterprise size Number of workers in HBE 
9 Enterprise sector Manufacturing, retail or service 
B. Spatial or 'entourage' conditions (control variables) 
10 Distance to large retail Number of blocks to the closest large retail shop 
11 Distance to high street Number of blocks to the closest high street 
12 Distance to underground station Number of blocks to the closest underground station 
C. Municipal conditions (control variables) 
13 Municipal inhabitant income Average inhabitant income for municipality 
14 Municipal budget per person Average municipal budget per inhabitant 
15 Municipal poverty rate Poverty as percentage of municipality inhabitants 
D. Supportive local policies (explanatory variables)              
16 Home ownership Owner or not owner 
17 Storage space 
Type of storage space (no storage, at home, specialised space or 
at the shop)  
18 Plot size Size in square meters of area where HBE operates 
19 Parking facilities Availability of parking space at home 
20 Branch office Having a external branch (yes/no) 
21 Machinery (level of technology) Use of machines for production/storage (none, basic, advanced) 
22 Work clothing Use of special clothing for production or selling 
23 National financial fund Receipt of national grant (yes/no) 
24 Local financial support Receipt of local grant (yes/ no) 
25 Access to credit Access to credit (yes/no) 
26 Diversity of payments Number of payment alternatives 
27 Unionisation Belonging to an organisation (yes/no) 
28 Technical support Receipt of local support for project applications 
29 Provider contact support  
Receipt of local support for contact and negotiation with provid-
ers 
30 Client contact support Receipt of local support for client contact 
31 Place to leave children  Access to child care (none, network or public nursery) 
32 Vehicle 
Access to vehicle (none, non-motorised, family/friend transport, 
collective transport, rental vehicle, own car, own van, own pick-
up, own truck) 
33 Exterior visibility 
Visibility of enterprise from the street (non-recognisable, precar-
ious, standard, superior) 
34 Diversity of selling methods Number of different strategies for selling products 
35 Value of local permit Value of local permit 
B. Repressive local policies (explanatory variables) 
37 Harassment and policing Perception level of local taxation and police harassment 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table A.8.3: Summary of the Impacts of Municipal Policies on the Performance of Home-Based Enterprises 
Respose Variable Positively Impacting Policy Negatively Impacting Policy Magnitude SE Type of policy 
Overall Impact 
(a) 
1. Economic Efficiency 
Indicator 1.b: Branch office    702,449** -308,853 Access to markets A 
HBE'sEarnings per month 
Advanced machinery   233,912* -51727 Physical Capital A 
Diversity of accepted payments 136,014*** -616713 Access to markets A 
Child care (network)   237,479* -130,994 Neg. Externalities A 
  Private parking  -300,273** -127,640 Physical Capital C 
2. Social Equity 
Indicator 2.b: Plot size   0.000740* -0.00042 Physical Capital A 
HBE's women income rela-
tive to average HBE's men 
income 
Access to credit   0.248** -0.113 Financial Capital B 
Indicator 2.c: Working cloths   0.385** -0.186 Physical Capital A 
Employment generated per 
HBE 
Relative and friends (borrow car) 1.086*** -0.291 Financial Capital B 
Pick-up van (owned)   0.649*** -0.234 Physical Capital B 
Standard selling space   0.414** -0.183 Physical Capital B 
Superior selling space   0.818** -0.318 Physical Capital B 
  Unionisation -0.695*** -0.233 Organisation C 
  Technical support -0.582** -0.292 Human Capital B 
3. Quality of work 
Indicator 3.a: Plot size   -0.00387*** -1.45E-03 Physical Capital A 
Frequency of workplace 
accidents 
Branch office    -2.246** -1.07E+00 Access to markets A 
Access to credit   -0.949* -5.20E-01 Financial Capital B 
  National fund 2.682*** -7.06E-01 Financial Capital B 
Indicator 3.b:     
- - 
  
- 
Access to Pension (yes/no)       
Indicator 3.c: Child care (network)   1.573* -0.937 Neg. Externalities A 
Healht Access (yes/no)   Plot size -0.00615** -0.0024 Physical Capital B 
4. Negative Externalities 
Indicator 4.a: Branch office    -1.758*** -0.555 Access to markets C 
Family Life  disturbance (c) 
Basic machinery   -0.804** -0.338 Physical Capital A 
Advanced machinery   -0.858** -0.432 Physical Capital A 
  Local financial support 1.010* -0.539 Financial Capital B 
  Precarious selling space 0.820* -0.485 Physical Capital B 
  Storage at home 0.858*** -0.247 Physical Capital   
Notes: 
a) Overall Impact A denotes municipal policies that have only a positive impact across indicators; B refers to municipal policies that have both positive and negative impacts 
across indicators; C denotes policies that have only negative impacts across indicators. 
  b) Where 1 signifies 'I never go with my child/chidren to collect waste' and 6 signifies 'I always go with my child/children to collect waste' 
  c) Where 1 signifies 'I always clean up after collecting/sorting waste' and 6 signifies 'I never clean up after collecting/sorting waste' 
  c) Level of formality is measured as the number of legal regulations that they accomplish with a maximum of five 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses         
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HBE Profitability: Earnings per month (indicator 1.b) 
 
 An HBE owner’s income per month faces a significant rise with policies that promote 
branch offices, increasing monthly income by CLP 702,449 (USD 1377.35), along with the in-
corporation of advanced machinery by CLP 233,912 (USD 458.65), diversifying payment 
methods by CLP 136,014 (USD 266.69) and access to childcare facilities by CLP 237,479 
(USD 465.65). Seeing as the first three policies lead to an increase in HBE productivity (indica-
tor 1), it follows logically that this translates into a higher net income per month. The availabil-
ity of childcare facilities helps those HBE owners who have children – particularly female own-
ers – by allowing them to separate their work and family time, enabling them to contribute more 
hours of work and increasing their monthly earnings. In the contrasting experiences of Mariana 
(41), a chocolate maker and Nelly (37), a garment producer, both from Lo Prado: 
M: Well, in my case as a woman, the children are an issue, because you have no time (to make 
products). It is very difficult to organise your schedule because you have to cook and look after 
them.  
N: In my case, I know my working hours because I leave them in the nursery…so I can produce in 
a quiet space.  
Similar to indicator 1.a (in Chapter 6), the negative impact of allocating parking spaces leads to 
an overall decrease CLP 300,273 (USD 588.77) in HBEs’ monthly income.  
 Gender Equality: Average female HBE income relative to average male HBE income 
(indicator 2.b) 
 
Regarding gender income inequality (indicator 4), providing larger plot sizes to female-
owned HBEs closes the male/female income gap by a tiny 0.075% per each extra ten square 
meter, while facilitating access to credits for female entrepreneurs closes the gap by 24.8%. Due 
to historical disparities in income, male hereditary privileges and gender bias in the state alloca-
tion of social housing, women in Chile have typically had unequal access to property and tend 
to own smaller plots than men do (Leon 2011; Ramm 2013). Plot size, as directly related to 
house size, is a key element affecting the production outcomes of HBEs, as it restricts the avail-
ability of space to sell, produce and store products, and so women face relatively restricted op-
portunities for income generation. Rosa (34) a balloon decorator, explain the relevance of space 
for productivity outcomes: 
 
 
R: I have a large number of clients, big enterprises. I have ideas, a good product, I have every-
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thing but I have neither the capital to invest nor the space to produce. I have things that are very 
expensive, some special bags and I don’t have where to leave them… I am going to have to give 
them away. 
 
 
 Some not-for-profit organisations such as Fondo Esperanza (the larger provider of mi-
crofinance in Chile) have preferential microcredit access for women, providing the opportunity 
to slowly close the gap of capital endowments with their male counterparts
3
. As Tomas (49), 
chief of the EDUS, and Carmen (56), a cosmetics producer from Santiago Centro, explain: 
T: In the case of Santiago…we undertake a serious exercise that translates into easier access to 
credits for women. 
C: The credit was useful… I bought some tools for production, like having a table for welcoming 
clients, or to implement more services. 
 
Employment generation: Number of jobs generated per HBE (indicator 2.c) 
  
 The number of jobs within an HBE seems to increase with support policies – facilitating 
access to vehicles creates between 0.65 and 1.1 new positions, and rendering HBEs more visible 
to the public between 0.7 and 0.8. With access to a pick-up or a truck, an HBE can create addi-
tional employment in roles such as collecting inputs, delivering products or using vehicles as 
informal points of sale, as Raul (52), a national leader of CONUPIA, and Carlos (50), the direc-
tor of the DIDLP, describe: 
R: With a vehicle I can access markets in other locations, I can take over a street corner and send 
someone to sell empanadas on the highway… A micro-entrepreneur with a vehicle can grow.  
 
C: People working in car repair start from (Lo Prado)… They send workers to clean cars or re-
pair vehicles (in other surrounding municipalities)… They take the vehicle with everything inside 
and go to do repairs… Also, the furniture industry…sells in other places where people pay for the 
design…and they send a worker to deliver it. 
 Increasing HBE visibility through vending sites or public advertising increases an 
HBE’s demand, as it attracts new clients, which in turn increases the number of jobs in produc-
tion and sales. Sandra (44), owner of a hairdressing salon in La Granja, illustrates: 
A:  In the beginning I worked only through contacts. So, only people that have heard through word 
of mouth… Then when I installed my billboard, people started coming. Where I live, the buses and 
the taxis come past, so people started coming and coming, wow! So you need more space, more 
production workers and you offer more services. 
 
                                                        
3
 A recent study analysing four major NGOs providing access to microcredit shows that 87% of 
beneficiaries are women, and almost half of these women have used the PAM programme (FOSIS 2015, 
p.20). 
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 The positive results of supportive policies for indicator 1.a (in Chapter 6, section three) 
can also have an indirect impact on employment generation, as HBEs that generate more in-
come tend to produce a higher number of jobs. This employment can be on a permanent or part-
time, contractless basis, as illustrated by Ana (48), owner of a fast food shop in La Granja: 
A: I work with a girl on a permanent basis but without a contract…and on the weekend I work 
with four people but without contracts.  
 However, the unionisation of HBEs seems to reduce the number of jobs by 0.7, as 
HBEs operating in a cluster or in cooperatives have a reduced number of redundant jobs, mostly 
of redundant workers paid by the hour. Nicolas (56), a public officer of DIDLP: 
 
N: Organisations are important… We have the experience with furniture makers where, instead of 
every (business) hiring someone different to do the delivery, they hire one person that delivers for 
all of them, so it is cheaper.  
 
 Furthermore, the provision of technical support results in a reduction of 0.6 jobs as it 
decreases the need for administrative tasks and paperwork, as these roles are assumed by the 
municipality, and then taught to the HBE owners themselves. This came up in my discussion 
with Carmen (56) and Rosa (34), both entrepreneurs in Santiago Centro: 
 
C: I have a problem with the tax system, I owe around 400,000 [USD 600]… I hired a guy to do 
my tax declaration and he did it wrong. 
R: Can I say something? Haven’t you thought about going to the municipality to ask for help with 
this? They helped me a couple of times with my (tax) declaration.  
 
Workplace accidents: Accidents occurring at the workplace in the last six months (indi-
cator 3.b) 
 Providing access to larger plots creates a very small reduction in work-related accidents 
of 0.04 incidents every six months for each additional ten square meters, the creation of extra 
branches by 2.25 accidents per month, and facilitating access to credits by 0.95 accidents every 
six months (indicator 8). Larger work areas, and particularly the creation of additional branches, 
separates family and work spaces and creates opportunities for separated storage areas, minimis-
ing the exposure of workers and family members to hazards and the necessity of manipulating 
heavy materials. Hector (52) a furniture maker in Lo Prado, describes the effect of workplace 
size: 
H: When I started, I didn’t have a workshop. In summer I was working on the patio, but in winter I 
had to work inside the house. So, sunburn in summer and cold in winter… I had muscle pain, and 
sometimes cuts because I had to keep moving everything – nails, saws, the woodboards. Not now – 
I got rid of the parking space and made a decent atelier. 
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 Similarly, with access to credit, HBEs are able to invest in security equipment and the 
renovation of tools and machinery, as well as improving infrastructure that can reduce the risk 
of house fires. Hector (52) again, and Susana (48), owner of a hairdressing salon in Lo Prado: 
H: I received a credit for 400,000 pesos [USD 645.16]…and I installed a concrete floor, ventila-
tors, lighting, a fire extinguisher and security equipment… Before, I was producing without any-
thing like that…  I went to the doctor…and in the radiographies my lungs were horrible… I real-
ised that it was (due to) the dust. 
S: When you use a lot of machines, the electrical switches jump. You plug in a boiler or a machine 
and it trips… The problem is that changing the electricity system is expensive. I received a credit 
of 250,000 [USD 375.41] and did it with that. 
 
 
 However, receipt of national financial funding correlates with an increase of 2.7  work-
related accidents every six months. These funds restrict expenditure almost exclusively to in-
vestments that grow productivity, in turn increasing the risk of injury in a limited house space. 
Nicolas (56), a public officer at the DIDLP, notes: 
 
C: The problem is that national funds…don’t allow expenditure on house extensions or upgrading 
electricity, but favour investment in machinery and tools… An enterprise that was producing four 
(products) now produces eight, but in the same space. Thus, they have less free space, more of a 
risk of accidents, a higher fire risk. 
 
Pension Access: Having Access to the Pension System (indicator 3.c) 
 The results show that none of the current supportive municipal policies seem to be ef-
fective in increasing the pension contributions of HBE owners. This could be the result of two 
complementary alternatives. First, national government has traditionally assumed the task of 
promoting pension access, and so non-specific types of supportive policies have been designed 
at the local level. Second, local governments also seem ill-equipped to design, finance and regu-
late pension schemes given their lack of detailed information, resources and legal competence. 
Camila (31), a public officer of La Granja: 
C: We don’t provide help with pension access. I think this is rather a national government task, 
and also we don’t have the resources to do this…   
 
 It is also not clear that HBE owners have worse access to pension than other formally 
contracted workers. At the time of data collection, ‘independent workers’ – representing 22.5% 
of the workforce in Chile – who are formally hired for specific services but must contribute to 
pension voluntarily, have very similar levels of access to pension schemes (41% for independ-
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ent workers versus 38% for HBEs) (Jimenez & Catalan 2014). Francisca (39), a public officer 
of Las Condes, expands on this: 
 
F: I think that (not having a pension) is not a problem unique to microenterprises. It is also a 
problem for all independent workers… You see TV actors that work all their lives and have no 
pension, who never thought about having one. It is a problem of Chilean working conditions ra-
ther than one of microenterprises.  
 
   
 
Access to Health: Having Any Type of Health Coverage (indicator 3.d) 
 
The provision of childcare facilities increases the likelihood of HBE owners having 
health access by 57%. Although the Chilean health system does provide a basic public health 
service for free, four out of five HBE owners are not registered. It seems that the bureaucratic 
process of registration, the excessive workday length that HBE owners face, along with their 
time dedicated to parenting, seems to be a significant barrier to filing the required paperwork. 
The reduced time constraints created by childcare access can thus free up enough time to enrol 
in the health system. Ana (48), owner of a fast food restaurant in La Granja: 
 
A: I work from 11 a.m. to 8 p.m… I just have one little girl… I am not registered (in the health sys-
tem), I’m going to start the paperwork now… For two months my husband has been (working) 
with me…so now I have time to do (the paperwork)… In this way, we’ll all have our health (cov-
ered). 
 
Access to a larger land area seems to have a significant negative impact, although off a 
smaller magnitude. Whilst my qualitative data does not provide support for a specific 
mechanism, this may also be the result of time constraints, as larger plots tend to be located in 
peripheral areas where there is less easy access to healthcare facilities, again making the process 
of registration more time-consuming. 
 
Family Life Disturbance: Perception of HBE’s Disturbance on Owner’s Family Life 
(indicator 4.b) 
 Family life disturbance (indicator 11) can be minimised by facilitating access to home 
ownership, creating separate business branches and providing machinery. When they own their 
own home, an HBE owner is more likely to invest in housing infrastructure, often resulting in a 
separation of work and family space and minimising disruption of family life. Having a separate 
business branch works in a similar way. Susana (48), a hairdresser and Ana (41), owner of a dog 
grooming shop in Lo Prado, comment: 
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S: I used to work in a corner of one square metre in my living room… It affected (family life) – for 
instance, you couldn’t cook because then everything smelt like food and you can’t welcome 
clients… (Now), I own my house, so…I extended into the parking space.  
 
A; I have my shop close to home. I open a door and I leave the shop, so I can disconnect… I work 
there with small and big dogs, I have most of all my things there… so, (my HBE) doesn’t affect 
(my family life) much. 
i
 
 
 
 The provision of specialised machinery maximises the use of space and can result in 
fewer noisy or polluting production processes, improving family quality of life. As explained by 
Hector (52) a furniture maker in Lo Prado: 
H: I bought a new wood planer. The old one, I made it myself, but the axle broke… It was spread-
ing kindling around and making too much noise… (The new machine) makes less noise and I don’t 
disturb my family or neighbours. 
 
 Local financial support, using home storage and low visibility to the public seem to in-
crease family disturbance. Support in the form of cash transfers often go towards the purchasing 
of inputs without a proportional increase of space to accommodate them. As Susanna (48), a 
hairdresser, commented: 
S: I received a municipal grant of 400,000 pesos [USD 645.16]… I bought 100 boxes of hair dye, 
and it was like – hooray! Now that I have the hair dye, I can charge more… I have a room full of 
boxes at home, but it was fantastic. 
 
Using home storage effectively works in a way opposite to having an external branch, 
where storage space takes over part of the living space, reducing the size of the area for family 
activities. Similarly, the lack of a specialised vending space also reduces the home living space.   
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Table A.8. 4: HBEs OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Economic Efficiency and Social Equity 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Financial Capital
Access to credit 138.2 194.1 205 205.4 73,012 52,453 57,269 58,003 0.517 0.392 0.347 0.356 0.224** 0.200* 0.245** 0.248** 0.14 0.131 0.0713 0.1
(-237.8) (-235.7) (-251.9) (-247) (-60,978) (-63,368) (-68,322) (-67,811) (-0.386) (-0.344) (-0.356) (-0.35) (-0.1) (-0.102) (-0.116) (-0.113) (-0.147) (-0.167) (-0.181) (-0.172)
Local financial support 790 793.6* 828.8 771.3* 175,604 159,602 171,789 159,787 -0.15 -0.0601 -0.046 -0.109 0.182 0.049 0.0391 0.0141 0.42 0.336 0.341 0.339
(-503.9) (-476.6) (-503.2) (-443.3) (-118,446) (-112,494) (-119,998) (-113,610) (-0.636) (-0.574) (-0.591) (-0.578) (-0.162) (-0.125) (-0.124) (-0.133) (-0.266) (-0.258) (-0.261) (-0.266)
National fund -445.9 -479.6 -504.2 -461.7 -99,518 -92,119 -102,083 -93,286 0.189 0.109 0.135 0.197 0.0189 0.0703 0.0349 0.0443 0.116 0.223 0.27 0.249
(-371.9) (-330.9) (-340.2) (-323.8) (-94,109) (-87,844) (-90,888) (-89,171) (-0.791) (-0.682) (-0.69) (-0.684) (-0.14) (-0.129) (-0.136) (-0.139) (-0.191) (-0.203) (-0.215) (-0.212)
Human Capital
Tranning support -440.7 -256.5 -294.8 -158.7 -87,112 -78,979 -91,557 -62,827 0.103 -0.0421 -0.0712 0.0437 -0.135 -0.147 -0.136 -0.136 -0.119 -0.218 -0.237 -0.213
(-366) (-431.2) (-439.7) (-404.1) (-90,045) (-109,178) (-111,414) (-102,816) (-0.481) (-0.506) (-0.518) (-0.504) (-0.118) (-0.132) (-0.14) (-0.138) (-0.184) (-0.202) (-0.201) (-0.206)
Technical support -927.0* -718.5** -705.3* -500.2 -203,426* -178,467* -175,022* -132,189 -0.592 -0.184 -0.161 -0.0206 -0.165 -0.159 -0.146 -0.12 -0.717*** -0.629** -0.612** -0.582**
(-477.9) (-351.7) (-363) (-340) (-104,681) (-91,574) (-95,608) (-89,092) (-0.853) (-0.749) (-0.755) (-0.756) (-0.149) (-0.15) (-0.144) (-0.138) (-0.263) (-0.299) (-0.302) (-0.292)
Physical Capital
Working cloths 19.88 -29.01 -15.12 -50.53 11,163 15,084 18,261 11,925 0.00514 -0.146 -0.147 -0.143 -0.0583 -0.0392 -0.0517 -0.0681 0.305* 0.361* 0.349* 0.385**
(-299.8) (-271.3) (-273.8) (-252) (-75,801) (-71,027) (-71,747) (-67,504) (-0.448) (-0.39) (-0.386) (-0.364) (-0.0939) (-0.0791) (-0.0782) (-0.08) (-0.178) (-0.189) (-0.194) (-0.186)
Basic machinery 230.2 254.9 251.3 246.7 74,106 67,381 63,682 62,831 0.082 0.334 0.32 0.336 0.134 0.0863 0.0428 0.0271 0.211 0.134 0.157 0.153
(-189.3) (-196.2) (-207.9) (-198.7) (-49,414) (-53,268) (-55,316) (-54,034) (-0.333) (-0.315) (-0.327) (-0.332) (-0.0955) (-0.0881) (-0.0874) (-0.0894) (-0.13) (-0.135) (-0.14) (-0.144)
Advanced machinery 891.3* 924.7* 909.6* 861.0* 237,983* 252,492* 244,465* 233,912* 0.727 1.216* 1.174* 1.147* 0.129 0.159 0.159 0.15 0.360* 0.266 0.265 0.238
(-517.8) (-534.2) (-543.1) (-492.9) (-121,870) (-138,562) (-140,707) (-131,221) (-0.662) (-0.657) (-0.662) (-0.633) (-0.15) (-0.158) (-0.155) (-0.156) (-0.189) (-0.201) (-0.205) (-0.206)
Non motorised -434.2 32.65 86.67 37.29 -46,677 4,471 22,613 13,913 -0.311 0.122 0.121 0.0866 0.133 0.103 0.155 0.16 -0.15 -0.151 -0.191 -0.107
(-295.5) (-296.30 (-300.4) (-299.4) (-71,067) (-81,687) (-81,996) (-80,990) (-0.579) (-0.594) (-0.627) (-0.603) (-0.126) (-0.14) (-0.146) (-0.16) (-0.299) (-0.315) (-0.32) (-0.334)
Collective trasport 3.803 46.23 49.27 -41.13 38,865 63,401 62,112 44,311 0.21 0.415 0.497 0.498 0.185 0.105 0.0785 0.0382 0.238 0.149 0.227 0.26
(-294.3) (-339.8) (-348.4) (-371.6) (-86,702) (-93,295) (-96,077) (-100,336) (-0.531) (-0.527) (-0.569) (-0.552) (-0.153) (-0.147) (-0.142) (-0.141) (-0.265) (-0.294) (-0.284) (-0.281)
Relative and friends (borrow car) -273.2 -227.9 -290.6 -313.9 -37,472 -35,204 -57,788 -60,803 -0.543 0.116 0.163 0.21 0.178 0.146 0.0995 0.0681 1.039*** 0.950*** 1.042*** 1.086***
(-399.8) (-388.1) (-414.3) (-421.3) (-106770) (-107316) (-112915) (-115381) (-0.497) (-0.588) (-0.614) (-0.644) (-0.174) (-0.14) (-0.153) (-0.16) (-0.298) (-0.291) (-0.29) (-0.291)
Pick-up (rented) -290.4 32.28 90.96 111.2 -70,120 -21,958 2,265 6,686 -0.235 0.256 0.333 0.369 -0.0338 0.023 0.0253 0.0117 -0.201 -0.286 -0.286 -0.27
(-264.3) (-249.4) (-247.5) (-232.5) (-66847) (-67992) (-66609) (-63601) (-0.377) (-0.396) (-0.41) (-0.413) (-0.0862) (-0.0934) (-0.0935) (-0.0957) (-0.185) (-0.192) (-0.198) (-0.193)
Car (owned) 285 168.1 180.3 181.6 62,960 39,319 42,578 44,552 0.304 0.0692 0.0972 0.158 0.0927 0.0369 0.0277 0.0222 0.101 0.0905 0.111 0.185
(-198.9) (-194) (-193.3) (-188) (-50693) (-53069) (-52340) (-51888) (-0.304) (-0.302) (-0.31) (-0.331) (-0.0886) (-0.0828) (-0.0841) (-0.0871) (-0.149) (-0.163) (-0.163) (-0.153)
Van (owned) -366.8 -383 -380.5 -360.8 -80,596 -113,169 -112,202 -108,291 0.103 -0.000166 0.0167 0.0641 -0.0581 -0.164 -0.144 -0.192 0.531 0.449 0.467 0.435
(-407.6) (-386.6) (-394.9) (-376.4) (-106797) (-101342) (-103913) (-100405) (-0.705) (-0.646) (-0.651) (-0.675) (-0.228) (-0.169) (-0.164) (-0.162) (-0.344) (-0.404) (-0.405) (-0.421)
Pick-up van (owned) 57.77 -60.34 -57.93 -134.8 50,788 16,238 15,446 79.94 0.764 0.327 0.362 0.317 0.101 -0.032 -0.0669 -0.0813 0.670*** 0.614** 0.644*** 0.649***
(-302.1) (-304.6) (-308.4) (-323.1) (-77026) (-83504) (-84969) (-89801) (-0.523) (-0.478) (-0.499) (-0.507) (-0.191) (-0.144) (-0.157) (-0.165) (-0.218) (-0.238) (-0.246) (-0.234)
Truck (owned) -245.6 -129.4 -197 -459.5 18,591 -297.8 -22,619 -74,146 0.579 0.101 0.179 0.023 -0.0647 -0.472** -0.470** -0.441* 0.11 0.109 0.204 0.344
(-387.5) (-540.5) (-584.4) (-596.3) (-134277) (-159472) (-171842) (-173818) (-0.885) (-0.913) (-0.928) (-0.95) (-0.246) (-0.22) (-0.217) (-0.226) (-0.393) (-0.503) (-0.525) (-0.577)
Storage at home -1,198* 91.59 83.12 88.35 -352,331** 21,850 18,926 20,081 -1.714* -0.134 -0.16 -0.158 -0.0134 -0.0241 -0.00141 0.0121 1.444*** -0.0395 -0.0592 -0.053
(-707.1) (-175) (-168.3) (-159) (-175462) (-46525) (-44726) (-43684) (-1.037) (-0.308) (-0.307) (-0.304) (-0.0749) (-0.0655) (-0.0704) (-0.0718) (-0.487) (-0.134) (-0.135) (-0.137)
Storage outside home -965.4 83.62 93.4 -175.5 -319,626 -4,139 -1,629 -57,187 -1.74 -0.496 -0.501 -0.73 0.225 0.248 0.252 0.21 2.022*** 0.429 0.407 0.402
(-943.1) (-462.1) (-469.2) (-516.1) (-230820) (-123602) (-126023) (-135474) (-1.315) (-0.597) (-0.596) (-0.668) (-0.364) (-0.319) (-0.306) (-0.293) (-0.541) (-0.283) (-0.283) (-0.294)
Other type of storage Space -1,032 107.7 110.4 -103.2 -370,090* 7,521 10,657 -35,449 -0.676 0.0415 0.0248 -0.311 0.363 0.379 0.386* 0.388* 1.751** 0.283 0.238 0.177
(-911.9) (-588.8) (-605.8) (-697.1) (-207746) (-150122) (-153334) (-177757) (-1.335) (-0.77) (-0.779) (-0.954) (-0.234) (-0.232) (-0.223) (-0.223) (-0.692) (-0.525) (-0.548) (-0.543)
Private parking -1,156*** -970.0** -1,044** -1,183*** -243,478** -244,397** -269,977** -300,273** -0.508 -0.827 -0.86 -1.048 -0.197 -0.0283 -0.0265 -0.0338 0.0354 0.424 0.459 0.391
(-413.7) (-415.8) (-430.2) (-435.8) (-116919) (-121556) (-124786) (-127640) (-0.628) (-0.615) (-0.638) (-0.693) (-0.337) (-0.227) (-0.219) (-0.225) (-0.288) (-0.329) (-0.328) (-0.33)
Plot size 1.421* 1.117 1.214* 1.110* 264 244.4 284.4 261.9 0.00208 0.00169 0.00175 0.00170* 0.00103** 0.000921** 0.000850* 0.000740* 0.000567 0.000453 0.000409 0.00036
(-0.776) (-0.711) (-0.732) (-0.642) (-173) (-180.2) (-186.1) (-166.7) (-0.00128) (-0.00107) (-0.00113) (-0.00103) (-0.000427) (-0.000452) (-0.000437) (-0.00042) (-0.000366) (-0.000383) (-0.000392) (-0.000368)
Home ownership -241.7 -308.7 -307.8 -412.8 -80,747 -86,900 -83,069 -103,912 -0.64 -0.633* -0.599* -0.657* -0.147 -0.113 -0.124 -0.139 -0.0795 -0.0993 -0.0808 -0.0361
(-298.9) (-289.9) (-299.8) (-326) (-76051) (-76319) (-78733) (-85895) (-0.4) (-0.354) (-0.36) (-0.384) (-0.0909) (-0.0894) (-0.0926) (-0.0988) (-0.131) (-0.146) (-0.151) (-0.164)
Branch office 2,532* 2,385* 2,424* 2,473** 648,852* 679,407** 690,352** 702,449** 3.597** 3.231** 3.261** 3.336** 0.0134 0.0533 0.0223 0.0947 0.444 0.229 0.219 0.309
(-1348) (-1261) (-1268) (-1192) (-348073) (-323630) (-324316) (-308853) (-1.576) (-1.395) (-1.395) (-1.33) (-0.185) (-0.163) (-0.191) (-0.209) (-0.311) (-0.288) (-0.307) (-0.298)
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses
VARIABLES
1: Earnings/ hour worked 2: HBE Monthly Earnings 3: N. of Times Minimum Wage 4: Gender Income Inequality 5: HBE Employ Generation
353 
 
 
Table A.8.4: HBEs OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Economic Efficiency and Social Equity (Continuation) 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Market Access
Diversity of accepted payments 647.4*** 595.4*** 595.5*** 459.6*** 181,398*** 164,621*** 164,925*** 136,014*** 0.529** 0.569*** 0.554*** 0.407* 0.159** 0.0938 0.107* 0.105 0.141* 0.0658 0.0499 0.0253
(-145.3) (-126.4) (-128.5) (-111.1) (-39131) (-36025) (-36815) (-33093) (-0.209) (-0.177) (-0.181) (-0.209) (-0.0625) (-0.0591) (-0.0625) (-0.0652) (-0.0824) (-0.0896) (-0.0869) (-0.089)
Diversity of selling  methods -6.755 -164 -144.4 -139.5 -13,005 -39,045 -32,079 -30,331 -0.0398 -0.299 -0.278 -0.279 -0.0412 -0.0801 -0.0808 -0.0513 0.0456 0.0662 0.0679 0.105
(-175.1) (-153.1) (-154.5) (-162.2) (-42762) (-39516) (-39751) (-42012) (-0.253) (-0.227) (-0.224) (-0.224) (-0.0666) (-0.0522) (-0.0524) (-0.0531) (-0.0707) (-0.0801) (-0.0805) (-0.0828)
Contacting providers 908.8 700.5 621.4 805.9 154,098 183,373 162,605 202,138 0.561 0.642 0.62 0.823 -0.065 0.118 0.0595 0.084 0.229 0.227 0.279 0.321
(-804.9) (-710.4) (-757.5) (-756.3) (-196144) (-179986) (-191805) (-194542) (-0.864) (-0.727) (-0.794) (-0.802) (-0.171) (-0.134) (-0.161) (-0.157) (-0.279) (-0.317) (-0.323) (-0.316)
Contacting clients -1,850* -1,391 -1,424 -1,673* -370,382 -343,910 -358,179 -413,573* -2.479** -1.970** -2.005** -2.310** -0.142 -0.225 -0.162 -0.239 0.657* 0.669* 0.655 0.461
(-995.3) (-866) (-895) (-929.4) (-238868) (-217023) (-223909) (-229610) (-1.128) (-0.927) (-0.952) (-0.993) (-0.164) (-0.147) (-0.156) (-0.151) (-0.364) (-0.406) (-0.411) (-0.399)
Precarious (street view) -318.7 -104.3 -88.35 -56.64 -48,063 1,520 5,389 13,244 -0.553 -0.0852 -0.0366 0.084 -0.145 -0.0261 -0.0552 -0.0859 0.368* 0.335 0.390* 0.428*
(-316.5) (-326.2) (-340.2) (-332.1) (-81874) (-91034) (-95354) (-95354) (-0.497) (-0.461) (-0.471) (-0.459) (-0.12) (-0.135) (-0.138) (-0.153) (-0.206) (-0.224) (-0.224) (-0.228)
Standard (street view) -435.9 -204.9 -193.9 -78.07 -63,584 -48,206 -44,017 -19,163 -0.383 -0.208 -0.185 -0.00778 -0.13 -0.121 -0.125 -0.16 0.444*** 0.394** 0.403** 0.414**
(-321.1) (-338.2) (-339.1) (-297.5) (-72094) (-87654) (-87987) (-80610) (-0.508) (-0.494) (-0.497) (-0.443) (-0.114) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.148) (-0.155) (-0.179) (-0.179) (-0.183)
Superior (street view) 630.6 971.4 921.5 1,058* 236,403 257,377 239,995 268,725 0.698 1.006 0.973 1.13 -0.00678 -0.00451 -0.0131 -0.0322 1.014*** 0.828*** 0.833** 0.818**
(-700.6) (-636.6) (-617.2) (-613.1) (-186149) (-168071) (-163081) (-166388) (-0.967) (-0.81) (-0.803) (-0.78) (-0.179) (-0.161) (-0.155) (-0.158) (-0.292) (-0.315) (-0.321) (-0.318)
Other (street view) -965.5** -634.7 -774.2 -459.7 -146,185 -199,740 -254,186* -184,446 -1.606* 0.669 0.407 0.808 -0.606*** -0.819*** -0.698*** -0.643** -0.00899 0.17 0.076 0.256
(-424.5) (-495.7) (-476.7) (-499.8) (-99343) (-136472) (-130374) (-136512) (-0.829) (-0.861) (-0.856) (-0.858) (-0.172) (-0.263) (-0.255) (-0.284) (-0.248) (-0.355) (-0.374) (-0.376)
Organisation
Unionisation 136.5 365 314.9 275.9 74,810 99,561 82,718 74,375 0.257 0.264 0.226 0.163 -0.0879 -0.0513 -0.0286 -0.013 -0.651*** -0.711*** -0.716*** -0.695***
(-333.4) (-326.2) (-298.8) (-292.4) (-81438) (-84701) (-77833) (-76754) (-0.471) (-0.439) (-0.427) (-0.436) (-0.103) (-0.0999) (-0.106) (-0.102) (-0.203) (-0.228) (-0.224) (-0.233)
Negative Externalities
Child care (network) 952.8 1,024** 1,052** 936.7* 183,711* 252,861** 260,759** 237,479* 1.907 1.696 1.799 1.717 -0.0508 0.00893 -0.0497 -0.0359 0.0575 0.00507 0.085 0.116
(-577.5) (-495.4) (-504.7) (-513.4) (-108059) (-127893) (-131273) (-130994) (-1.823) (-1.544) (-1.557) (-1.585) (-0.174) (-0.148) (-0.136) (-0.138) (-0.204) (-0.247) (-0.257) (-0.253)
Child care (public nursery) 232.2 182.6 138.8 318.5 117,349 82,791 72,683 110,851 -0.203 -0.384 -0.408 -0.25 0.0274 -0.0581 -0.0144 -0.00755 0.016 -0.0792 -0.0937 -0.051
(-295) (-257.1) (-251.2) (-279.9) (-78792) (-71134) (-70272) (-77345) (-0.455) (-0.389) (-0.412) (-0.42) (-0.0914) (-0.0832) (-0.0848) (-0.0868) (-0.149) (-0.15) (-0.16) (-0.165)
Child care (other) 11.09 40.21 60.99 -16.85 14,308 38,348 46,522 30,441 0.0923 -0.266 -0.263 -0.333 0.099 0.132 0.150* 0.137 0.176 0.193 0.166 0.162
(-213.3) (-208.7) (-214) (-210.7) (-54118) (-56061) (-57279) (-56515) (-0.399) (-0.436) (-0.437) (-0.437) (-0.0819) (-0.0849) (-0.0849) (-0.083) (-0.135) (-0.145) (-0.146) (-0.148)
Harrasment policy 35.13 24.91 26.16 17.96 1,046 1,825 1,503 41.33 0.000207 0.0229 0.0283 0.0245 0.000634 0.00858 -0.000276 0.000257 8.81E-03 7.06E-03 1.48E-02 2.62E-02
(-39.61) (-37.35) (-39.58) (-38.56) (-9884) (-10079) (-10531) (-10514) (-0.072) (-0.0635) (-0.0662) (-0.0615) (-0.0158) (-0.0131) (-0.0132) (-0.0132) (-0.0279) (-0.0303) (-0.0319) (-0.033)
Value of the local permit 0.00154 0.00227* 0.0021 0.00223* 0.609** 0.791** 0.743* 0.765** 6.24E-06 5.80e-06* 5.73E-06 5.80E-06 9.03e-07* 1.49e-06** 1.52e-06** 1.56e-06*** 0.00000188 0.00000134 0.00000129 0.00000108
(-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979) (-0.000979)
Enterprise controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Socio-Demographic Controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Spatial Controls no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
Municipal Controls no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes
Constant 1111 3,864** 3,929** 2198 299,813* 870574 900136 501314 2.616** 6.871*** 6.811*** 4.528 0.088 2.649*** 2.750*** 2.292*** -2.113*** -0.612 -0.751 -2.565
-712.5 -1754 -1752 -2018 -167469 -617516 -617677 -678231 -1.211 -2.631 -2.597 -2.938 -0.337 -0.466 -0.458 -0.574 -0.507 -1.379 -1.44 -1.769
Observations 326 324 322 322 331 324 322 322 331 324 322 322 195 192 191 191 346 322 320 320
R-squared 0.323 0.439 0.44 0.482 0.339 0.416 0.42 0.447 0.265 0.451 0.451 0.47 0.318 0.569 0.59 0.605 0.311 3.50E-01 3.57E-01 3.89E-01
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses
VARIABLES
1: Earnings/ hour worked 2: HBE Monthly Earnings 3: N. of Times Minimum Wage 4: Gender Income Inequality 5: HBE Employ Generation
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Table A.8.5: HBEs OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Work Quality 
 
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Financial Capital
Access to credit 0.204 0.123 0.0412 0.0324 -0.45 -0.333 -0.214 -0.287 -0.849** -0.838* -1.015* -0.949* 5.055* 5.694** 6.476** 6.561** 0.25 0.267 0.258 0.286
(-0.278) (-0.319) (-0.331) (-0.328) (-0.369) (-0.434) (-0.45) (-0.458) (-0.429) (-0.448) (-0.523) (-0.52) (-2.639) (-2.848) (-2.947) (-2.948) (-0.378) (-0.396) (-0.41) (-0.423)
Local financial support 0.685 0.82 0.836 0.786 0.411 0.784 0.831 0.85 0.0996 0.116 -0.175 -0.23 0.911 0.836 0.53 0.668 -1.296* -1.061 -1.061 -1.035
(-0.571) (-0.608) (-0.613) (-0.602) (-0.627) (-0.781) (-0.747) (-0.74) (-0.713) (-0.809) (-0.841) (-0.847) (-6.527) (-6.342) (-6.219) (-6.157) (-0.774) (-0.858) (-0.888) (-0.89)
National fund -0.283 -0.397 -0.342 -0.278 -0.303 -0.154 -0.361 -0.508 1.649*** 1.921*** 2.543*** 2.682*** -3.063 -1.168 -1.791 -2.109 0.0583 -0.102 -0.0591 -0.0328
(-0.436) (-0.457) (-0.456) (-0.453) (-0.523) (-0.641) (-0.716) (-0.753) (-0.463) (-0.562) (-0.675) (-0.706) (-4.284) (-4.535) (-4.597) (-4.636) (-0.526) (-0.532) (-0.564) (-0.573)
Human Capital
Tranning support -0.565 -0.342 -0.431 -0.505 -0.221 -0.697 -0.594 -0.576 0.235 0.358 0.143 0.196 6.108* 6.531* 7.076* 7.285** 0.672 0.861* 0.784 0.799
(-0.467) (-0.509) (-0.518) (-0.524) (-0.662) (-0.715) (-0.705) (-0.704) (-0.57) (-0.695) (-0.74) (-0.728) (-3.265) (-3.563) (-3.606) (-3.584) (-0.549) (-0.506) (-0.518) (-0.519)
Technical support -0.76 -0.729 -0.738 -1.045 0.47 0.0856 -0.158 -0.194 0.136 0.359 0.697 0.587 3.469 4.208 3.565 4.166 1.511** 1.008 1.039 1.01
(-0.764) (-0.809) (-0.843) (-0.888) (-0.701) (-0.871) (-0.916) (-0.908) (-0.628) (-0.746) (-0.765) (-0.796) (-6.95) (-6.492) (-6.525) (-6.415) (-0.759) (-0.794) (-0.809) (-0.776)
Physical Capital
Working cloths 0.461 0.206 0.189 0.272 -0.496 -0.845* -0.926** -0.934** 0.522 0.57 0.704 0.707 -0.0915 -0.809 -0.864 -1.007 0.00782 0.378 0.351 0.429
(-0.331) (-0.378) (-0.377) (-0.377) (-0.429) (-0.449) (-0.451) (-0.466) (-0.385) (-0.42) (-0.462) (-0.48) (-3.409) (-3.37) (-3.377) (-3.426) (-0.324) (-0.331) (-0.341) (-0.35)
Basic machinery -0.465 -0.468 -0.459 -0.423 0.419 0.401 0.362 0.267 -0.00527 -0.234 -0.218 -0.177 2.341 1.179 1.335 1.107 -0.575 -0.567 -0.561 -0.505
(-0.306) (-0.33) (-0.341) (-0.347) (-0.367) (-0.404) (-0.452) (-0.45) (-0.42) (-0.459) (-0.499) (-0.512) (-2.845) (-3.083) (-3.22) (-3.259) (-0.374) (-0.377) (-0.404) (-0.4)
Advanced machinery -0.0536 -0.162 -0.188 -0.133 0.148 -0.267 -0.314 -0.526 0.56 0.515 0.604 0.699 3.199 1.779 2.417 2.087 -0.0807 -0.0722 -0.068 0.0225
(-0.414) (-0.478) (-0.482) (-0.492) (-0.52) (-0.687) (-0.723) (-0.808) (-0.542) (-0.651) (-0.678) (-0.696) (-3.689) (-4.282) (-4.294) (-4.31) (-0.544) (-0.5) (-0.514) (-0.511)
Non motorised 0.119 0.0912 0.0858 0.0329 1.354 0.924 0.881 0.984 13.41* 13.20** 12.79* 13.11* 0.416 0.0763 0.156 0.182
(-0.851) (-0.834) (-0.81) (-0.859) (-1.034) (-1.063) (-1.067) (-1.236) (-6.931) (-6.681) (-6.983) (-6.85) (-1.031) (-1.04) (-1.047) (-1.13)
Collective trasport -1.211 -1.361* -1.258 -1.038 1.112 0.638 0.399 0.000449 -0.25 -0.414 0.634 0.914 0.711 0.0666 -1.913 -2.65 0.613 0.966 0.999 1.16
(-0.88) (-0.811) (-0.825) (-0.844) (-0.834) (-0.925) (-0.969) (-1) (-1.304) (-1.313) (-1.196) (-1.181) (-6.139) (-6.716) (-6.545) (-6.5) (-0.842) (-0.738) (-0.737) (-0.709)
Relative and friends (borrow car) -1.287* -1.057 -0.93 -0.807 1.566** 0.924 0.772 0.544 1.634** 1.181 1.347 1.346 2.542 2.321 1.19 0.869 -0.946 -1.291** -1.217* -1.04
(-0.773) (-0.857) (-0.867) (-0.882) (-0.704) (-0.696) (-0.773) (-0.764) (-0.785) (-0.897) (-0.903) (-0.945) (-6.198) (-6.638) (-6.459) (-6.468) (-0.613) (-0.631) (-0.654) (-0.665)
Pick-up (rented) -0.391 -0.229 -0.147 -0.164 1.087* 0.835 0.827 0.736 1.181* 1.229 1.537* 1.530* 6.399 7.439 5.789 5.614 -0.557 -0.996* -0.857 -0.797
(-0.477) (-0.501) (-0.518) (-0.525) (-0.617) (-0.675) (-0.708) (-0.727) (-0.693) (-0.753) (-0.802) (-0.786) (-4.798) (-4.757) (-4.91) (-4.976) (-0.648) (-0.597) (-0.607) (-0.594)
Car (owned) -0.13 -0.186 -0.131 -0.0351 1.000* 0.671 0.577 0.351 0.665 0.511 0.677 0.72 0.427 1.067 0.351 0.119 -0.22 0.0268 0.0789 0.254
(-0.4) (-0.435) (-0.438) (-0.465) (-0.522) (-0.577) (-0.603) (-0.604) (-0.611) (-0.707) (-0.744) (-0.771) (-3.394) (-3.657) (-3.703) (-3.75) (-0.504) (-0.497) (-0.499) (-0.513)
Van (owned) 0.609 0.896 0.961 1.041 1.044 -0.162 -0.192 -0.467 0.5 -0.0109 0.114 0.121 9.774* 9.415 8.887 8.409 -0.314 0.902 1.024 1.013
(-0.625) (-0.791) (-0.796) (-0.786) (-0.794) (-1.13) (-1.124) (-1.139) (-0.838) (-0.911) (-0.976) (-1.066) (-5.832) (-6.373) (-6.474) (-6.572) (-0.917) (-0.806) (-0.824) (-0.806)
Pick-up van (owned) 0.219 0.112 0.173 0.223 0.879* 0.414 0.209 0.197 0.837 0.643 0.918 0.921 1.707 1.948 1.035 0.922 -0.492 -0.32 -0.271 -0.238
(-0.418) (-0.471) (-0.475) (-0.492) (-0.529) (-0.641) (-0.686) (-0.668) (-0.619) (-0.739) (-0.749) (-0.768) (-3.783) (-4.027) (-4.055) (-4.049) (-0.527) (-0.513) (-0.53) (-0.531)
Truck (owned) 1.04 0.815 0.984 1.108 0.612 -0.5 -0.612 -0.371 1.663 2.148 2.707 2.817 1.842 7.65 5.711 5.588 -0.561 -0.245 -0.0421 0.253
(-0.846) (-0.988) (-0.953) (-0.957) (-1.632) (-2.766) (-2.481) (-2.197) (-1.437) (-2.059) (-2.254) (-2.39) (-7.651) (-8.51) (-8.723) (-8.895) (-1.066) (-1.154) (-1.14) (-1.172)
Storage at home 0.6 0.0732 0.016 -0.0131 0.507 0.674* 0.707* 0.835** 0.438 0.395 0.209 0.174 -10.9 1.955 2.37 2.417 -3.206*** -0.365 -0.352 -0.33
(-0.806) (-0.325) (-0.329) (-0.333) (-0.35) (-0.408) (-0.417) (-0.423) (-0.435) (-0.465) (-0.458) (-0.458) (-9.776) (-2.804) (-2.837) (-2.85) (-1.171) (-0.358) (-0.359) (-0.357)
Storage outside home 0.757 -0.0393 -0.0997 -0.0551 0.534 0.854 0.849 0.846 0.0273 -0.751 -0.764 -0.773 -9.425 0.0948 0.0955 0.0143 -2.631* -0.269 -0.335 -0.375
(-0.891) (-0.59) (-0.589) (-0.604) (-0.614) (-0.781) (-0.803) (-0.809) (-0.593) (-0.685) (-0.719) (-0.723) (-11.04) (-5.328) (-5.34) (-5.609) (-1.408) (-0.702) (-0.708) (-0.717)
Other type of storage Space -0.576 -0.634 -1.022 0.355 0.492 0.581 1.162 -1.842 -2.315 -2.603 -3.023 -17.58 -7.001 -6.485 -5.154 -5.687*** -2.548*** -2.486*** -2.755***
(-0.854) (-0.873) (-0.887) (-0.921) (-1.11) (-1.134) (-1.282) (-1.765) (-1.851) (-1.738) (-2.228) (-12.29) (-7.226) (-7.334) (-7.263) (-1.347) (-0.876) (-0.855) (-0.925)
Private parking -0.044 0.302 0.319 0.251 0.683 0.739 0.753 1.057 0.352 0.631 0.764 0.878 4.056 5.344 5.984 6.318 1.052 0.842 0.724 0.601
(-0.551) (-0.663) (-0.699) (-0.689) (-0.669) (-0.826) (-0.868) (-0.885) (-0.573) (-0.83) (-0.861) (-0.877) (-4.932) (-5.652) (-5.832) (-5.844) (-0.869) (-0.922) (-0.934) (-0.91)
Plot size 0.00132* 0.000387 0.000446 0.000618 -0.00462*** -0.00603*** -0.00555** -0.00615** -0.00264** -0.00342*** -0.00398*** -0.00387*** -0.00816 -0.00775 -0.00844 -0.00921 -0.000285 0.000235 0.000317 0.000463
(-0.000768) (-0.000842) (-0.000862) (-0.00088) (-0.00159) (-0.00226) (-0.00231) (-0.0024) (-0.0012) (-0.00124) (-0.00146) (-0.00145) (-0.00844) (-0.00902) (-0.0094) (-0.0095) (-0.000755) (-0.000818) (-0.000834) (-0.000822)
Home ownership 0.442 0.378 0.437 0.508 -0.226 -0.365 -0.344 -0.413 0.0815 -0.0447 0.216 0.229 -1.035 -1.083 -1.566 -1.738 0.444 0.355 0.425 0.521
(-0.315) (-0.349) (-0.35) (-0.36) (-0.367) (-0.482) (-0.498) (-0.487) (-0.418) (-0.486) (-0.506) (-0.538) (-2.931) (-3.206) (-3.242) (-3.376) (-0.371) (-0.341) (-0.345) (-0.347)
Branch office -0.738 -0.873 -0.896 -0.978 0.481 0.444 0.23 0.107 -1.919** -2.442** -2.336** -2.246** -9.402** -10.22** -11.03** -10.74** -0.829 -0.475 -0.44 -0.398
(-0.726) (-0.795) (-0.791) (-0.828) (-0.728) (-0.749) (-0.784) (-0.866) (-0.925) (-1.1) (-1.086) (-1.074) (-3.902) (-4.321) (-4.34) (-4.374) (-0.735) (-0.86) (-0.874) (-0.834)
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses
VARIABLES
6: Pension Access 7: Health Access 8: Quantity of Accidents 9: Workweek 10: Frencuency of Childwork
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Table A.8.5: HBEs OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Work Quality (Continuation) 
 
 
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Market Access
Diversity of accepted payments 0.278* 0.321* 0.298 0.27 -0.125 0.151 0.182 0.256 0.333* 0.420* 0.316 0.295 -0.319 -0.643 -0.362 -0.246 -0.13 -0.0319 -0.034 -0.0741
(-0.163) (-0.19) (-0.192) (-0.203) (-0.251) (-0.256) (-0.261) (-0.276) (-0.182) (-0.223) (-0.266) (-0.281) (-1.374) (-1.547) (-1.546) (-1.577) (-0.212) (-0.216) (-0.219) (-0.217)
Diversity of selling  methods 0.194 0.0439 0.0551 0.0166 -0.169 0.0978 0.0789 0.222 0.00335 0.0178 0.129 0.0747 -3.243* -2.811 -3.172* -2.876 -0.0425 0.274 0.309 0.322
(-0.191) (-0.219) (-0.219) (-0.224) (-0.243) (-0.303) (-0.303) (-0.326) (-0.23) (-0.298) (-0.3) (-0.302) (-1.69) (-1.84) (-1.823) (-1.853) (-0.231) (-0.228) (-0.234) (-0.24)
Contacting providers -1.017 -1.535* -1.445* -1.412 -0.1 0.445 0.859 0.794 2.178** 2.085* 1.709 1.662 -10.05 -13.95* -12.75 -12.78 -0.939 -2.234** -2.243** -2.191**
(-0.677) (-0.892) (-0.878) (-0.889) (-0.975) (-1.222) (-1.364) (-1.383) (-0.852) (-1.178) (-1.248) (-1.222) (-6.732) (-7.835) (-8.24) (-8.386) (-1.045) (-0.92) (-0.914) (-0.914)
Contacting clients -0.47 0.0164 -0.0274 0.00647 -0.584 -1.195 -1.507 -1.431 0.905 0.9 1.035 1.114 14.62* 15.19* 15.56* 15.38* 1.254 1.829* 1.779* 1.593*
(-1.166) (-1.271) (-1.319) (-1.302) (-1.296) (-1.673) (-1.768) (-1.797) (-1.386) (-1.563) (-1.647) (-1.715) (-8.119) (-8.872) (-8.955) (-9.117) (-1.014) (-0.95) (-0.957) (-0.931)
Precarious (street view) 0.179 0.142 0.261 0.501 0.52 -0.119 -0.108 -0.299 0.417 -0.21 -0.0399 -0.0353 1.222 -1.281 -2.344 -3.127 1.185** 1.049* 1.145* 1.265**
(-0.487) (-0.594) (-0.6) (-0.627) (-0.7) (-0.802) (-0.8) (-0.751) (-0.64) (-0.774) (-0.831) (-0.865) (-4.345) (-4.762) (-4.785) (-4.918) (-0.59) (-0.585) (-0.614) (-0.635)
Standard (street view) 0.217 0.313 0.343 0.515 0.599 -0.179 -0.15 -0.415 0.482 0.222 0.366 0.405 5.386 4.601 4.029 3.318 0.353 0.446 0.485 0.548
(-0.369) (-0.482) (-0.485) (-0.516) (-0.564) (-0.65) (-0.664) (-0.663) (-0.558) (-0.662) (-0.708) (-0.771) (-3.612) (-3.858) (-3.903) (-4.113) (-0.457) (-0.439) (-0.46) (-0.467)
Superior (street view) 0.355 0.653 0.642 0.698 0.809 0.563 0.762 0.742 0.759 0.599 0.402 0.169 9.388 5.629 6.157 5.822 0.0659 -0.174 -0.244 -0.212
(-0.646) (-0.82) (-0.82) (-0.826) (-0.781) (-0.809) (-0.821) (-0.8) (-0.714) (-0.867) (-0.935) (-1.062) (-6.045) (-6.379) (-6.402) (-6.46) (-0.721) (-0.774) (-0.778) (-0.781)
Other (street view) 14.81** 16.93** 21.56** 21.31**
(-6.484) (-8.475) (-8.807) (-8.856)
Organisation
Unionisation 0.422 0.635 0.609 0.505 0.179 -0.19 -0.145 -0.047 -0.272 0.177 -0.147 -0.321 5.094 7.079* 7.692* 7.965* 0.519 0.176 0.135 0.00996
(-0.488) (-0.556) (-0.564) (-0.592) (-0.674) (-0.843) (-0.858) (-0.822) (-0.711) (-0.764) (-0.772) (-0.759) (-3.903) (-4.028) (-4.113) (-4.101) (-0.605) (-0.59) (-0.61) (-0.639)
Negative Externalities
Child care (network) 0.735 0.26 0.429 0.522 1.556** 1.753* 1.607* 1.573* 0.697 0.751 1.296 1.247 -2.901 -1.446 -3.831 -3.874 -1.187 -1.363 -1.227 -1.163
(-1.07) (-1.075) (-1.084) (-1.115) (-0.781) (-0.916) (-0.944) (-0.937) (-1.154) (-1.244) (-1.317) (-1.247) (-10.84) (-12.05) (-12.79) (-12.89) (-1.039) (-0.941) (-0.977) (-1.019)
Child care (public nursery) -0.195 -0.081 -0.0871 -0.16 0.785* 0.609 0.820* 0.890* -0.062 0.0166 -0.315 -0.426 3.201 4.09 4.666 4.959 -0.812** -0.452 -0.397 -0.374
(-0.41) (-0.444) (-0.463) (-0.48) (-0.43) (-0.452) (-0.461) (-0.48) (-0.499) (-0.564) (-0.637) (-0.616) (-3.108) (-3.134) (-3.132) (-3.258) (-0.382) (-0.398) (-0.415) (-0.414)
Child care (other) -0.00792 -0.449 -0.471 -0.453 0.34 0.0742 0.151 0.186 0.273 0.0396 -0.029 -0.139 -0.513 -0.795 -0.797 -0.765 0.172 0.368 0.395 0.368
(-0.296) (-0.368) (-0.365) (-0.37) (-0.378) (-0.439) (-0.453) (-0.455) (-0.43) (-0.505) (-0.527) (-0.508) (-2.891) (-3.205) (-3.151) (-3.16) (-0.365) (-0.407) (-0.408) (-0.405)
Harrasment policy 0.107* 0.109 0.116 0.121 -0.111 -0.101 -0.141* -0.123 -0.0178 -0.0717 -0.0227 -0.0557 -0.593 -0.876 -1.016* -0.983 0.147* 0.170** 0.170** 0.162**
(-0.0632) (-0.0738) (-0.077) (-0.0791) (-0.0718) (-0.0782) (-0.0808) (-0.08) (-0.0879) (-0.092) (-0.102) (-0.103) (-0.545) (-0.587) (-0.591) (-0.597) (-0.0782) (-0.0768) (-0.0771) (-0.0781)
Value of the local permit -6.27e-06* -2.33E-06 -2.36E-06 -2.52E-06 -4.62E-07 4.88E-07 1.06E-06 1.15E-06 -5.98E-06 -4.35E-06 -6.51E-06 -5.29E-06 8.06E-06 1.51E-05 1.62E-05 1.57E-05 1.10E-06 4.90E-07 5.41E-07 6.34E-09
(-0.000003) (-0.000003) (-0.000003) (-0.000003) (-0.000003) (-0.000003) (-0.000003) (-0.000003) (-0.000004) (-0.000004) (-0.000005) (-0.000004) (-0.00002) (-0.00002) (-0.00002) (-0.00002) (-0.000005) (-0.000004) (-0.000004) (-0.000004)
Enterprise controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Socio-Demographic Controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Spatial Controls no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
Municipal Controls no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes
Constant -2.253** -1.247 -1.151 -1.457 -1.571 -2.437 -2.027 -1.089 -0.789*** -0.152 -0.221 -0.0544 77.44*** 49.85*** 50.19*** 47.29*** 4.360*** -1.544 -1.437 -2.943
(-1.114) (-1.327) (-1.304) (-1.669) (-1.128) (-1.682) (-1.692) (-2.023) (-0.233) (-0.288) (-0.304) (-0.339) (-11.05) (-13.87) (-14.23) (-17.6) (-1.395) (-1.865) (-1.934) (-2.505)
Observations 346 319 317 317 348 321 319 319 346 320 318 318 344 324 322 322 242 229 228 228
R-squared 0.263 0.317 0.335 0.344 0.191 0.232 0.243 0.246 0.259 0.392 0.398 0.409
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses
VARIABLES
6: Pension Access 7: Health Access 8: Quantity of Accidents 9: Workweek 10: Frencuency of Childwork
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Table A.8.6: HBEs OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Negative Externalities 
 
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56
Financial Capital
Access to credit 0.0123 0.00526 0.00036 -0.00627 -0.136 -0.112 -0.0916 -0.0982 0.0105 0.0394 0.0458 0.0578 0.141 0.142 0.132 0.131
(-0.271) (-0.282) (-0.287) (-0.291) (-0.186) (-0.196) (-0.201) (-0.204) (-0.114) (-0.115) (-0.115) (-0.116) (-0.165) (-0.187) (-0.184) (-0.184)
Local financial support 1.008* 0.923* 0.963* 1.010* 0.249 0.237 0.228 0.242 0.0283 -0.0182 0.0589 0.0641 -0.510** -0.505** -0.477* -0.474*
(-0.596) (-0.54) (-0.558) (-0.539) (-0.331) (-0.371) (-0.373) (-0.363) (-0.213) (-0.228) (-0.234) (-0.24) (-0.249) (-0.253) (-0.263) (-0.265)
National fund -0.101 0.0587 0.105 0.0648 -0.254 -0.265 -0.269 -0.291 -0.0605 0.00373 -0.0428 -0.0665 -0.0104 -0.161 -0.157 -0.164
(-0.418) (-0.409) (-0.417) (-0.412) (-0.324) (-0.348) (-0.348) (-0.353) (-0.189) (-0.188) (-0.195) (-0.199) (-0.206) (-0.198) (-0.196) (-0.199)
Human Capital
Tranning support -0.662* -0.533 -0.608* -0.676* 0.0481 0.000835 0.00291 -0.0291 -0.158 -0.226 -0.275 -0.253 0.375 0.506*** 0.472** 0.471**
(-0.336) (-0.339) (-0.367) (-0.366) (-0.235) (-0.253) (-0.258) (-0.255) (-0.198) (-0.214) (-0.204) (-0.205) (-0.242) (-0.183) (-0.189) (-0.191)
Technical support 1.027 1.135* 1.228* 1.166* -0.442 -0.449 -0.447 -0.473 0.272 0.235 0.205 0.244 0.0546 0.00647 0.00358 0.00968
(-0.677) (-0.679) (-0.68) (-0.686) (-0.478) (-0.477) (-0.481) (-0.492) (-0.223) (-0.253) (-0.262) (-0.267) (-0.366) (-0.355) (-0.355) (-0.366)
Physical Capital
Working cloths -0.386 -0.426 -0.344 -0.35 0.0578 0.0383 0.0257 0.0174 0.0712 0.0733 0.0598 0.0554 0.374** 0.363** 0.338** 0.334**
(-0.278) (-0.288) (-0.288) (-0.287) (-0.189) (-0.193) (-0.198) (-0.203) (-0.133) (-0.146) (-0.143) (-0.144) (-0.153) (-0.151) (-0.15) (-0.152)
Basic machinery -0.718** -0.733** -0.781** -0.804** 0.0786 0.0966 0.0654 0.049 0.0755 0.104 0.176 0.163 0.0839 0.0229 0.0539 0.0487
(-0.303) (-0.314) (-0.338) (-0.338) (-0.187) (-0.197) (-0.195) (-0.189) (-0.129) (-0.142) (-0.143) (-0.146) (-0.171) (-0.172) (-0.182) (-0.185)
Advanced machinery -0.851** -0.789* -0.833* -0.858** 0.327 0.408* 0.373 0.358 -0.0147 0.118 0.177 0.149 -0.0604 -0.00798 -0.00185 -0.00768
(-0.379) (-0.433) (-0.439) (-0.432) (-0.248) (-0.244) (-0.245) (-0.247) (-0.182) (-0.187) (-0.186) (-0.188) (-0.238) (-0.252) (-0.26) (-0.264)
Non motorised -0.309 -0.013 0.144 0.189 -0.365 -0.413 -0.397 -0.38 0.133 -0.0213 -0.0397 0.00314 -0.401 -0.43 -0.442 -0.437
(-0.68) (-0.671) (-0.673) (-0.667) (-0.468) (-0.488) (-0.492) (-0.48) (-0.317) (-0.344) (-0.344) (-0.338) (-0.471) (-0.483) (-0.492) (-0.481)
Collective trasport -0.872 -0.747 -0.538 -0.57 -0.246 0.11 0.115 0.0908 0.384 0.456 0.368 0.328 0.366 0.569 0.570* 0.555
(-0.715) (-0.72) (-0.76) (-0.76) (-0.526) (-0.348) (-0.362) (-0.354) (-0.34) (-0.378) (-0.402) (-0.414) (-0.402) (-0.352) (-0.34) (-0.348)
Relative and friends (borrow car) -0.0791 0.0954 0.0711 0.0382 0.196 0.115 0.119 0.0953 0.238 0.241 0.174 0.177 0.351 0.456 0.485 0.475
(-0.606) (-0.639) (-0.622) (-0.621) (-0.266) (-0.299) (-0.31) (-0.318) (-0.263) (-0.272) (-0.279) (-0.291) (-0.271) (-0.316) (-0.31) (-0.312)
Pick-up (rented) 0.0664 0.137 0.317 0.291 0.23 0.228 0.287 0.269 0.400* 0.363 0.306 0.305 -0.254 -0.175 -0.17 -0.174
(-0.438) (-0.446) (-0.448) (-0.446) (-0.249) (-0.238) (-0.245) (-0.249) (-0.226) (-0.224) (-0.227) (-0.23) (-0.294) (-0.291) (-0.293) (-0.295)
Car (owned) -0.283 -0.283 -0.185 -0.238 0.173 0.0813 0.0836 0.0486 0.391* 0.334 0.305 0.311 -0.0458 -0.0437 -0.0447 -0.0547
(-0.385) (-0.394) (-0.394) (-0.397) (-0.213) (-0.226) (-0.229) (-0.234) (-0.205) (-0.213) (-0.215) (-0.224) (-0.22) (-0.249) (-0.244) (-0.247)
Van (owned) 0.55 0.836 0.836 0.795 -0.216 0.204 0.207 0.188 0.321 0.214 0.21 0.183 -0.201 -0.0979 -0.085 -0.0931
(-0.578) (-0.613) (-0.634) (-0.611) (-0.431) (-0.299) (-0.299) (-0.285) (-0.278) (-0.266) (-0.26) (-0.258) (-0.283) (-0.326) (-0.324) (-0.328)
Pick-up van (owned) 0.306 0.513 0.616 0.647 -0.262 -0.394 -0.399 -0.387 0.476** 0.393* 0.347* 0.347* -0.0713 -0.0235 -0.0285 -0.0298
(-0.409) (-0.434) (-0.429) (-0.429) (-0.252) (-0.277) (-0.283) (-0.285) (-0.197) (-0.205) (-0.204) (-0.207) (-0.233) (-0.277) (-0.27) (-0.273)
Truck (owned) -0.334 0.262 0.354 0.487 0.417 0.291 0.344 0.396 0.439 0.555** 0.394* 0.410* 0.171 -0.0154 -0.00158 -0.00263
(-0.621) (-0.626) (-0.632) (-0.647) (-0.308) (-0.379) (-0.381) (-0.406) (-0.323) (-0.241) (-0.231) (-0.244) (-0.384) (-0.379) (-0.374) (-0.392)
Storage at home -3.198*** 0.857*** 0.859*** 0.858*** 5.633*** -0.162 -0.148 -0.149 1.070* -0.0282 -0.0476 -0.0423 0.601 -0.311** -0.314** -0.314**
(-1.104) (-0.256) (-0.25) (-0.247) (-0.56) (-0.162) (-0.163) (-0.164) (-0.546) (-0.132) (-0.132) (-0.132) (-0.402) (-0.141) (-0.146) (-0.147)
Storage outside home -4.312*** -0.632 -0.57 -0.404 5.748*** 0.0487 0.0533 0.138 1.232** 0.221 0.19 0.187 1.219** 0.287 0.277 0.284
(-1.203) (-0.494) (-0.485) (-0.496) (-0.614) (-0.328) (-0.331) (-0.3) (-0.581) (-0.199) (-0.198) (-0.202) (-0.475) (-0.221) (-0.22) (-0.229)
Other type of storage Space -4.769*** -1.108** -1.077** -0.789 5.692*** -0.1 -0.0591 0.101 1.472*** 0.17 0.104 0.169 0.71 -0.326 -0.346 -0.307
(-1.169) (-0.513) (-0.526) (-0.535) (-0.623) (-0.328) (-0.323) (-0.372) (-0.561) (-0.203) (-0.213) (-0.232) (-0.52) (-0.304) (-0.317) (-0.327)
Private parking 0.227 0.631 0.443 0.63 -0.293 -0.18 -0.183 -0.0796 0.0846 0.00563 0.0233 0.0126 -0.0649 -0.0793 -0.0486 -0.0301
(-0.463) (-0.581) (-0.61) (-0.601) (-0.365) (-0.417) (-0.437) (-0.443) (-0.181) (-0.221) (-0.223) (-0.232) (-0.274) (-0.344) (-0.359) (-0.366)
Plot size -0.000787 -0.00120* -0.00116* -0.0012 0.000218 0.000518 0.000562 0.000542 -8.46E-05 -5.77E-05 1.95E-05 -4.24E-05 -0.000124 -0.000253 -0.000242 -0.000255
(-0.000659) (-0.000671) (-0.000685) (-0.000762) (-0.00039) (-0.000432) (-0.000432) (-0.000423) (-0.000337) (-0.000348) (-0.00037) (-0.00037) (-0.000469) (-0.000513) (-0.00052) (-0.000529)
Home ownership -0.292 -0.523* -0.593** -0.541* 0.0983 0.0863 0.117 0.14 0.247* 0.189 0.196 0.196 -0.0688 -0.194 -0.162 -0.164
(-0.267) (-0.3) (-0.296) (-0.31) (-0.179) (-0.186) (-0.192) (-0.196) (-0.131) (-0.144) (-0.145) (-0.148) (-0.148) (-0.162) (-0.165) (-0.167)
Branch office -1.355*** -1.867*** -1.624*** -1.758*** -0.648 -0.644 -0.651 -0.731 0.155 0.197 0.148 0.19 0.176 0.0822 0.048 0.0395
(-0.503) (-0.548) (-0.553) (-0.555) (-0.559) (-0.502) (-0.505) (-0.513) (-0.223) (-0.225) (-0.216) (-0.212) (-0.236) (-0.251) (-0.252) (-0.256)
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses
VARIABLES
11: Family Life Distrubance 12: Neiborhood Life Disturbance 13: Level Formalisation 14: Hapiness
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Table A.8.6: HBEs OLS Models Testing Local Policy Impact on Negative Externalities 
 
 
 
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56
Market Access
Diversity of accepted payments 0.262* 0.235 0.226 0.311* -0.0169 -0.0369 -0.0323 0.0143 -0.0213 -0.0054 0.00222 0.000403 -0.0103 -0.0424 -0.0427 -0.0352
(-0.143) (-0.156) (-0.156) (-0.158) (-0.086) (-0.0959) (-0.097) (-0.102) (-0.061) (-0.0667) (-0.0658) (-0.0671) (-0.0859) (-0.0874) (-0.0879) (-0.0909)
Diversity of selling  methods 0.271* 0.306* 0.371** 0.393** 0.0201 -0.0858 -0.0806 -0.073 0.0454 0.015 0.00565 0.0292 0.0307 -0.0009 -0.00601 -0.00221
(-0.157) (-0.171) (-0.174) (-0.178) (-0.106) (-0.101) (-0.105) (-0.106) (-0.0802) (-0.0871) (-0.0876) (-0.0898) (-0.092) (-0.104) (-0.105) (-0.109)
Contacting providers 0.941 0.141 -0.401 -0.583 -0.147 0.11 0.134 0.0404 -0.31 -0.186 -0.0137 0.00858 -0.179 -0.278 -0.147 -0.16
(-0.603) (-0.649) (-0.638) (-0.615) (-0.332) (-0.306) (-0.344) (-0.317) (-0.292) (-0.313) (-0.337) (-0.333) (-0.287) (-0.278) (-0.305) (-0.313)
Contacting clients -0.599 -0.0645 -0.04 0.218 0.485 0.495 0.471 0.619 0.0283 -0.0573 -0.118 -0.179 0.219 0.387 0.338 0.358
(-0.818) (-0.85) (-0.859) (-0.845) (-0.455) (-0.439) (-0.452) (-0.455) (-0.566) (-0.571) (-0.575) (-0.571) (-0.398) (-0.418) (-0.428) (-0.439)
Precarious (street view) 1.210*** 0.857* 0.932* 0.820* 0.121 0.286 0.271 0.204 0.169 0.0342 0.0406 0.0144 -0.0142 -0.046 -0.0198 -0.0404
(-0.443) (-0.471) (-0.473) (-0.485) (-0.302) (-0.31) (-0.317) (-0.311) (-0.247) (-0.274) (-0.266) (-0.272) (-0.272) (-0.276) (-0.279) (-0.291)
Standard (street view) 0.667** 0.446 0.5 0.351 0.34 0.412 0.422* 0.341 0.402** 0.29 0.254 0.228 -0.096 -0.186 -0.187 -0.207
(-0.325) (-0.345) (-0.342) (-0.367) (-0.244) (-0.255) (-0.255) (-0.242) (-0.174) (-0.196) (-0.194) (-0.2) (-0.202) (-0.211) (-0.211) (-0.229)
Superior (street view) 1.223** 1.017 0.893 0.73 0.212 0.277 0.266 0.18 0.534*** 0.348 0.342 0.341 -0.123 -0.261 -0.26 -0.274
(-0.621) (-0.685) (-0.667) (-0.65) (-0.396) (-0.43) (-0.435) (-0.421) (-0.201) (-0.231) (-0.235) (-0.237) (-0.343) (-0.354) (-0.347) (-0.356)
Other (street view) 5.120*** 6.307*** 5.989*** 5.743*** 0.791** 0.442 0.412 0.267 0.558** 0.724 0.74 0.782* 0.732** 0.379 0.375 0.35
(-0.55) (-0.602) (-0.648) (-0.662) (-0.374) (-0.499) (-0.555) (-0.532) (-0.264) (-0.445) (-0.461) (-0.469) (-0.365) (-0.419) (-0.436) (-0.455)
Organisation
Unionisation -0.405 -0.27 -0.335 -0.28 0.182 0.213 0.22 0.244 0.0657 0.0363 0.0104 0.0274 0.267 0.199 0.192 0.199
(-0.394) (-0.399) (-0.378) (-0.385) (-0.278) (-0.301) (-0.3) (-0.274) (-0.203) (-0.222) (-0.224) (-0.224) (-0.196) (-0.208) (-0.217) (-0.221)
Negative Externalities
Child care (network) -0.631 -1.604** -1.368** -1.339** 0.326 0.291 0.3 0.308 -0.855 -0.946 -0.997 -0.994 -0.472 -0.358 -0.335 -0.336
(-0.994) (-0.645) (-0.629) (-0.67) (-0.382) (-0.556) (-0.548) (-0.595) (-0.588) (-0.645) (-0.656) (-0.638) (-0.574) (-0.645) (-0.671) (-0.669)
Child care (public nursery) -0.38 -0.214 -0.381 -0.494 0.184 0.287 0.347 0.286 -0.0116 0.0166 0.00898 0.0418 0.14 0.116 0.149 0.145
(-0.343) (-0.359) (-0.374) (-0.386) (-0.218) (-0.21) (-0.223) (-0.215) (-0.175) (-0.181) (-0.182) (-0.188) (-0.211) (-0.217) (-0.221) (-0.228)
Child care (other) -0.459 -0.335 -0.292 -0.245 -0.0543 -0.129 -0.119 -0.0956 -0.0998 -0.136 -0.143 -0.141 0.177 0.203 0.189 0.192
(-0.292) (-0.326) (-0.325) (-0.327) (-0.166) (-0.194) (-0.199) (-0.203) (-0.133) (-0.152) (-0.151) (-0.152) (-0.169) (-0.19) (-0.193) (-0.195)
Harrasment policy 0.0252 -0.0171 0.00611 0.0104 0.0425 0.032 0.0264 0.028 0.0125 -0.00146 -0.00615 -0.00212 0.131*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.124***
(-0.0543) (-0.0586) (-0.059) (-0.0593) (-0.036) (-0.0386) (-0.0404) (-0.0415) (-0.0261) (-0.0272) (-0.0282) (-0.0285) (-0.0367) (-0.0363) (-0.0366) (-0.0373)
Value of the local permit 1.42E-06 4.96E-07 2.22E-07 -9.48E-08 1.53E-06 2.36e-06* 2.47e-06** 2.38e-06* 5.58E-08 4.57E-07 2.06E-07 1.56E-07 2.81E-07 -4.33E-08 -1.06E-07 -1.17E-07
(-0.000003) (-0.000003) (-0.000003) (-0.000003) (-0.000001) (-0.000001) (-0.000001) (-0.000001) (-0.0000009) (-0.000001) (-0.000001) (-0.000001) (-0.000002) (-0.000003) (-0.000003) (-0.000003)
Enterprise controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Socio-Demographic Controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Spatial Controls no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
Municipal Controls no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes
Constant 5.399*** 1.008 0.832 2.049 -0.847 3.613*** 3.658*** 4.467*** 1.615*** 2.281** 2.401** 1.793 4.374*** 5.254*** 5.282*** 5.391***
-1.227 -1.812 -1.862 -2.27 -0.675 -1.383 -1.392 -1.493 -0.57 -1.068 -1.043 -1.116 -0.695 -1.003 -1 -1.094
Observations 346 321 319 319 350 324 322 322 350 324 322 322 350 324 322 322
R-squared 0.209 0.271 0.3 0.316 0.14 0.155 0.157 0.172 0.101 0.13 0.15 0.159 0.166 0.21 0.211 0.211
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 : Robust standard errors in parentheses
VARIABLES
11: Family Life Distrubance 12: Neiborhood Life Disturbance 13: Level Formalisation 14: Hapiness
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ANNEX 9: INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUPS  
Table A.9. 1: Participants in Interviews and Focus Groups with Waste-Pickers and Local Authorities 
N Pseudonym Gender Age Nationality Category Municipality 
Local Policy 
Approach 
Method of data 
collection 
Duration of the interview 
1 Esteban M 52 Chile National Waste-picker Leader National n.a Interview 01:46:00 
2 Angel M 39 Chile Public Officer Peñalolén Strong support Interview 01:02:00 
3 Olivia F 27 Chile Public Officer Peñalolén Strong support Interview 00:45:00 
4 Sofia F 46 Chile Local Waste-picker Leader Peñalolén Strong support Interview 00:40:00 
5 Claudia  F 48 Peru waste-picker Peñalolén Strong support Group Discussion 01:05:00 
6 Natalia F 50 Chile waste-picker Peñalolén Strong support Group Discussion 01:05:00 
7 Paula  F 28 Chile waste-picker Peñalolén Strong support Group Discussion 01:05:00 
8 Ximena F 51 Chile waste-picker Peñalolén Strong support Group Discussion 01:05:00 
9 Victor M 60 Chile waste-picker Peñalolén Strong support Group Discussion 01:05:00 
10 Antonio M 52 Chile waste-picker Peñalolén Strong support Group Discussion 01:05:00 
11 David M 48 Chile waste-picker Peñalolén Strong support Group Discussion 01:05:00 
12 Karina F 39 Chile Public Officer La Reina Strong support Interview 01:39:00 
13 Fernanda F 55 Chile Public Officer La Reina Strong support Interview 00:49:00 
14 Carlos M 48 Chile Local Waste-picker Leader La Reina Strong support Interview 00:55:00 
15 Santiago M 42 Chile Public Officer Recoleta Weak support Interview 00:45:00 
16 Lorenzo M 45 Chile Local Waste-picker Leader Recoleta Weak support Interview 00:51:00 
17 Gloria F 54 Chile waste-picker Recoleta Weak support Group Discussion 01:02:00 
18 Daniela F 60 Chile waste-picker Recoleta Weak support Group Discussion 01:02:00 
19 Hugo M 55 Chile waste-picker Recoleta Weak support Group Discussion 01:02:00 
20 Fernando M 56 Chile waste-picker Recoleta Weak support Group Discussion 01:02:00 
21 Lorenzo M 45 Chile waste-picker Recoleta Weak support Group Discussion 01:02:00 
22 Rafael M 39 Chile waste-picker Recoleta Weak support Group Discussion 01:02:00 
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Table A.9. 1: Participants in Interviews and Focus Groups with Waste-Pickers and Local Authorities (Continuation) 
N Pseudonym Gender Age Nationality Category Municipality 
Local Policy 
Approach 
Method of data 
collection 
Duration of the interview 
23 Gabriel M 53 Chile Public Officer Cerrillos Tolerance Interview 00:50:00 
24 Ignacio M 65 Chile Local Waste-picker Leader Cerrillos Tolerance Interview 00:42:00 
25 Ramon  M 57 Chile waste-picker Cerrillos Tolerance Group Discussion 01:03:00 
26 Cristian  M 35 Chile waste-picker Cerrillos Tolerance Group Discussion 01:03:00 
27 Isabel F 52 Chile waste-picker Cerrillos Tolerance Group Discussion 01:03:00 
28 Nicolas M 62 Chile waste-picker Cerrillos Tolerance Group Discussion 01:03:00 
29 Max M 42 Chile Public Officer Pudahuel Displacement Interview 00:55:00 
30 Pedro M 44 Chile Public Officer Pudahuel Displacement Interview 00:55:00 
31 Sebastian M 62 Chile Local Waste-picker Leader Pudahuel Displacement Interview 00:53:00 
32 Jose M 45 Chile waste-picker Pudahuel Displacement Group Discussion 01:00:00 
33 Daniela F 43 Chile waste-picker Pudahuel Displacement Group Discussion 01:00:00 
34 Veronica F 46 Chile waste-picker Pudahuel Displacement Group Discussion 01:00:00 
35 Emilio M 65 Chile waste-picker Pudahuel Displacement Group Discussion 01:00:00 
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Table A.9. 2: Participants in Interviews and Focus Groups with Street Vendors and Local Authorities 
 
N Pseudonym Gender Age Nationality Category Municipality
Local Policy 
Approach
Method of data 
collection
Duration of the 
interview
1 Agustin M 31 Chile Manager for Procter and Gamble National n.a Interview 01:23:00
2 Ian M 54 Chile Manager of Lo Valledor Regional n.a Interview 01:01:00
3 Gabriel M 55 Chile National Street Vendor Leader National n.a Interview 00:45:00
4 Guillermo M 67 Chile National Street Vendor Leader National n.a Interview 02:07:00
5 Mario M 55 Chile Public Officer Macul Strong support Interview 00:53:00
6 Ignacio M 35 Chile Public Officer Macul Strong support Interview 00:45:00
7 Pablo M 42 Chile Local Street Vendor Leader Macul Strong support Interview 00:47:00
8 Rodrigo M 52 Chile Street Vendor Macul Strong support Group Discussion 01:37:00
9 Alejandro M 54 Chile Street Vendor Macul Strong support Group Discussion 01:37:00
10 Raul M 58 Chile Street Vendor Macul Strong support Group Discussion 01:37:00
11 Benjamin M 44 Chile Street Vendor Macul Strong support Group Discussion 01:37:00
12 Emilio M 50 Chile Public Officer Conchali Weak support Interview 01:04:00
13 Marina F 45 Chile Local Street Vendor Leader Conchali Weak support Interview 01:29:00
14 Claudio M 54 Chile Street Vendor Conchali Weak support Group Discussion 01:04:00
15 Roberto M 50 Chile Street Vendor Conchali Weak support Group Discussion 01:04:00
16 Mariela F 49 Chile Street Vendor Conchali Weak support Group Discussion 01:04:00
17 Marta F 52 Chile Street Vendor Conchali Weak support Group Discussion 01:04:00
18 Pilar F 54 Chile Public Officer Maipu Tolerance Interview 00:48:00
19 Sandra F 42 Chile Local Street Vendor Leader Maipu Tolerance Group Discussion 01:37:00
20 Oscar Gálvez M 52 Chile Local Street Vendor Leader Maipu Tolerance Group Discussion 01:37:00
21 Germán Avello M 54 Chile Local Street Vendor Leader Maipu Tolerance Group Discussion 01:37:00
22 Gaston M 43 Chile Street Vendor Maipu Tolerance Group Discussion 01:03:00
23 Victor M 34 Chile Street Vendor Maipu Tolerance Group Discussion 01:03:00
24 Aucan M 50 Chile Street Vendor Maipu Tolerance Group Discussion 01:03:00
25 Felipe M 49 Chile Street Vendor Maipu Tolerance Group Discussion 01:03:00
26 Paulo M 58 Chile Street Vendor Maipu Tolerance Group Discussion 01:03:00
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Table A.9. 2: Participants in Interviews and Focus Groups with Street Vendors and Local Authorities (Continuation) 
N Pseudonym Gender Age Nationality Category Municipality 
Local Policy Ap-
proach 
Method of data collec-
tion 
Duration of the in-
terview 
26 Alberto M 52 Chile Street Vendor Maipu Tolerance Group Discussion 01:03:00 
27 Sara F 49 Chile Public Officer La Granja Repression Interview 01:09:00 
28 Claudio M 48 Chile 
Local Street Vendor 
Leader 
La Granja Repression Interview 01:30:00 
29 Maria F 52 Chile Street Vendor La Granja Repression Group Discussion 01:27:00 
30 Luis M 54 Chile Street Vendor La Granja Repression Group Discussion 01:27:00 
31 Eduardo M 52 Chile Street Vendor La Granja Repression Group Discussion 01:27:00 
32 Paulina F 44 Chile Street Vendor La Granja Repression Group Discussion 01:27:00 
33 Claudio F 48 Chile Street Vendor La Granja Repression Group Discussion 01:27:00 
 
362 
 
Table A.9. 3: Participants in Interviews and Focus Groups with Home-Base Entrepreneurs and Local Authorities  
N Pseudonym Gender Age Nationality Category Municipality 
Local Policy  
Approach 
Method of data  
collection 
Duration of the interview 
1 Axel M 52 Chile National Union of HBEs National n.a Interview 01:22:00 
2 Javier M 55 Chile Public Officer Santiago Strong support Interview 01:22:00 
3 Francisca F 36 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Santiago Strong support Group Discussion 01:23:00 
4 Marta F 45 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Santiago Strong support Group Discussion 01:23:00 
5 Sofia F 47 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Santiago Strong support Group Discussion 01:23:00 
6 Carmen F 56 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Santiago Strong support Group Discussion 01:23:00 
7 Rosa F 34 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Santiago Strong support Group Discussion 01:23:00 
8 Silvia F 40 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Santiago Strong support Group Discussion 01:23:00 
9 Nicolas M 56 Chile Public Officer Lo Prado Weak Support Interview 00:45:00 
9 Emilio M 50 Chile Public Officer Lo Prado Weak support Interview 01:14:00 
10 Rodrigo M 53 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Lo Prado Weak support Group Discussion 01:39:00 
11 Ana F 41 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Lo Prado Weak support Group Discussion 01:39:00 
12 Mariela F 50 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Lo Prado Weak support Group Discussion 01:39:00 
13 Susana F 48 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Lo Prado Weak support Group Discussion 01:39:00 
14 Claudia F 61 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Lo Prado Weak support Group Discussion 01:39:00 
15 Mariana F 41 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Lo Prado Weak support Group Discussion 01:39:00 
16 Maria Teresa F 49 Chile Public Officer Las Condes Tolerance Interview 00:46:00 
17 Maria Eugenia F 39 Chile Public Officer Las Condes Tolerance Interview 00:46:00 
18 Elisabeth F 55 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Las Condes Tolerance Group Discussion 01:39:00 
19 Elena F 34 Rusia Home-Base Entrepreneur Las Condes Tolerance Group Discussion 01:39:00 
20 Nancy F 53 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Las Condes Tolerance Group Discussion 01:39:00 
21 Gabriel M 50 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Las Condes Tolerance Group Discussion 01:39:00 
22 Rene M 62 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur Las Condes Tolerance Group Discussion 01:39:00 
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Table A.9.3: Participants in Interviews and Focus Groups with Home-Base Entrepreneurs and Local Authorities (Continuation) 
N Pseudonym Gender Age Nationality Category Municipality 
Local Policy Ap-
proach 
Method of data  
collection 
Duration of the inter-
view 
23 Camila F 49 Chile Public Officer La Granja Repression Interview 00:52:00 
24 Maria F 52 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur La Granja Repression Group Discussion 01:07:00 
25 Sandra F 48 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur La Granja Repression Group Discussion 01:07:00 
26 Ana M 52 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur La Granja Repression Group Discussion 01:07:00 
27 Paula F 44 Chile Home-Base Entrepreneur La Granja Repression Group Discussion 01:07:00 
 
364 
 
ANNEX 10: TOPIC GUIDES WITH WASTE-PICKERS 
 
Interview Guide: National waste-picker leaders 
 
Section 1: Organisation (national & local) 
 
1. How is your organisation structured, and what are the organisation’s objectives? 
2. Are there other organisations that are not part or that are parallel to this organisation? Which 
ones? Why? 
 
Section 2: Entry to and exit from the informal economy 
 
     Entry and exit 
1. How did you begin to engage in waste-picking as a job? 
2. Why do you think other waste-pickers began recycling? 
3. Why do you think the majority of waste-pickers continue to recycle? 
4. Do you think that if there were more jobs in the formal sector that waste-pickers would stop 
recycling? Why? Why not? 
5. Under which conditions or factors would waste-pickers be willing to stop recycling?  
 
Relation to the economy 
1. Does s/he think unemployment or economic crises affect waste-picking? In what ways? 
2. Which factors does s/he think determine whether a waste-picker stays in the business for a long 
or a short periods of time? 
3. Based on informant’s opinion, what are the benefits of waste-picking, and what are some of the 
problems? 
 
Section 3: How does waste-picking function? 
 
Production 
1. What are main materials that are recycled in the metropolitan region? 
2. How or what determines which type of materials are recycled and which ones are not? 
3. Which factors determine the waste-picker’s collection route? How are the routes distributed, 
organised, or negotiated? 
 
Distribution 
1. Does the type of vehicle affect the quantity of material or type of materials that are collected? 
 
Gathering 
1. Where / Which places do waste-pickers commonly pick-up/collect recycled materials? 
2. Is having a place to accumulate waste a relevant factor in the recycling business? Why? Why 
not? 
3. Do the collected materials receive any type of treatment before they are sold? Is there a value 
added for this treatment? 
 
Sale 
1. Whom do the waste-pickers sell the recycled materials to? 
2. What are the factors that determine where the recycled materials are sold? Proximity? Price? 
Other?  
3. Do you think the type of vehicle used affects the place and prices where and for how the 
collected materials are sold? Are the prices for recycled materials homogenous across the city? 
4. How is the sale price for the collected materials determined? 
5. Which companies are the final consumers of the recycled products? Do they vary per sector? 
Bottles? Papers? Cans and metals? Plastics? 
 
Section 4: Economic rationale and public policy 
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1. What initiatives are most successful in supporting waste-pickers in Chile? 
2. Do waste-pickers have access to any type of credit? Do you think this has had any positive 
impact on the practice of waste-picking? 
3. Which politics or regulations have been implemented that have had a repressive, fiscal, or 
harmful attitude towards waste-pickers? Which of them have impacted the activity? 
4. What qualities must a waste-picker have to reach maximum potential of productivity or 
income? 
5. How do you think waste-pickers might be able to obtain higher prices at the point of sale? 
6. How do you think waste-pickers might be able to pick-up/collect higher quantities of 
materials? Or collect materials with a higher value at the point of sale? 
7. How do you think recyclers can add value to their products? 
8. Do you think that the experience of a waste-picker plays an important role in earning better 
incomes, or better labour conditions for a recycler? 
9. Are there training programs for waste-pickers? What do they consist of? Which training 
programs do you think would be useful to the waste-pickers? 
 
Section 5: Social rationale and public policy  
 
1. What do you think is the waste-pickers’ range of incomes? Which factors determine their 
income? 
2. Do you think there more females than males in the recycling business? Do they earn less or 
more? What are the reasons? 
3. Do you think there are more migrants in waste-picking than other sectors of the economy? Do 
they earn less or more than national waste-pickers? What are the reasons? 
 
Section 6: Negative externalities and public policy 
 
1. Do you think there is child labour deeper in the waste-picking business? Why do you think this 
happens? How do you think this problem can improve? 
2. Do you think there is a problem of trash dispersion on the part of the waste-picking? How can 
this problem be improved? 
3. What are the accidents that waste-pickers are exposed to in their jobs? How can these accidents 
be reduced? 
4. Do you think waste-pickers have access to pensions? What can be done to improve this 
situation? 
5. What level of healthcare do you think waste-pickers have access to? Do you think it’s 
sufficient? Why? What can be done to improve this situation? 
6. How many days a week and average hours does a waste-picker work? Why do you think this 
is? 
 
Section 7: Selection of four municipalities 
 
1. Which municipal departments liase most closely with waste-pickers?  
2. I need to choose four representative municipalities of policies or norms with an approximation 
of: 1) negative or repressive, 2) tolerance or indifference (without major regulations), 3) 
support to build base organisations, 4) high social and economic support to the activity.  
3. Do you have a list of organisations and/or its members? How complete would you say these 
lists are? 
 
 
Interview Guide:  Local waste-Picker leaders 
 
Section 1: Entry and exit in informal economy 
 
1. How have you got involved in this activity? 
2. What were you doing before entering into this activity?  
3. Why have you undertaken this activity? 
4. How do you feel about this activity? Are you happy with the activity that you undertook? 
Why? 
5. Which are the main benefits and problems of this activity? 
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6. Would you quit your current activity if formal work was offered to you? Why?  
 
Section 2: Economic rationality 
 
1. How does your business work? 
2. What do you do in a normal working day? In a week? 
3. How do you get the products that you sell? Do you pay for them? How do you collect them? 
4. Where do you store your products? 
5. Do you classify your products? Do you process your products? Do you repair your products? 
Why? 
6. How do you transport the products that you collect? If you have a vehicle, how did you get the 
vehicle? E.g.  credit, saving, other? 
7. Who do you sell your products to?  
8. Do they pay the market price? Below? Above? Why do you sell products to them?  
9. Do you sell your own products?  Why?  
10. How do you determine the products that you collect and sell?  
11. Do you sell in small or large amounts? Why? 
12. Do you have any plan of expanding your business? Why? 
13. How important do you consider the collaboration of enterprises or households in the selection 
of material? Why? 
 
Section 3: Supportive policies 
 
1. How do you think you could improve your earnings? 
2. How do you think you could get better prices when selling products?  
3. How do you think you could collect higher quantities?  
4. How do you think you could process (add value to) your products? 
5. How do you think you could sell more or/and get higher prices? 
6. What do you think the municipality can do to help you improve your earnings or working con-
ditions? 
 
Section 4: Working conditions and negative externalities 
 
1. Do children work in the activity? What do they do? Why do you think this happens?  
2. If waste-pickers earned more, do you think that children would keep working? Why? 
3. What do you think could be done to reduce child work?  
4. Do you make contributions to the pension system? Why? 
5. Do you have access to health? What type? Why?  
6. What are the main accidents that you or your colleagues have suffered working in  this activi-
ty?  
7. How many hours do you work per day? How many days do you work per week? 
8. What factors determine the number of hours you work in a week?   
9. Do you take "annual leave" once a year? Why? If yes, how much time off do you take? 
10. Do you clean after collecting recycling materials from household garbage? Why? 
 
Section 5: Physical and human capital 
 
1. Do you use any tools or equipment in your work? Can you list them? 
2. Which are the most useful ones? Why?  
3. If you had extra money, what type of equipment would you buy? 
4. If you had 2 million to invest in your business, what would you do with this money? 
5. How many years have you been working in this activity? 
6. Compared with when you started, do you think you have learnt more efficient ways of per-
forming in your activity? Give examples. 
7. Have you received any formal training? Was it useful? Why?  
8. What are the main factors that affect your daily income?  
9. Over which factors (that affect your income) do you have control? 
10. Over which factors (that affect your income) do you have no control? 
    
Section 6: Informal organisation involvement 
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1. Do you belong to any  waste-picker organisation? which one/s? 
2. How is the composition of its committee board decided? Is it democratically elected? 
3. What is the role of the organisation towards its members? 
4. What is the role of the organisation towards local authorities? 
5. Do you feel that being involved in an organisation is useful to improve your income or working 
conditions? Why? 
   
Section 7: Relation with local public authorities 
 
1. What is your relationship with the local authorities? 
2. Which authority or department of the local council do you normally address your problems or 
suggestion to? 
3. Do you think that the local council supports, ignores or represses waste-pickers' activities? 
4. Which positive/negative actions related to waste-picking has the local council taken? 
5. How have these policies affected your business and/or working conditions? 
6. Do you have a positive or negative relationship with the police? How does it impact on your 
activity? 
7. Does the authority restrict the schedules of your work? 
8. In your opinion, what are the main concerns that the authority has regarding your activity? Are 
these justified? 
9. Do you think that there is a way to solve these problems? 
10. What is the authority's attitude to the proposed solutions?  
 
 
 
Interview Guide:  Municipal officers  
 
Section 1: Entry and exit in informal economy 
 
1.  In your opinion which is the profile of people working in waste-picking activities? 
2. In your opinion, what was their activity before becoming street vendor? 
3. Why do you think they have undertaken this activity? 
4. What do you think the future of the activity should be?  
5. Do you think they would accept a formal job if they were offered one? Why? 
6. Do you think waste-pickers make a positive or negative contribution to the quality of life in the 
municipality? And to local economy?  
 
Section 2: Economic rationality and link with formality 
 
1. In your opinion, how does the waste-picking business work? 
2. How do you think street vendors get the products or materials they sell in your municipality?  
3. Where do you think waste-pickers store their products before selling them? Does this cause 
any problem? 
4. Do you know if they process or repair the products that they sell? 
5. Do you know to whom they sell their product? 
6. Does the municipality intervene in/contribute to any step of this process?  
 
Section 3: Vision regarding waste-pickers 
 
1. Do you think waste-picking make a positive or negative contribution to the quality of life in the 
local borough? Why? 
2. What are the main contributions and problems of street vendors’ activities in your municipali-
ty? 
3. Do you think that waste-pickers make a significant contribution to recycling in your municipal-
ity? Why? 
4. Do you think that waste-pickers make a significant contribution to increasing the diversity of 
materials recycled in your municipality? Why? 
5. Do you think that waste-pickers’’ activities can provide a significant source of local employ-
ment? Why? 
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6. Do you think that waste-pickers’ activities can provide a decent source of employment? Why? 
7. What are the main problems caused by waste-pickers’ activities in your municipality? 
8. Do you have any problems with waste disposal? 
9. Do you think waste-pickers make an economic contribution to local industries? Why? 
10. Do you think waste-pickers make an economic contribution to local consumers? Why? 
 
Section 4: Informal organisation involvement 
 
1. Has the municipality got a relationship with any waste-picker organisation. Which one/s? 
2. In the recent period, have you had a conflictive or a collaborative relationship? 
3. What are the main requests from waste pickers?  
4. Do organisations provide support in addressing the concerns of waste-pickers or is it preferable 
for you if they work independently? Why?  
5. What are the main issues or problems that the municipality and the organisations are trying to 
solve now? 
6. Are you trying to coordinate or integrate waste-pickers into the formal municipal solid waste 
management system? How?   
7. How would it work? What would the main constraints be? 
 
Section 5: Economic policies towards waste pickers 
 
1. What is the approach of the municipality towards waste-pickers? 
2. Does the municipality have policies targeting waste-pickers? Which ones? 
3. Do you restrict waste-pickers' collection schedules? why? 
4. Do you confiscate the material collected by waste-pickers? 
5. Do you restrict the areas where material is collected or sold? Why? 
6. Do you have any other policy to restrict or regulate the waste-picking activity? 
7. Does the municipality support the activity in any form? How? 
8. Can waste-pickers access any funding opportunity through the municipality? Which ones? 
9. Have you provided any tool/equipment? Which ones? What is the expected impact? 
10. Have you provided or helped get any vehicle to transport products? What is the expected im-
pact of this policy? 
11. Have you provided any machinery, tools or infrastructure to help the processing of materials or 
storage? Which ones? What is the expected impact? 
12. Have waste-pickers attended any training provided by your municipality? Which ones? What 
was the expected impact of the training? 
13. Has the municipality helped to link waste-pickers with enterprises for selling recyclable mate-
rials?  
14. Has the municipality organised points of collection or/and sorting of recyclable materials at the 
household level? 
15. Has the municipality helped to link waste-pickers with enterprises for the collection of recycla-
ble materials?  
16. Has the municipality helped waste-pickers to improve access to existing buyers or access to 
new buyers? 
17. What is the policy of the inspectors and police towards waste-pickers? 
18. Do waste-pickers pay any municipal tax to work in the municipal areas? 
 
Section 6: Social policy 
 
1. Does the municipality provide any particular social policy towards waste-pickers? 
2. Do you think there are children working in this activity? Why do you think this happens?  
3. Do you provide childcare facilities? What are the opening and closing hours? Do they match 
waste pickers' working hours? 
4. Does the municipality provide training on health hazards associated with waste picking? Does 
it provide any equipment to reduce accidents? 
5. Does the municipality provide any access to health security and treatments? How? 
6. Does the municipality provide or facilitate access to pension in any form? Which one? 
7. Do you think waste-pickers work extensive hours? More or less than formal workers? Why? 
8. What do you think the municipality can do to regulate workday?  
9. In your opinion, which are the best policies to increase the quality of life of people involved in 
waste-picking activities?  
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Group discussion: Waste-pickers 
 
Section 1: Entry and exit in informal economy 
 
1. How have you got involved in this activity? 
2. What were you doing before undertaking this activity? 
3. How do you feel about this activity? Are you happy with the activity that you undertook? 
Why? 
4. Which are the main benefits and problems of this activity? 
5. Would you quit your current activity if formal work was offered to you? Why?  
 
Section 2: Economic rationality 
 
1. How does your business work? 
2. What do you do in a normal working day? In a week? 
3. How do you get the products that you sell? Do you pay for them?  
4. Where do you store your products? 
5. Do you process your products? Do you repair your products? Why? 
6. How do you transport the products that you collect? How did you get the vehicle?  
7. How do you choose the products that you collect and sell?  
8. Do you sell in small or large amounts? Why? 
9. Do you have any plan of expanding your business? Why? 
10. In your opinion, how important  the collaboration of enterprises or households in the selection 
of material is? Why? 
 
Section 3: Supportive policies 
 
1. How do you think you could improve your earnings? 
2. How do you think you could get higher prices when selling products?  
3. How do you think you could collect higher quantities?  
4. What do you think the municipality could do to help you improve your earnings or working 
conditions? 
 
Section 4: Working conditions and negative externalities? 
 
1. Do children work in the activity? What do they do? Why do you think this happens?  
2. If waste pickers earned more, do you think that children would keep working? Why? 
3. Do you make contributions to the pension system? Why? Do you have access to health? What 
type? Why?  
4. What are the main accidents that you or your colleagues have suffered working in this activity?  
5. Do you clean recycling material after collecting it from household garbage? Why? 
 
Section 5: Capital and Human Capital 
 
1. Do you use any tools or equipment in their work? Please itemise. 
2. Which are the most useful ones? Why?  
3. If you had 2 million to invest in your business what would you do with this money? 
4. How many years have you been working in this activity? 
5. Compared with when you started, do you think you have learnt more efficient ways of per-
forming in your activity? Give examples. 
6. Have you attended any formal training? Was it useful? Why?  
    
Section 6: Informal organisation involvement 
 
1. Do you belong to any waste-picker organisation. Which one/s? 
2. How is the composition of its committee board decided? Is it democratically elected? 
3. Do you feel that being involved in an organisation is useful to improve your income or work-
ing conditions? Why? 
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Section 7: Relation with local public authorities 
 
1. What is your relationship with the local authorities? 
2. Do you think that the local council supports, ignores or represses waste-pickers' activities? 
3. How have these policies affected your business and/or working conditions? 
4. Do you have a positive or negative relationship with the police? How does it impact on your 
activity? 
5. Does the authority restrict the schedules of your work? 
6. How the municipality have helped you in your activity (e.g. organisation, capital, credit and 
training) 
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ANNEX 11: TOPIC GUIDES WITH STREET VENDORS 
 
Interview Guide:  National street vendors leaders 
 
Section 1: Organization (nacional & local) 
 
1. How is your organisation structured? 
2. What are your organisation’s objectives? 
3. How many people or organisations do you represent? 
4. Are there other organisations that are not part or that are parallel to this organisation? Which? 
Why is this?  
5. How do the Street vendors organise themselves? Are they organised at the communal level? 
For the majority, only one part? 
6. Do you have a listing of all the street markets, organisations and/or its members? How 
complete do you think these listings are? 
7. How are the representatives of this organisation elected? How are decisions at the national and 
local level made? 
 
Section 2: Entry to and exit from the informal economy 
 
Entry and exit 
1. How did you get begging doing this kind of work? 
2. Why do you think the majority of the street vendors begin to engage in this activity? Are there 
any other reasons? 
3. Do you think being a street vendor is their primary economic or commercial activity? What is 
this occupation’s trajectory (economic backgrounds, presents, and futures)? 
4. Why do you think the street vendors still continue to do this kind of job? 
5. If there were more jobs in the formal sector, do you think that traders would stop doing this 
job? Why? 
6. If the formal sector offered higher incomes than those gained in the markets, do you think 
traders would change their jobs? Why? 
7. Under what conditions or what factors would lead street vendors to stop working in this 
business? 
8. Who works in these HBEs? Only the owner, or other family members, and/or other persons 
under contract? What factors determine who works (familiar/external)?  
 
Relation to the economy 
1. Do you think unemployment or other periods of national economic crisis affect this business? 
In what ways? Do they impact the number of street vendors ? 
2. Do you think there is a permanent number of traders and another one that is more fluctuating 
number of Street vendors?  
3. What factors determine the length of time (number of years) a trader stays in the business? 
 
Vision 
1. Which of the following adjectives describe best the reasons Street vendors do this activity and 
why?: 1) Unemployment in the formal sector, 2) lack of decent jobs, 3) microenterprises, 4) 
working under exploitative conditions or 5) by choice  
2. What are the main benefits of doing this kind of work? 
3. What are the main problems? 
 
Section 3: How does recycling work? 
 
Production 
1. What are the main rubrics on sale in the street markets in the metropolitan region? 
2. How or what determines what kind of product sells and what doesn’t sell? 
3. How do the traders get the products they sell? What factors determine where to buy / whom to 
buy from? 
4. Do they buy from small, medium, or large scale producers? 
5. Who are the providers of the products sold? Are they products of big companies? What 
percentage, approximately? 
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6. How do you get providers as well as their integrity and loyalty? 
7. What factors determine the buying price? How do you think you can negotiate a better buying 
price? 
8. Is the collaboration between neighbours or enterprises an important factor for the street 
vendors? Why? 
 
Distribution 
1. How are the products purchased transported from the point of sale to the site of storage, and 
from there to the street market? 
2. What kind of vehicle do you use? 
3. How does having a vehicle, or the type of vehicle, factor into the quantity sold or the amount 
income street vendors earn? 
 
Storage 
1. Where are the products for sale commonly stored? Are there any other places used? 
2. Are there traders that sell what they buy on the same day? How does this affect their income? 
3. Is the availability of a good place for storage a relevant factor in the Street vendors’ income or 
labour conditions? Why? 
4. Are there any street vendors that treat or process their products in any way before selling them? 
Are products prepared? Washed or cut? Packed? 
5. Would any machinery for storage or processing help improve the income or labour conditions 
of the street vendors? Would this also help improve hygiene of the products? Why? 
 
Sale 
1. What factors determine the localisation of the street markets? How are the stalls distributed? 
How is who sells what determined? 
2. Does the size or number of stalls negatively or positively affect the traders’ income and labour 
conditions? 
3. Is the location of the market a key factor for the Street vendors’ level of income? Why? What 
factors influence what is a good or bad street market location? 
4. Does the number of sellers selling the same product have a positive or negative effect on the 
sellers’ income? 
5. Are there locations that are more privileged than others inside the market? Does this have an 
impact in the Street vendors income? 
6. What is the infrastructure that is used to put on a market? Does the quality or quantity of the 
infrastructure have an impact on the traders’ income? In what way? What about labour 
conditions? In what way? 
7. What factors determine what products are sold in one place and not the other? Proximity? 
Price? 
8. How is the selling price for the products determined? Who fixes/determines it? How is the 
competition amongst traders regulated? 
9. How can you increase the price of products sold? 
10. Who do they sell to and what strategy do they use to maintain their clientele? 
11. Are products sold in small or large quantities? How is the price affected by quantity? 
12. Approximately, how many street markets does a street vendor work in? 
13. How many days and hours does a street market function in a particular location? Do the hours 
affect the price? And the days? How so? 
14. Does the presence of the supermarkets in terms of proximity affect the Street vendors’ income? 
Why? 
15. What factors determine the street vendors’ income? 
16. What other factors affect the street vendors’ labour conditions? 
 
Section 4: Economic realisation and public policy 
 
1. What initiatives are most successful in supporting street vendors in Chile? 
2. What other initiatives do you think can be implemented to support the street vendors? 
3. What are the Chilean municipalities that have a repressive, fiscal, or harmful attitude towards 
street vendors?  
4. Do the markets sell more or less expensive than the prices in the supermarkets? Why is this the 
case? 
5. Do municipal policies affect the street vendors’ income or prices of the products? In what way? 
6. What do street vendors need in order to maximise their productivity or income? 
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7. How do you think street vendors’ might get better prices for their products or sell more? 
8. Do you think the experience plays a role in improving the street vendors’ income or labour 
conditions? 
9. Are there training programs for the street vendors? What programs do you think are the most 
useful for the street vendors? 
 
Section 5: Social rationale and public policy 
 
1. Are there more women or men in this business? What are the reasons? 
2. Are there more or less non-Chileans in this sector than other sectors of the economy? 
3. What do you think the municipalities can do to improve the street vendors’ labour conditions? 
 
Section 6: Negative externalities and public policy 
 
1. What are the major conflicts that municipalities have with the street vendors? Do you think they 
are justified? 
2. Do you think that child labour is being used in this activity? Why does this happen? How do you 
think the situation can improve? 
3. Do you think that there a trash dispersal problem after the street markets leave their locality? 
How do you think this situation can improve? 
4. Do you think that street vendors have access to pensions? What do you think can be done to 
improve this situation? 
5. Do you think the street vendors can count on adequate infrastructure to carry on with their jobs? 
How does this affect the labour conditions (toilet access, exposure to sun, etc.)? How can this 
situation be improved? 
6. Do you think street markets can generate problems of congestion in the streets? Why? How can 
this situation be improved?  
7. Do you think having access to electricity or water would help to increase the selling price, the 
quantity or selling new kinds of products? And would it help to better labour conditions? How 
so? 
 
Section 7: Selection of four municipalities 
 
1. Which municipal departments liase most closely with street-vendors? 
2. What are the go to department or departments the street vendors, or which ones do the traders 
have more contact with? 
3. I need to choose 4 representative municipalities of policies or norms with an approximation of: 
1) negative or repressive, 2) tolerance or indifference (without major regulations), 3) support to 
build base organisations, 4) of high social and economic support to the activity.  
 
Interview Guide:  Local street vendors leaders 
 
Section 1: Entry and exit of informal economy 
 
1. How have you got involved in this activity? 
2. What were you doing before entering into this activity?  
3. Why have you undertaken this activity? 
4. How do you feel about this activity? Are you happy with the activity that you undertook? 
Why? 
5. Which are the main benefits and problems of this activity? 
6. Would you quit your current activity if formal work was offered to you? Why?  
 
Section 2: Economic rationality 
 
1. How does your business work? 
2. What do you do in a normal working day? In a week? 
3. How do you get the products that you sell? Do you pay for them? How do you collect them? 
4. Do you get them from large producers/distributors or from small producers? Why?  
5. Do you buy these products in association with other street vendors? Why? 
6. How do you transport your products? Why?  
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7. How did you get the vehicle? E.g. credit, saving, other? (If you have a vehicle) 
8. Do you think that having a better or bigger vehicle would impact on your income? Why? 
9. Where do you store your products? Do you lose products because of the lack of storage 
facilities? 
10. Do you think that having a better (e.g. larger or/and safer) storage facility would improve your 
income or working conditions? Why?  
11. Do you process or produce your products? Where do you make them? Do you use any 
equipment for this? 
12. Do you sell your own products?  Why?  
13. Who are your clients?  
14. How do you choose the products that you sell? Do you think that you sell the most profitable 
products? Why? 
15. How do you determine your selling prices? Which are the main considerations to determine 
your selling prices? 
16. Do you sell above/below or at the same price than supermarkets? Why?  
17. Do you employ anyone else in your business? What do they do? 
18. Does any other family member work in your business? Who? Do they receive any payment? 
19. Do you have any plans of expanding your business? Why? What restricts the expansion of your 
business? 
20. How does the competition with other street vendors affect your profits? 
21. How does the competition with formal business affect your profits? Who are your main 
competitors? 
22. Do you pay local or national taxes? Which ones? Why? 
23. Does the weather affect your business? Why? (Impact on the number of clients or damage to 
products) 
 
Section 3: Supportive policies 
 
1. How do you think you could improve your earnings? 
2. How do you think you could get better prices when selling products?  
3. How do you think you could sell more or/and get higher prices?  
4. Would you get higher profits by processing your products? Why? What prevents you from do-
ing so? 
5. Do you think that introducing water or electricity in your working place could improve the 
prices, quantities or type of products that you sell? How? Do you think this would improve 
your working conditions? 
6. Do you think that the provision of physical infrastructure, such as a market roof, could improve 
your working conditions or your earnings? Why? Which is the most crucial infrastructure that 
you need? 
7. Would you buy more equipments or products if you had access to a safe, secure and close stor-
age place? How would this improve your business? 
8. Do you think that having permission to work more days per week in the same place would im-
prove your earnings? Why? 
9. Do you prefer to work in a fix place or in different locations? Why? 
10. What do you think the municipality can do to help your business' growth? 
 
Section 4: Working conditions and negative externalities? 
 
1. Do children work in the activity? What do they do? Why do you think this happens?  
2. If street vendors earned more, do you think that children would keep working? Why? 
3. What do you think could be done to reduce child work?  
4. Do you make contributions to the pension system? Why? 
5. Do you have access to health? What type? Why?  
6. What are the main accidents that you or your colleagues have suffered working in  this 
activity?  
7. How many hours do you work per day? How many days do you work per week? 
8. What factors determine the number of hours you work in a week?   
9. Do you take "annual leave" once a year? Why? If yes, how much time off do you take? 
10. Do you clean after leaving the street market? Why? 
11. Where do you get water and electricity from? Where do you go to the toilet? 
12. In your opinion, which is the perception of the community living close to a street market? Posi-
tive or negative? Why?  
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Section 5:Physical and human capital 
 
1. Do you use any tools or equipment in your work? Can you list them? 
2. Which are the most useful ones? Why?  
3. If you had extra money, what type of equipment would you buy? 
4. If you had 2 million to invest in your business, what would you do with this money? 
5. How many years have you been working in this activity? 
6. Compared with when you started, do you think you have learnt more efficient ways of 
performing in your activity? Give examples. 
7. Have you received any formal training? Was it useful? Why?  
8. What are the main factors that affect your daily income?  
9. Over which factors (that affect your  income) do you have control? 
10. Over which factors (that affect your income) do you have no control? 
 
Section 6: Informal organisation involvement 
 
1. Do you belong to any  waste-picker organisation? which one/s? 
2. How is the composition of its committee board decided? Is it democratically elected? 
3. What is the role of the organisation towards its members? 
4. What is the role of the organisation towards local authorities? 
5. Do you feel that being involved in an organisation is useful to improve your income or working 
conditions? Why? 
 
Section 7: Relation with local public authorities 
 
1. What is your relationship with the local authorities? 
2. Which authority or department of the local council do you normally address your problems or 
suggestion to? 
3. Do you think that the local council supports, ignores or represses waste-pickers' activities? 
4. What are the main policies related to your business applied by the local authority? Please list 
them. 
5. How have these policies affected your business and/or working conditions? 
6. Do you have a positive or negative relationship with the police? How does it impact on your 
activity? 
7. Does the authority restrict the schedules of your work? 
8. In your opinion, what are the main concerns that the authority has regarding your activity? Are 
these justified? 
9. Do you think that there is a way to solve these problems? 
10. What is the authority's attitude to the proposed solutions?  
 
 
Interview Guide:  Municipal officers  
 
Section 1: Entry and exit of informal economy 
 
1. In your opinion, which is the profile of people working in street market activities? (Education, 
income, economic perspective 
2. In your opinion, what was their activity before becoming street vendor? 
3. Why do you think they have undertaken this activity? 
4. What do you think the future of the activity should be?  
5. Do you think they would accept a formal job if they were offered one? Why? 
6. Do you think street vendors make a positive or negative contribution to the quality of life in the 
municipality? And to local economy?  
 
Section 2: Economic rationality and link with formality 
 
1. How do you think the business of street vending works? 
2. How do you think street vendors get the products they sell in your municipality? From which 
sources (e.g. large retail, central distribution points, local providers)?  
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3. Where do you think street vendors store their products before selling them? Does this cause 
any problem? 
4. Do you know if they process their products before selling them? 
5. Do you know to whom they sell their product? 
6. Do you think they provide higher or lower quality products than formal retailers? Why? 
7. Do they provide higher or lower priced products than formal retailers? Why? 
 
Section 3: Vision towards street markets 
 
1. Do you think that street vending makes a positive or negative contribution to the quality of life 
in the local borough? Why? 
2.  What are the main contributions and problems of street vendors’ activities in your municipali-
ty? 
3. Do you think street vendors make a significant contribution to the affordability of goods and 
services in your municipality? Why? 
4. Do you think street markets increase the amount of fruits and vegetables consumed by citizens 
in your municipality? Why? 
5. Do you think street markets improve the urban image of your municipality and attract people 
from other parts of the city? Why? 
6. Do you think that the number of street vendors in your municipality is affected by the local un-
employment rate? 
7. Do you think that street vendors’ activities can provide a significant source of local employ-
ment? Why? 
8. Do you think that street vendors’ activities can provide a decent source of employment? Why? 
9. Do you think street vendors make an economic contribution to the local economy or do you 
think they harm it? Why? 
10. What are the main problems caused by street vendors’ activities in your municipality? 
11. Do you have problems related to disposing the waste of street vendors? 
12. Do you have problems related to hygiene or food poisoning from street vendors’ products? 
13. Compared to other formal businesses in your municipality (e.g. supermarket, industries, etc.), 
do you think that street vendors make a significant contribution to municipal budget? 
14. Do you think street vendors increase, decrease or have no impact on criminality in your munic-
ipality? 
15. Do you think street markets cause significant problems of congestion? Why? 
16. Overall, do you think street vendors make a positive or negative contribution to the economy 
and quality of life in the municipality? Why? 
 
Section 4: Informal organisation involvement 
 
1. Has the municipality got a relationship with any street vendor organisations. Which one/s? 
2. In the recent period, have you had a conflictive or a collaborative relationship? 
3. What are the main requests from street vendors?  
4. Do organisations provide support in addressing the concerns of street vendors or is it preferable 
for you if they work independently? Why?  
5. What are the main issues or problems that the municipality and the organisations are trying to 
solve now? 
6. Does the municipality help to create street vendor organisations? How? 
 
Section 5: Economic policies towards street markets 
 
1. Ask the participant what the approach of the municipality towards waste-pickers is. 
2. Does the municipality have policies targeting waste-pickers? Which ones? 
3. Do you define a yearly calendar, specific days and precise hours for opening and closure of 
street markets? Why?  
4. Do you restrict the size and areas of operation of street markets? How does it work? 
5. What is the policy of the inspectors and police towards street vendors? 
6. Does the municipality have local inspectors and/or police to control street vendors’ activity? 
What are they duties? 
7. Do they confiscate products? Why? 
8. Do you have any other policy to restrict or regulate the activity? 
9. Does the municipality support the activity in any form? How? 
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10. Can street vendors access any funding opportunity through the municipality? Which ones? 
11. Have you provided any tool/equipment? Which ones? What is the expected impact? 
12. Have you provided or helped get any vehicle to transport products? What is the expected im-
pact of this policy? 
13. Have you provided any infrastructure to help processing, storing or selling products? Which 
ones? What is the expected impact? 
14. Has the municipality provided or helped provide access to credits? 
15. Has the municipality helped link street vendors with enterprises for purchasing or selling prod-
ucts?  
16. Has the municipality advertised street markets in local newspapers or organised them in the 
public space? 
17. Do you have a system of waste collection targeting street markets? How does it work?  
18. Do street vendors pay a local tax to work in your municipality? How do you control payments? 
Which are the consequences if taxes are not paid? 
19.  Do you currently give new permits to street vendors? If yes, how are the new-comers distrib-
uted in the street markets? If not, why?  
 
Section 6: Social policy 
 
1. Does the municipality provide any particular social policy towards street vendors? 
2. Do you think there are children working in this activity? Why do you think this happens?  
3. Do you provide childcare facilities? What are the opening and closing hours? Do they match 
waste pickers' working hours? 
4. Does the municipality provide training on health hazards associated with street vending? Does 
it provide any equipment to reduce accidents? 
5. Does the municipality provide any access to health security and treatments? How? 
6. Does the municipality provide training on management and food conservation?  
7. Does the municipality provide or facilitate access to pension in any form? Which one? 
8. Do you think street vendors work extensive hours? More or less than formal workers? Why? 
9. What do you think the municipality can do to regulate workday?  
10. Does the municipality provide access to toilets, electricity or drinkable water? 
11. In your opinion, which are the best policies to increase the quality of life of people involved in 
street vending activities?  
 
 
Group discussion: Street vendors (feriantes) 
 
Section 1: Entry and exit of informal economy 
 
1. How have you got involved in this activity? 
2. What were you doing before undertaking this activity? 
3. How do you feel about this activity? Are you happy with the activity that you undertook? 
Why? 
4. Which are the main benefits and problems of this activity? 
5. Would you quit your current activity if formal work was offered to you? Why?  
 
Section 2: Economic rationality 
 
1. How does your business work? 
2. What do you do in a normal working day? In a week? 
3. Do you get them from large producers or small producers? Why? 
4. Who do you sell your products to? Local clients? Why? 
5. Who are your main competitors? E.g. retailers, coleros, los cachureros? Why? 
6. Do you sell above/below or at the same price than supermarkets or other competitors? Why?  
7. How do you set the prices of your products?  How do you decide what to sell? 
8. Which are the main salaried people working in street markets?  
9. What are the main constraints to the expansion of  your business? 
10. Does the weather affect your business? Why? (Impact in the number of clients or damage to 
products) 
 
Section 3: Supportive policies 
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1. How do you think you could improve your earnings? 
2. How do you think you could get higher prices when purchasing products?  
3. How do you think you could get better prices when selling products?  
4. Would you obtain higher profits by processing your products? Why? What prevents you to do 
so? 
5. Which do you think would be the impact of having water or electricity in your working place? 
could improve prices, type of products that you sell, working conditions? 
6. Do you think that the provision of physical infrastructure, such as a market roof, could improve 
your working conditions or your earnings? Why? Which is the most crucial infrastructure that 
you need? 
7. Do you think that working more days per week in the same place would improve your earn-
ings? Why? 
8. Do you prefer to work in a fix place or in different locations? Why? 
9. What do you think the municipality can do to help your business' growth? 
 
 
Section 4: Working conditions and negative externalities? 
 
1. Do children work in the activity? What do they do? Why do you think this happens?  
2. If street vendors earned more, do you think that children would keep working? Why? 
3. Do you make contributions to the pension system? Why? Do you have access to health? What 
type? Why?  
4. What are the main accidents that you or your colleagues have suffered working in this activity?  
5. How many hours do you work per day? How many days do you work per week? 
6. Do you have toilet facilities? Where? 
7. Do you and your colleagues clean the street after leaving the market? Why? 
8. In your opinion, which is the perception of the community living close to the street market? 
Positive or negative? Why?  
 
Section 5: Physical and human capital 
 
1. Do you use any tools or equipment in your work? Please itemise. 
2. If you had 2 million to invest in your business, what would you do with this money 
3. Compared with when you started, do you think you have learnt more efficient ways of per-
forming in your activity? Give examples. 
4. Have you received any formal training? Was it useful? Why?  
 
Section 6: Informal organisation involvement 
 
1. Do you belong to any street vendor organisation? which one/s? 
2. How are the committee board defined? Is it democratically elected? 
3. Do you feel that being involved in an organisation is useful to improve your income or work-
ing conditions? Why? 
 
Section 7: Relation with local public authorities 
 
1. What is your relationship with the local authorities? 
2. Which authority or department of the local council do you normally address your problems or 
suggestion to? 
3. Do you think that the local council supports, ignores or represses waste-pickers' activities? 
4. Which positive/negative actions related to street vendors has the local council taken? Can you 
list them? 
5. How have these policies affected your business and/or working conditions? 
6. Do you have a positive or negative relationship with the police? How does it impact on your 
activity? 
7. Does the authority restrict the schedules of your work? 
8. In your opinion, what are the main concerns that the authority has regarding your activity? Are 
these justified? 
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ANNEX 12: TOPIC GUIDES WITH HOME-BASED ENTERPRISES 
 
Interview Guide:  National home-based enterprises (HBEs) leaders 
 
Section 1: organisation (national & local) 
 
1. How is your organisation structured? 
2. What are your organisation’s objectives? 
3. How many people or organisations do you represent? How many HBEs? 
4. Are there other organisations that are not part or that are parallel to this organisation? Which? 
Why is this?  
5. How do the HBEs organise themselves? Are they organised at the communal level? For the 
majority, only one part? 
6. Do you have a listing of all the HBEs, organisations and/or its members? How complete do 
you think these listings are? 
7. How are the representatives of this organisation elected? How are decisions at the national and 
local level made? 
 
Section 2: Entry to and exit from the informal economy 
 
Entry and exit 
1. How did you get involved with this kind of work? 
2. Why do you think the majority of the HBEs begin to engage in this activity? Are there any 
other reasons? 
3. Do you think being a HBE is their primary economic or commercial activity? What is this 
occupation’s trajectory (economic backgrounds, presents, and futures)? 
4. What is the potential for expansion of these HBEs? What impedes their growth? 
5. Why do you think HBEs continue to doing this kind of job? 
6. If there were more jobs in the formal sector, do you think that people in HBEs would stop 
doing this job? Why? 
7. If the formal sector offered higher incomes than those gained in the HBEs, do you think micro-
entrepreneurs would change their jobs? Why? 
8. Under what conditions or what factors would lead HBEs to stop working in this business? 
9. Who works in these microenterprises? Only the owner, or other family members, and/or other 
persons under contract? What factors determine who works (familiar/external)?  
 
Relation to the economy 
1. Do you think unemployment or other periods of national economic crisis affect this business? 
In what ways? Do they impact the number of HBEs? 
2. Do you think there is a permanent number of HBEs and another one that is more fluctuating 
number of HBEs?  
3. What factors determine the length of time (number of years) a HBE stays in the business? 
 
Vision 
1. Which of the following adjectives describe best the reasons HBEs do this activity and why?: 1) 
Unemployment in the formal sector, 2) lack of decent jobs, 3) micro-entrepreneurship, 4) 
working under exploitative conditions or 5) by choice  
2. Which of the four adjectives describe microenterprises that stay in business for a period of five 
or more years? Why? 
3. What are the main benefits of doing this kind of work? 
4. What are the main problems? 
 
Section 3: How does this HBE work? 
 
Production 
1. What are the main products on sale in the HBEs in Chile? And in the Metropolitan region? 
2. In the case of HBEs that are dedicated to production, how do the HBEs determine what type of 
products they produce and which ones they do not? In the case of HBEs that focus on the sale 
of processed foods, what determines which products are sold and which ones are not? 
380 
 
3. How do HBEs get the products they sell? What factors determine where to buy / whom to buy 
from? What factors determine how much they buy? 
4. Do you buy from small, medium, or large scale producers? 
5. Who are the providers of the products or input sold? Are they products from big brand or big 
corporations or just smaller ones? What percentage, approximately? 
6. Through what networks are providers secured? 
7. What factors determine the buying price? How do you think you can negotiate a better buying 
price? 
8. Is the collaboration between neighbours or enterprises an important factor for HBEs? Why? 
9. Are there associations that allow the HBEs to get better prices or buy in higher volumes? 
10. What might reduce the selling prices? 
 
Distribution 
1. How are the products purchased transported from the point of sale to the site of storage? How 
are they transported to the point of sale? 
2. What kind of vehicle do you use? Are they property of the HBE? 
3. How does having a vehicle or the type of vehicle, factor into the cost, quantity sold or the 
amount income HBEs earn? 
4. Does the type of vehicle impact the selling price? 
5. In the case of HBEs that manufacture, how do they determine their networks of distribution 
and sale? Whom do they sell directly to? 
6. Who puts in purchase orders? Where the products that they produce finally are sold? 
7. What approximate percentage of the final sale price do HBEs receive? 
 
Storage 
1. Where do HBEs commonly store the products for sale? Are there any other places used? 
2. Is the size of the home a limiting factor for expansion? 
3. Is the availability of a good place for storage a relevant factor of the HBE’s income, labour 
conditions, or quality of life? Why? 
4. Are there HBEs of any kind that treat or process their products before selling them? Are they 
processed? Washed or cut? Packed? 
5. Would any machinery for storage or processing help improve the income or labour conditions 
of the HBEs? Would this also help improve hygiene of the products? Why? 
 
Sale 
1. Who are the major competitors of HBEs? 
2. What are the major problems HBEs face if they want to expand? If they were able to store or 
produce more, do you think they would be able to sell more? 
3. What factors determine the localisation of the HBEs? How are the locales distributed? How is 
who sells what determined in relation to their locality? 
4. Does the size or number of HBEs negatively or positively affect their income and labour 
conditions? 
5. Is the location of the HBE a key factor for the microenterprises’ level of income? Why? What 
factors influence what is a good or bad location? 
6. Does the number of sellers selling the same product in the same vicinity have a positive or 
negative effect on the HBEs’ income? What about manufacturers? And in the sale of product? 
Why? 
7. What is the infrastructure that is used to put on a HBE? Does the quality or quantity of the 
infrastructure have an impact on the HBEs’ income? In what way? What about labour 
conditions? In what way? 
8. What are the regulations that HBEs must be met in order to sell or produce? What percentage of 
HBEs comply with these prerequisites? 
9. How is the price for the products determined? What about in the case of manufacturers? And in 
the case of retail HBEs? 
10. Do you think HBEs sell more smaller or larger quantities? To larger enterprises or smaller 
enterprises? 
11. How is the competition regulated? Is it a competition to the lowest price? 
12. How can they increase their prices or volume of sale of their products? 
13. How many days and hours does a HBEs function? 
14. Does the presence of the supermarkets in terms of proximity affect the HBEs’ income? Why? 
15. What factors determine the HBEs’ income? 
16. What other factors affect the HBEs labour conditions? 
381 
 
17. How can municipalities help HBEs grow? 
 
Section 4: Economic realisation and public policy 
 
1. What initiatives are most successful in supporting HBEs in Chile? 
2. In what ways have these initiatives been particularly helpful? And how does this help 
contribute to support the business (income, labour conditions, pension access, health, etc.) 
3. What other initiatives do you think can be implemented to support HBEs?  
4. Do HBEs have access to any type of credit? Which? Do you think this had had a positive or 
negative impact in this business? Why?  
5. Are interest rates way too high? Are there alternative financing options? 
6. Do they have access to government programs o any type of municipal program that can help 
them gain access to capital or financing? Which programs, examples? Are they effective Why? 
7. What are the Chilean municipalities that have a repressive, fiscal, or harmful attitude towards 
recyclers? 
8. What are the policies or regulations that have been implemented? How have they impacted the 
business? 
9. Do the HBEs sell higher or lower than the price of the supermarkets or larger stores? Why do 
you think this is? 
10. Do you think municipal policy affects the HBEs’ income, quantity sold, or prices of the 
materials? In what way? 
11. Do you think being organised in cooperatives or social organisations can affect HBEs’ incomes 
or productivity? In what way? 
12. What should a HBE count on to reach their maximum potential in terms of productivity and 
income? Describe how this business should function ideally. 
13. How do you think that HBEs can get better prices for their products, or sell in higher quantity? 
14. How do you think HBEs can increase added value to their product or sell products that 
generate more profit? 
15. How do you think HBEs can augment their network of distribution or market? 
16. Do you think the experience or years under the rubric of a HBE plays an important role in in 
improving their income or labour conditions? In what ways? 
17. Are there training programs for HBEs? Which ones? What do they consist of? Which ones do 
you think are training programs that are useful to the HBEs? What would you change? 
18. In what can the lack of infrastructure affect the income or quantities sold? 
19. Are there any other policies, regulations, or other factors that influence the HBEs’ income? 
 
Section 5: Social rationale and public policy 
 
1. Do you think HBEs contribute to people’s purchasing power? In what way? 
2. Do HBEs help to provide access to products to remote areas or areas with little to no services? 
In what way? 
3. What about employment generation? In what way? What quality of employment? 
4. What is the most common type of support that HBEs receive from municipalities? Are the 
other less common types? 
5. What is the range of incomes that HBEs gain?  
6. What is level of education of most people in HBEs? 
7. Are there more male or female working in HBEs? Why is this? 
8. Are there non-Chilean managing HBEs? Are they more than other sectors of the economy? 
9. Do you think women or migrants make less money than their male counterparts? Why? 
10. Do you think HBEs that are organised get more or have better labour conditions than those that 
are not organised? Why? 
11. Do you think that municipalities or the government can reduce income inequalities in the inner 
workings of the HBE? Why? 
12. Do you think municipalities can do a better job in terms of improving incomes or labour 
conditions of the HBEs? 
 
Section 6: Negative externalities and public policy 
 
1. What are the major conflicts that municipalities have with the HBEs? Do you think they are 
justified? 
2. What are the major conflicts neighbours have with HBEs? 
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3. Do HBEs pay taxes? National, or local? 
4. Do you think that child labour is being used in this activity? What jobs do they do? Why does 
this happen? What about work by family members that is unpaid? 
5. What are the labour conditions in which non-family workers work? …, Pensions, contracts, 
cash payments? 
6. How can this situation be improved? 
7. What are they kinds of norms or taxes that are least complied or paid, or the ones that are most 
difficult to comply with for HBEs? 
8. What kinds of accidents are people in HBEs exposed to in terms of fires, falls, etc.? Are they 
frequent? 
9. How can these accidents be reduced? 
10. Do you think people in HBEs have access to pension? And their workers (non-family)? What 
are the main reasons for this? What can be done to improve this situation? 
11. What is the owners HBEs’ level of access to healthcare? And their (non-family) workers? Do 
you think it’s enough? Why? What can be done to improve this situation? 
12. Do you think people in HBEs have a lengthy labour journey? How many days a week and 
hours a week do they work? What can be done to improve this situation? 
13. Do you think HBEs count on adequate conditions of infrastructure to conduct their business? 
How does this affect labour conditions (access to toilet, exposure to sun, pollution, etc.)? What 
can be done to improve this situation? 
14. Do you think HBEs are a nuisance to their neighbours? What can be done to improve this 
situation? 
15. Do you think some HBEs generate problems in terms of noise pollution, pollution or produce 
large amounts of trash (toxic and non-toxic)?  
16. Do you think HBEs use toxic materials? Which ones are they? 
17. What is the level of compliance with planning rules and norms? Land use, pollution activities, 
irregular expansions? What is the main impediment in complying with these prerequisites? 
18. Is the security in terms of crime or accidents a theme that affects HBEs? How and to what 
extent? How are these situations resolved? 
19. Why do you think there is a general separation between how HBEs split their use of spaces for 
business and for domestic life? Do you think this affects their quality of life? In what way? 
 
Section 7: Selection of four municipalities 
 
1. In general, do you think HBEs are supported by the municipalities? 
2. Which municipal departments liase most closely with HBEs? 
3. I need to choose 4 representative municipalities of policies or norms with an approximation of: 
1) negative or repressive, 2) tolerance or indifference (without major regulations), 3) support to 
build base organisations, 4) high social and economic support to the activity. 
 
 
Interview Guide:  Local home-based enterprises leaders 
 
Section 1: Entry and exit of informal economy 
 
1. How have you got involved in this activity? 
2. What were you doing before entering into this activity?  
3. Why have you undertaken this activity? 
4. How do you feel about this activity? Are you happy with the activity that you undertook? 
Why? 
5. Which are the main benefits and problems of this activity? 
6. Which are the most relevant problems of this activity? 
7. Would you quit your current activity if formal work was offered to you? Why? 
 
Section 2: Economic rationality 
 
1. How does your business work? 
2. What do you do in a normal working day? In a week? 
3. How do you get the products that you sell?  Where do you buy them? Why? 
4. Do you buy inputs in association with other enterprises? Why? 
5. Where do you store your products? Do you lose products due to poor storage conditions? 
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6. Do you think that a better or larger storage facility would improve your income? Why?  
7. Do you process your products? Do you repair your products? 
8. Do you get them from large or small producers? Why? 
9. How do you transport your products to your home and then to your clients? Why 
10. How did you get the vehicle? E.g. credit, saving, other?  (If you have  a vehicle) 
11. Who do you sell your products to? Do you sell in small or large amounts? Why? 
12. How do you get access to these clients? 
13. Do you sell your own products?  Why?  
14. Do you have any plan of expanding your business? Why? 
15. Who are your main competitors? 
16. Do you sell above/below or at the same price than supermarkets or other competitors? Why?  
17. How does the competition in the neighbourhood affect your profits? 
18. How do you set the prices of your products?  Which are the main considerations that you take 
into account? 
19. What are the factors that impact the most on the profits of your business? Credit payments? 
20. How many people work in your HBE? Why?  
21. Does any family member help you to run your business? Who? Do you pay him? Why? 
22. How do you think you could expand or better develop your business? 
23. What do you take into account to select the products that you sell? 
24. Do you pay local taxes? Why? 
25. What are the main constraints to the expansion of  your business? 
 
Section 3: Supporting polices 
 
1. How do you think you could improve your earnings? 
2. How do you think you could get better prices when purchasing products or inputs? 
3. How do you think you could get better prices when selling products?   
4. In your opinion, how could you increase your production?  
5. If you were able to produce more, do you think you would be able to sell more?  Why? 
6. How do you think you could sell higher quantities? 
7. Do you have problems with the stability or continuity of electricity in your business?  
8. Which are the main constrains for expanding your business? 
9. In your opinion, what can the municipality do to help you improve your business' growth 
and/or working conditions? 
10. Have you received any support from the municipality (e.g. training, credit and capital)? How 
has this impacted on your business? 
 
Section 4: Working conditions and negative externalities 
 
1. Do children work in the HBEs? What do they do? Why do you think this happens?  
2. If people in HBEs earned more, do you think that children would keep working? Why? 
3. What do you think could be done to reduce child work?  
4. Do you make contributions to the pension system? Why? 
5. Do you have access to health? What type? Why?  
6. What are the main accidents that you or your colleagues have suffered working in this activity?  
7. How many hours do you work per day? How many days do you work per week? 
8. Has your business been victim of crime? How often has this happened? 
9. Do you have a separate space for your business and your home? 
10. Excluding the space for your business, do you think you have enough living space in your 
house? Why?  
11. Do you use any toxic material in your production? Does your activity produce any disturbing 
noise? Have your neighbours complained about this? Have you found any solution to this prob-
lem? 
12. Does your business produce significant waste?  
13. Do you think the community living close to you or your business has a positive or negative 
perception of your business? Why 
14. What factors determine the number of hours that you work per week?   
15. Do you take "annual leave" once a year? Why? If yes, how much time off do you take? 
 
Section 5: Physical and human capital 
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1. Do you use any tools or equipment in your work? Can you list them? 
2. Which are the most useful ones? Why?  
3. If you had extra money, what type of equipment would you buy? 
4. If you had 2 million to invest in your business, what would you do with this money? 
5. How many years have you been working in this activity? 
6. Compared with when you started, do you think you have learnt more efficient ways of 
performing in your activity? Give examples. 
7. Have you received any formal training? Was it useful? Why?  
8. What type of infrastructure do you have for storing, producing or selling your products?  
9. What are the main factors that affect your daily income?  
10. Have your profits increased or decreased over time? How do you explain this? 
11. Over which factors (that affect your income) do you have control? 
12. Over which factors (that affect your income) do you have no control? 
 
Section 6: Informal organisation involvement 
 
1. Do you belong to any  HBEs organisation? which one/s? 
2. How is the composition of its committee board decided? Is it democratically elected? 
3. What is the role of the organisation towards its members? 
4. What is the role of the organisation towards local authorities? 
5. Do you feel that being involved in an organisation is useful to improve your income or work-
ing conditions? Why? 
 
Section 7: Relation with local public authorities 
 
1. What is your relationship with the local authorities? 
2. Which authority or department of the local council do you normally address your problems or 
suggestion to? 
3. Do you think that the local council supports, ignores or represses waste-pickers' activities? 
4. How have these policies affected your business and/or working conditions? 
5. Do you have a positive or negative relationship with the police? How does it impact on your 
activity? 
6. Does the authority restrict the schedules of your work? 
7. In your opinion, what are the main concerns that the authority has regarding your activity? Are 
these justified? 
8. Do you think that there is a way to solve these problems? 
9. What is the authority's attitude to the proposed solutions?  
10. Which municipal policies are the most valuable to your business and working conditions? 
 
 
Interview Guide:  Municipal officers  
 
Section 1: Entry and exit of informal economy 
 
1. In your opinion, which is the profile of people working in HBEs? (Education, income, econom-
ic perspective) 
2. In your opinion, what was their activity before becoming street vendor? 
3. Why do you think they have undertaken this activity? 
4. What do you think the future of the activity should be?  
5. Do you think they would accept a formal job if they were offered one? Why? 
6. Do you HBEs make a positive or negative contribution to the quality of life in the municipali-
ty? And to local economy?  
 
Section 2: Economic rationality and link with formality 
 
1. How do you think the business of HBEs work? 
2. How do you think HBEs get the products they sell in your municipality? From which sources 
(e.g. large retail, central distribution points, local providers)?  
3. Where do you think street vendors store their products before selling them? Does this cause 
any problem? 
4. Do you think they have low or high economic return? Why? 
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5. Do you know to whom they sell the products? Local residents, local enterprises, large enter-
prises? Why? 
6. Does the municipality intervene in/contribute to any step of this process?  
 
Section 3: Vision regarding HBEs  
 
1. Do you think that HBEs make a positive or negative contribution to the quality of life in the 
local borough? Why? 
2. What are the main problems caused by HBEs in your municipality? 
3. Do you think HBEs make a significant contribution to the  availability and affordability of 
goods and services in your municipality? Why? 
4. Do you think HBEs have a positive impact on the local economy? Why? 
5. Do you think the number of HBEs in your municipality is affected by unemployment? How? 
Increasing or decreasing? 
6. Do you think that HBEs can provide a significant source of local employment? Why? 
7. Do you think that HBEs can provide a decent source of employment? Why? 
8. Compared to other formal businesses in your municipality (e.g. supermarket, industries, etc.), 
do you think that HBEs make a significant contribution to municipal budget? 
9. Do you think home-based enterprises significantly increase the local production of waste? 
10. Do you think that HBEs have an impact on the living space of a household? 
11. Overall, do you think HBEs make a positive or negative contribution to the economy and 
quality of life in the municipality? Why? 
 
Section 4: Informal organisation involvement 
 
1. Has the municipality got a relationship with any street vendor organisations. Which one/s? 
2. In the recent period, have you had a conflictive or a collaborative relationship? 
3. What are the main requests from HBEs?  
4. Do organisations provide support in addressing the concerns of street vendors or is it preferable 
for you if they work independently? Why?  
5. What are the main issues or problems that the municipality and the organisation are trying to 
solve now? 
6. Does the municipality help to create HBEs organisations? How? 
 
Section 5: Economic policies towards HBEs 
 
1. What is the approach of the municipality towards HBEs? 
2. Does the municipality have polices targeting HBEs? Which ones? 
3. Do you restrict schedules or forbid days for them to work? Why? 
4. Do you restrict the areas where HBE can operate? Why? 
5. Does the municipality have inspectors that control home-based enterprises? What do they do? 
6. Do you restrict the release of HBE permits?  
7. Do you have any forbidden activities? Which ones?  
8. Do you have any other policy to restrict or regulate the activity? 
9. Does the municipality support the activity in any form? How? 
10. In the last four years, do you think that the number of home-based enterprises in your munici-
pality has increased or decreased? Why do you think this happened? 
11. Can HBEs access any funding opportunity through the municipality? Which ones? 
12. Have you provided any tool/equipment? Which ones? What is the expected impact? 
13. Have you provided or helped get any vehicle to transport products? What is the expected im-
pact of this policy? 
14. Have you provided any machinery, tools or infrastructure to help the processing of materials or 
storage? Which ones? What is the expected impact? 
15. Have owners of home-based enterprises attended any training provided by your municipality? 
Which one? What was the expected impact of the training? 
16. Has the municipality helped to link HBEs with enterprises for selling products or buying mate-
rials?  
17. Does the municipality charge any extra fees for waste collection to some home-based enter-
prises? 
18. Has the municipality provided or helped provide access to credits? 
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19. Do HBEs pay a local tax to work in your municipality? How do you control payments? Which 
are the consequences if taxes are not paid? 
20. Is the municipality currently giving new permits to HBEs to operate? Why?,  
21. Other programmes that home-based enterprises can access in your municipality? 
 
Section 6: Social policy 
 
1. Does the municipality provide any particular social policy towards HBEs? 
2. Do you think there are children working in this activity? Why do you think this happens?  
3. Do you provide childcare facilities? What are the opening and closing hours? Do they match 
waste pickers' working hours? 
4. Does the municipality provide training on health hazards associated with street vending? Does 
it provide any equipment to reduce accidents? 
5. Does the municipality provide any access to health security and treatments? How? 
6. Does the municipality provide or facilitate access to pension in any form? Which one? 
7. Do you think HBEs work extensive hours? More or less than formal workers? Why? 
8. What do you think the municipality can do to regulate workday?  
9. In your opinion, which are the best policies to increase the quality of life of people in HBEs?  
 
 
Group discussion: Home-based enterprises 
 
Section 1: Entry and exit of informal economy 
 
1. How have you got involved in this activity? 
2. What were you doing before undertaking this activity? 
3. How do you feel about this activity? Are you happy with the activity that you undertook? 
Why? 
4. Which are the main benefits and problems of this activity?  
5. Would you quit your current activity if formal work was offered to you? Why 
 
 
Section 2: Economic rationality 
 
1. How does your business work? 
2. What do you do in a normal working day? In a week? 
3. How do you get the products that you sell? Where do you buy them? Why? 
4. Where do you store your products? Do you lose products due to poor storage conditions? 
5. Do you process your products? Do you repair your products? Why? 
6. Do you get them from large or small producers? Why? 
7. How do you transport your products to your home and then to your clients? Why 
8. Who do you sell your products to? Do you sell in small or large amounts? Why? 
9. Who are your main competitors? 
10. Do you sell above/below or at the same price than supermarkets or other competitors? Why?  
11. How do you set the prices of your products?  Which are the main considerations that you take 
into account? 
12. How many people work in your HBE?  Why?  
13. What do you take into account when selecting the products that you sell? 
14. What are the main constraints to the expansion of your business? 
 
Section 3: Supporting polices 
 
1. How do you think you could improve your earnings? 
2. How do you think you could get higher prices when purchasing inputs/selling products?  
3. In your opinion, how could you produce more?  
4. If you were able to produce more, do you think you would be able to sell more?  Why? 
5. Do you have problems with the stability or continuity of electricity in your business?  
6. Have you received any support from the municipality (e.g. training, credit and capital)? How 
has this impacted your business? 
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7. What do you think the municipality could do to help you improve your earnings or working 
conditions? 
 
Section 4: Working conditions and negative externalities 
 
1. Do you think that children work in HBE in general? What do they do? Why do you think this 
happens?  
2. Do you make contributions to the pension system? Why? 
3. Do you have access to health? What type? Why?  
4. What are the main accidents that you or your colleagues have suffered working in this activity?  
5. Has your business been victim of crime? How often has this happened? 
6. Do you have separate spaces for your business and your home? 
7. Excluding the space for your business, do you think you have enough living space in your 
house? Why?  
8. Do you use any toxic material in your production? Does your activity produce any disturbing 
noise? Have your neighbours complained about this? 
9. Do you think the community living close to you or your business has a positive or negative 
perception of your business? Why?   
 
Section 5: Physical and human capital 
 
1. Do you use any tools or equipment in their work? Please itemise. 
2. If you had 2 million to invest in your business what would you do with this money? 
3. How many years have you been working in this activity? 
4. Compared with when you started, do you think you have learnt more efficient ways of 
performing in your activity? Give examples. 
5. Have you attended any formal training? Was it useful? Why?  
6. Have your profits increased or decreased over time? How do you explain this? 
 
Section 6: Relation with local public authorities 
 
1. Which authority or department of the local council do you normally address your problems or 
suggestion to? 
2. Do you think that the local council supports, ignores or represses HBEs activities? 
3. Which positive/negative actions related to your business has the local council taken? Please list 
them. 
4. Do you have a positive or negative relationship with the police? How does it impact on your 
activity? 
5. Does the authority restrict the schedules or days of your work? 
6. In your opinion, what are the main concerns that the authority has regarding your activity? Are 
these justified? 
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ANNEX 13: QUESTIONNAIRE WASTE-PICKERS 
 
This annex provides the Spanish version of the waste-pickers  questionnaire survey in Santiago 
de Chile.  
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ANNEX 14: QUESTIONNAIRE STREET VENDORS 
This annex provides the Spanish version of the street vendors  questionnaire survey in Santiago 
de Chile. 
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ANNEX 15: QUESTIONNAIRE HOME-BASED ENTERPRISES 
This annex provides the Spanish version of the Home-Based enterprises’  questionnaire survey 
in Santiago de Chile.  
 
  
405 
 
 
406 
 
 
407 
 
 
408 
 
 
409 
 
 
410 
 
 
411 
 
 
412 
 
 
413 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
414 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 16: CODE BOOKS 
This annex provides a sample of the codebook used code interviews with waste-pickers. 
As for the previous annex complete examples for codebooks with HBEs and street vendors can 
be requested from the author.  
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